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Partner, Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., Fort Myers/Naples, Florida. B.A. cum laude,
University of Pittsburgh, 1981; J.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1984. Mr. Adams concentrates
his legal practice on the law of community associations. Since 1992 he has served as a
delegate to the Community Associations Institute/Florida Legislative Alliance, currently
serving as its Chair, and has been actively involved in community association legislation and
administrative rulemaking. He is a member of the College of the Community Association of
Lawyers, based upon published writings, teaching, and speaking engagements in the field of
community association law. He is the author of a newspaper column called "Community
Life," which has appeared weekly in the Real Estate Section of the Fort Myers News-Press
since 1996. Mr. Adams has lectured at the University of Miami's annual Condominium and
Cluster Housing Seminar. Mr. Adams also wishes to thank his Associate, Michael E.
Chapnick, for his assistance in compiling the materials in this survey.
1. The reference to "community associations" means any mandatory membership
corporation tied to the ownership of real property, which corporation has a right of lien for the
collection of assessments. See FLA. STAT. § 468.431(1) (2001). The most common forms of
community associations are condominium associations, cooperative associations, and
homeowners' associations. This survey covers 2001 Florida legislation and.appellate court
cases from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001. Condominium related arbitration decisions,
Declaratory Statements, and Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile
Home rules should also be examined by readers for a comprehensive review of legal
authorities affecting Florida community associations for the period covered by this survey.
Further, this survey does not cover issues involving timeshare developments, nor mobile home
parks.
*
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I. LEGISLATION

A. Condominiums
The most notable aspect of condominium legislation considered by the
2001 Florida Legislature was the bills that were not passed out of the
session. Indeed, the only bill involving chapter 718 that was ultimately
approved was a reviser's bill.2 Among the potentially significant bills that
did not pass, including a couple that died on the calendar in the waning
moments of the session, were the following: 1) proposed amendments to
chapter 718 dealing with a variety of operational issues, including the ability
to amend condominium declarations to restrict rental rights, 3 the ability to
amend documents regarding alterations of common elements,4 amendments
regarding the transfer of limited common element rights, 5 and miscellaneous
other operational provisions; 6 2) reorganization of the Department of
Business and Professional Regulation, including the elimination of
condominium arbitration; 7 3) a proposal to substantially limit the scope of
warranty rights enjoyed by condominium unit owners and their associations
regarding construction deficiencies; 8 and 4) a proposed amendment to
eliminate the contention 9 that documentary 10stamps be paid on a community
association's foreclosure of its lien interests.

2.
H.R. 667, 2001 Leg., (Fla. 2001). H.R. 667 corrects numerous perceived
typographical and citation errors in various sections of the FloridaStatutes, including several
amendments to chapter 718. This bill was approved by the Governor on May 25, 2001, 200164 Fla. Laws, effective July 3, 2001.
3.
See Woodside Village Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Jahren, 754 So. 2d 831, 833 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
4.
See Wellington Prop. Mgmt. v. "Parc Corniche Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 755 So. 2d
824, 825 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
5.
See Brown v. Rice, 716 So. 2d 807, 808 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); 2000-302,

§ 50 Fla. Laws.
6.
H.R. 1907, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted). Also treated at H.B.
207; S.B. 348 and S.B. 2210.
7.
H.R. 1923, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted).
8.
S. 1742, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted).
9.
See State v. 100 La Peninsula Condo. Ass'n, Inc., Case No. 99-6646, Leon
County, Florida (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
10. H.R. 1835, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted).
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B. Cooperatives

To the knowledge of the author, no bills affecting cooperatives or
cooperative associations" were considered nor adopted during the 2001
legislative session.
C. Homeowners'Associations
Likewise, no substantial legislation directly affecting the operation of
homeowners' associations was passed during the legislative session. A local
bill was considered which would have permitted Marion County to adopt
special legislation for homeowners' associations. 12 A bill which did pass,
but was vetoed by the Governor,'3 would have permitted homeowners'
associations to apply for the vacation of public roads and the simultaneous
conveyance of the same to a residential homeowners' association for the
purpose of creating a gated subdivision upon a vote of four-fifths of the
owners therein.
One clause that was added to the homeowners' association statute was a
newly enacted section 720.3075 of the FloridaStatutes.1 4 This law, dealing
with a variety of other topics,15 provides that any homeowners' association
documents, including declarations of covenants, articles of incorporation, or
bylaws, entered into after October 1, 2001, "may not prohibit any property
owner from implementing Xeriscape or "Florida-friendly landscape as
defined in section 373.185(1)" of the FloridaStatutes. 6 The statute defines
"Xeriscape" or "Florida-friendly landscape" as "quality landscapes that
and are adaptable to local
conserve water and protect the environment
17
conditions and which are drought tolerant.,

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
procedures,
16.
17.

See FLA. STAT. § 719 (2001).
H.R. 1901, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted).
H.R. 1053, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted).
FLA. STAT. § 720.3075 (2001).
Including a county's authority to convey property, tax deed application
and tourist taxes. Id.
FLA. STAT. § 720.3075 (2001).
FLA. STAT.

§ 373.185 (2001).
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D. Miscellaneous Legislation Affecting Community Association Operations
The 2001 Florida Legislature amended section 760 of the Florida
Statutes, regulating, inter alia, "housing for older persons."'" The 2001
amendment provides that a community claiming to be exempt from
prohibitions of state law against discrimination on the basis of familial
status,' 9 must register with the Florida Commission on Human Relations
("Commission") stating that the community complies with the requirements
of the law. The statute provides that a letter shall be submitted on the
letterhead of the community and shall be signed by the president of the
community. 21 Registration must be renewed biannually.2 2 Unfortunately,
the filing of these registration forms confers no presumption of compliance
with the law, and failure to comply with the law does not disqualify a
community from holding itself out as "fifty-five and over housing."
The Commission is required to make information in the registry
available to the public, and the Commission shall include this information on
23
an Internet website. The Commission has also promulgated rules, which
were scheduled
for a potential Rule Development Workshop on September
24
7, 2001.
Section 482 of the Florida Statutes, relevant to pest control, was also
amended in the 2001 Legislature.2 Newly enacted section 482.242(1)(c)(1)
of the Florida Statutes permits local governments to require, for multicomplex dwellings in excess of ten units, annual inspections for termite
activity or damage, as well as the remediation of same. It is important to
note that this law does not mandate the inspections and treatment, but simply
permits local governments to adopt such standards; pest control is generally
preempted by state regulation and is not susceptible to local regulation.

§ 760.29(4) (2001).
For example, "fifty-five and over communities."
FLA. STAT. §§ 760.29(4)(e), .31 (2001).

18.
19.
20.

FLA. STAT.

21.
22.

Id.
Id.

23. Housing for Older Persons Registration and Documentation, 27 Fla. Admin.
Weekly 3907 (proposed Aug. 24, 2001) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.29(4)(e) (2001)).
24. See FLA. STAT. § 760.29(4)(e) (2001).
25. FLA. STAT. § 725.06 (2001).
26.

Id.
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For the second time in as many years, 27 section 725.06 of the Florida
Statutes, which regulates indemnity provisions in construction contracts, was
amended with an effective date of July 1, 2001.28
The new statute applies to any construction contract entered into on or
after July 1, 2001.29 Included within the ambit of the law are not only
contracts directly between the owner and the contractor, but also contracts
with architects, engineers and subcontractors.3 Indemnification provisions
in such contracts, which do not comply with the law, are declared void and
unenforceable. 3 1 In order to be valid, an indemnity clause must contain a
dollar limit on the obligations of the indemnitor. 2 The indemnity obligations must bear a commercially reasonable relationship to the value of the
work.33 Unless otherwise provided in the agreement between the parties, one
as the per se minimum level of reasonable
million dollars is established
34
indemnity undertakings.
The new proviso also permits the indemnitor to indemnify the
indemnitee for the indemnitee's own negligence, if so provided in the
agreement between the parties.3 5 However, the law specifically limits the
parameters of such undertakings, and excludes indemnification caused by
"gross negligence, or willful, wanton or intentional misconduct," or for
"statutory violation or punitive damages except and to the extent the
statutory violation or punitive damages are caused by or result from the acts
or omissions" of the indemnitor, or for those acts the indemnitor is
responsible.3 6
Attorneys for community associations are frequently called upon by
their clients to prepare and/or review various forms of construction related
agreements, which will be subject to this statute. Extreme care should be
taken in insuring that the relevant provisions of the agreement comply with
the statute, particularly when "industry boilerplate" forms, such as those
27. Ch. 2001-372, § 31, 2001 Fla. Laws 4334 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 725.06
(2001)).
28. Ch. 2001-211, § 10, 2001 Fla. Laws 1887-88 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
725.06 (2001)).
29. FLA. STAT. § 725.06(1) (2001).
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

34.
35.

§ 725.06(1).
§ 725.06(1)(c).

36.

Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

8

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 26:1

used by the American Institute of Architects, or similar organizations, form
the basis of the contract documents.
II. APPELLATE CASE LAW
A. Introduction
Although the period encompassed by this survey was unusually quiet in
terms of legislation,37 there was no shortage of appellate case law impacting
the operation of community associations. One interesting side note is that8
1990s,
the substantial amendments to the condominium statute in the early
which mandated arbitration of many condominium "disputes," 39 have
resulted in the near elimination of what many consider as "trivial"
condomnium controversies 40 being decided in the appellate courts. Indeed,
with the exception of a jurisdiction case4 ' and a couple of collection related
cases,42 there were no appellate decisions involving what has historically
been the fodder of condominium litigation. This is a clear departure from
the volume of appellate court cases prior to the implementation of the
arbitration program. Thus, to the extent the legislature sought to avoid
crowding the circuit courts with disputes of this nature, 43 the program
appears to be accomplishing that result, at least at the appellate court level.
Hopefully, future efforts in the legislature to address the operation of the
arbitration program" will be undertaken with due regard for what has gone
before.

37. Several Tallahassee lobbyists have advised author that the activity surrounding the
Bush/Gore Presidential contest, including involvement by the Florida Legislature, resulted in
delays in the pre-session committee process, which precluded many legislative initiatives,
even if uncontested, from being guided through the process.
38. FLA. STAT. § 718.111 (1991).
39. See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(l) (2001) (defining "disputes").
40. By way of example, but not limitation, these include pet cases, vehicle parking
controversies, and election challenges.
41. Fla. Tower Condo., Inc. v. Mindes, 770 So. 2d 210, 211 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.

2000)
42. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. v. The Gardens N. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 764 So. 2d
883, 884 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Schooner Oaks Ltd. Co. v. Schooner Oaks Condo.
Ass'n, Inc., 776 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
43. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (2001).
44. H.R. 1923, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001).
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B. Breach of FiduciaryDuty/Tort Claims
The period covered by the survey includes what appears to be an
unusual number of cases involving breach of fiduciary duty or intentional
tort claims in varying forms. The condominium statute 45 provides that each
officer and director has a fiduciary relationship to the unit owners. Further,
the statute confers a cause of action by unit owners or the Association,
against directors who willfully or knowingly fail to comply with the law," or
directors designated by the developer, for actions taken by them prior to the
time control of the Association 47 is assumed by unit owners other than the
developer.4 8 The cooperative statute49 contains similar provisions.50 The
statute applicable to homeowners associations 51 similarly imposes a
fiduciary duty on officers and directors 2 and likewise confers a cause of
action in favor of the Association or a homeowner against directors who
willfully and knowingly fail to comply with the law. 3 Notably missing from
the parallel clause in the statute for condominium associations is the direct
conferral of a cause of action against directors appointed by the developer
for pre-turnover acts or omissions.
The case of Stevens v. Cricket Club Condominium, Inc.5 although
benign in result, creates a basis for substantial concern for condominium
associations and their boards of directors.55 According to the per curiam
decision, at the time the underlying dispute went to trial, only counts III and
V of the five count complaint remained.56
Count M, presented in a class action capacity,5 7 sought compensatory
damages for breach of fiduciary duty against the Association. 58 The plaintiff

46.
47.
48.

§ 718.111(1)(a) (2001).
§ 718.303(1)(d) (2001).
Commonly referred to as "turnover"
§ 718.303(I)(d).

49.
50.
51.

§ 719.104.
§ 719.303(1)(c)-(d).
§ 720.301.

52.
53.

See § 720.303(1).
See § 720.305(1)(c).

54.
55.
56.

784 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
Id. at 518.

57.

See Cricket Club Condo., Inc. v. Stevens, 695 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.

45.

FLA. STAT.

App. 1997).

58.

Stevens, 784 So. 2d at 518.
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complained that the Association's board made "false statements concerning
' 59
new wiring and price savings in regard to cable television service.
Count V, which again pled the unit owner's putative status as class
representative, also sounded in breach of fiduciary duty. 6° Stevens alleged
that the board of directors spent funds from a 1992 special assessment on
6
items other than those set forth in the "Notice of Special Assessment." '
Apparently, $50,000 was assessed to repair the pool area, however the board
did not have that work done.652 The funds were instead largely used 63 to
repair 4the south terrace area, which was described as an area leading to the
6
pool.
The trial court found in favor of the Association on count In (the cable
television claim). 65 In regard to count V, the trial court ruled in favor of the
unit owner, concluding that he had sustained his burden of proof on the
misapplication of the 1992 special assessment. 66 However, the trial court
awarded only nominal damages in the amount of $1.6 7 The unit owner
appealed the trial court's judgment on count III and the award of only
nominal damages on count V. The Association cross appealed the finding
7
9
of liability on count V.6 Citing GNB, Inc. v. United Danco Batteries, Inc.,
the reviewing appellate panel indicated it would not reweigh the evidence,
and that the record supported the trial court's conclusions. 7'
With regard to count III (the cable television issue), the court noted that
the Association held a "town meeting" to explain cable television options
and that various reports were made available for inspection by the unit
owners. The court concluded that the board of directors did not mislead

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
2d at 518.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Except for about $2000 which was used for cleaning the pool. Stevens, 784 So.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Stevens, 784 So. 2d at 518.
Id.
627 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
Stevens, 718 So. 2d at 518.
Id. at 519.
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the unit owners, but allowed them73to draw their own conclusions as to which
cable company should be chosen.
Although the rationale for the court's affnrmance of the dismissal of
count Il is brief, the troubling aspect is the suggestion that under different
factual circumstances, a prima facie case for breach of fiduciary duty could
have been made. The courts have historically given condominium
association boards wide "business judgment" latitude 4 and indeed the
condominium statute permits the board of directors to normally, absent a
contrary restriction in the declaration of condominium, choose the bulk cable
provider.
Hopefully, the court's disposition of count Ill will not be
construed to imply a broader standard of liability than Florida's case law
currently provides.
The more troubling aspect of the court's decision in Stevens is the
affirmance of count V and the award of nominal damages. Even though it
was not contested that the repair of the south terrace area was a proper
function of the Association, the court concluded that the Association "did
misapply funds."" Although the decision does not include a detailed review
of the underlying facts in the matter, the court does note that when Mr.
Stevens charged the board with "misapplying" the funds, the board returned
the assessment to the unit owners, and thereafter, presumably properly,
specially assessed the funds necessary to repair the south terrace. 78 Although
the use of special assessment funds for purposes other than that for which
they were levied appears to violate the condominium statute,7 9 the court does
not address 8° why the dispute did not become moot when the assessment was
returned. 8' Clearly, of greatest practical significance to the Association is
the fact that Mr. Stevens would presumably be declared the "prevailing
party" in count V, and as such, would be entitled to the recovery
of
82
reasonable attorney's fees incurred with the prosecution of that count.

73. Id.
74. Farrington v. Casa Solana Condo. Ass'n, 517 So. 2d 70, 72 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987).

75. Id. FLA. STAT. § 718.115(l)(d) (2001).
76. See, e.g., Perlow v. Goldberg, 700 So. 2d 148 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
77.
78.

Stevens, 784 So. 2d at 519.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(c)

79.
(2001).
80. It is unknown whether the issue was raised in the pleading or the briefs.
81. See, e.g., 51 Island Way Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Williams, 458 So. 2d 364, 367
(Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
82. FLA. STAT. § 718.303(1) (2001).
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Another breach of fiduciary duty case which is troubling from the
perspective of unit owner or homeowner controlled associations is Turkey
Creek Master Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Hope.83 In this case, a homeowners
association sued the officers and directors of the Association who had been
appointed by the developer. 84 The Association's claims sounded in breach
of fiduciary duty, conversion, breach of contract, and accounting.8 5 In
connection with the underlying action, the trial court entered an order that
required the Association to pay the attorney's fees of the developer's board
appointees.8 6 The basis of the trial court's award was section 607.0850(9) of
the Florida Statutes, the section of the corporation laws applicable to
indemnification.
The statute provides that a trial court may order a
corporate plaintiff to indemnify a defendant for fees and expenses incurred
in defending a suit filed by the corporation against one or more of its
directors or employees. 88 The statute limits indemnification in such
situations to cases where the court finds that the defendant or defendants are
"fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification or advancement of
expenses or both, in view of all of the relevant circumstances .... ."89
Although disagreeing with the Association's contention that the trial
court should have dismissed the claim to indemnification entitlement on the
pleadings, the appellate court ruled that the trial court did not set forth a
sufficient basis for determining whether the "fairly and reasonably"
entitlement standard was met, nor did the trial court explicate the "relevant
circumstances" upon which such judgment was rendered. 90 The parties
stipulated that the trial courts order of indemnification was based upon the
pleadings; the appellate panel, writing per curiam, sent the order back to the
trial court, on remand, for reconsideration in light of the standards explicated
in the opinion. 91
In dicta, the appellate court noted that the indemnification statute is
more likely to be applied when a corporate employee or director is sued by a
third party in relation to the actions of the employee or director as a
83.

766 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id.

87. Although most condominium and homeowners associations are not-for-profit
corporations, the indemnity provisions of the Florida Business Corporation Act are
incorporated into the Florida Not-for-Profit Corporation Act. FLA.STAT. § 617.0831 (2000).
88. § 607.0850(9).
89.

Id.

90.
91.

Turkey Creek, 766 So. 2d at 1246.
Id. at 1246-47.
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corporate agent. 92 Conceding that the statute recognizes circumstances
where the corporation must indemnify the agent it is suing, the court further
noted that, since the corporation faces the possibility of being required to
pay the legal fees and the expenses of the very party it is suing, it is
"especially important to determine whether the circumstances
93 justify a
indemnification."
to
entitled
reasonably
is
agent
the
that
finding
Perhaps most puzzling, the Turkey Creek court does not discuss the
effect of section 617.0831 of the Florida Not-for-Profit Corporation Act
which provides that "the term director, as used in section 617.0850, does not
include a director appointed by the developer to the board of directors of a
condominium association under chapter 718, a cooperative association under
chapter 719, a homeowners association defined in section 720.301, or a
timeshare managing entity under chapter 721." 94 Unfortunately, the court's
decision does little to develop objective standards in the law as it pertains to
the unique circumstances of the relationship between associations and those
directors who were appointed by the developer.
Obviously, the specter of paying a developer-appointee's attorney's
fees, pursuant to the corporate indemnification statute, could create a
chilling affect on an associations' vindication of legal rights, and the pursuit
of recognized causes of action. Interestingly, the court does not address the
standards for indemnification for cases of this nature, as enunciated in Old
Port Cove Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Ecclestone.95 In Old Port Cove,
the Association sued the principal in the development entity, also a member
of the Association's board, for selling the road system within the development back to the Association at a price of approximately two million
96
dollars. The developer prevailed on the Association's claim of breach of
fiduciary duty. 97 The trial court awarded Mr. Ecclestone his attorney's fees,
based upon language in the Association's articles of incorporation, which
entitled directors of the Association to indemnification. 98 The appellate
court, relying on the then existing version of the law struck down the
indemnification award. 99 The Old Port Cove court also cited Penthouse
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1247.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 617.0831 (2000).
500 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 333.

98.

Id. at 336.

99. Id. at 335. The version of the indemnification statute litigated in Turkey Creek is
different than the version that existed when the Old Port Cove case was decided.
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North Ass'n, Inc. v. Lombardi,1°° where the Supreme Court of Florida held,
on essentially public policy grounds, that the indemnification provision in
the articles of incorporation of a condominium association could not be
invoked to support a claim by the developer-appointees to the board.' 0 1
Another "pre-turnover" breach of fiduciary duty type case, 10 Larsen v.
Island Developers, Ltd. 10 3 has the twist of the not-for-profit corporation
structured as an "equity club.' 04 At issue in the case was the trial court's
dismissal of the derivative action complaint, brought by members of the
club, against the developer of Fisher Island, an exclusive development in
Miami-Dade County. 0 5
According to the complaint, the club's developer enticed prospective
purchasers of equity memberships in the club on the basis of representations
that a right of first refusal existed for undeveloped land on Fisher Island and
a similar right with respect to the developer's unsold condominium units, t°
if6
level.
price
stated
a
below
sale
for
units
the
offer
to
decided
the developer
The developer ostensibly breached the agreement by marketing to third
parties its remaining undeveloped land, along with its inventory of unsold
condominium units.'07 After having sold the property in question, the
developer gave notice of a proposed sale to its own employee, as president of
the club, but provided no opportunity to purchase. 10 8
The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that derivative actions
could not be brought for the benefit of, or on behalf of, not-for-profit
corporations. 0 9 The trial court's ruling was based upon a 1993 amendment
to chapter 617110 which "burned the bridge" between that statute and chapter
100. 461 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1984).
101. Id. at 1351.

102. The reported decision does not specifically identify the theories of action pled in
the case. The case does, however, involve actions of the developer's appointee to the board.
103. 769 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
104. Id. Although the term "equity club" has no statutory definition, it generally
involves property interests and use rights with respect to recreational amenities (golf courses,
country clubs, etc.) which are not tied to the ownership of real estate, and which do not
involve mandatory membership in a community association. Community association
practitioners are, however, frequently called upon to address issues pertaining to "equity
clubs," which are often included as a feature of master planned developments.
105. Larsen, 769 So. 2d at 1071.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1072.
110. Larsen, 769 So. 2d at 1071 (citing The Florida Not-for-Profit Corporation Law,
section 617.1908 of the FloridaStatutes).
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607."' The appellate court acknowledged that chapter 617 contains no
specific grant of authority to bring a derivative action on behalf of a not-forprofit corporation.' 12 However, the court further noted that the derivative
rights conferred upon shareholders in corporations for profit were not
initially derived from the legislature, but granted at common law as an
equitable remedy."13
Thus, and in light of there being no specific prohibition in chapter 617
against derivative suits, the court applied the same rationale that led to
imposition of derivative action rights at common law for profit making
corporations." 4 The court's opinion, written by Judge Ramirez, confesses5
that the intent of the 1993 amendments to the relevant statute is unclear."
The court reasoned, however, that there were likely other reasons why the
statute was amended, and there was no indicia of legislative intent 11to6
"completely eliminate a long-recognized, common law cause of action."
Going a step further, the court went on to say that, "[t]o hold otherwise could
likely raise the possibility of an unconstitutional restriction on access to
courts." ' 17 The procedural vehicle of a derivative suit is a potentially
important right to homeowners or unit owners within associations still
controlled by developers. Indeed, prior to the definitive announcement of
the Larsen court, the existence or non existence of derivative actions for notfor-profit corporations remained an open question since the 1993 statutory
amendments.
A relatively straightforward breach of fiduciary duty case, Florida
Discount Properties,Inc. v. Windermere Condominium, Inc., s presents a
fact pattern in a unit owner-controlled association which is most notable for
the ostensible audacity of the two condominium association directors
involved." 9 Harold Glover and Jack Gerzina sat on the board of directors of
Windermere Condominium, Inc.12° Windermere Condominium was subject
to a "recreation lease.''
Over a period of some twenty five years, the
111. Id. (citing The Florida Business Corporation Act, section 607 of the Florida
Statutes).
112. Id. at 1072.

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Larsen, 769 So. 2d at 1072.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
786 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1272-73.
Id. at 1271-72.
Id. at 1272; FLA. STAT. § 718.401 (1997).
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association paid a total of $750,000 in lease payments. 122 In 1995, the board
of the association voted to buy out the lease. 12' The association was able to
negotiate a purchase price with the developer of $35,000.124 At a December
1996 Board meeting, Gerzina and Glover, along with the Association's
attorney, urged the association to contest the lease based upon the argument
that it was unconscionable. 125 Initially, a quorum was not present because
only three of the seven directors were at the meeting.126 Apparently at the
attorney's recommendation, two more Board members were appointed,
makin the Board nine members in total, and thus creating a quorum of
12
five.

f

Subsequently, a dispute in the condominium developed as to who was
lawfully on the Board.128 A receiver was appointed in 1997 to operate the
association and Gerzina and Glover were recalled from the Board, as
ultimately confirmed by an arbitrator.129 Prior to their removal from the
board, however, Gerzina and Glover began negotiating with the recreation
lease's owner to purchase the recreational lease property.1 30 A week after
Gerzina and Glover were recalled from the board, they entered into a
contract to purchase the property from the owner. 131 Thereafter, they filed
suit against the association to collect back rents. 32 Although the opinion,
written by Judge Stevenson, does not involve a detailed recitation of the trial
court's legal findings, the appellate court summarily upheld the trial court's
order that Gerzina and Glover "utilized their position on the [board] to
negotiate an advantageous economic position for themselves personally to
the detriment of Windermere. ' 33 The trial court also ordered that the
association be given a right of first refusal to purchase the property for

122. Id.
123. Fla. Disc. Props., Inc., 786 So. 2d at 1272.

124. Id. The decision does not specify why such an apparently low purchase price was
involved in light of the fact that the lease presumably provided a substantial income stream.
Id. at 1271-73.
125. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.122(1)(a)(i) (1997) ("detailing guidelines for
determining whether a lease is presumptively unconscionable.")).
126

Fla.Disc. Props., Inc., 786 So. 2d at 1272.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1272-73.

131. Fla. Disc. Props., Inc., 786 So. 2d at 1273.

132. Id.
133. Id.
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$20,000, the same amount Gerzina and Glover paid for it."' One of the
issues on appeal was whether or not the subject lease was subject to the right
of first refusal found in section 718.401(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes.13 5 The
appellate court found that it was not necessary to reach this question,
because the trial judge properly granted the right of first refusal based on
Gerzina's and Glover's "disgorgment for usurping the corporate opportu-

nity.,,136

Unfortunately, it is not uncommon in condominium governance for
disputes to erupt as to who is, or is not, legally seated on the Board. The
action of appointing two directors as an emergency matter at a Board
meeting certainly seems suspect, although the relevant provisions of the
association's bylaws are not set forth in the decision.1 37 However, when unit
owners and Board members engage in conduct that implicates personal profit
making pertinent to condominium business, this case drives home the fact
that the liability limitations and immunities generally sprinkled throughout
the applicable statutes and relevant case law will find no application.
The final tort based conduct related case, Hollywood Lakes Country
Club, Inc. v. Community Ass'n Services, Inc., 138 presents yet another twist.
Here, it was the developer who sued a management company, arising out of
services provided by the management company regarding the community the
developer had developed. 139 The developer's complaint sounded in breach
of contract, misrepresentation, equitable subrogation, and malpractice. 40
The "trial court dismissed
the fourth amended complaint with prejudice,"
41
appeal.1
the
in
resulting
The issue in the underlying dispute was whether the management
company hired by the developer-controlled association failed to take
appropriate steps to collect assessments from unit owners.' 42 The developer
claimed to be damaged since the governing documents for the community
required the developer to fund
'43 any shortfalls in assessments collected from
non-developer unit owners.
The legal hurdle faced by the developer was
that the management agreement was between the association and the
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
The 1997 version of the statute was stated to apply to these proceedings. Id.
Fla. Disc. Props., Inc., 786 So. 2d at 1273.
See id. at 1271-73.
770 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at717.
ld.
Id.

142. Id. at 718.
143. Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc., 770 So. 2d at 718.
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management company, not the developer and the management company.144
The appellate court held that the fourth amended complaint contained all of
the necessary allegations to sustain a prima facie case for fraud (misrepresentation) by the management company as to the developer. 45 Citing
applicable authorities, the court held that the developer sufficiently alleged
misrepresentations by the management company, which caused the
developer to refrain from independently acting to collect assessments.'4
The court also addressed the dismissal of the count for equitable
subrogation. 47 Citing relevant authorities, and primarily relying on National
Union Fire Insurance Co. v. KPMG Peat Marwick,14s the Fourth District's
panel, through Chief Judge Warner, found sufficient grounds to sustain a
primafacie case for a claim of equitable subrogation. 4 9 The court ruled that
the debt was due to the association from the individual homeowners, the
management company was responsible for collecting the debt, and the
management company's negligence caused the loss of the assessment. 50
The developer's payment of that debt allows it to succeed to the position of
the original creditor, the association, under the doctrine of equitable
subrogation. 15
The court did, however, affirm the dismissal of a breach of contract
count, which had been pled under a third party beneficiary theory. 52 Citing
Caretta Trucking, Inc. v. Cheoy Lee Shipyards, Ltd., 53 the court found that
there was no indication that both parties to the contract, the association and
the management company, intended to benefit the developer. 54 Finally,
without discussion, the court dismissed the "malpractice" complaint against
the management company, "as there was no allegation that [the management
55
company] was a professional, and no privity of contract alleged."'
This case presents developers with some interesting food for thought in
terms of structuring the contractual relationship for communities they
144. Id.

145. Id.
146.
Enters, Inc.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. (citing Lance v. Wade, 457 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 1984)); see also Frenz
v. Port Everglades, 746 So. 2d 498, 502-03 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id.
742 So. 2d 328, 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc., 770 So. 2d at 718.
Id. at 718-19.
Id. at 719.
Id.
647 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 1994).
Id.
Id.
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develop with the manager or management company that is typically retained
to administer the day-to-day affairs of the development and the association.
Although many homeowners in communities under development see the
management company as "working for the developer," in most cases the
privity of contract is between the association and the management company,
albeit under developer control. Clearly, a manager's negligence or other
tortious conduct can cause as much, perhaps more, damage to the developer
than to the association itself, since various statutory provisions and common
law theories may result in the developer, and its board appointees, being
exposed to liability claims for pre-turnover acts or omissions.
C. Attorney MalpracticeClaims
Perhaps as a reminder that community association law is hardly a riskfree endeavor, two decisions announced during the period covered by this
survey explore legal malpractice exposure for those engaged in the practice.
In decisions issued only three days apart, the first and second districts
addressed slightly different scenarios.
Hunt Ridge at Tall Pines, Inc. v. Hall'56 involved a malpractice suit
filed by a homeowners association 57 against the attorney retained by the
developer to draft the governing documents for the community and its
governing associations. 158 According to the suit, one of the declaration
supplements prepared by the Developer's attorney incorrectly listed the
owner of the property, 5 9 resulting in the alleged invalidity of the declaration
to perform
of covenants as to certain lots and the consequent inability
16
anticipated duties and collect corresponding maintenance fees. 0
At issue was whether the attorney-client relationship between the
lawyer and the developer, as opposed to the developer and the association,
conferred any standing on the association for a malpractice claim, as an
intended third party beneficiary of the lawyer-client relationship. 161 Citing
the Caretta case, the second district, through Judge Threadgill, enforced
156. 766 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
157. Although not specifically stated in the opinion, it appears that this was the postturnover association that acted as plaintiff in the suit.
158. Hunt Ridge, 766 So. 2d at 400.
159. Allegedly the general partner of the development entity, rather than the limited
partnership which was the developer entity itself, was named.
160. Hunt Ridge, 766 So. 2d at 400.
161. Id.
162. See Caretta Trucking, 647 So. 2d at 1028.
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the long-standing legal principle that a party is an intended beneficiary to a
itself expresses an
contract only if the parties clearly express or the contract
63
intent to primarily and directly benefit a third party.1
The court observed that the declaration expressly indicated that it
benefited the property owners, but made no mention of benefiting the
association. 164 Reasoning that the association is not an "owner," the party
whom benefited from the document drafting, the court concluded that the
association could not state a cause of action.
Although this case was resolved favorably from the perspective of the
developer's counsel, query whether a different result would have obtained if
individual owners had filed the suit, rather than the association. Indeed, and
although not so expressly stated by the second district, a review of the
Court's rationale could lead one to conclude that the court would have
reviewed the matter in an entirely different light, given the language in the
Declaration, which could be construed to confer third party beneficiary
status on the property owners in the development.
The flip side of the Hunt Ridge case involved a malpractice lawsuit by
unit owners in a unit-owner controlled condominium association against the
association's attorney. In Silver Dunes Condominium of Destin, Inc. v.
Beggs and Lane,166 a group of unit owners sued the association's attorney for
legal malpractice, arising out of allegedly negligent advice given to the
association relative to reconstruction of the condominium after Hurricane
167
Opal, which inflicted major damage in the Florida Panhandle in 1995.
Silver Dunes, the condominium operated by the association, sustained
substantial damage after Hurricane Opal. John Daniel, an attorney with the
Law Firm of Beggs and Lane, was retained to provide advice and counsel to
Ultimately, it was discovered that insurance proceeds
the association.
would not be sufficient to repair all of the damage that had been caused by
the storm.'6 9 The Board, with Daniel's assistance, announced a plan
whereby additional units would be built during the reconstruction and sold to
shortfalls that were expected due to insufficient
make up the monetary
70
1
proceeds.
insurance
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169
170

Hunt Ridge, 766 So. 2d at 400.
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 401.
763 So. 2d 1274 (FIa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1275-76.
Id. at 1276.
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Controversy erupted over the board's plan. At one point, Daniel wrote
letters to some of the individual unit owners, threatening legal action if they
In their suit, the unit owners
did not vote in favor of the board's plan.
contended that the attorney provided erroneous legal advice to the board in
connection with the reconstruction expansion plan, which led to a delay in
the ultimate reconstruction of the destroyed units, and a resulting loss of
rental income to the affected owners. 72 The trial
court entered summary
173
judgment in favor of the attorney and the law firn.
Citing the general rule that an attorney's liability for negligence is
generally limited to the persons with whom the attorney shares privity of
contract, the court, in its per curiam opinion, noted that a "narrow exception"
exists when the non-clients can demonstrate174that they are a third-party
beneficiary of the agreement for legal services.
Without cited authority from other case decisions, the court went on to
observe that a condominium association is a "closely held corporation." 175
Thus, the court concluded that the issue was governed, at least in part, by a
case from the fourth district.176 On the authority of Brennan,the first district
likened the unit owners to "minority stockholders," and accordingly found
no basis to conclude that the attorney was representing the legal interests of
the individual unit owners. 177 Indeed, the court noted that it would be
unusual to argue that the attorney was representing the individual interests
of
1 78
the unit owners when he had sent them letters threatening to sue them.
The relationship between a community association attorney and its unit
owners is one that is often problematic for community association
practitioners. Many unit owners and homeowners feel that they are "paying
for" the services, and therefore feel that the attorney's loyalty should be
directed to their interests. Unfortunately, the interests of the association and
particular unit owners often diverge, and an attorney cannot serve two
masters. This case is a common sense result and is consistent with other
cases involving the role of community association attorneys and the unit

171 Silver Dunes, 763 So. 2d at 1276.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1277.
174. Id. at 1276; see also Hunt Ridge, 766 So. 2d at 400.
175. Id. at 1276.
176. Silver Dunes, 763 So. 2d at 1276 (discussing Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
177. Id. at 1277.
178. Id.
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owners. 179 However, the case is also instructive that association lawyers
need to be constantly on the guard to insure that their representational roles
are clear, and to insure that they remain so.
D. Condominium Cases
An interesting case, apparently reviewing issues of first impression,
involves the liability of unit owners in a condominium for the negligent acts
or omissions of their association. Cooley v. Pheasant Run at Rosemont
Condominium Ass'n, Inc. 18 involved claims made by a person who was
common elements of the condominium, while a guest at the
injured on the 181
condominium.
However, in addition to suing the Association as a corporate entity, the
plaintiff also sued each unit owner individually.18 2 The trial court dismissed
the action against the individual unit owners, with prejudice, and indeed
suggested that it would favorably entertain .motions filed pursuant to section
57.105 of the Florida Statutes, which provides sanctions for frivolous
litigation. 183 On appeal before the fifth district, Judge Cobb writing for the
panel, examined the provisions of section 718.119 of the FloridaStatutes.'84
Finding the issue to be one of "legislative intent," 185 the court reasoned that
179. See, e.g., Ocean Club of Palm Beach Shores Condo. Ass'n v. Estate of Daly, 504
So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
180. 781 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
181. Id. at 1183.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Same provides:
Limitation of liability.(1) The liability of the owner of a unit for common expenses is limited to the
amounts for which he or she is assessed for common expenses from time to time in
accordance with this chapter, the declaration, and bylaws.
(2) The owner of a unit may be personally liable for the acts or omissions of the
association in relation to the use of the common elements, but only to the extent of his
or her pro rata share of that liability in the same percentage as his or her interest in the
common elements, and then in no case shall that liability exceed the value of his or her
unit.
(3) In any legal action in which the association may be exposed to liability in excess
of insurance coverage protecting it and the unit owners, the association shall give
notice of the exposure within a reasonable time to all unit owners, and they shall have
the right to intervene and defend.
Id. at 1183-84.
185. Cooley,781 So. 2d at 1184.
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the requirement that an association give notice to unit owners of potential
liability in excess of insurance proceeds was indicative of the intention that
the unit owner would not be an original party to the action, otherwise such
notice would not be necessary.' 86 The court found the focus of section
718.119 of the Florida Statutes to stand for the proposition that the
association, as a corporate entity, would be the party liable for personal
injuries on the condominium common elements, while the individual unit
owners would be liable for assessments proportionate to such damage, up to
the value of the unit.187 Citing cases relative to a condominium association's
189
•

status as a defendant in class action proceedings, 188 the court found that
the association, and only the association, would serve as the appropriate
defensive class representative in matters of this nature.'9 The result in this
case is consistent with the apparent legislative intent of section 718.119 of
the FloridaStatutes, which the court found to be less than "clear-cut," and is
also consistent with the unique feature of condominium associations' 91
As noted previously, the introduction of mandatory, non-binding
arbitration for most condominium "disputes" has resulted in a paucity of
appellate cases exploring the limits of the dos and don'ts of condominium
living. However, exploration of the limits of arbitrators' jurisdiction
continue to emanate from the courts. 192 FloridaTower Condominium, Inc. v.
Mindes,193 authored by Chief Judge Schwartz, dealt with a controversy over
the right to use a particular parking space at the condominium. 94 Finding

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Graves v. Ciega Verde Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997); Kesl, Inc. v. Racquet Club of Deer Creek II Condo, Inc., 574 So. 2d 251 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
189. While apparently disagreeing with the trial court's perception that the issue was so
clear-cut so as to invoke section 57.105 of the FloridaStatutes.
190. Cooley, 781 So. 2d at 1184.
191. Id. See The Florida Bar, 353 So. 2d 95, 97 (Fla. 1977); Avila South Condo.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599, 608 (Fla. 1977).
192. See Neate v. Cypress Club Condo. Inc., 718 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
Dist. 1998); Ruffin v. Kingswood E Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 719 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998); Clark v. England, 715 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Summit Towers
Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Coren, 707 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Carlandia
Corporation v. Obernauer, 695 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Seamaan v. Sea
Ranch Club Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 695 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Blum v.
Tamarac Fairways Ass'n, Inc., 684 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
193. 770 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
194. Id. at 211.
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that because the statutory definition of "dispute"1 95 does not include
disagreements that involve "title to a unit or any common element," the court
ruled that such controversies were not arbitrable, and that original jurisdic196
tion for the adjudication of such claims therefore lies in the courts. Noting
that the Arbitration Section of the Department of Business and Professional
Regulation has, nonetheless, accepted jurisdiction over a variety of parking
assignment disputes,197 the court "decline[d] to follow [those] contrary

decisions of arbitrators." ' '
It can be argued that the court ascribed a definition to the term "title"
199
which is different from the use of that term in normal legal parlance. Since
common elements by their nature are not "owned" by individual unit
owners, 2no the legal basis for concluding that a disagreement as to who may
use a parking space involves "title" is perhaps debatable. However, unless
addressed in a contrary fashion by the Legislature, or treated differently
outside of the third district, practitioners should add to their rule enforcement checklist the existence of this case in jurisdictional determination. The
case of Schooner Oaks Ltd. Co. v. Schooner Oaks Condominium Ass'n,
Inc., 2°1 is the latest in the "phantom unit cases" rising out of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal 20 2 which appears to address the "phantom issue"
Schooner Oaks Limited Company
differently than the second district.
("Schooner Oaks") constructed Schooner Oaks Condominium, a phase
2 4
When
condominium, "which ultimately consisted of four phases." 0
Schooner Oaks stopped making payments on unconstructed units, Schooner
Oaks Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") initiated foreclosure
action against the unconstructed units. 2°5 The trial court entered summary
195.

FLA. STAT.

§ 718.1255(1) (2001).

196. Florida Tower, 770 So. 2d at 211.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 211 n.1.
199. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1485 (6th ed. 1990) (defining title to include "the
union of all the elements which constitute ownership").
200. FLA. STAT. § 718.106(2)(a) (2001).
201. 776 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
202. See also RIS Inv. Group, Inc. v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 695 So. 2d
357 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Welleby Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. The William Lyon Co., 522
So. 2d 35 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). Cf.Winkelman v. Toll, 661 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
203. See Estancia Condo. Ass'n v. Sunfield Homes, Inc., 619 So. 2d 1008, 1010 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Hyde Park Condo. Ass'n v. Estero Island Real Estate, Inc., 486 So.
2d 1, 2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
204. Schooner Oaks, 776 So. 2d at 305.
205. Id.
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judgment finding that Schooner Oaks was liable for assessments on the
unconstructed "units," from which order Schooner Oaks appealed. 2°
On appeal, the central issue was whether unimproved land was subject
to assessments.m7 As the grant of a summary judgment was on appeal, the
court, in its per curiam opinion, felt constrained to review the matter in a
light most favorable to Schooner Oaks.208 In reviewing the various
provisions of the declaration of condominium, which largely tracks statutory
definitions verbatim, the court concluded that a reasonable inference could
be drawn that "units" were created immediately
9 upon a new phase being
construction.t2
of
phase
the
of
regardless
added,
However, the court noted that section four of the Declaration of
Condominium, which defines the "unit boundaries," supported a different
conclusion. 1 Recognizing that these "boundaries" did not exist, the court
ruled that a genuine issue of material fact as to the intention of the
declaration of condominium was presented.21 1 The court held that the
declaration permitted differing reasonable inferences, and thus remanded the
case to the trial court for plenary proceedings. 1 2
This case, although perhaps judicious in terms of summary judgment
standards, continues the judicial trend in the fourth district, which fails to
recognize that in condominiums, there are only two types of property,
common elements and units. Property that is submitted to a declaration must
be one or the other, it can not be neither, nor can it be both. In fact, after the
fourth district's Welleby decision, the statute was specifically amended to
provide that upon the recording of a declaration, or an amendment adding a
phase to the terms of the declaration, all units described in the declaration or
phase amendment as being located in or on the land then being submitted to
condominium ownership shall come into existence "regardless of the state of
completion of planned improvements in which the units may be located. 213
Although it was not stated in the opinion whether this declaration pre-dates
or post-dates the 1990 amendment to the statute, it appears that the views of
the Fourth District continue demonstrating the court's hesitation to impose
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 306.
209. Schooner Oaks, 776 So. 2d at 306.
210. The boundary definition in this declaration contained typical "interior shell"
definitions, with the "unit" being encompassed within the perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings.
Id. at 305-06.
211. Schooner Oaks, 776 So. 2d at 306.
212. Id.
213. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (2001).
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liability on raw land. If this case is litigated again to appeal after remand, it
will certainly be interesting to see how the court resolves the issues,
particularly to the extent that a post-1990 condominium may be involved.21 4
In Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. v. The Gardens North Condominium
Ass'n, Inc.,25 the quality of title obtained after foreclosure of a condominium lien, where service of process was subsequently contested, was at
issue.2 16 In 1997, the bank purchased the subject unit at a foreclosure sale.217
The association alleged that, thereafter, the bank failed to pay assessments. 218 The association filed a lien and subsequent action to foreclose on
the same. 219 Nationsbanc did not file a response to the complaint and a
default judgment was ultimately entered. 22 0 The foreclosure sale was held
on March 2, 1998, and a third-party bidder purchased the unit. 221
Nearly a year later, the bank moved to quash service of process and
dismiss the complaint. 222 Nationsbanc alleged that service of process was
defective, specifically that service was effectuated on an administrative
223
The
assistant in violation of section 48.081 of the Florida Statutes.
void.224
association responded that the attempt of service was voidable, not
The trial court found service to be facially defective, but refused to grant
NationBanc's motion to vacate the sale and void the certificate of title.223
Stating that it was undisputed that the association did not comply with
the statute applicable to service of process on corporations, Judge Polen,
writing for the court, held that as statutes governing service of process must
be strictly construed, attempted service on a random employee without a
showing of necessity negated the court's personal jurisdiction over the
226
defendant corporation.
214. The RIS decision also involved a pre-1990 Declaration of Condominium. RIS
Inv. Group, Inc. v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'1 Regulation, 695 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
215. 764 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
216. Id. at 844.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. NationsbancMortgage Corp., 764 So. 2d at 884.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. ld.
225. NationsbancMortgage Corp., 764 So. 2d at 884.
226. Id. at 884-85 (citing York Communications, Inc. v. Furst Group Inc., 724 So. 2d
678 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
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Distinguishing cases where a judgment is only voidable where service
of process does not violate the essential requirements of law, the court
concluded that the association's attempted service was facially void, as the
affidavit accompanying the proof of service did not contain any statement of
supporting the necessity of substitute service on a random employee.227
Obviously, the consequences for insurers of title, the foreclosure sale
purchaser, and the association itself in a case of this nature could be
substantial. Since the statute of limitations in a matter of this nature would
appear to be seven years,228 exposure to the foreclosing associations and the
attorney handling the case could continue for a substantial period of time.
Attorneys handling association foreclosure cases should view this case as
inducement to insure that the foreclosure checklist includes verification of
appropriate service of process in every collections case before it is taken to
foreclosure judgment and sale.
E. Homeowners' Association and Covenant Cases
Another decision involving the occasional legal no man's land of
undeveloped phases of a development is Villages at Mango Key v. Hunter
Development, Inc.229 At issue in Villages at Mango Key was voting rights
for lands that were originally intended to be reserved as potential future
development in the Mango Key development. 230 Vacations Villages of
American Inc. ("VVA") 231,
purchased Tract A of Lindfields Unit Six, which
consisted of 18.89 acres.
It replatted a portion of this land into "Villages
at Mango Key," consisting of thirty-three platted townhouse lots. 232 An
exhibit to the Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions reflected eightyeight additional proposed lots in the unplatted portion of Tract A, which was
set aside for future development. 233 VVA's interest in the undeveloped
portion of the project was ultimately foreclosed, and purchased out of
foreclosure by a company who ultimately sold it to Hunter Development

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 885.
See FLA. STAT. § 95.12 (2001).
763 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 477.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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("Hunter").2 34 Hunter obtained approval to develop 236 condominium
units
35
on the land, including additional adjoining land owned by Hunter.2
Desiring to use the amenities servicing the Village at Mango Key,
Hunter took the position that its purchase of the lands set aside for future
phases entitled it to eighty-eight votes (the maximum number of potential
lots), which thus would entitle it to control of the
homeowners association. 236
237
The trial court agreed with Hunter's position.
In reversing the trial court, Judge Harris writing for the court, opined
that the definition of a "lot, 238 contained in the original governing documents
was key to the adjudication of the issue. 239 Finding that the voting rights
appurtenant to "lots" was limited to the actual "Villages" development, or
lands "subsequently added to the project," the court found that the
attachment reserving the lands in question for future development was not a
"recorded subdivision map" sufficient to grant voting rights.No The court's
reasoning was that there were no lots specifically described, but rather a
large developable tract of land.21 The court found that Hunter was "at best
the fee simple owner of acreage which may or may not be developed into
townhouse lots." 242
Had the court stopped here, it seems clear that its decision was wellfounded and based upon the intent of the documents and normal allocation
of rights and interests in potential future phases of typical real estate
developments. The court arguably going a step farther than it needed to,
went on to find that the proposed construction of substantially more
condominium units than would have been permitted under the original plan
"reveals most convincingly that the foreclosure of the Developer's interest in
the property released the unplatted land from the Developer's proposed
expansion of the Villages project. '243 The court found that Hunter
abandoned the right to develop the property as part of Villages of Mango
234. Villages of Mango Key, 763 So. 2d at 477.

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The Declaration provided:

"'Lot" shall mean and refer to any plot of land on

which a Living Unit may be constructed as shown on any recorded subdivision map of the
Property or which may hereafter be platted or otherwise created .. " Id. at 477-78. "'Living Unit" is defined as a "townhouse residence."' Villages of Mango Key, 763 So. 2d at 478.
239. Id. at 478.
240. Id.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Villages of Mango Key, 763 So. 2d at 478.
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Key by converting the property to condominium project. 244 It is perhaps
troubling that the court looked at the foreclosure as the act eliminating the
developer's interest in the potential future phases pertaining to Villages of
Mango Key. Obviously, when developments go sour, the lender or foreclosure purchaser, who may wish to continue the original scheme of
development, wants to be sure that a foreclosure will not extinguish reserved
rights under the documents. Although the court's statement is perhaps dicta,
it is a lesson for document drafters that clear reservation of use rights and the
provision for what shall or may happen if potential future phases are put to
different uses than originally anticipated, are key elements in drafting initial
project documentation.
Although primarily presented as an agency case, Lensa Corporationv.
Poinciana Gardens Ass'n, Inc.245 is perhaps most enlightening as to the
difference in judicial treatment between condominium associations and
homeowners associations. Although Florida's appellate courts have suggested that it takes unanimous approval for a condominium association to build a
new swimming pool,2 6 or obtain super majority approval to change the color
of a condominium building's paint,2 7 the Lensa court suggests that the board
of directors of a homeowners association
has the authority to sell all of the
8
property and assets of the Association.2
The president of the Association, Dr. Goodman, negotiated and agreed
to sell substantially all of the association's assets, consisting of land, to a
company called BBG Appraiser Co. ("BBG"), which was owned by Ms.
Sandel. 9 It was understood that BBG would assign its contract rights to
Lensa Corporation, which would develop the property.2 0
The parties executed an agreement, which Dr. Goodman signed on
behalf of the Association. 2 1 After discovering that Dr. Goodman's signature
had been witnessed by Mr. Sandel (also the owner of Lensa), Dr. Goodman
was asked to execute a second contract to avoid any problems.252 Prior to
that time, however, Mr. Sandel had a discussion with Ms. Stole, the secretary
244. Id.
245. 765 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
246. See Downey v. Jungle Den Villas Recreation Ass'n, 525 So. 2d 438, 441-42 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988). It is likely that this aspect of Jungle Den is no longer good law.
247. Islandia Condo. Ass'n v. Vermut, 501 So. 2d 741, 743 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1987)
248. Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 298.
249. Id. at 297.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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of the homeowner's association board. 3 Ms. Stole apparently told Mr.
Sandel that she was not aware that a sales contract existed for the sale of the
land. 54 In response to Mr. Sandel's concerns, Dr. Goodman assured him
2 55
that he would straighten out the matter with the board.
6
Consequently, a board meeting was held to address the issue.25
According to the court's opinion, it was undisputed that a quorum was not in
attendance for this meeting. 7 Those who were in attendance agreed that
Dr. Goodman was authorized to sign the purchase documents for the sum of
$50,000.258 The signed minutes of the meeting were subsequently faxed to
Mr. Sandel, and several days later, a second contract, identical to the first,
was entered into.2 5 9 Thereafter, the board elected a new president, and
informed Mr. Sandel that the contract would not be honored because the
selling price was too low.26 Lensa filed a breach of contract action against
the Association.26'
Lensa conceded during the jury trial of the case that Dr. Goodman did
not have actual authority to sell the property and that the board had not
approved it.262 The jury entered a verdict in favor of Lensa, totaling
$18,000, finding that Dr. Goodman had apparent authority to sign the
agreement. 263 The trial court granted the Association's motion for directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding that Dr. Goodman
had no actual authority because the true board of directors did not vote on
the agreement.264 Further, the trial court ruled that Dr. Goodman failed to
obtain the approval of the directors as required under the Association's
bylaws, 265 as well as section 617.1202 of the Florida Statutes.266 Judge
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of corporate property and assets requiring
member approval.A sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the property
and assets of a corporation, in all cases other than those not requiring member approval
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Stone, writing for the court's majority, found that because the bylaws did not
require membership approval, the directors had the authority to sell the
property and assets of the corporation. 267 It being undisputed that the board
never approved the transaction, the court then concluded that any liability of
the Association would need to based on Dr. Goodman's apparent authority.2 68 Discussing the traditional elements of apparent authority, the court

held that because sale of the Association's property was not in the ordinary
course of business, there could be no presumed authority that Dr. Goodman
had the authority to act for the Association. 69 Accordingly, in the absence
of representation from the Board that Dr. Goodman was authorized to act in
this capacity, the court concluded that there was not representation by the
purported principal, the Board, as to the agent's, the president's, authority.2
as specified in ss. 617.1201, may be made upon such terms and conditions and for
such consideration, which may consist in whole or in part of money or property, real or
personal, including shares, bonds, or other securities of any corporation or corporations
for profit, domestic or foreign, and must be authorized in the following manner
(1) If the corporation has members entitled to vote on the sale, lease, exchange, or other
disposition of corporate property, the board of directors must adopt a resolution approving such sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition, and directing that it be submitted to a vote at a meeting of members entitled to vote thereon, which may be either an
annual or special meeting. Written notice stating that the purpose, or one of the purposes, of such meeting is to consider the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of
all or substantially all of the property and assets of the corporation must be given to
each member entitled to vote at such meeting in accordance with the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. At such meeting, the members may authorize such sale, lease,
exchange, or other disposition and may approve or fix, or may authorize the board of
directors to fix, any or all of the terms and conditions thereof and the consideration to
be received by the corporation therefor. Such authorization requires at least a majority
of the votes which members present at such meeting or represented by proxy are
entitled to cast. After such authorization by a vote of members, the board of directors
may, in its discretion, abandon such sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of
assets, subject to the rights of third parties under any contracts relating to such sale,
lease, exchange, or other disposition, without further action or approval by members.
(2) If the corporation has no members or if its members are not entitled to vote thereon,
a sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or substantially all the property and
assets of a corporation may be authorized by a majority vote of the directors then in
office.

FtA. STAT. § 617.1202 (2001).
267. Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 298.
268. Id.
269. Id. See Ideal Foods, Inc. v. Action Leasing Corp., 413 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
270. Id.
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Judge Gross, specially concurring, agreed with the conclusion that
apparent authority had not been demonstrated by Lensa.271 Judge Gross,
noting the absence of a corporate resolution and the absence of a history of
completed deals between the parties that would give rise to apparent
authority, found there was no formal act by the board which would denote
the holding out of Dr.
Goodman as possessing the authority to act on the
272
Association's behalf.
While the decision appears to accomplish justice, at least from the
perspective of the Association, there are a couple of aspects that are
noteworthy to the practitioner. First, in most dealings with community
Associations, the authority of the board president to bind the corporation is
often accepted as a given. This case demonstrates, at least when actions do
not involve the ordinary course of business, the practitioner should acquire
additional indicia of the president's
authority, such as a board resolution,
2 73
signed minutes, and the like.
Perhaps of greater theoretical interest is the court's suggestion that had
a full quorum of the board been at the meeting where the second contract
274
was authorized, the action would have been a valid act of the Association.
Keeping in mind that common properties for homeowners associations are
often a central nature of the homeowners' investment in the community
recreational facilities, open spaces, etc., one can certainly question the
wisdom of applying the general provisions of the Florida Not-for-Profit
Corporation Statute relevant to asset disposition, and to disposition of the
common areas of a homeowners association. 275
In what the court described as a "classic case of waiver," Judge
Orfinger, writing for the Fifth District Court of Appeal in the Woodlands
Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Darrow,276 reviewed a neighborhood dispute regarding
the use of property, which had been originally deed restricted to residential
use and which- was being used as a chiropractor's office.277 The deed
restriction in question 278 had apparently been in effect for a number of
271. Id.
272. Id. at 299 (Gross, J., concurring).
273 Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 298. Especially true where the magnitude of the transaction
or undertaking justifies same.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 765 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
277 Id. at 875.
278. In pertinent part:
No lot shall be used except for residential* purposes. No building shall be erected,
altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached single family
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years.27 9 Prior to acquisition of the property in question by Dr. Darrow, the
property had been used for the conduct of a real estate business, including
exterior parking signage indicating that the property was used primarily for
commercial purposes.i According to the court,
the real estate business had
281
1989.
since
property
the
on
been conducted
When Dr. Darrow decided to purchase the property for his chiropractor's office, it came to his attention that the president of the voluntary
homeowners' association which existed in the development was not happy
about his plans, although Association representatives apparently told Dr.
Darrow there was nothing they felt they could legally do to stop him.282
After Dr. Darrow closed on the property in 1996 and began his chiropractic
practice, the homeowners association 283 and three individual property owners
filed suit against Dr. Darrow. 3 4 At trial, testimony was adduced to the effect
that prior to Dr. Darrow's acquisition, for at least seven years, the property
had openly and notoriously been used for commercial, not residential,
purposes.2 5 For example, Dr. Darrow's predecessor undertook substantial
renovations in 1993 and 1994, all geared toward the property's commercial
utilization,
without objection from the Association, which took no action to
286
it.
stop
The appellate court began its opinion by noting that the trial court,
apparently attempting to fashion a solution that it hoped would make all
parties happy, made no findings in its final order denying enforcement of the

dwelling not to exceed two stories in height and a private garage for not more than two
cars.

No building shall be erected, placed or altered on any lot until the construction plans
and specifications and a plan allowing the location of the structure have been approved
by the Architectural Control Committee as to quality of workmanship and materials,
harmony of external design with existing structures and as to location with respect to
topography and finish grade elevation.

Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 875.
282. Id. at 876.
283. See Palm Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Pisarski, 626 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1993)
(indicating it is not clear as to the legal basis upon which the association filed suit).
284. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 874.
285. Id. at 876.
286. Id. at 875. Even though the association was aware of the work, as evidenced by
testimony of a telephone call between the then president of the association and Dr. Darrow's
predecessor. Id.
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restrictions. 217 On the authority of Home Depot U.S.A. v. Taylor,28 8 the Fifth

District concluded that it was obligated to uphold the trial court's conclusion
if it was correct for any reason.2 9 After quotation of black letter law
regarding waiver of enforcement of restrictive covenants, 2 9 the standards
required to demonstrate waiver,291 and Supreme Court cases from Indiana 292
and Mississippi, 293 the court concluded, without embellishment, that the

substantial delay in objecting to the commercial use of the property resulted
in a waiver of the restriction and that the doctrine of laches likewise barred
enforcement of the covenant.294
Although the voiding of a covenant running with the land is a harsh
result, enforcement of covenants lies largely within the equity jurisdiction of
the court.
While the appellate panel seemed to gently criticize the trial
judge for ruling in favor of Dr. Darrow simply based upon an oral pronouncement that it would be inequitable to enforce the restriction. 296 It is
equally obvious that the appellate court did not fundamentally disagree that
297
enforcement of the covenant would be inequitable in this case. Although
the concept is not particularly well-developed in the published decision,
implicit in the court's holding is that laches will defeat a covenant's
enforceability when there is injury flowing from the non-action.298 Here, the
Association and the neighbors sat by idly for years while the property was
used for commercial purposes, was substantially improved, and then
subsequently sold to Dr. Darrow. 299
Another pair of cases involving deed restrictions and voluntary
homeowners associations are Cudjoe Gardens Property Owners Ass'n, Inc.
v. Payne,300 (Cudjoe I) and Cudjoe Gardens Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v.

287. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 876.
288. 676 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
289. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 876.
290. 20 AM. JUR. 2d Covenants § 239 (1995).
291. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 876-77 (citing Taylor v. Kenco Chem. & Mfg. Corp.,
465 So. 2d 581, 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
292. Wischmeyer v. Finch, 107 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. 1952).

293. Twin States Realty Co., v. Kilpatrick, 26 So. 2d 356 (Miss. 1946).
294. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 877.

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 875.
770 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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Payne,3m (Cudjoe II). In Cudjoe I, standing of the plaintiff Association was
at issue.3°2 The Association was seeking to enforce a deed restriction that
included minimum setback requirements against the Paynes. °3 Because the
property owners association was a voluntary organization, the Paynes moved
to dismiss the complaint based upon the Association's lack of standing and
on the authority of a 1993 case decided by the Supreme Court of Florida.3 °
In reversing the trial court's order of dismissal, the Cudjoe I Court,
through Judge Ramirez, distinguished the standing of the Association in the
instant dispute from that in Palm Point, because the Cudjoe Association
owned a platted lot within the subdivision. 30 5 Although the lot was
apparently not buildable, the third district held that same would not defeat
the Association's standing as a property owner to enforce the deed
restrictions. The appellate court remanded the cause to the trial court with
instructions that the Association should be granted standing to pursue relief,
resulting in Cudjoe 11.306
After remand, the Cudjoe II trial judge again entered judgment against
the Association, this time on the grounds that the deed restrictions, as
previously amended by a majority vote of the property owners and as
authorized by the original deed restriction, were void.
The written ballots
of the property owners did not comply with the two witness requirement of
Florida's version of the Statute Deeds, section 689.01 of the Florida
Statutes.303 The appellate court's opinion, written by Chief Judge Schwartz,
301. 779 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
302. Cudjoe 1, 770 So. 2d at 190.
303. Id.

304. Id. (discussing Palm Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Pisarski,626 So. 2d 195
(Fla. 1993).
305. Id.

306. Id. at 190-91.
307. Cudjoe 1I, 779 So. 2d at 598.

308. In pertinent part:
No estate or interest of freehold, or for a term of more than 1 year, or any uncertain
interest of, in or out of any messages, lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be
created, made, granted, transferred or released in any other manner than by instrument
in writing, signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses by the party creating,
making, granting, conveying, transferring or releasing such estate, interest, or term of
more than I year, or by the party's agent thereunto lawfully authorized, unless by will
and testament, or other testamentary appointment, duly made according to law; and no
estate or interest, either of freehold, or of term of more than 1 year, or any uncertain
interest of, in, to or out of any messages, lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall be
assigned or surrendered unless it be by instrument signed in the presence of two
subscribing witnesses by the party so assigning or surrendering, or by the party's agent
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found it clear that deed restrictions of this type are "simply equitable rights
arising out of the contractual relationship between and among the property
owners and emphatically do not constitute interest in real estate which §
689.01 applies.
Although both Cudjoe I and Cudjoe II do not recite facts which enable
the reader of the decision to comprehend the precise nature of the underlying
disputes involving the setback controversy, it does appear that amendments
to the deed restrictions may have been involved. While the condominium
statute3 1 contains clear guidance as to the procedure for certifying amendments to condominium documents, there is no parallel guidance in the statute
311
Obviously, it remains necessary
applicable to homeowners associations.
for those seeking to amend deed restrictions to comply with the amendatory
procedures contained therein, 3 12 but this case provides safe harbor from
adherence to the technicalities of conveyancing laws applicable to real
property transfers at least where not specifically required.
Sugarmill Woods Oaks Village Association, Inc. v. Wires313 involves the
following issue:
Does the issuance of a tax deed to a lot extinguish a homeowner association's lien placed on such lot, pursuant to a declaration of
covenants, recorded prior to issuance of the tax deed, where the
declaration provided for homeowner association liens to be placed
on lots for delinquent homeowner association assessments, and the
homeowners association recorded a lien pursuant to the declaration
prior to the issuance of the tax deed? 314

thereunto lawfully authorized, or by the act and operation of law. No seal shall be
necessary to give validity to any instrument executed in conformity with this section.
Corporations may convey in accordance with the provisions of this section or in
accordance with the provisions of sections 692.01 and 692.02 of the FloridaStatutes.

FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (2000).
309. Cudjoe II, 779 So. 2d at 598-99. Cudjoe I states that a setback requirement was in
controversy.
310. FLA. STAT. § 718.110 (2000).
311. FLA. STAT. § 720.301 (2000).
312. Cudjoe II, 779 So. 2d at 598. Many covenants applicable to homeowners
associations and other non-condominium deed restricted communities do require recordation
of individual lot owner consents. Id.
313. 766 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
314. Id. at 488.
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'The trial court ruled that the liens were extinguished. 315 The Fifth District
316
Court of Appeal, through Judge Sharp, agreed, and affirmed the trial court.
According to the court's opinion, the case turned solely on the interpretation
of applicable statutes. 3' 7 The court first considered a 1973 amendment to
section 197.552 of the Florida Statutes,31 8 which governs tax deeds. The
1973 amendment to the statute provided that "[n]o right, interest, restriction,
or other covenant shall survive the issuance of a tax deed. 3 19 In 1979, this
provision was amended to exempt from tax deeds extinguishment, a lien of
record held by a municipality or governmental unit.32 0 In the same Act, the
legislature also amended section 197.573 of the FloridaStatutes, to provide
that certain restrictions and covenants would survive issuance of a tax
deed .321 Subsection 2 of the law limited those restrictions that survived to
322
usual restrictions and covenants limiting the use of property. However, the
1979 law also specifically provided that the limited exception for survival of
restrictions or covenants "shall not protect covenants creating any debt or
lien against or upon the property... .,,323 After considering the legislative
history of the 1979 amendments, the court concluded that the obvious public
policy of the 1979 amendments was to allow local governments to protect
their taxing basis by limiting those financial obligations that would survive
issuance of a tax deed. 3u
The gravamen of the issue in the Sugarmill Woods case involved a 1995
amendment to section 617.312 of the Florida Statutes.3"s The 1995
amendment was, according to the court, enacted in recognition of the need
for homeowners associations to provide governance to the communities
encumbered by plats or declarations. 3 2 The 1995 amendment provided, in
pertinent part, that all "provisions of a declaration of covenants relating to

315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Sugarmill Woods Oaks Village Ass'n v. Wires, 766 So. 2d at 487, 488 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing ch. 73-332, § 21, 1973 Fla. Laws).

319. Id.
320. Id. at 489 (citing ch. 79-334, § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Sugarmill Woods, 766 So. 2d at 489. See also Gainer v. Fiddlesticks Country
Club, Inc., 710 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
324. Sugarmill Woods, 766 So. 2d at 489.
325. Id. (citing renumbered FLA. STAT. § 720.312 (2000)).
326. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 617.312 (1995)).
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the parcel that has been sold for taxes survive the tax deed., 327 The issue for
the court was whether the provisions of a declaration of covenants relating to
a parcel included assessments accruing against the lot prior to the tax deed
sale.32 The court held that it did not.3 9 The court further opined that the
intent of the statute was obvious, and even though assessments accruing
prior to issuance of the tax deed would be extinguished, assessments
accruing in futuro would be preserved. 330 The court's distinction of the
difference between "covenants" and "assessments" is founded on sound
legal principles. 33 1 The court's interpretation of the 1995 amendment to the
statute applicable to homeowners associations strikes a proper balance
between the interests of municipalities in encouraging the purchase of tax
certificates and the needs of the homeowner association to insure that the
right to collect assessments against a particular lot is not abolished in
perpetuity. 33 Although one may argue that the equities should lie with the
Association,33 3 the situation is no different than in typical mortgage
foreclosure situations where the lien of the Association is
typically inferior
335
334
to the lien of the mortgagee, either by declaration proviso or statute.

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
Id.
Id. Sugarmill Woods, 766 So. 2d at 489.
Id.
Palm Beach Polo, Inc. v. Hill, 757 So. 2d 1287, 1288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

2000).
332. Sugarnill Woods, 766 So. 2d at 489-90.
333. The association is, after all, continuing to provide services to benefit the property,
for which the other homeowners must then pay.
334. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. McKesson, 639 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
335. See FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1) (2000).
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I. INTRODUCTION

The previous survey of Florida law on trusts and estates discussed
statutes, cases, and rules through the middle of 1998.1 This survey attempts
to update the prior survey through the middle of 2001.
This article highlights and summarizes, in Part II, some aspects of the
elective share provisions and other legislative changes to the Florida
Probate Code and trust administration statutes.2 Part III addresses amendments to the FloridaProbate Rules. Lastly, Part IV discusses a few recent
cases affecting this area of the law.

*

Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod is an Associate Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern

University Shepard Broad Law Center. She is also Vice-Chair of the The Florida Bar Real
Property, Probate, and Trust Law Section Model and Uniform Acts Committee. The author
would like to express her gratitude to Olympia Duhart for her research assistance.
1. Michael D. Simon & William T. Hennessey, Estates, Trusts and Guardianships:
1998 Survey of Florida Law, 23 NOVA. L. REv. 119, 120 (1998). The 1998 survey also

included a discussion of guardianship law. See generally id. However, this survey will be
limited to the laws affecting probate estates and trusts and will not include references to
statutes or rules governing guardianships.
2.
It is impractical to discuss all the changes to the probate estate and trust
administration statutes or other related statutes. Therefore, I will focus on what I deem the
more important or more interesting changes.
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STATUTORY CHANGES

The Florida Legislature has been quite active in the past three years in
amending the Florida Probate Code ("Probate Code"). Many of the
changes have been minor in nature, enacted for clarification purposes, 3 to4
eliminate redundancies with the FloridaProbate Rules ("Probate Rules"),
or to correlate a statute with another statute, such as the renumbering of
statutes.5 However, the legislature did overhaul the elective share provisions
of the Florida Probate Code, bringing it somewhat more in line with the
Uniform Probate Code.6
A. Elective Share Provisions
7
The new elective share provisions took effect October 1, 1999.
However, they only apply to estates of decedents dying after October 1,
2001. 8 Most of the existing elective share provisions were repealed,
rather
9
than merely amended, and new statutes were added in their place.
The spousal right to an elective share t° under section 732.201 has not
changed, but the statute was amended to reflect the right to a thirty percent"
share in the newly augmented "elective" estate.' 2 A spouse's right to this

3.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.302 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 733.805(1)(a) (2001)
(changing language in abatement rule from a "[p]roperty not disposed of by will" to a
"[p]roperty passing by intestacy").
4.
See, e.g., FLA. Stat. § 731.301 (2001).
5.
See, e.g., Ch. 2001-226, §§ 60-61, 2001 Fla. Laws 2010 (renumbering FLA. STAT.
§ 732,910-.911 (2001) as FLA. STAT. § 765.510-.511 (2001)).
6.
See, e.g., UNWF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203 (amended 1993) (outlining augmented
estate).
7.
§ 732.2155(1) (2000).
8.
Id.
9.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.201-.2155 (2001).
10. Of course, a spouse may have waived rights to an elective share pursuant to a
prenuptial or post nuptial agreement. For the requirements of a valid waiver effective January
2, 2001, see infra Part II.B. Any valid waiver executed prior to October 1, 1999, is valid
under the new provisions.
11. § 732.2065. An ad-hoc committee of the Florida bar had recommended
increasing the percentage of the estate payable to the surviving spouse based on the length of
the marriage but the legislature ultimately decided against that. See Florida's Elective Share
Revised Executive Summary 2, (revised Sept. 24, 2001), availableat http://www.dpowell.com
[hereinafter Executive Summary].
12. § 732.201. The statute previously stated that "[the] surviving spouse... [has] the
right to a share of the estate of the [decedent]." FLA. STAT. § 732.201 (1999). The statute, as
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elective share is still in addition to the spouse's rights to other statutory
entitlements under Part IV of the FloridaProbate Code,13
but the legislature
14
clarified that the homestead rights were included as well.
Previously, only a spouse or guardian of the surviving spouse's property
could exercise the right to the elective share. 15 The new statute also permits
a surviving spouse's attorney-in-fact to exercise the right to elect against the
estate.16 As always, if someone other than the surviving spouse exercises the
fight, then court approval is required; 17 however, the court must now take
into account the surviving spouse's lifetime needs when reviewing whether
the election is in the spouse's best interest.' 8
In addition, the time period within which to make the election has been
extended "from four months from the date of the first publication of [the]
notice of administration"' 9 to the earlier of six months from the date the
surviving spouse or "an attorney in fact or guardian of the property of the
surviving spouse" are served with a copy of the notice of administration, 20 or
two years after the decedent's death. 21 Conceivably, a surviving spouse may
not discover that the decedent has died until*some time after the second
anniversary of the decedent's death and thus, under the new statute, the
surviving spouse may be precluded from electing against the estate. The
amended, now reads, "[the] surviving spouse... has the right to a share of the elective estate
of the decedent." § 732.201.
13. § 732.2105.
14. Ch. 99-343, § 10, 1999 Fla. Laws 3568 (renumbered from FLA. STAT. § 732.208
(1999) and amended at FLA. STAT. § 732.2105 (2000)). Section 732.2105 also states that a
spouse who takes against the estate is treated as having predeceased the decedent; this
provision was previously codified under section 732.211, which has since been repealed (Ch.
99-343, § 16, 1999 Fla. Laws 3571).
15. FA. STAT. § 732.210 (1999).
16. FLA. STAT. § 732.2125 (2001). The change finally codifies the court's holding in

In re Estate of Schriver, wherein the court stated that a holder of a durable power of attorney
could exercise the elective share right on behalf of a surviving spouse. 441 So. 2d 1105, 1108
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) approved in part by Harmon v. Williams, 615 So. 2d 681 (Fla.
1993).
17. FLA. STAT. § 732.2125(2). If a surviving spouse's attorney-in-fact or guardian of
the property petitions the court for approval of the right to take the elective share, such
petition tolls the time for exercising the election. § 732.2135(4).
18. § 732.2125(2).
19. § 732.212.
20. FLA. STAT. § 732.2135(1) (2001). As originally enacted in 1999, it was the earlier

of six months from the first date of publication, rather than service of a copy, of notice of
administration. See id. It was recently amended to its present language.

21.

Id.
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statute, though, provides that a court may grant an extension for good
22
cause.
Nevertheless, this mechanism does not solve the problem, as the
petition for an extension of time must be made within the time period
provided for making the election itself.23 In the above hypothetical then, it
seems that the spouse, within two years after the other spouse is missing,
would have to file for an extension of time in order to preserve the surviving
spouse's right to later elect against the estate. But then the question remains
as to whether a court would consider this to be good cause for granting any
extension. Is this really what the legislature intended?
After a petition for the elective share has been filed, the petition may be
withdrawn as long as it is done so within eight months after the decedent's
death and the court has not yet ordered contribution.
However, upon
withdrawal, the court, in its discretion, may assess attorneys' fees and costs
against the surviving spouse.25
The biggest change to the elective share provisions concerns the
property that is included in computing the elective share amount. First, the
new elective share provisions no longer exclude real property located outside
of Florida from the probate assets included in the computation of the elective
share. 26 Section 732.2035 of the Florida Statutes includes all of the
decedent's "probate estate." 27 The "probate estate" is defined within the
Probate Code as "all property wherever located that is subject to estate
administration in any state of the United States or in the District of
Columbia. '' 28 The Probate Code clarifies that the decedent's "protected
homestead" is not included as an asset subject to administration,
and thus, its
29
computation.
share
elective
the
from
value is excluded

22. § 732.2135(2). A petition for an extension of time tolls the time for exercising the
election against the estate. § 732.2135(4).
23. § 732.2135(2).
24. § 732.2135(3).
25. Id. The surviving spouse's estate may also be assessed for such fees and costs
should the surviving spouse die. Id.
26. § 732.2035(1).
27. Id.
28. § 732.2025(7).
29. FLA. STAT. § 732.2045(1)(i). The legislature recently added a provision to the
Probate Code defining "protected homestead" as the property described under article X,
section 4 of the Florida Constitution, except for property held as a tenancy by entireties. FLA.
STAT. § 731.201(29).
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The decedent's interest in jointly held property is also included in the
elective estate. 30 This includes accounts or securities held by the decedent at
the time of death in "pay on death," Totten trust, or other similar right of
survivorship form, or as a tenancy by the entireties.3 ' For tenancies by the
entireties, one-half of the value of the account or security is included in the
computation.32 For all other jointly held survivorship accounts or securities,
the amount included is the amount that could be withdrawn by the 'decedent
without accounting to the others.33
Likewise, the elective estate includes other property held by the
decedent at the time of death as a joint tenant with right of survivorship or as
a tenancy by the entireties.34 As with jointly held accounts and securities,3 5
one-half of such other property held as a tenancy by the entireties will be
included.36 Other property held as a tenancy with right of survivorship will
be valued based on the decedent's "fractional interest. ' 37 Thus, if a decedent
owned real property with three others as a tenancy with right of survivorship,
one-third of the value of the property is included in the elective estate.
When a transferred interest in property is revocable, the value of the
property at the time of the decedent's death is added into the computation of
the elective estate; 38 revocable trusts fall into this category. However, only
those transfers that are revocable by the decedent individually or with
another person are taken into account;3 9 those transfers that are revocable
only upon the consent of all beneficiaries are excludedW
Irrevocable property transfers made by the decedent are also computed
into the elective estate.4 1 The Probate Code addresses two categories of
these irrevocable transfers. The first category consists of transfers by the
decedent in which the decedent retained the right to, or actually enjoyed the
possession or use of, income or principal at the time of the decedent's
death. 42 The second category are those transfers by the decedent in which, at
30.

§ 732.2035(2), (3).

31.

§ 732.2035(2).

32.

ld

33.

Id.

34.

§ 732.2035(3).

35.

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

36.
37.

§ 732.2035(4).
§ 732.2035(3).

38.

Id.

39.

§ 732.2035(4).

40.

Id.

41.

§ 732.2035(5).

42.

§ 732.2035(5)(a)(1).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

44

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 26:37

the time of decedent's death, another person had discretionary powers to
distribute principal to the decedent,43 such as in an irrevocable discretionary
trust.
However, if the spouse possessed the discretionary power to distribute
the principal to the decedent, then the transfer is excluded, 44 as the spouse
presumptively would have consented to any such distribution to the
decedent. Both of these types of irrevocable transfers are valued, for
elective estate purposes, based on the interest that benefits any person other
than the decedent's estate. 45 Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are some
exclusionary rules applicable to these irrevocable transfers. Excluded are
those distributions to the decedent permitted only upon the consent of all
beneficiaries, 47 as are those distributions made possible only through an
exercisable general power of appointment. 48 In addition, those distributions
that are made or would have been made to satisfy the decedent's obligations
to support are not considered. 49 Lastly, the statute excludes the value of any
contingent right of the decedent to receive principal when the contingency
was beyond the decedent's control and, in fact, never occurred before the
decedent's death.
The decedent's interest immediately prior to death, in the net cash
surrender value of insurance on the decedent's life is also computed into the
elective estate. 1 The elective share provisions do not apply, though, to any
excess life insurance proceeds5 2 or proceeds from court ordered insurance
policies on the decedent's life. 3
The elective estate also consists of the value of amounts payable upon
decedent's death under public or private pension, retirement, deferred
compensation or other similar plans, except for those benefits payable under
54
the Federal Railroad Retirement Act or Federal Social Security System.
Also excluded are proceeds in excess of the cash surrender value of life
43.
44.

§ 732.2035(5)(a)(2).

45.

§ 732.2035(5)(b).

Id.

46. § 732.2035(5)(c).
47. § 732.2035(5)(c)(1).
48. § 732.2035(5)(c)(2).
49. § 732.2035(5)(c)(3). The statute does not limit these distributions to court
ordered support obligations; however, it would seem to create a proof problem otherwise.
50. § 732.2035(5)(c)(4).
51. § 732.2035(6).
52. § 732.2045(1)(d).
53. § 732.2045(1)(e).
54. § 732.2035(7).
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insurance policies related
to certain contribution plans defined under the
55
Internal Revenue Code.
The elective estate provisions also apply to property transferred by the
decedent within one year prior to death due to the termination of the
decedent's rights in a revocable trust under section 732.2035(4) or in an
irrevocable trust under section 732.2035(5) that would otherwise have been
included in the elective estate under those sections. 6 Also included is other
property transferred by the decedent within one year prior to death, with
certain exceptions. 7 Payment for medical or educational expenses and
$10,000 payments, which qualify under the Internal Revenue Code gift tax
exclusions, are excepted from the elective estate computation.5
Lastly, the elective estate includes "[piroperty transferred in satisfaction
of the elective share." 59 This transfer is further defined as an "irrevocable
transfer by the decedent to an elective share trust." 6 An elective share trust
is defined 6 as one wherein: 1) the surviving spouse is entitled to lifetime
use of the property or to all of the income of the trust payable at least
annually; 62 2) the trust is subject to the Florida "underproductive property"
provision for trust administration 63 or the surviving spouse has the right
under the trust or state law to require the trustee to make the property
productive; 64 and 3) the surviving spouse has sole lifetime
power to
6
distribute principal or income to anyone other than the spouse. 5
The property discussed above is subject to additional exclusions under
the elective share provisions.6 6 Property transferred before October 1, 1999,
55. Id.
56. § 732.2035(8)(a). A termination of fights occurs when the decedent ends or
relinquishes such right. § 732.2035(8)(c)(1). Similarly, a terination of a power over
property occurs upon the "exercise, release, lapse, [or] default" of the power or other similar

to termination. Id Termination under this section does not occur pursuant to the terms of the
governing instrument unless such terms were purposefully included to avoid the elective share
provisions. § 732.2035(8)(d)(1).
57. § 732.2035(8)(b).

58.

Id.

59. § 732.2035(9).
60. § 732.2025(10).
61. § 732.2025(2). A trust created before October 1, 1999, the effective date of the
new elective share provisions, which meets all the requirements of an "elective share trust" is
treated as one for purposes of the new elective share provisions. § 732.2155(4).

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

§ 732.2025(2)(a).
§ 738.12 (2000).
§ 732.2025(2)(b).
§ 732.2025(2)(c).
§ 732.2045.
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67
the effective date of the new elective share provisions, is excluded.
Property transferred prior to the decedent's marriage to the surviving spouse
is likewise excluded.68 The elective estate also excludes transfers made by
the decedent for adequate consideration 69 or with the surviving spouse's
written consent. 70 The decedent's interest in any community property is not
included in the computation of the elective estate. 71 Property deemed part of
the decedent's gross estate for federal tax purposes solely because the
decedent held a general power of appointment over that property is also
excluded.7 2
In addition to the foregoing, property transferred by the decedent into a
"qualifying special needs trust" remains as property separate from the
elective estate. 73 The "qualifying special needs trust" is a court-approved
trust created before or after the decedent's death for the benefit of an
incapacitated spouse and, commencing on the decedent's death,74 the income
and principal are distributable to the surviving spouse for life "in the
discretion of one or more trustees less than half of whom are ineligible
family trustees, 7 5 and the spouse has sole lifetime power to distribute
income or principal to anyone else.76
In computing the elective estate, most of the property is computed
based on the fair market value on the date of the decedent's death, after
7
deducting mortgages,
claims and liens on that property and claims payable
from the estate. In the case of the net cash surrender value of life insurance
policies, the computation takes into account the value immediately before

67. § 732.2045(1)(a).
68. Id. This includes property transferred to a revocable or irrevocable trust if the
assets were in trust from at least October 1, 1999, through the date of decedent's death and
were non-marital assets. § 732.2155(6) (2001).
69. § 732.2045(1)(b); see also § 732.2155(5).
70. § 732.2045(1)(c). However, "spousal consent to split-gift treatment under
[federal] gift tax laws does not constitute written consent ..." Id.
71. § 732.2045(1)(f).
72.

§ 732.2045(1)(h).

73. § 732.2045(1)(g).
74. § 732.2025(8).
75. § 732.2025(8)(a). Ineligible family trustees are the decedent's grandparents and
their descendants who are not also descendants of the surviving spouse. Id.
76. § 732.2025(8)(b).
77. § 732.2055(5). As originally enacted, section 732.2055(5) excluded funeral
expenses as a claim payable by the elective estate for these purposes. § 732.2055. For a
discussion concerning funeral expense inclusion, see Executive Summary, supra note 11, cmt.
at 6.
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the decedent's death. s Any property transferred within one year prior to
decedent's death and includable in the elective estate pursuant to section
732.2035(8) is computed based on the fair market value of the property as of
the date of the termination or transfer of the property, after deducting
mortgages, claims and liens on that property.79 Pension plans and the like
are included based on the tax transfer value of the date of the decedent's
death.80
Once the elective estate is computed, the elective share is satisfied by
property in the following order of priority, unless the decedent's will or a
trust referred to in the will, if any, provides otherwise. 8 ' First, property
82
benefiting the surviving spouse is applied to satisfy the elective share.
Property benefiting the spouse includes: 1) proceeds from insurance
policies, owned by another person, on the decedent's life to the extent paid
to or benefiting the surviving spouse;8 3 2) amounts paid to or benefiting the
surviving spouse under pension plans and similar arrangements described in
section 732.3025(7); 84 3) the decedent's one-half of community property to
the extent paid to or benefiting the surviving spouse; 85 4) property in a
qualifying special needs trust;86 5) property in the elective estate that passes
to the surviving spouse; 87 and 6) property that would have satisfied the
elective share but for the surviving spouse's disclaimer. 88
Then, if that property is insufficient, the balance is satisfied from the
recipients of the remaining property in the elective estate apportioned
according to four classes, in that order of priority.89 Class 1 consists of the
decedent's probate estate, as defined in section 732.2025(7) and revocable
trusts.90 Class 2 includes accounts, securities, and other property held by the
78. § 732.2055(1). However, any right or interest in life insurance policies
transferred within one year prior to the decedent's death and includable in the elective estate
pursuant to section 732.2035(8) is valued as of the date of the termination or transfer of the

right or interest. § 732.2055(2).
79. § 732.2055(4).
80. § 732.2055(3).
81. § 732.2075(1).
82.
83.

Id.
§ 732.2075(1)(a).

84.

§ 732.2075(1)(b).

85.

§ 732.2075(1)(c).

86.
87.
88.
89.

§ 732.2075(1)(d).
§ 732.2075(I)(e).
§ 732.2075(1)(O.
§ 732.2075(2).

90.

§ 732.2075(2)(a).
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decedent with another in a survivorship form, such as Totten trusts, joint
tenants with right of survivorship, and tenancy by the entireties. 9 It also
includes the decedent's property interests in irrevocable transfers described
in section 732.2035(5) and pension plans and similar arrangements described
in section 732.2035(7) where the decedent died owning the power to
designate the recipient of those property interests. 92 Class 3 takes into
93
account all other property interests, except protected charitable interests.
Class 4 consists of "protected charitable lead interests," as defined in the
statute, to the extent allowable without disqualifying such interest from
being deducted under the federal gift tax laws. 94 As in the computation of
the elective estate, most of the property used95to satisfy the elective estate is
valued as of the date of the decedent's death.
Only direct recipients of the elective estate and beneficiaries, including
trusts, are liable for contribution to the elective share. 9 6 The abatement rules
under section 733.805 continue to apply for distribution of the Class 1
probate estate used to satisfy the elective estate. 97 Recipients of property
designated as Class 2 and Class 3 pay according to their proportionate share
within each class. 98 Trust beneficiaries contribute a percentage based on the
amount of principal distributed to such beneficiaries after the decedent's
death. 99 Contribution may be in cash or in kind.1° Once payment has been
made to the surviving spouse, as under the old provisions, the spouse is
treated as having predeceased the decedent.1 ' 1
These new provisions have yet to be challenged in court. However,
before they applied to any estates, the legislature found itself tweaking its

91.

§ 732.2075(2)(b).

92.

Id.

93. § 732.2075(2)(c).
94. § 732.2075(2)(d).
95. § 732.2095.
96. § 732.2085(1). Section 732.2115 protects certain payors and third parties acting
in good faith in reliance on a governing instrument. Id. For the definitions of "payor,"
"governing instrument," and certain other terms included in the new elective share provisions,
see generally § 732.2025.

97.

§ 732.2075(4).

98.

§ 732.2085(1)(a).

99. § 732.2085(1)(b).
100. § 732.2075(3). See also § 732.2085(2). Section 732.2145 describes the personal
representative's duties in collecting the contribution.
101. § 732.2105(2) (2000). This provision was previously codified in section 732.211.
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own drafted language.10 2 It will be interesting to see how the new provisions
play out.
B. Other Changes to Probate Code
This year, the legislature passed the "Barry Grunow Act," which
provides benefits to public school teachers and administrators who are
intentionally killed or injured in the line of duty. 10 3 As part of the Act, any
paid benefits are included as exempt property under section 732.402.'0 4 The
26, 2000.105
Act applies retroactively to incidents occurring on or after May
The following changes become effective on January 1, 2002.106 In
order for a spouse residing in Florida to effectively waive rights to the
elective share, intestate share, pretermitted share, homestead, exempt
property, family allowance, and preference in appointment as the personal
representative of an intestate estate, that spouse must sign the waiver in the
presence of two subscribing witnesses. 1°7 Removal of contents from safe
deposit boxes is now governed by section 733.6065.'°z The biggest change
to the previous provision is that, in addition to the safe deposit box
inventory, the personal representative will have to file a copy of the safe
deposit box entry record from the period of time commencing six months
prior to the decedent's death through and including the date of the
inventory. 0 9 A personal representative will now be required to serve formal
notice of a copy of the Notice10 of Administration on "[plersons who may be
entitled to exempt property."
A much needed change was made to the intestacy statute governing
spousal share. When the decedent's lineal descendants are also the surviving
spouse's lineal descendants, the surviving spouse will receive the first
$60,000 of the intestate estate, an increase of $40,000."' Property used to
102. See generally ch. 2001-226.

103. Ch. 2001-180, §§ 1-6, 2001 Fla. Laws 1-3 (codified in FLA. STAT. §§ 112.1915,
732.402). Barry Grunow was a Florida public school teacher shot and killed in the school by
one of his students. Kellie Patrick, Tolerance Dips to Zero as Schools' End Nears, SUN
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 31, 2001, at IA.
104. FLA. STAT. § 732.402(2)(d) (2001).
105. § 112.1915.
106. § 731.155.

107. § 732.702(1).
108. § 733.6065.
109. Id.

110. § 733.212(1)(d).
111. § 732.102.
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effect such a payment will be valued as 1of the date of distribution, rather
12
than as of the date of the decedent's death.
The maximum amount of family allowance payable to dependents of
the decedent has also been increased to $18,000,113 three times the maximum
previously permitted by law. 114 Exempt property, under section 732.402 of
the FloridaStatutes, will now be deducted from the estate before computing
any residuary, intestacy, pretermitted, or elective shares." 5 The suggested
form for the self-proving affidavit includes two separate declarations, one by
the testator/testatrix and another by the witnesses.116 What is most
interesting about this change is that the testator/testatrix will have to declare
to the witnesses that the document is that person's will for the affidavit to be
valid." 7
The anti-lapse statutes will now apply to beneficiaries of testamentary
trusts.1 18 Family administration is completely repealed; 1 9 however, the
threshold for estates subject to summary administration increases to estates
valued at $75,000120 from $25,000.121 Before the court enters an order
granting summary administration, a petitioner for summary administration
will have to conduct a diligent and reasonable search for ascertainable
creditors, serve a copy of the petition on any such creditors, and provide for
payment to those creditors. 122
The legislature has amended the language of section 732.515 '" to make
it consistent with section 732.505 concerning revocation of a will or codicil
by a subsequent writing. 12 The legislature added a sentence stating that,
where there exists more than one separate writing disposing tangible
112. Id. My students in Wills and Trusts will be elated with this change.
113. § 732.403.
114. Id.
115. § 732.402. I would presume that for these purposes homestead would be treated
in the same manner as exempt property, but this issue has not been addressed by either the
legislature or the courts. Likewise, the statute does not address whether any family allowance
is excluded before determination of those shares.
116. § 732.503.
117. Id.
118. § 732.603.
119. Ch. 2001-226, § 178, 2001 Fla. Laws 108-09.
120. § 735.201(2).
121. See FLA. STAT. § 735.201(2) (2000).
122. § 735.206(2) (2001).
123. § 732.515.
124. Section 732.505 of the FloridaStatutes states: "[a] will or codicil, or any part of
either, is revoked... by a subsequent inconsistent will or codicil ... only so far as the
inconsistency."
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personal property, the more recent writing revokes any inconsistent
provisions in any other prior writings.'25 A provision has been added to
section 733.613 of the FloridaStatutes, where, upon the issuance of a court
order authorizing the personal representative to sell or mortgage real
property, the purchaser or lender takes the property free of creditors' claims
against the estate, 1 except
for existing mortgages and liens, and rights of
26
estate beneficiaries.
C. Changes to Trust Administrationand Related Statutes
As opposed to the Probate Code, the trust administration statutes have
remained fairly unchanged.'2 7 However, the following are some points of
interest. Effective July 1, 1999, any attorney rendering services to a trust as
of that date may petition for a court order awarding attorneys' fees; the
petition must be served on the trustee and beneficiaries.
Also, the
legislature further limited the personal liability of a successor trustee beyond
those succeeding only grantor trustees of revocable trusts.' 29 Under this
provision, a successor trustee is also not personally liable 30 to the trust
beneficiaries for any prior trustee's actions or omissions where a super
majority of the beneficiaries has released the successor trustee T3 or to any
particular beneficiary that has effectuated such a release.
The next legislative session rewrote the trust "slayer statute' ' 132 and
added a provision concerning evidence of death. 33 The language of both
125. § 732.515.
126. § 733.613. The legislature seems to have somewhat codified the result in
Anderson v. Johnson; in that case, the court held that a bona fide buyer who took title to the
estate owned real property, pursuant to a court order, free of an interested party's claim for
partition. 732 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
127. That is not to say that the legislature did not perform some minor housekeeping in
that area as well, such as omitting legalese and changing the word "settlor" to "grantor" in
some provisions. See, e.g., Ch. 2001-226, §§ 187-88, 190,2001 Fla.Laws 113-16, 116-17.
128. FLA. STAT. § 737.2035 (2000). Service on beneficiaries is required only on those
beneficiaries entitled to an accounting. Id.
129. FLA. STAT. § 737.306 (2001). Former section 737.306 of the Florida Statutes
applied only with respect to a trust "that was revocable during the time that the grantor served

as trustee." FLA. STAT. § 737.306 (1999).
130. For a complete list of circumstances under which a successor trustee is not

personally liable, see FLA. STAT. § 737.306 (2001).
131. § 737.306(3)(e)(1). "Super majority" is defined as "at least two-thirds in interest
of the beneficiaries" where the interests are ascertainable or, otherwise, "two-thirds in number
of the beneficiaries." § 737.306(3)(f).
132. § 737.625.
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1 34
statutes conforms to the language found in the Probate Code counterparts.
In addition, the legislature extended the savings clause of the rule against
perpetuities from 99 years to 360 years for nonvested property interests and
powers of appointments in trusts created after December 31, 2000.135

D. Other Related Statutory Changes
It has become a bit easier for the estate practitioner regarding estate tax
filings with the Florida Department of Revenue. The Preliminary Notice and
Report has been eliminated for those estates where the decedent died as of
January 1, 2000.136 If no estate tax is due, a practitioner
may now simply file
137
with the clerk of the court an affidavit to this effect.
The Medicaid Estate Recovery Act' 38 was enacted effective July 1,
1999.139 This Act establishes the right, pursuant to federal law, of the
Agency for Health Care Administration to file a claim against an estate of a
Medicaid recipient at least fifty-five years old. 40 However, there will be no
recovery by the Agency where the decedent is survived by a spouse, minor
children, or a blind or permanently disabled child.'14 Other heirs may
petition for a hardship waiver under certain circumstances. 142 In addition,
the claim is not enforceable against property exempt from creditors' claims
pursuant to Florida law. 143 In order to ensure compliance, a personal
representative must serve a copy of the Notice of Administration on the
Agency when a decedent was at least fifty-five years old.144
Lastly, the anatomical gifts provisions have been removed from the
Probate Code and added to the chapter on "Health Care Advance

133. § 737.626.
134. See FLA. STAT. §§ 731.103, 732.802 (2000).
135. FLA. STAT. § 689.225(2)(f).
136. Ch. 99-208, § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws 1260, 1265 (repealing FLA. STAT. § 198.12).
137. FLA. STAT. § 198.32(2). For a copy of the "Affidavit of No Estate Tax Due," see
Form DR-312, available at http://sun6.dms.state.fl.usldor/formsl1999/dr312.pdf. If an estate
tax return is in fact filed with the Department of Revenue and yet no estate tax is due, the
Department will still issue a certificate of nonliability. § 198.13(2).
138. § 409.9101.
139. Id.
140. § 409.9101(3).
141. § 409.9101(6).
142. § 409.9101(8).
143. § 409.9101(7).
144. § 733.2121(3)(d).
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Directives."' 45 Chapter 765 had also been amended earlier to, among other
things, permit the termination of life prolonging procedures1 47for persons with
!
an end-stage condition 4 or in a persistent vegetative state.
III. PROBATE RULES
There have not been any significant substantive changes to the Florida
Probate Rules. However, one particular rule should please most probate
attorneys. Under rule 5.110, an attorney serving as resident agent for a
personal representative need only state the attorney's office address and
mailing address rather than the attorney's residence address as previously
required.1 48 This amendment became effective January 1, 2001.149
IV. CASES
This Part highlights a few select Florida cases that may be of interest
to a trust and estates practitioner.
The courts had an opportunity to address the distribution of wrongful
death proceeds between the decedent's survivors and estate. In In re Estate
of Wiggins,1 50 the appellate court upheld a lower court's admission of expert
witness testimony concerning the distribution of those proceeds.151 In that
case, an estate recovered, on behalf of the decedent's survivors and estate,
$100,000 in proceeds from the insurer of the driver that killed the
decedent. 152 The hospital where the decedent was taken when the accident
occurred filed a claim against the estate for services rendered in the amount
of $19,030.90. 53 The trial court permitted the personal representative to
introduce the testimony of an attorney specializing in wrongful death
cases.154 Because a jury never heard the case, the attorney, as an expert,
145. §§ 765.510-.522.
146. "End-stage condition" is defined as a severe and permanent irreversible
deterioration. § 765.101(4).
147. § 765.302(1). A "persistent vegetative state" is one where there is permanent and
irreversible unconsciousness. § 765.101(12).
148. Amendments to Florida Probate Rules, 778 So. 2d 272, 280 (Fla. 2001)
(amending, among others, 5 FLA. PROBATE R. 120).

149. Id. at 273.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

729 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at526.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Id.
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testified as to the probable jury verdict on damages, and the apportionment
of these damages had the case gone to trial.' 55 The expert estimated that the
jury would probably have awarded $775,000 in damages, 3.3% of which (or
$26,000) would have been distributed to the estate. 56 Since the actual
recovery totaled only $100,000 (the policy's limit), rather than distributing
3.3% of the actual recovery ($3300), the personal representative recommended that the court distribute a greater amount, ten percent of the total
recovery ($10,000), to the estate.157 Due to the order of priority for paying
claims and expenses under the Probate Code, there were barely any funds
remaining to pay the hospital. 5 The hospital appealed the trial court's use
of the expert testimony as to the value of the wrongful death claim and
apportionment of the estimated value. 159 The appellate court held that as
long as the trial court fairly apportions the value of a wrongful death claim
among the decedent's survivors and estate, based 16 on substantial and
competent evidence, then the trial court's ruling stands. 0
Another case also involved the distribution of proceeds recovered in a
In that case, a
settlement before a wrongful death action was instituted.
minor child was killed in a car accident caused by her mother. 62 The father,
who was appointed personal representative of the child's estate, asked the
court to award him the full amount of the settlement; the father argued that
the mother was at fault in the accident and thus should be awarded
nothing. 63 The trial court disagreed and apportioned damages among the
64 The appellate court reversed. 65
two parents based on the intestacy statute.
The court applied the Florida Wrongful Death Act in reaching its
decision. 66 The court noted that, in wrongful death claims, a court must
consider the comparative negligence of a survivor in reducing or denying an
apportionment of damages to that survivor. 167 Thus, even though the issue of
apportionment was before the probate court because the claim was settled
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Wiggins, 729 So. 2d at 524.
ld. at 525.
Id.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.707).
Id. at 526.
Wiggins, 729 So. 2d at 526.
Hess v. Hess, 758 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1204.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 1206.
Hess, 758 So. 2d at 1204-05 (citing FLA.
Id. at 1205 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.20).
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before suit, theprobate judge could not avoid the application of the wrongful
death statutes. 16 Accordingly, the appellate court remanded
the case for an
169
entry of an order awarding all the proceeds to the father.
In a case that will surely disturb creditors, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal held that, under the facts, a brother-in-law and a niece related by
marriage were heirs for homestead protection purposes.7
In Moss v.
Moss, 17 a decedent devised a share of her homestead property to the brother
and niece of her predeceased spouse. 172 The lower court afforded homestead
protection to blood relatives of the decedent, but not to her deceased
husband's relatives; therefore, the court awarded the property only to the
decedent's relatives.173 The appellate court noted that in Snyder v. Davis, the
Supreme Court of Florida held that, where a homestead is properly devised,
the homestead provision extends homestead protection to any person
categorized within the intestacy statute. 174 Because the intestacy statute
includes familial heirs of the last deceased spouse as heirs of an intestate
estate, the decedent's brother-in-law and niece by marriage were her heirs
for homestead purposes and thus entitled to the devise of the decedent's
homestead property protected from creditors' claims. 175
In In re Estate of DeLuca,176 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
addressed the issue of whether service of a copy of the Notice of
Administration is required when there are later discovered codicils. 177 In
that case, Josephine Hyland, a beneficiary of the decedent's will, received a
copy of the Notice of Administration. 5 Hyland desired to challenge the
validity of the will; however, she did not file a claim within the limitations
period pursuant to section 733.212.179 After the time period for objections
had expired, the co-personal representatives of the estate filed two newly
8
discovered
codicils, which
promptly
0
The
personal representatives
did were
not send
Hylandadmitted
a Noticeto ofprobate.'
Administration
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

ad at 1205-06.
Id at 1206.
Moss v. Moss, 777 So. 2d 1110, 1113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1111.

173. Id.
174. Id. at 1112 (citing Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997)).
175. Moss, 777 So. 2d at 1112-13.
176. 748 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
177. Id at 1086-87.
178. Id. at 1087.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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regarding these
codicils. 181 Hyland then filed a petition to revoke the will
182
and codicil.
The personal representatives argued that her petition was untimely
because the three-month objection period had expired from the time they had
served the Notice of Administration. 183 Hyland's argument was that the
original time period did not apply because a new Notice of Administration
was necessitated with regard to the codicils. 84 The appellate court agreed
with Hyland.1 5 The court first noted that a codicil is included in the
definition of a will.' 86 It then reviewed section 733.212 that limits the time
for an interested person to challenge a will, and thus a codicil, only when a
Notice of Administration has been served. 187 Because no notice as to the
codicils was served on Hyland, she was not time barred and could object to
the validity of the will and codicils under section 733.109.188
In May v. Illinois NationalInsurance Co., the Supreme Court of Florida
addressed another limitations issue.1 9 In that case, the court reviewed
section 733.702, entitled "Limitations on presentation of claims,"' 19 and
section 733.710, entitled "Limitations on claims against estate." 19 1 The
question certified to the court was:
WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF
THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY
AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF
NONCLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION
EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED WITHIN
THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT BINDING ON
THE ESTATE, OR DO THEY ACT AS STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS WHICH MUST BE PLEADED AND PROVED

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

DeLuca, 748 So. 2d at 1088.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DeLuca, 748 So. 2d at 1088.
Id.
Id. at 1089.
May v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2000).
190. Id. at 1145; FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (2000).
191. May, 771 So. 2d at 1145; FLA. STAT. § 733.710.
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AS

AFFIRMATIVE
192

DEFENSES IN ORDER TO AVOID

WAIVER.

After analyzing the language in the statutes, the court decided that

section 733.710 is a self-executing statute of repose that absolutely bars any
claims filed on an untimely basis. 193 On the other hand, the court held that
section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. 194 The court based its decision on
the language found in section 733.702. That statute permits an enlargement
of time to file a claim upon a showing of fraud, estoppel or insufficiency of
notice of the claims period. 195 However, section 733.702(5) explicitly states
that "nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in
[section] 733.710.,,196 In reading the two statutes together, the court stated
that holding otherwise would result in both statutes being "all but

indistinguishable."' 197 Thus, since there is no provision for extending section
is a statute of repose which absolutely prohibits
733.710, that statute
19
untimely claims. 8
There are four other cases also worthy of mention. In Williams v.
99 the First District Court of Appeal held that the elements
Estate of Pender,1

of a virtual adoption must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.mo
The court noted that, to date, no other court had affirmatively ruled on the

making its decision by the courts' reasoning in
issue, but it was guided in 201
prior virtual adoption cases.

192. May, 771 So. 2d at 1145. The question was certified by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. May v. Ill. Nat'l. Ins. Co., 190 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th
Cir. 1999). Prior to that, two Florida district courts of appeal had certified a conflict to the
Supreme Court on the same issue. See Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating
Partners, L.P., 673 So. 2d 163, 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (certifying conflict with
Baptist Hosp. of Miami v. Carter, 658 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)); Lutheran
Bhd. Legal Reserve Fraternal Benefit Soc'y v. Estate of Petz, 744 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (aligning itself with Comerica and certifying conflict with Baptist
Hospital).

193. May, 771 So. 2d at 1145.
194. Id.
195. Id.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 1156.
Id.
May, 771 So. 2d at 1145.
738 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 456.
Id. at 454-56.
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Snyder v. Bell 2 concerned the award of attorneys' fees in a claim of
breach of a trustee's fiduciary duties. 20 3 At trial, the jury found in favor of
the trustee; however, the court denied the trustee an award of attorneys' fees
under section 737.627.204 On appeal, the court reversed and addressed the
issue of the amount that could be awarded . The court noted that section
737.627 is similar to section 733.106, which provides for the award of
attorneys' fees in defending a probate action.206 The court then relied on the
opinion in Dayton v. Conger where the Third District Court of Appeal held
that there is no personal liability for attorneys' fees under section 733.106. 20
Accordingly, the court held that the trustee's award 2of8 attorney's fees could
be no greater than the beneficiary's share in the trust. 0
In the third case, also concerning attorneys' fees, the Third District
Court of Appeal issued a warning regarding duplication of such fees. 2 9 The
Brake court stated, in dicta, that needless legal work should not be
rewarded. 210 In a strongly worded opinion, it stated that the public has
become repulsed by a probate process which "they perceive to be a sharing
of the estate with an attorney.
It suggested that courts "seize
control" as
21 2
they are the "ultimate guardian[s] of the public's ...property.
Finally, in Persan v. Life Concepts, Inc.,2 13 the court stated that
"[m]aking a gift to,,214
a charity for a specific project or purpose does not create
There, some donors had given twenty-four acres of
a charitable trust.
real property to Central Florida Sheltered Workshop, Inc. ("CFSW") to
construct homes for disadvantaged adults. 215 CFSW built the homes but sold
216
the property fifteen years later.
202. 746 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
203. Id. at 1100.
204. Id. at 1101. Section 737.627 provides for the award of attorneys' fees in
challenges to trustees' exercise of powers. FLA. STAT. § 737.627 (2000).
205. Snyder, 746 So. 2d at 1103-04.
206. Id. at 1104 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.106).
207. Id. at 1104 (citing Dayton v. Conger, 448 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984)).
208. Id.
209. Brake v. Murphy, 736 So. 2d 745, 748 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
210. rd.
211. Id. at749.
212. Id.
213. 738 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
214. Id. at 1010.
215. Id. at 1009.
216. Id.
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A lawsuit was filed against Life Concepts, Inc., the successor charity to
CFSW, for breach of a charitable trust or, in the alternative, an imposition of
a resulting trust. 217 The court held that neither type of trust existed. 21s In
order to create a charitable trust in land, the trust must be in writing, signed
by the party creating the trust and evincing the intent to create a trust. 219 In
this case, the real property was given by deed with no restrictions, right of
reverter or other conditions creating an express charitable trust.22 Again,
because the court found that the property was transferred directly by the
owner221to CFSW as a gift, the court found that a resulting trust did not
exist.
V. CONCLUSION

It is evident from this survey that the law of trusts and estates is not
well settled in this state. In some instances, the Florida Legislature was
motivated by a need to implement clarifications to the language in the law.
Other changes reflect the need to fulfill the legislature's role in responding
to public policy needs. Similarly, the courts' decisions in recent cases
attempt to meet these goals. Clearly, it is imperative that the practitioner in
this dynamic field closely monitor changes in the law of trusts and estates.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id at 1009-10.
Persan,738 So. 2d. at 1012.
Id. at 1012 (citing FLA. STAT. § 689.05).
Id. at 1011.
Id. at 1012.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In our legal system of trial by jury, a good deal of the law of evidence is
given to exploring hearsay and its exceptions. "The factors upon which the
value of testimony depends, are: the perception, memory, narration, and
sincerity of the witness." 1 In order to encourage witnesses to put forth their
*
Leonard Birdsong is an Associate Professor of Law at Barry University School of
Law, Orlando, Florida. He received his B.A. (Cum Laude) at Howard University in 1968 and
his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1973. He served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the

District of Columbia, and later as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Virgin Islands. He
teaches Evidence, Criminal Law, and White Collar Crime. He also appears as a legal analyst
for Fox News, Court TV, and MSNBC. Professor Birdsong wishes to thank reference
librarians Warren McEwen, Alan Diefenbach, and Michael Schnau of the Barry University
School of Law Library for their research assistance in preparation of this article. He also

Published by NSUWorks, 2001

61

Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 26:59

best efforts and to expose inaccuracies that might be present with respect to
any of these factors, our trial system has developed what is known as the
testimonial ideal. That is, witnesses are required to testify under oath, testify
in person, and be subject to cross examination. The rule against hearsay is
designed to insure compliance with these ideals. When one of them is
absent, a hearsay objection becomes pertinent.2 Hearsay evidence is often
characterized as unreliable and untrustworthy. Nevertheless, courts constantly admit hearsay evidence under the numerous exceptions found in the
common law and in latter day statutes. "Hearsay evidence exhibits a wide
range of reliability. The effort to adjust the rules of admissibility [of hearsay
evidence] to variations in reliability has been
a major motivating factor in
3
the movement to liberalize evidence law."
The FederalRules of Evidence, adopted in 19754 for use in the federal
courts and adopted by many states, have helped liberalize the introduction of
trustworthy hearsay evidence at trials. The Federal Rules of Evidence
recognize twenty-eight standard exceptions to the hearsay rule.6 In addition
7
to those exceptions and the "nonhearsay" exceptions, Congress, in promulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence?, adopted rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5), as residual hearsay exceptions. Such rules allowed the introduction of hearsay statements not specifically covered by any of the named
exceptions but having circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
if the
8
court determined that certain stated conditions were met.
wishes to thank Professor Stephen Leacock of Barry University School of Law for reading and
offering helpful insights to the preparation of this article.
1.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE: 1996 COURTROOM
MANUAL (1995).
5.
Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "these rules shall be
construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,
and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
6.
FED. R. EviD. 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(1)-(4), (6).
7.
FED. R. EvED. 801(d).
8.
FED. R. Evm. 803 (1997) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as

witness:
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
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It was intended that the residual exceptions would be used sparingly by
courts
and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. 9 The Advisory
the
Committee cautioned that the residual exceptions "do not contemplate an
unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but they do provide for treating
new and presently unanticipated situations which demonstrate
trustworthy1°
ness within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions."
"Of all the exceptions [to the hearsay rule], the residual exceptions have
probably generated the greatest amount of controversy."' 1 One evidence
scholar, James Beaver, who has examined the use of the residual exceptions,
fears that the residual exceptions will swallow the hearsay rule. 12 Another
scholar, Thomas Black, believes that the residual exceptions may be used in
such a manner in the federal courts as to abuse traditional concepts of
evidence. 13 As this article will demonstrate, such fears are totally
unfounded.
In 1997, the residual exceptions of rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), were
amended and cast into one new rule, 807 of the FederalRules of Evidence.14
The amended rule provides:

which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by the admission
of statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to

prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including name and address of the declarant.

FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) (1997). Rule 804(b)(5) of the 1997 Federal Rules of Evidence is
identical in language except for its preamble which states "the following are not excluded by
the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness."
9.
See Senate Comm. on Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7051, 7065-66.
10. See James W. Moore et al., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE § 803.12 (1997 ed.).
11. James E. Beaver, The Residual HearsayException Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 787, 789 (1993).
12. Id. at 790; but cf. G. Michael Fenner, The Residual Exception to the Hearsay
Rule: The Complete Treatment, 33 CREIGHTON L. REv. 265, 303 (2000) ("the residual
exception is the safety valve of the hearsay rule.").
13. Thomas Black, Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 804(b)(5)-The Residual
Exceptions-An Overview, 25 Hous. L. REv. 13, 56 (1988).
14. Rule 807, of the Federal Rules of Evidence, became effective on December 1,
1997. See FEDERAL RULES OF EVMENCE HANDBOOK (Anderson Publ'g 1999).
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A statement not specifically covered by rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not
excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement
and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.15
In amending the residual exception the Advisory Committee noted that
"[t]he contents of Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) have been combined and
additions to Rules
transferred to a new Rule 807. This was done to facilitate
16
803 and 804. No change in meaning is intended.'
Prior to the 1997 amendment, the aforementioned scholar, James
Beaver, surveyed the use of the residual exceptions and found that between
1975 and 1993, the residual exceptions and their state equivalents were
reported in more than 140 federal cases and in more than 90 state cases. 17 He
concludes that such figures suggest that the residual exceptions were being
used more than just in rare and exceptional circumstances. 18 He also
maintained that the residual exceptions weaken the hearsay rule and
cautioned states to refuse to adopt the residuals on the ground that they were
undesirable and unnecessary. 19 Another scholar, John Strong, the general
editor of McCormick on Evidence, believes resort to the exception has been
and is surprised by its prominent use by prosecutors in federal
substantial
2°
courts.

A review of recent cases reveals that the admission of residual hearsay
pursuant to the exception is being used sparingly and only after a good deal
of analysis by both the federal courts and by the courts of states which allow
15.

FED.R. EviD. 807.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Beaver, supra note 11, at 790.
Id. at 791.
Id.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 324.
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the exception. In Beaver's survey, he found that the residual exception was
reported in 140 federal cases and 90 state cases. He believes that this was
abuse of the rule and that we better be careful. However, such analysis,
relying solely on the number of reported cases, is flawed. Everything is
relative. The use of the residual exception as reported in 140 cases over a 23
year period does not seem astounding, given there are 13 federal circuit
courts of appeals in the country. Nor does it seem astounding that the
residual exception was reported in 90 state cases during the same period.
We have 50 state court systems, many with a two tier appellate court system
consisting of a court of appeal and a higher state supreme court.
If Beaver had analyzed exactly how the residual exception was used in
each case, he would have found no abuse. The purpose of this article is to
survey and analyze the pertinent reported federal and state decisions
addressing admission of residual hearsay since the 1997 amendment to the
residual exception. Such survey and analysis reveal that there is little
likelihood that the hearsay rule will be swallowed by the residual exception.
A secondary purpose of this article is to provide civil trial lawyers, defense
attorneys, prosecutors, and judges examples of how the circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness of the residual exception have been argued and
analyzed in federal and state courts in recent years.
11. HEARSAY, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, AND THE STATES
In order to understand the residual exception, one must appreciate the
definition of hearsay under the Federal Rules. The rules first define a
statement as, "an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." 22 Thus, hearsay,
under the rules, is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."2 The definition is an affirmative one, which says that "an
out-of-court assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is
hearsay." 2 "Exceptions to the hearsay rule usually are justified on the
ground that evidence meeting the requirements of the exception possess
special reliability and often special need, such as the unavailability of the
21. In May, 2001 the author, with assistance from the Barry University School of Law
Library reference staff, undertook an on-line search of cited cases referencing the residual
exception since 1997. The cases cited herein are a result of that search.
22. FED. R. Evm. 801(a).
23. FED.R. Evin. 801(c).
24. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 246.
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declarant."5 That is, there is an objective guaranty of trustworthiness to
such statements.26
The often cited examples of exceptions that exhibit such guarantees of
trustworthiness are the excited utterance,27 statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis,2 records of regularly conducted activity,29 statements in
ancient documents,
the dying declaration, and, of course, statements
32
against interest.
Forty-one states, Puerto Rico, and the military have adopted the Federal
Rules of Evidence.33 The majority of these states adopted rules of evidence
based on the final Federal Rules of Evidence.34 As the Federal Rules of
Evidence are amended, some states also promptly amend their corresponding
rules to maintain similarity with the federal rules.35 "The following states
have not adopted rules of evidence based on the FederalRules of Evidence:
25.
26.

Id. § 254.
Id. § 256.

27.
28.
29.

FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
FED. R. Evin. 803(4).
FED. R. Evm. 803(6).

30. FED. R. EvID. 803(16).
31. FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(2).
32. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3).
33. 6 WEINSTEN'S FEDERAL EViDENCE, TI (2d ed. 2000)
34. Id. at T2-T7. The Alabama Rules of Evidence became effective 1/1/96; Alaska
Rules effective 8/1/79; Arizona Rules effective 9/1/77; Arkansas Rules effective 7/1/76;
Colorado Rules effective 1/1/80; Delaware Rules effective 1/1/80; Florida Rules effective
7/1/79; Hawaii Rules effective 1/1/81; Idaho Rules effective 1/1/85; Indiana Rules effective
1/1/94; Iowa Rules effective 1/1/83; Kentucky Rules effective 1/1/92; Louisiana Rules
effective 1/1/89; Maine Rules effective 2/2/76; Maryland Rules effective 1/1/94; Michigan
Rules effective 3/1/78; Minnesota Rules effective 7/1/77; Mississippi Rules effective I/1/86;
Montana Rules effective 7/1/77; Nebraska Rules effective 8/24/75; Nevada Rules effective
1/1/71 (based on Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules); New Hampshire Rules effective
1/1/85; New Jersey Rules effective 1/1/93; New Mexico Rules effective 1/1/73 (amended
7/1/76 to conform to the changes made to the draft Federal Rules by Congress); North
Carolina Rules effective 7/1/84; North Dakota Rules effective 2/15/77; Ohio Rules effective
7/1/80; Oklahoma Rules effective 10/1/78; Oregon Rules effective 1/1/82; Pennsylvania Rules
effective 10/1/98; Puerto Rico Rules effective 10/1/79; Rhode Island Rules effective 10/1/87;
South Carolina Rules effective 9/3/95; South Dakota Rules effective 7/1/78; Tennessee Rules
effective 1/1/90; Texas Rules effective 3/1/98; Utah Rules effective 9/1/83; Vermont Rules
effective 4/1/83; Washington Rules effective 4/2/79; West Virginia Rules effective 2/1/85;
Wisconsin Rules effective 7/1/74 (based on Final Draft of the Federal Rules); Wyoming Rules
effective 1/1/78. The Military Rules of Evidence are based on the Federal Rules and were
adopted 3/12/80. Id. at T2-T7 (citations omitted).
35. Id. atTl.
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California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Virginia, and the Virgin Islands. ' 36
The forty-one states, Puerto Rico; and the military that have adopted the
FederalRules of Evidence have all adopted rules similar to the hearsay rule
of 801. 3 7 However, not all of these states have adopted the residual
exceptions.3 8 Of the states that have adopted such residual exceptions,
Colorado appears to be the only state to have already amended its rules to
combine the 803(24) and 804(b)(5) into one rule 807 as have the Federal
Rules of Evidence.3 9 The states which have not adopted a residual exception
are: Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and1
Louisiana limits its residual exception to civil cases.
Washington.
43
Nevada and Wisconsin omit the notice requirement of the federal rule.
Although Florida has not adopted a residual exception akin to rule 807,
it has two sections of its evidence code4 which speak to the kinds of
circumstances where residual hearsay exceptions often are applied. These
may be thought of as "quasi residual" exceptions. Section 90.803(23) of the
FloridaEvidence Code, allows the use of out-of-court statements of a child,
eleven years old or less, describing child abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse
against the child, 45 after the court holds a hearing to determine reliability of
such statements.4 The statute is applicable whether the child is available or
unavailable to testify.47 If the child is unavailable to testify and the
statements are deemed to be reliable by the court, there must be other
36.

Id atT7.

37.
38.

Id. at T106-12.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 33, at T159-61. The states that have adopted residual

exceptions are:

Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa,

Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the United
States Military.
39.

Id. at T159-61; see also CoLo. R. EvID. 807, effective January 1, 1999.

40. Id. at T159-61.
41. Id. at T160.
42. The State of Nevada has no residual exception where the declarant is available.
Nevada does provide a residual exception akin to rule 807 when the declarant is unavailable.
However, the Nevada rule omits the notice requirement. Id. at T160.
43.

WEINSTEIN, supra note 33, at T160, T162.

44.
45.
46.

See FLA. R. EvD. § 90.803(23), (24) (2000).
FLA. R. EVID. § 90.803(23)(a) (2000).
§ 90.803(23)(a)(1).

47.

§ 90.803(23)(a)(2)(a), (b).
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corroborating evidence of the offense before such statement may be used.4
There is also a ten day notice requirement that must be given to a defendant
in a criminal case.49 Finally, the court, under this statute must make specific
findings of fact on the record as to the basis for its ruling to admit or exclude
the statements.5 0 Section 90.803(24) of the FloridaEvidence Code is identical, except that it applies to elderly or disabled adults.5 '
Florida promulgated such hearsay exceptions for children in 1985.52
The Florida exception was expanded to the elderly in 1995.53 However, it
was not until after 1990 that a number of other states were confronted with
the need for such exceptions. This was as a result of the Supreme Court's
ruling in State v. Wright.5 4 In Wright, a child sexual abuse case, the Court
was required to decide whether the admission at trial of certain hearsay statements admitted under Idaho's residual exception violated the defendant's
rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.5 5 The hearsay statements were made by a child declarant to an examining pediatrician.5 6 At trial, the child was unavailable as a witness 57 and the pediatrician
58
testified as to the child's statements concerning the abuse.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Idaho, which ruled
that the defendant's right to confrontation had been denied by admission of
the testimony.5 9 The Court held that the State of Idaho could not use other
evidence corroborating the truth of such a hearsay statement to support a
findin that the statement bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthyIn other words, to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause,
ness."
hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of
reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other
evidence at trial. 61 The Court in Wright declined to endorse a mechanical

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

§ 90.803 (23)(a)(2)(b).
§ 90.803(23)(b).
§ 90.803(23)(c).
§ 90.803(24)(a)-(c).
See In re Amendments to FloridaEvidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 2000).
§ 90.803(24).
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
Id. at 808.
Id. at 809.
Id.
Id.
Wright, 497 U.S. at 827.
Id. at 823.
Id.
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test for determining "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,"
however, the Court alluded to a number of factors that might make the
hearsay statements made by a child in an abuse case reliable, including
spontaneity and consistent repetition, lack of motive to fabricate, mental
state of the 3 declarant, and use of terminology unexpected of a child of
similar age.
III. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE RESIDUAL
EXCEPTION
A. AppropriateIndicia of Reliability
All hearsay exceptions must exhibit an element of trustworthiness
which derives from certain appropriate indicia of reliability. One often
cited example of a trustworthy hearsay exception is the dying declaration."
It has long been considered reliable that a man would not go to his death
with a lie on his lips. Obviously, fear of retribution in the afterlife provides
the appropriate indicia of reliability to make the dying declaration
trustworthy. So how do we find the appropriate indicia in the residual
hearsay exception? Rule 807 provides that "a statement not specifically
covered by 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule... ,,65 "In applying the
residual exceptions, the most important issue is whether the statement offers
'equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' to those found in
other specific hearsay exceptions. 66
The factors supporting trustworthiness are varied, but a few recurring
factors may be pertinent to the determination of admissibility. Among them
would be: 1) whether the declarant had a motivation to speak truthfully; 2)
the spontaneity of the statement; 3) the time lapse between the event and the
statement; 4) whether the declarant was under oath; 5) whether declarant has
been cross-examined; 6) whether the declarant has recanted or reaffirmed the
statement; and 7) whether the declarant's first hand knowledge is clearly
demonstrated. 67 A court may also consider whether an out-of-court
statement was corroborated by the declarant, who was available and testified
62. Id. at 824-25.
63. Id. at 826.
64. See FED. R.EVID. 804(b)(2).
65.

FED. R. Evm. 807.

66. McCORMICK, supranote 1, § 324.
67. Id.
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at trial. 8 Further, a court might look to circumstances surrounding the
69
extrajudicial statement to determine trustworthiness.
In an effort to determine whether circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness exist, a court may look to: 1) matters that occur at trial; 2)
extrinsic corroboration of the statement; 3) surrounding circumstances
70
concerning the statement; or 4) all of these to determine trustworthiness.
Beaver is troubled by this approach. He complains that with respect to the
residual exception "a court need not be consistent in its use of such
standards.",7' "The standard used can very easily be changed to meet the
necessities of current political expediency or judicial whim., 72 "We have a
container into which anything can be poured.'
Such criticism of the standards for allowing statements pursuant to the
residual exception is flaccid. The appropriate position with respect to the
question of standards is that espoused by Fenner who maintains that
"[w]ithout some residual exception, a statutory set of rules of evidence
simply would not work.",74 "The pressure to admit hearsay evidence that
does not fall under the fixed, specific exceptions would inevitably lead to
one of two things: the evidence would not be admitted and injustice would
be done, or one of the other exceptions would be misread to say that it does
cover the evidence in question." 5 We should always remember that the
Federal Rules of Evidence are to be construed to secure fairness in
administration, and to help the development of the law of evidence to the
76
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
The standards for determining the circumstantial guarantees of the
trustworthiness of residual statements must vary. In the cases reviewed
herein, decided since the 1997 amendment to rule 807, we find courts that
admitted residual hearsay because there was little likelihood of fabrication or
inaccuracies with respect to the statements admitted.77 We also find a court
68. See Beaver, supra note 11, at 797.
69. Id. at 797-98 (citing Karme v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982),
where the court found that bank records bore circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
because of the distant location of the bank and because there was no evidence to suggest the
bank records were anything other than what they purported to be).
70. See id.
71. Beaver, supra note 11, at 798.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Fenner, supra note 12, at 303.
75. Id.
76. See FED. R. Evin. 102.
77. See Gonzalez v. Digital Equip. Corp., 8 F. Supp. 2d 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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that admitted such out-of-court statements on the ground that they were
business records produced by a defendant against his interest in litigation
and thus trustworthy. 78 In the criminal area, we find courts that undertook
extensive analysis to determine: whether the residual hearsay statements
were sufficiently detailed so that they would have been difficult to fabricate;
whether there was a lack of evidence of coercion; whether the declarants had
personal knowledge
of the events; and, how soon the statements were made
79
after the event.
.,
Other courts examined whether the statements sought to be admitted
pursuant to the residual exception were made under oath and subject to the
penalty of perjury; whether such statements had been made voluntarily; and
whether they contradicted previous statements by the declarants.80 Finally,
we find a criminal case in which the court examined: whether the declarant
was offered leniency in exchange for his statement; whether the declarant
attempted to shift blame from himself to the accused; whether the declarant
took full responsibility for his role in the offense; whether the declarant was
caught "red-handed" and merely tried to share his blame by 8implicating
1
another; and, whether the declarant was given his Mirandarights.
As Beaver notes, the courts need not be consistent in their use of
standards. 82 What is most important with respect to any residual exception
analysis is the determination that such evidence, which might meet the
standard of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is evidence offered
as evidence of a material fact; that the evidence is the most probative
evidence available on the point for which it is offered; that the interests of
justice will be served by admitting the evidence; and that there was notice of
the evidence.83 One must bear this analytical framework in mind as we
survey the recent cases in an effort to determine whether the residual hearsay
rule is being abused.
B. Notice
The notice requirement of rule 807 is very important. What does notice
mean? When and how must notice be given? The residual exception is not
78.
(S.D.N.Y.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Quality King Distrib. Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 462
2000).
See United States v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 1999).
See United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998).
See State v. Hallum, 585 N.W.2d 249 (1998).
Beaver, supra note 11, at 798.
FED. R. EvID. 807.
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available unless offering counsel gives opposing counsel advance notice of
his or her intention to offer the out of court statement, and the particulars of
the statement, including the name and address of the out of court declarant. 84
Rule 807 does not require pretrial notice of an intention to use rule 807. All
it requires is notice of an intention to offer the particular statement; not
notice of an intention to use any particular hearsay exception. Once counsel
has notified opposing counsel of an intention to offer the statement in
question, then it can be offered under rule 807.85 The notice may be formal
or less formal. Fenner reminds us the pretrial notice may be a document
filed with the court styled "Notice of Intention to Use Rule 807 Evidence,"
or it may be a letter sent to opposing counsel stating an intention to introduce
particular statements,
including the names and addresses of the proposed
86
declarants.
The timing of the notice has been problematic. Both Fenner and Beaver
note that prior to the 1997 amendment, some courts interpreted the notice
requirement more in accord with the spirit of the law than with the letter of
the law. This often creates inconsistency in application of the notice requirement.8 7 The rule provides that notice must be "sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet [the evidence]." 88 Fenner claims that "some courts stress the
'fair opportunity' part of the notice requirement over the 'in advance of the
trial or hearing' part." 89 He notes that "[o]ne influential court has said that
in cases where the need to use this exception does not become apparent until
after the trial has begun, midtrial notice given enough in advance of the
actual use of the evidence can satisfy the rule's pretrial notice requirement." 9
The cases surveyed herein reveal that variations of the flexible
approach to notice requirement predominate. Although this does not appear
consistent with the plain meaning of the rule, we shall see that the interests
of justice require such flexibility. Even less formal notice is better than no
notice. With this analytical framework in mind with respect to appropriate

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Fenner, supra note 12, at 280.
87. See id. See also Beaver, supranote 11, at 802.
88. FED. R. Evm. 807.
89. Fenner, supra note 12, at 281.
90. See Fenner, supra note 12, at 280 (citing United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp.
554 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976).
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indicia of reliability and notice, let us survey the recent cases relying on the
residual exception to determine whether the rule is being abused.
IV. RULE 807 CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

A. Civil Cases
Since the 1997 amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
residual exception was cited as an issue in seven civil cases in the federal
courts. The cases come from the Second and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeal, federal district courts in the Eastern District of New York, and the
district court for Puerto Rico. It will be clear from a review of these civil
cases that judges are not abusing their authority with respect to admitting
unreliable hearsay pursuant to the residual exception.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals gave short shrift to a plaintiff's
argument that the residual exception of rule 807 should be admissible to
allow hearsay of a dead witness to help substantiate her claim of copyright
infringement.9' In Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment92 the plaintiff,
Herzog, brought a copyright action against the writer, director, producer, and
distributor of the motion picture "Lone Star."93 Plaintiff alleged that
defendants infringed her copyright for a screenplay she had written entitled
"Concealed., 94 The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment and Herzog appealed. 95 The Eleventh Circuit, relying on the
district court's opinion, upheld the grant of summary judgment on the
grounds that Herzog had failed to establish that Sayles, the writer-director of
"Lone Star," had a reasonable opportunity to view her screenplay, and that
the motion picture and screenplay were not substantially similar.9
Herzog's burden was to show that her screenplay was a copyrighted
work, and that Sayles had copied it.97 9Herzog submitted a certificate of
copyright for her screenplay to the court. The second requirement, proof of

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Herzog v. Castle Rock Entr't, 193 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 1999).
193 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1243.
Id.
Id. at 1244.

96.
97.

Id. at 1263.
Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1249.

98.

Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2001

73

Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 26:59

copying, she attempted to prove circumstantially by demonstrating that the
person who copied the work had access to her copyrighted screenplay. 99
Herzog averred that she had written the screenplay as a requirement for
her Master Degree in film studies at the University of Miami.1° She had
given her screenplay to Cosford, one of her professors for review.'01 He had
never returned it to her.10 2 After "Lone Star" was released, she learned that
Sayles was an acquaintance of Cosford and that Sayles and Cosford had met
for lunch in Miami during the time Cosford had her screenplay.1 3 Herzog
theorized that Cosford had shown Sayles her work.1 4 By the time of the
lawsuit, Cosford had died and was, thus,
unavailable to testify as to whether
05
he had shown Sayles the screenplay.
Herzog sought to introduce, under rule 807, hearsay statements of
Allegro, another Professor at the University of Miami.10 6 Allegro testified at
deposition that Cosford told him that he was reading Herzog's screenplay
and he found it interesting.'0 7 Allegro, further, testified that during this same
time period Sayles was in Miami and Cosford came out of his office at the
university and announced to Allegro that he was on his way home to pick up
Sayles to take him to lunch. 10 8 Allegro also testified that he only inferred
from Cosford's statements that he was picking up Sayles 0at9 his home and
that he had never actually saw Sayles and Cosford together.'
Courts cannot properly consider hearsay evidence in ruling on motions
for summary judgment. 10 Defendants argued that the proffered testimony of
Allegro would be inadmissible hearsay.
There were no equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness found in those conversations.1 12 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed on the ground that rule 807 requires the equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness covered by exceptions in rule
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1244.
101. Id.
102. Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1244-45.
103. Id. at 1245.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1252.
106. Id. at 1252-53.
107. Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1252-53.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1254 (citing Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549
(5th Cir.1987)).
111. Id. at 1254.
112. Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1255.
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803 and rule 804.113 The court undertook the requisite analysis for
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and found that the conversations
had taken place five years earlier and Allegro was 1vague
and not precise or
4
knowledgeable in his memory of the conversations.'
This was hearsay of the worst kind. The court found that even if such
hearsay was admissible to show that Cosford had a copy of Herzog's
screenplay and that Sayles had stayed at Cosford's home in 1993, said
evidence did not establish that Cosford had a copy of the screenplay with
him when he met Sayles for lunch and that he allowed Sayles to see it, and
that Sayles was not truthful when he averred he had never heard of Herzog's
composition." 5 Also, there was no allegation
that Cosford previously
16
contributed creative ideas or material to Sayles.'
The hearsay was not admitted despite proper pretrial notice being given
under the residual exception. No appropriate indicia of reliability could be
found on the facts of the case. The Eleventh Circuit did not abuse its powers
by allowing the admission of unreliable hearsay pursuant to the residual
exception in Herzog.
In Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc.,' 7 the Second Circuit found that
although certain surveys offered by plaintiffs in a false advertising case
called for statements concerning memory, this did not automatically preclude
their admission under the residual exception of rule 807.18 The plaintiff,
Schering, was a pharmaceutical company that produces Claritin, a prescription antihistamine.' 9 UCB, a European pharmaceutical company, developed
a competing product called Zyrtec.' ° UCB licensed Pfizer, a Delaware
corporation to promote Zyrtec in the United States.' 2' In 1996, Schering
brought an action against UCB and Pfizer alleging false advertising with
respect to Zyrtec in violation 22of the Lanham Act and a prior settlement
agreement between the parties.
At a 1998 hearing on a preliminary injunction, Schering sought to
introduce five surveys concerning the marketing and sale of Zyrtec to
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.at 1254.
Id.
Id.at 1255.
Id.
189 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 240.
Id. at221.
Id.
ld. at222.
Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at 222.
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doctors. 123 Pfizer responded to the motion on grounds that the surveys were
inadmissible as hearsay.1 4 The district court agreed and issued a written
opinion disallowing the surveys for any purpose.125 The trial court denied
the injunction and Schering appealed.126 The Second Circuit found that the
surveys should have been allowed, vacated the judgment, and remanded the
case for further hearing regarding the surveys concerning memory
statements.127
Five surveys Schering had sought to introduce called for more
information than rule 803(3) would allow."2 The court found that those
surveys went beyond the state of mind of those surveyed and called for
memory or belief to prove the facts remembered or believed. 29 However,
Pfizer had also sought to introduce the surveys under the residual hearsay
exception. 30 The court examined the surveys and rule 807 and found that
the lower court had abused its discretion by not allowing admission of the
surveys pursuant to the residual exception. 13 The Second Circuit held that
the trial court had been in error to rule against the use of out-of-court
memory statements to prove facts remembered.132 The court reminded us
that:
Unlike Rule 803(3), which explicitly excludes from its purview
memory statements offered to establish the facts remembered, the
residual hearsay rule contains no such express limitation. There is
a reason for this difference. Almost any statement used to describe
events that a speaker has experienced in the past can be
characterized as a 'memory,' which is a presently-existing state of
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id.
Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at 239-40.
Rule 803 of the FederalRules of Evidence provides:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: (3) A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind,
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to

prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
FED. R. EviD. 803(3).
129. Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at 231.
130. Id. at 224.
131. Id. at 231.
132. Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

76

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Birdsong

2001]

mind when it is conveyed. If such statements were admissible
under Rule 803(3) to prove the facts remembered, parties could
thus offer hearsay to establish almost any past fact, a result that
would indeed mark the 'the virtual destruction of the hearsay
rule' .... The residual hearsay rule, by contrast, escapes this
problem by setting forth its own set of requirements, which include
trustworthiness, before it will allow for a statement's
necessity and
13 3
admission.
The court held that memory surveys, in principle, may have greater
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness than many other traditional
exceptions to the hearsay rule, but that it was the methodological validity of
the survey that had to be examined before a guaranty of trustworthiness
could be assured. 134
In Schering Corp., the court found that there was long standing notice
of the intent to introduce the surveys.135 The court further found that the
surveys were trustworthy and necessary, and concluded that in the context of
survey evidence, the interests of justice and the general purposes of the rules
of evidence are generally best served by the admission of the surveys that
meet these two criteria. 36 A review of the case shows that the residual
exception is not being abused in the Second Circuit, rather, the exception is
being put to a strong analytical process as to its application.
In Rotolo v. Digital Equipment Corp., 3 7 the Second Circuit overturned
a trial court judgment on the ground that the notice requirement of 807"3 had
not been met." 9 In this case, plaintiff brought a products liability case
against Digital, alleging that she suffered repetitive stress injuries resulting
from the use of their computer keyboard.14° Plaintiff presented evidence 14
of
1
claim.
her
bolster
to
witnesses
medical
from
evidence
and
her injuries
133. l at 232.
134. Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at. 234.
135. Id. at 238.

136. Id.
137. 150 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1998).
138. The notice requirement of FED. R. EVlID. 807 provides:
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent
of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it... including the
name and address of the declarant.
FED. R. EvlD. 807.

139. Id. at 226.
140. Rotolo, 150 F.3d at 224.
141. Id.
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Plaintiff's attorneys also came into possession of a videotape made by Apple
Computer Corporation. 42 The tape, which was received in evidence,
contained the voice and images of three Apple consultants who asserted and
emphasized the existence of a possible causal connection between computer
keyboard use and repetitive stress injury. 43 Digital objected to the
introduction of the videotape as hearsay.1'"
The Second Circuit agreed that the videotape contained inadmissible
hearsay and vacated judgment and remanded the case. 45 The court found
that the consultants that appeared in the videotape, two identified as
physicians and one as an engineer, were unswom witnesses, whose
qualifications were not expounded upon or subjected to crossexamination.'
Rotolo's counsel had informed the trial court that he was
not offering the videotape because it was publicly available, but offered it
"as appropriate and compelling state of the art proof as to what could be
known.
The court held it was error to admit the report.1
Before a
defendant, who has never seen an unpublished report that is not part of the
published literature, can be said to have non-hearsay notice, it must be
shown that the defendant "was at least inferentially put on notice by the
report."' 49 Digital presented proof that it had no such notice of the report or
that they should have seen it as a part of the published literature on the
industry. 50
The court held a rule 807 residual exception inapplicable to the
videotape evidence because the advance notice of intent to use that section
was not used.' 5 ' The court further found that the district court "nisadvised
the jury that it might consider the videotape as evidence of 'what might have
been made available [to] these defendants [sic] and what was in the field to
show what their state of mind was or should have been.... ' Simply put, the
Apple videotape was inadmissible hearsay.' ' 152 No notice, no residual
exception. No abuse there.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rotolo, 150 F.3d at 223.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
Rotolo, 150 F.3d at 225.
Id.
Id.
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Rotolo v. DigitalEquipment Corp. was decided on July 24, 1998.13 A
month earlier the same company, Digital, had not fared as well in a similar
case heard in the District Court of the Eastern District of New York. On
June 8, 1998, plaintiffs prevailed in the case of Gonzalez v. Digital
Equipment Corp.'54 Much of that case concerned the rule 807 residual
exception. Although notice was also at issue, the court in Gonzalez reached
a result opposite that of the court in Rotolo.
In Gonzalez, a number of plaintiffs had sued Digital claiming that their
upper body, arm, or hand problems had been caused by repeated use of
Digital's computer keyboards and that they had not been properly warned by
Digital of the possibility of such injury. 155 Plaintiffs sought to introduce
documents and two videotapes, one produced by IBM and the other
produced by Apple Computer which addressed the comfort disorders of
keyboard users.
Digital moved to exclude such evidence, alleging among
other reasons, that it was hearsay. 157 The district court found that the
proffered evidence was relevant to the proceedings on the theory that
evidence of the current state of mind of large producers in this industry was
relevant. 58 It allowed the inference that given the state of the art at that
time, members of the industry as a whole had, or should have had, the same
"state of mind" with respect to possible users that needed to be considered
59
by each of the manufactures even though they were operating separately.1
Since Digital had "a duty to keep abreast of scientific knowledge,
discoveries and advances it [was] presumed to know what [was] imparted
6
thereby.' 160 Thus, the documents and videos were deemed relevant.' '
The court ruled that with respect to the hearsay objection such
documents would be admitted pursuant to the residual exception. 62 The
court specifically found that the notice requirement of 807 had been met,
because Digital had notice for an extended time (a whole year and one half
prior to trial) that the evidence had been proposed. 63 The court also found
that the proffered evidence offered evidence of a material fact and the
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 223.
8 F. Supp. 2d 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
l at 196.
Id.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id
Idat 197.
Gonzalez, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
Idat 198.
Id.
Id. at 201.
Id.
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internal materials were highly probative. 164 The court further found that the
"general interests of justice and the standards of trustworthiness" had been
met in the case. 165 The court maintained that the fear of fabrication or of
inaccuracies inherent in much hearsay was unfounded because these videos
had been created for legitimate business reasons and were less likely to have
been fabricated than would testimony of a live witness. 66 The court also
found that with respect to inaccuracies, the videos were more likely to be
more accurate than a live witnesses because they were created internally and
with great care.167 The court did not find the inability to cross-examine with
respect of the videotapes compelling, because Digital could call its own
experts1 68or those who created the videotapes to refute contentions of
notice.
The court allowed admission of the documents and videotapes under the
residual rule to show the state of mind of other producers in the industry on

the issue of notice.i69 Although notice was informal in this case, the court
found that a proposal made by plaintiffs to use the evidence a year and a half

prior to trial met the notice requirement.1 70 This stands in stark contrast to
Rotolo, where there was no advance notice of the intent to use the
evidence.171 Again, in Gonzalez, the district court followed a well-reasoned
analytical framework to determine whether the evidence bore adequate

circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and that there was proper
notice. Such analytical approach to admitting evidence pursuant to the
residual exception should put to rest fears by Beaver and others that the
residual exception will swallow the hearsay rule.
In Vasquez v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc., 7 2 the district court in
Puerto Rico held that a statement by a driver in an auto accident was not
admissible under the rule 807 residual exception. 173 Mr. and Mrs. Lopez had
rented a car from defendant at Puerto Rico's international airport on
December 26, 1997.174 Shortly thereafter, they were in a auto accident with
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Gonzalez, 8 F. Supp. at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gonzalez, 8 F. Supp. at 202.
Id.
Id.
24 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.P.R. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 198.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

80

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Birdsong

20011

another vehicle driven by Gonzalez.1 75 Mr. Lopez, the driver of the rented
vehicle, died several days later as a result of his injuries.' 76 Mrs. Lopez, the
passenger, was also injured and subsequently died. 77 Suit was brought
78
pursuant to a diversity action by Mrs. Lopez's daughters, the Vazquezs.
the owner of a
Plaintiffs sued National, because under Puerto Rico Law,
1 79
negligence.
lessee's
its
for
accountable
is
leased vehicle
National sought admission into evidence of certain portions of Ms.
Vazquez's deposition testimony in which she described Mr. Lopez's
utterances right after the accident. 80 According to plaintiff, Vasquez, her
mother told her that immediately after the accident Mr. Lopez uttered to her
the words "[w]hat hit us?"'181 National offered this evidence because it cast
doubt as to who hit whom. '1 2 National argued that because Mr. Lopez did
not explicitly say that he ran a red light or was negligent in his driving, there
was uncertainty as to whether he was negligent.18 Under Puerto Rico Law,
114
defendant's liability hinged on the driver's liability (i.e. lessee's liability).
If National could prove that Mr. Lopez was not driving negligently, the
defendant would not be liable. National acknowledged that such statement
would85 be hearsay but sought to have it admitted under the residual hearsay
rule.'
The court reviewed rule 807 and the facts and found that there was
adequate notice of intent to use the statements.186 Yet, the court did not
allow the hearsay evidence on the grounds that the evidence fell below the
threshold of trustworthiness required by the rule. 87 The court found that
even though in the hospital, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Lopez's
remarks did not assure the court that he was under a condition that would
still his capacity of reflection or that he was under any pressure to tell the
truth.188 The court found further that the defendant had "failed to prove that
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Vasquez, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
Id.
See 9 P.R. LAws ANN. § 1751 (1996).
Vasquez, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
Id.
Id.

183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
See 9 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 1751 (1996).
Vasquez, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 199.

Id.

187. Id. at 200.

188. Id.
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Mr. Lopez had reliable knowledge of the events that transpired on the night
of the accident."1 89 Ms. Vazquez in her deposition testified that Mr. Lopez
was not clear as to the events that transpired, and that he really did not recall
what happened. 9° The court disallowed the evidence and said it could not
rely on an individual's account of an event, if that individual acknowledged
1 92
191
that he did not recall the specifics of the event, as had Mr. Lopez.
Mr. Lopez's lack of recall would not support a finding of
trustworthiness to his statements. In accord with our analytical framework,
the court found no support to substantiate appropriate indicia of reliability
for his statements. 93 To keep such evidence out was the correct decision.
Here, the hearsay rule prevailed. Critics have little to fear about the use of
the residual exception when a court explains its analysis of the
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as in Vasquez.194 The hearsay
rule prevails despite the residual exception.
In the case of Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI)
Infrastructure Ltd., 95 the court allowed admission, pursuant to the residual
exception, into evidence, of a news article that had appeared in a Chinese
newspaper.196 In 1998, Chase Bank, acting as a trustee, and Traffic Stream,
had entered into an indenture agreement in which Traffic Stream issued
secured notes to finance a business venture involving the construction of toll
roads in China. 197 In 1999, plaintiff Chase commenced litigation contending
that Traffic Stream had defaulted on payment. 98 Chase sought summary
judgment. 99 Defendant Traffic admitted default but argued that its default
should be excused pursuant to the contract doctrine of impossibility of
performance.2m Traffic Stream contended that a change in Chinese policy
delayed recoupment of money from the toll road projects, making
it
1
impossible for them to fulfill their obligation under the indenture.2

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Vasquez, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 200.
Id.
86 F. Supp. 2d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
ld.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id.
Chase ManhattanBank, F. Supp. 2d at 247.
Id. at 250.
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The facts of the case reveal that in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial
crisis, the Chinese government had taken steps to strengthen its supervision
of disbursement of foreign exchange involving Chinese companies doing
business with foreign partners.202 On September 14, 1998, the Chinese State
3
policy.2
Administration of Foreign Exchange gave notice of its change in
The notice was a confidential document of the Chinese government that had
not been publicly released.204 However, news of the notice appeared in the
People's Daily, the official newspaper of the government on September 18,
1998. 205 Traffic Stream maintained that it was this change in foreign
exchange supervision that made it impossible for them to perform.2 )6
Chase objected to the introduction of the newspaper article on grounds
that it was hearsay. 20 7 The court agreed that the article was hearsay but
found the article admissible pursuant to the residual exception of rule 807. 208
The court found that Traffic Stream had given Chase adequate notice of its
intention to introduce the article. 209 Perhaps, more importantly, the court
found the newspaper article had been offered as evidence of a material fact,
namely a change in Chinese policy, which could have rendered Traffic
Stream's performance under the indenture impossible. 2 0 The court also
found that the article was the most probative evidence of the notice of
change of policy that Traffic Stream could reasonably procure, because the
notice itself had not been publicly released by the Chinese government.2
Similarly, the court found because the notice itself was unavailable, "the
21 2
interests of justice would best be served by the admission of the article.
The court further found, with respect to rule 807, the People's Daily
newspaper article had a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness since it was
published by the Chinese Communist Party Central Commission.1 3
Therefore, it was deemed to be authoritative and representative of the
214
official opinion of the Chinese government.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 251.
Id.
Id.
Chase ManhattanBank, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
Id.
Id at 253.
Id. at 254.
Id.
ChaseManhattanBank, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
Id. at 251.
Id
Id.
Id.
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Although the article was admitted as evidence, Chase was ultimately
granted summary judgment on the claim.215 Nevertheless, the court gave a
well reasoned analysis as to why the evidence should be found admissible
pursuant to the residual exception. 1 6 There had been adequate notice of the
intent to use the newspaper article, and there was a thorough analysis of the
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that surrounded the introduction
of the article.2 17 There was no abuse to the traditional hearsay rule in this
case.
In John PaulMitchell Systems v. Quality King Distributors,Inc.,218 the
residual exception was used to allow the introduction of certain business
records at a hearing on an injunction.21 9 In this case, John Paul Mitchell
sought a preliminary injunction restraining the distributor Quality King from
selling over a million dollars of Paul Mitchell hair care products.2M
Allegedly these products had traveled to China for distribution, but were
diverted to Holland and then back to Quality King's Long Island, New York
warehouse. 221 Paul Mitchell sought an injunction against Quality King in
order to prevent irreparable damage to its exclusive salon only distribution
policy.222 In order to prove its case, Paul Mitchell sought introduction of
business records of the company which it arranged to sell its products in
China. 22 This firm, China Marketing & Distribution (CDM), was a
company that Paul Mitchell found defrauded it by diverting products from
the Chinese market where it would be sold only in salons to other
wholesalers who intended sale to direct retailers. 2u Quality King objected to
introduction of the CDM business records on the ground that they were not
authenticated.22 3
The court found, pursuant to rule 901(b)(4), 226 that the document
authentication requirement in this case was satisfied by the document's form

215. Chase Manhattan Bank, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 262.
216. Id. at 253-61.
217. Id.
218. 106 F. Supp. 2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
219. Id.
220. lId at 466.
221. Id. at 466-67.
222. Id. at 467.
223. John Paul Mitchell Sys., 106 F. 2d at 468.
224. Id. at 467-69.
225. Id. at471-72.
226. Rule 901(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides, in relevant part: "the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with this rule: (4)
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and content, taken together with other circumstances that indicated reliability
of the documents.2 7 Thus authenticated, the court found the documents
admissible pursuant to the residual exception because the records were
particularly trustworthy.tm
In its analysis, the court found that the
trustworthiness of the documents was established by the fact that they were
produced by the president of CDM against his interests in the litigation. 229
The court also found the issue of whether the Paul Mitchell product was sold
and shipped to Quality King material to the litigation, and the documents
were probative of the fact that CDM believed the product was shipped from
its warehouse in China to Rotterdam.230 The court further found that the
documents were the most probative evidence available of the route the goods
followedY' The court found further still that Quality King had sufficient
notice of the documents, as demonstrated by Quality King's motion in limine
to exclude them.2 32 In the final analysis, the court found that it was in the
best interests of justice to admit the documents.2 33
Although the documents were admitted pursuant to the residual
exception, Paul Mitchell's motion for preliminary injunction was denied. 2
The court found that it did not have the power to issue an injunction on a
replevin claim.235 Again, there appeared to be no abuse by the court of the
residual exception in this case.
The foregoing has been a survey of the federal civil cases found since
the 1997 amendment of rule 807. It does not appear from a review of these
cases that there should be fear that the use of the residual exception is being
abused. In Herzog and Vasquez the courts did not allow statements pursuant
to the exception because they could find no circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness to the statements in question. In Rotolo the statements were
disallowed by the appeals court because adequate notice of the intended use
of the evidence had not been given prior to trial by the plaintiffs. In
Schering, Gonzalez, Chase Manhattan Bank, and John Paul Mitchell
Distinctive Characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or

other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances."
227. John PaulMitchell Sys. Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 472.

228. Id.
229. Id. at 473.

230. Id.
231. ki.
232. John PaulMitchell Sys. Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 473.

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 478.
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Systems, both the notice requirements and the requirement of circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness were found to be adequate. However,
admission of such hearsay pursuant to the residual exception seldom
determined the ultimate outcome of the case. Let us now turn to the federal
criminal cases involving the residual exception since the 1997 amendment.
We will see that the analytical framework is just as important as in the civil
cases, if not more so.
B. CriminalCases
Since the 1997 Amendment, the residual exception has been reported in
few federal criminal cases. No more than eight such cases have been found.
This is approximately equal to the number of civil cases in which the
exception was either mentioned or reported in federal civil cases during the
same time period. Although anecdotal, this provides further evidence that
the residual exception is not being abused by the federal courts as a way of
allowing inadmissible hearsay into evidence. The cases reported on herein
come to us from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals.
The introduction of hearsay statements in the context of criminal cases,
whether federal or state, must be assessed in the light of a defendant's right
to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 236 The Confrontation Clause
does not operate as an absolute ban on hearsay evidence.237 If the declarant
is unavailable and the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability,"
hearsay declarations may be received into evidence without violating a
defendant's right to confrontation. 238 The indicia of reliability requirement
can be met in two ways: "where the hearsay statement 'falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception,' or where it is supported by 'a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 2 39
In United States v. Sanchez-Lima,2Q the Ninth Circuit reversed the
conviction of Sanchez-Lima for assault on a federal officer and determined
that evidence he sought to admit at trial under the residual exception should

236. Amendment VI of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him...."
237. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 805, 825.

238. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
239. Wright, 497 U.S. at 816.

240. 161 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998).
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have been admitted. 24 1 In 1996, Sanchez-Lima, an alien, and others illegally
entering the United States from Mexico, were arrested two miles east of the
Otay Mesa port of entry by border Patrol Agents. 24 At the time of his
apprehension, Sanchez-Lima struck an agent with a rock.24 3 Defendant was
arrested for assault on a federal officer in violation of title 18, section 111 of
the United States Code.2" At trial, Sanchez-Lima asserted a self-defense
claim alleging he had been pistol whipped by the federal officer before
striking him.24 5
In all, the Border Patrol agents apprehended twenty-two aliens that
night. 24 The Border Patrol and the FBI interviewed and videotaped all of
these aliens the night of their apprehension. 24 7 At trial, Sanchez-Lima
alleged that these interviews contained evidence in support of his selfdefense theory. 24 The remaining aliens were deported on May 31, 1996. 249
The trial court did not allow admission of the videotaped statements. 250
On appeal, Sanchez-Lima asserted that the failure to admit the
videotaped interviews, pursuant to the residual exception, denied him of his
252
251
Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. 1 The Ninth Circuit agreed.
That court reviewed rule 807 and determined that the videotaped statements
contained circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and met the other
criteria of the rule.253 The government had adequate notice of the intended
use of the evidence.25 4 The court found the statements were trustworthy
because the declarant's statements: 1) were under oath and subject to the
penalty of perjury; 2) were voluntary; 3) were based on facts within their
own personal knowledge; 4) did not contradict any previous statements to
government agents or defense investigators; and 5) was preserved on
241. Id. at 546.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Title 18, section Il l(a)(1) of the United States Code provides, in relevant part:
"[w]hoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any
person shall be fined or imprisoned not more than one year."
245. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d at 547.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d at 547.
251. Id.
252. Id
253. Id. at 547-48.
254. Id. at 548.
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videotape for the jurors to view their demeanor.2 5 5 The court also found that
the government had the opportunity to develop the testimony of these
witnesses and had notice of the videotapes. 256 The court further found that
the videotaped statements constituted evidence of a material fact regarding
Sanchez-Lima's self-defense theory. 5 7 Finally, the court found that "these
statements [were] more probative than any other evidence which could be
procured by reasonable efforts ....2 8
In refusing to admit the sworn videotaped statements, the district court
effectively prevented Sanchez-Lima from exercising his Sixth Amendment
right to present a defense. The decision appears well reasoned and does not
abuse the hearsay rule.
In United States v. Bryce,25 9 the Second Circuit reviewed Bryce's convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.20 The convictions grew out of law
2 1
enforcement surveillance of persons suspected of narcotics trafficking. 6
Agents intercepted and recorded seven telephone conversations between
Bryce and his co-defendant Johnson, and one conversation between Johnson
and another individual named Gomez.262
During the Bryce and Johnson conversations, Bryce arranged to sell
cocaine to Johnson.
Johnson, in turn telephoned Gomez and informed him
that Bryce was selling cocaine.264 Johnson and Gomez expressed concern
during the conversation that the price quoted would depress the price in
other transactions. 5 Nevertheless, after discussing matters with Gomez,
Johnson called Bryce back and said he would buy two kilograms of
cocaine.
Johnson and Bryce agreed to meet in fifteen minutes. 7 The
meeting never took place, because Bryce called Johnson several hours later
to say he had only one left.268 Johnson pleaded with Bryce to sell him the
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d at 547.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id.
208 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 348.
Id. at 349.
Id.
Id.
Bryce, 208 F.3d at 349.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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one kilogram. 269 Bryce agreed and they arranged to meet later that day."
This meeting never happened, because Johnson called Bryce five days later
and asked if he still had the cocaine.2 71 Bryce indicated that he did and they
Soon
agreed to meet.2 72 Several days later Johnson was arrested.
4
2
itself
was
thereafter, Bryce was also arrested. 7 No evidence of the cocaine
5
presented at trial.
On appeal, Bryce challenged his conviction on, among other grounds,
that the taped telephone conversation between Johnson and Gomez, in which
Johnson repeated Bryce's claim that he had cocaine for sale and had
276
The district court had
distributed it to others, was inadmissible hearsay.
admitted 27the telephone conversation pursuant to the residual exception of
rule 807. 7
The Second Circuit in analyzing the rule and the facts found that Bryce
"[did] not dispute that the statements in the Johnson-Gomez tape were
material, that the declarants were unable to testify, or that the government
complied with the Rule's notice requirement. ' 278 The court found that
Bryce's objection was that the admission of the tape violated his Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights and therefore could not have been deemed
to advance the interests of justice. 9 The court believed that the resolution
of the argument was linked to trustworthiness. 280 The court found that the
Johnson-Gomez tape had a high degree of trustworthiness. 281
The Second Circuit had already held in United States. v. Matthews 2
that:
[O]rdinarily a confession of an accomplice resulting from formal
police interrogation cannot be introduced as evidence of guilt of an
accused, absent some circumstance indicating authorization or
adoption. On the other hand, if the statement is made to a person
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Bryce, 208 F.3d at 349.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bryce, 208 F.3d at 349.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Bryce, 208 F.3d at 351.
Id.
Id.
20 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 1994).
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whom the declarant believes is an ally rather than a law
enforcement official, and if the circumstances surrounding the
portion of the statement that inculpates the defendant provide no
reason to suspect that inculpatory portion is any less trustworthy
than the part of the statement that directly incriminates the
declarant, the trustworthiness of the portion that inculpates the
defendant may well be sufficiently established
that its admission
283
does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Under this theory, the court found that the Johnson-Gomez tape did not
violate Bryce's Confrontation rights. The court specifically found:
1) the statements were obtained via a covert wiretap that neither
Johnson nor Gomez was aware; 2) the statements were made
during the same time period that Johnson was conversing with
Bryce; 3) Johnson's statements implicated both himself and Bryce
as participants in a narcotics conspiracy; and 4) Gomez was
Johnson's colleague in the narcotics trade.
Based on these factors, the court found there was little reason to believe that
Johnson and Gomez had any motive to lie, or were lying.285 With this
analysis, the court found the admission of the tape was proper under both
rule 807 and the Confrontation Clause. 286 Here, the court rightfully looked
to the surrounding circumstances of Bryce's drug activities to find support
for the appropriate indicia of reliability that made the statement trustworthy.
With such analysis, it is unlikely that the residual exception will swallow the
hearsay rule. Ultimately, the Second Circuit upheld Bryce's conspiracy
conviction, but reversed the possession with intent to distribute cocaine
conviction on the ground that there was no corroborating evidence that
Bryce actually did possess cocaine on the dates specified in the
indictment.287
In United States v. Papajohn,288 the Eighth Circuit found that use of the
grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness, admitted pursuant to the
residual exception in an arson and conspiracy trial, was proper. 289 Ms.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 545-46.
208 F.3d at 351.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 356.
212 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1119.
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Papajohn and her husband, Donald Lee Earles, were suspected of burning
down their convenience store in order to gain insurance proceeds. 2 9 A
grand jury was convened before which Mr. Earles' son, Donnie, testified
three times. 29' During Donnie' s first grand jury appearance, he testified that
he did not know who burned down the store.29 During his second grand
jury appearance, he changed his story, stating that Ms. Papajohn and his
father conspired to burn down the store for the insurance money.293 "During
Donnie's third grand jury appearance, he claimed his Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent and refused to testify."'2 94
At the subsequent trial of Papajohn and Earles, Donnie again refused to
testify. 295 The trial court declared Donnie an unavailable witness and
allowed the government, over objections of the defense, and pursuant to the
residual exception to the hearsay rule, to read to the jury portions of the
transcripts of all three of Donnie's appearances before the grand jury.2 The
jury convicted both defendants. 297
On appeal, Papajohn argued that she should be granted a new trial on
the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in the case of Lilly v. Virginia.29 s In
Lilly, the Court held that the admission of a non-testifying accomplice's
299
confession violated the defendant's right to confront his accuser.
However, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the facts of Lilly:
Donnie was never arrested or charged with a crime. The obvious
incentive that the captured accomplice in Lilly had to shift blame is
not present in our case. We recognize that although Donnie was
not charged with a crime at the time he made the statements, he
might still have had some incentive to blame [defendants], so that
he would not later be charged with the arson. It seems to us,
however, that it can almost always be said that a statement made by
a declarant that incriminates another person in a crime will make it
less likely that the declarant will be charged for that crime ....
We
290. Id. at 1116.
291. Id
292. Id.
293. Papajohn,212 F.3d at 1116.
294. Il
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1116. The appeal in this case was only brought by Ms. Papajohn. She
appealed her convictions for one count of conspiracy to commit arson and mail fraud, one
count of aiding and abetting arson, and two counts of mail fraud. Id. at 1115.
298. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
299. Id at 119.
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also find that the conditions under which the disputed hearsay
statement was made in our case differ significantly [than] in Lilly.
In Lilly ... the accomplice's statements were made in response to
leading police questions, asked during a custodial interrogation
that
3
took place very late at night, shortly after his arrest. 00
The court in Papajohnfound that the grand jury testimony satisfied the
requirement of having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness required of rule 807. 301 The court found that Donnie's testimony had
been: 1) given in a formal proceeding; 2) under oath; 3) before a grand
jury. 302 Also, Donnie was not in police custody, nor had he been charged
with any crime at the time the testimony was given. 303 Further, he had been
asked non leading questions by the government, and he answered them with
lengthy narratives.
Papajohn's convictions were affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit. 3 °5 The Eight Circuit's analysis of the appropriate indicia of reliability factors supporting residual exception as it applied to this situation
does not harm the hearsay rule. It is difficult to argue abuse of the hearsay
rule here.
In United States v. Brothers Construction,30 6 the Fourth Circuit reached
an opposite result with respect to grand jury testimony that had been
admitted pursuant to the residual exception. Brothers Construction Company
of Ohio and Tri-State Asphalt Corporation were convicted of conspiracy to
defraud the United States, mail fraud, and with making false statements to
the government. 3 07 Their trial and convictions grew out of a scheme
whereby the two companies falsified records in connection with obtaining
highway construction subcontract work in West Virginia.3 °8 Specifically, the
companies obtained federal highway money to comply with the development
of "disadvantaged business enterprises" ("DBEs"). However, no disadvantaged business employees ever performed any of the subcontract work. 310

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Papajohn, 212 F.3d at 1119.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1120.
Id.
Id.
Papajohn,212 F.3d at 1122.
219 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 308.
Id. at 304-06.
Id. at 304.
Id. at306-08.
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Robert Samol, an officer and in-house counsel for Tri-State, had
testified in the grand jury investigating the case, that prior to sending the
state a letter of certification of the company meeting its DBE goals under its
subcontract, he learned that there had never been an independent DBE work
force. 3 11 At trial, Samol invoked his rights under the Fifth Amendment and
refused to testify.312 The trial court determined that Samol was unavailable,
31 3
and "concluded that [his] grand jury testimony was sufficiently reliable."
The court admitted the grand jury testimony pursuant to the residual
exception.31 4 On appeal, both Brothers and Tri-State asserted that it was
315
improper to have allowed the grand jury testimony read to the jury. Here,
316
the Fourth Circuit agreed.
The court observed that the nature of grand jury testimony provided
some indicia of trustworthiness, because it was "given in the solemn setting
of the grand jury, under oath and the danger of pejury, in the presence of
jurors who are free to question and assess credibility, and a court reporter
made an official transcript of the proceedings. 317 The court held that with
respect to grand jury testimony they were still "required to consider 'the
totality of the circumstances'318 [of the testimony] for 'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."'
In considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court
found that Samol's grand jury testimony was suspect. 319 During the oral
argument of the case, the government acknowledged that after Samol's
appearance before the grand jury, the government began an investigation to
determine whether Samol committed perjury
3o through the same testimony
The court held that it had
that the government sought to introduce.
"serious reservations about the reliability of testimony which, at least in part,
the [g]ovemment finds so untrustworthy that it would consider bringing a
perjury charge. 3 21 As a result, the court concluded that Samol's grand jury

311. Bros. Constr., 219 F.3d at 309.

312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 309-10.

315. Il
316. Bros. Constr., 219 F.3d at 310.

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
l
Id.
Id
Bros. Const., 219 F.3d at 310.
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testimony was not32properly admitted pursuant to the requirements of the
residual exception. ?
Such reasoning is similar to that used by the district court in Puerto
Rico in the Vasquez case, that found Mr. Lopez's memory problems to be a
weak foundation for the admission of statements pursuant to the residual
exception. 323 The determination to not admit the grand jury testimony in
Brothers was the correct one and not in conflict with Papajohnwhen all of
the circumstances are analyzed. Although the court found that the admission
of the grand jury testimony against Brothers was an error, they found it to be
harmless error.32 The Fourth Circuit found that there was other sufficient
evidence to affirm the convictions of both Brothers and Tri-State. 325
In United States v. Phillips,326 the Fifth Circuit found that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to apply the residual exception to
327
admit alleged exculpatory statements of a witness proffered by defendants.
The case involved convictions on several schemes of local corruption
involving ghost employees, payment of salary kickbacks, and misuse of state
government funds by Phillips, the tax assessor for St. Helena Parish,
Louisiana, and Newman, a friend and political supporter who owned the
largest hardware store in the Parish.328
Phillips and Newman were involved in many schemes. 329 The Fifth
Circuit found that the salient scheme for purposes of the review of the use of
the residual exception involved Phillips, Newman, and Newman's wife,
Jean, who was deceased by the time of trial. 330 Starting in 1990, Phillips put
Newman and his wife on the tax assessor payroll, at a salary of $800 per
month, and health benefits. 33 1 The health benefits were important because
Jean had been diagnosed with cancer. Jean subsequently died of cancer in
332
1992.
She remained on the tax assessor payroll until one month prior to

322. Id.
323. See Vasquez, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
324. Id. at 320.
325. Id. at 320-21.
326. 219 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2000).
327. Id. at 419.
328. Id. The defendants were each convicted on all counts of a twenty-nine count
indictment charging conspiracy, mail fraud, engaging in an illegal monetary transaction, theft
from a federally funded program, money laundering, and perjury. Id. at 407.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 408, 419.
331. Id. at407-08.
332. Phillips, 219 F.3d at 407.
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her death.333 Facts at trial showed that over the time period of this scheme
Newman kicked back most of their $800 a month salary to Phillips, less what
was needed to pay federal taxes at the end of the year. 3 4 Evidence at trial
Newman and his wife did little or no work for the tax
that
showed 33
5
assessor.

At trial, defendants sought to admit exculpatory statements made by
Jean Newman to her friend Margaret Carter to show that she was working
for the assessors office.336 The trial court would not admit the statements
under the residual exception.337 If she had been allowed to testify,
defendants maintained
that Carter would have testified that one day, while in the hardware
store, she noticed Jean working with several pieces of paper.
When Carter inquired about the nature of the paperwork, Jean
on a project for Phillips
allegedly responded that she was working
338
that had something to do with land.
The Fifth Circuit, in a footnote, enumerated the requirements of rule
807, and then held:
The passing comment made by Jean concerning her employment is
arguably vague. It may be correct that Jean would have no reason
to lie in making a passing comment to a casual acquaintance
concerning the nature of any paperwork she was doing. It may also
be correct, however, that Jean's motivation to lie-her desire to
maintain the favorable status of her pseudo-employment for the
purpose of receiving health coverage-was so strong that any
employment with the
statements made concerning her 33supposed
9assessor's office cannot be trusted.
The court found that "[riegardless of which option seemed more
persuasive, neither presents a 'definite and firm conviction the [district]
court made a clear error of judgment"' by excluding the statements.3 4' As
such, the court did not disturb the ruling of the trial court with respect to the
333. Id. at 408.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 419.
Phillips,219 F.3d at 419.

338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Ud
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hearsay exclusion. 341 Again, good analysis by the court of the circumstances
and motivations for the proffered statement found that there was inadequate
indicia of reliability to support the trustworthiness of the statement.
Can one find abuse of the residual exception with respect to any of
these federal criminal cases? Of course not. The federal courts have used
good analysis and common sense in assessing the equivalent guarantees of
trustworthiness required of evidence admitted under rule 807. In SanchezLima, Bryce, and Papajohn, the court found equivalent guarantees of
trustworthiness for the statements after thoroughgoing analysis. In Brothers
and Phillips, analysis by the courts showed that the admission of the
statements sought to be admitted were unreliable and not supported by
equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness. Although the standard used to
reach the decision to admit the evidence pursuant to the residual exception
was different, it appears that such decisions were solid and reasonable in
each case,
Let us now turn our attention to the various states who, since 1997,
have reported cases that involved the residual exception. Could it be that
state courts are abusing the hearsay rule by its overindulgent use of the
residual exception? The evidence from the cases says no.
V. THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION IN STATE COURT CASES

A. Civil Cases
Our search of the reported use of the residual exception in state cases
since 1997, yielded only a small number of such reports in civil cases. Such
cases were reported from Colorado, 42 Delaware,
and Arkansas.
A

341. Id.
342. Rule 804(b)(5) of the ColoradoRules of Evidence provides:
A statement not specifically covered by [Rule 803 or 804] but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.
COLO. R. EvIn. 804(b)(5). On January 1, 1999, Colorado transferred its two part residual
exceptions into one new rule 807 Residual Exception.
343. Rule 803(24) of the Deleware Rules of Evidence provides: the following is not
excluded by DEL. R. EviD. 803(24) 802, the hearsay rule:
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review of these cases shows that fears of the residual exception in state court
cases swallowing the hearsay rule as we know it is highly unlikely. The
judges in the state courts appear to be very careful with respect to the
admission of hearsay pursuant to the residual exception. These judges use
the same analytical framework of seeking to determine whether there are
appropriate indicia of reliability to give the statements trustworthiness.
These same judges seek to determine whether there has been proper notice
of intent to use the exception.
In the Colorado case, Board of County Commissioners v. City and
County of Denver,345 the court of appeals upheld the introduction by
plaintiffs, pursuant to the residual exception to the hearsay rule, of a study
prepared for defendant.346 The case involved a breach of contract action
brought by the county concerning excessive noise levels by the defendant,
City of Denver's airport. 347 The study, prepared for Denver, showed that a
sixth runway would increase noise levels. 347 The court found the report was
probative of the validity of Denver's defenses and that it was not inherently

A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that:

(A) the statement is offered as a evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other

evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interest of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.

DEL. R. Evm. 803(24).
344. Rule 803(24) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides:
Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (i) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (ii) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (iii) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
A K. R. EvID. 803(24).
345. Board of County Comm'rs v. City & County of Denver, No. 00CA0217, 2001
Colo. App. LEXIS 564, *1 (Colo. Ct. App. Mar. 29,2001).
346. Id.at *1.
347. ld.
348. Id. at *25.
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unreliable. 349 Plaintiff county ultimately prevailed and received damages for
350
the excessive noise.
The admission of hearsay statements were also admitted pursuant to the
residual exception in a Delaware case. In Juran v. Bron,35 the Delaware
Court of Chancery reviewed the trial of parties involved in a partnership
venture.352 Plaintiffs alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against
defendants.3 53 The trial court had admitted into evidence a conversation of
the son of one of the defendants that went to the heart of the plaintiff's fraud,
bad faith, and fiduciary duty claims.35 4 The Appeals Court upheld this
ruling, finding that the statements had circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. The court found that, "in an action for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty where few nonparties have knowledge of the facts, statements
by a witness in a position to know the truth should.., be admitted. 355
Lincoln v. AAA Bail Bond Co. 356 was an Arkansas case where the
introduction of evidence pursuant to the residual exception was found to be
reversible error.357 In Lincoln, appellant Lincoln brought suit "to collect
35
unpaid commissions he claimed to have earned prior to his termination. 8
A judgment, however, was entered in favor of the appellee bail bond
company. 359 The court of appeals reviewed the admission of an exhibit
relied upon by appellee to show that Lincoln owed the company money. The
exhibit was a list concerning accounts receivable, which allegedly reflected
monies collected by Lincoln, but not turned in to the company. 360
The court of appeals found the introduction of this evidence was
inadmissible under the residual exception. 36 1 They held that the list had not
been prepared in the regular course of business, but was prepared for362a
special purpose to show the court that Lincoln owed the company money.
The court also found that the source of the information contained in the
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id. at *26.
Id. at *29.
No. 16464, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 232, at *1.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *10-11.
Id. at *12.
No. CA 98-365, 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 863, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1998).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Lincoln, 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 863, at *6.
Id.
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exhibit lacked trustworthiness, since the. information was provided by
criminal defendants who had the incentive to inflate the amount of monies
363
paid, so as to reduce their own debts.
Each of these state courts was cognizant and discerning of the
requirement that there be circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness before
evidence could be admitted under the residual exception. Although these
state cases are far less analytical than those reported from the federal courts,
they all articulate, in a well reasoned way, the reason the hearsay statements
were admissible or inadmissible. Again, in these states there should be no
worry that the residual exception will swallow the hearsay rule. It is clear
the state court judges in the civil cases reported on here have not abused
their power with respect to the residual exception.
B. Criminal Cases
Let us now briefly examine the state criminal law cases reported since
1997 involving the residual exception. The state courts must often balance
the residual exception against a defendant's confrontation rights. A review
of the state criminal cases shows that such state courts are very careful
concerning admission of hearsay pursuant to the residual exception. In
Arkansas, the Court of Appeals of the state has upheld trial judges' refusal
that a defendant be allowed to admit hearsay pursuant to that state's residual
exception on several occasions. In Clark v. State,3 a the defendant, on trial
for murder, sought to introduce statements through a police detective who
had allegedly heard that other persons had bragged to confidential police
informants that they, and not the defendant, had committed the murder.365
The trial court and the court of appeals found no guarantees of
trustworthiness to such alleged statements and excluded the evidence.366
In Bilyeu v. State,367 the Arkansas court of appeals again upheld the trial
court's refusal to admit statements pursuant to residual exception. 36' Bilyeu,
on trial for the death of his girlfriend's nineteen-month-old son, sought to
introduce a diary, purportedly written by the girlfriend, to show that he could
363. Id.
364. No. CACR 98-86, 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 747, at *1 (Ark. App. Ct. Oct. 14,
1998).
365.
366.
367.
1998).
368.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *12.
No. CACR 97-505, 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 66, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 4,
Id. at *5.
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not have killed the child on the day in question. 369 The court found that
since the diary was unsigned and undated, that it did not contain equivalent
guarantees of trustworthiness required by the state's residual exception.370
In Williams v. State,37 1 defendant's attempt to introduce hearsay through
the residual exception also failed. 372 In this murder and kidnapping case,
Williams gave a statement concerning his involvement in the crimes at the
time of his arrest.373 He later made a different and less inculpatory statement
to county detectives prior to trial. 374 At trial the State introduced, in its case
in chief, only Williams' first statement. 375 Williams sought to introduce his
second statement. The court ruled that it was inadmissible under the residual
exception because there was no guarantee of trustworthiness to this second
376
statement, which Williams made after a co-defendant had implicated him.
The court contended that Williams had every reason to give detectives a selfserving statement to minimize his participation in the crimes. 377
The Arkansas cases show that there is little likelihood that the residual
exception will swallow the hearsay rule, or that judges are abusing the use of
the exception. In Clark, Bilyeu, and Williams, none of the defendants could
show the requisite indicia of reliability surrounding the statements they
proffered to make one believe that they were trustworthy.
In People v. Meyer,378 the court of appeals of Colorado upheld the
prosecution's right to introduce, pursuant to the residual exception, a verified complaint to obtain a restraining order sworn out by the murder victim
against defendant. 379 The court found that the complaint possessed sufficient
indicia of reliability as a court document, and that the victim had little reason
to fabricate. 380 Because the statement possessed the necessary guarantees of
trustworthiness, admission of the statement did not violate defendant's right
of confrontation. 381

369. Id. at *4.
370. Id. at *5.

371.
372.
373.
374.

946 S.W.2d 678 (Ark. 1997).
Id. at 680.
Id. at 684.
Id.

375. Id. at 683.
376. Williams, 946 S.W.2d at 684.

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Id.
952 P. 2d 774 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 777.
Id.
Id.
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In State v. Anderson, the court did not allow the prosecution to
introduce, pursuant to Delaware's residual exception, statements made by
the victim in a felony murder case while he was in the hospital. The victim
gave three statements concerning the identity of the defendants before he
died.38 3 The court found that over the course of the victim's hospitalization
he suffered from nightmares and hallucinations.38 4 The court also found that
over the course of the hospitalization the victim discussed the case with
numerous people. 385 The court maintained that such facts raised doubts as to
whether the proffered statements against defendants came from the victim's
unaided memory. 386 Lacking particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,
the court excluded the statements because to 38admit
them would have
7
deprived defendants of their right to confrontation.
388

In an earlier case, State v. Bowe, the court reached a similar finding
with respect to the in hospital photo identifications of defendants by the
victim nine days after an assault. The court found that the photo
identifications, sought to be introduced by the prosecution came after the
victim had spoken with the detective investigating the case nine times. 389 The
court was not convinced that the identification was not influenced by the
detective or by something other than a desire to tell the truth. 390 There was
no appropriate indicia of reliability to the identifications to be found in this
situation. The identifications were disallowed pursuant to the residual
exception.
3 91
In State v. Castaneda,
the Supreme Court of Iowa overturned the
defendant's conviction for child abuse and remanded the case. The court
provided an explanation supporting the use of the residual exception on
remand. Yet, the court gave no thoroughgoing analysis for the trial court to
follow in order to determine whether there existed particularized "guarantees
of trustworthiness" with respect to the reintroduction at the retrial of a
videotaped statement of the child victim. 392 Castaneda is disappointing in
this respect.
382. 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 60 (Mar. 20, 2000).
383. Id. at 1.

384. Id. at 12.
385. id.
386. Id.
387. 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 60 at 12.
388. 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 603 (1997).
389. Id. at 4.

390. Id. at 9.
391. 621 N.W.2d 435 (Iowa 2001).

392. Id. at 443-48.
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The same court gave an excellent analysis of its findings of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness in the case of State v. Halum.393
In Hallum, the court allowed the prosecution during a murder trial, pursuant
to the residual exception, to introduce defendant's accomplice's videotaped
narrative of the crime.394
The accomplice in Hallum was Carlos Medina. The Supreme Court of
Iowa allowed Medina's statement into evidence pursuant to the residual
exception after finding: 1) Medina was not offered leniency in exchange for
his statement; 2) he did not attempt to shift blame to the defendant; 3) he
unequivocally acknowledged that he committed serious offenses and did not
attempt to avoid responsibility for his own acts; 4) he did not attempt to
curry favor with the police; 5) he voluntarily gave his statement after being
given his Miranda rights; 6) he had not been caught "red-handed" and so was
not in a situation where his only recourse was to share blame by implicating
the defendant; 7) his statement was given shortly after the commission of the
crime while his memory was fresh; and 8) his statement was extremely
detailed. 395 This thoroughgoing analysis by the court demonstrated that there
were appropriate indicia of reliability to show that the statement was
trustworthy.
In State v. Martin,39 6 the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the trial
court's refusal to allow the defendant, who was on trial for murder, to
introduce a double hearsay statement as part of his defense. 397 The court
found that the defendant had failed to establish sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness because he made no offer of proof about the circumstances
of the conversations about the declarant's memory. 398 Additionally, the
court found that before defendant had offered this double hearsay testimony,
he had already
introduced extrinsic evidence to contradict the proffered
399
testimony.
A year earlier in State v. Martin,4°° involving the same defendant, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the state appellate court's ruling that
prior testimony of Martin's co-defendants who were tried separately could

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

585 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 1999).
Id. at 257-59.
Id. at 257.
614 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. 2000).
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
591 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1999).
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be introduced at his trial by the prosecution. 40 1 The supreme court found that
the appeals court erred when it concluded that the entire portions of the codefendants' trial testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability to merit
admission under the residual exception and the Confrontation Clause.40 2 The
supreme court found that some of the proffered testimony was so unreliable
it would have to be subjected to cross examination.
In re L.E.P.,40 3 a case involving a juvenile, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota examined the criteria state courts should articulate in evaluating
statements by young children admitted pursuant to the residual exception.4
The criteria included evaluating the "lack of motive to fabricate, spontaneity
and demeanor of the child, expressions unexpected from a child of that age,
and the absence of leading questions.
the Court of Appeal of Minnesota upheld the
In State v. Wikan,
prosecution's introduction of prior inconsistent statements of a victim of
spousal abuse pursuant to the state's residual exception.4 0 7 The court found
that the prior statements implicating her spouse, which differed from her
testimony at trial, possessed the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness.40
The court found that the statements were reliable, because: 1) they were
against interest due to the relationship; 2) she did not appear confused when
she made the statements; 3) the statements were corroborative of what other
witnesses testified, and 4) they were made just after the event.4 9
In People v. Lee,410 the court of appeal of that state upheld the
admission, pursuant to the state's residual exception, statements of a victim
of an armed robbery who died before the trial. The declarant identified
defendant as the perpetrator. The court found the statements had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 411 Among other factors, the court
found were that 1) the victim suffered no memory loss from the incident; 2)

401. Id. at 484.

402. Id.
403. 594 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. 1999).

404. Id. at 170-71.
405. Id. at 173.
406. No. C1-96-880, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 271, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 11,
1997) (unpublished opinion).

407. Id.at*ll.
408. Id at *6.
409. Id.at *6-7.
410. 622 N.W.2d 71 (2000).
411. Id. at79.
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that he was coherent when he made the statements; 3) he was not confused;
and 4) the statements were voluntary. 412
In People v. Welch,413 the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's decision not to allow a hearsay statement offered by the defendant
pursuant to the residual exception. 414 Defendant, on trial for the murder of a
girlfriend he allegedly pushed off a bridge to her death, sought the
introduction of statements by witnesses who allegedly heard the victim say
she was going to kill herself moments before her plunge. 415 Here, the court
held that the statements were not reliable. The court found that statement
had not been related directly to the police officer who would testify. The
defense sought to have the police officer testify to what a witness had
overheard from others. 416 However, there was 1) no evidence that this
witness actually heard the statement by the victim; 2) no other witnesses
testified as to such statement; 3) sixteen minutes had elapsed between the
victim's plunge and the witness relating the information to the officer.417 The
court also found unreliable the fact that the officer who approached the
group of witnesses 4) found them laughing and giggling about the
situation.
Finally, the court found the officer 5) had not written down the
statement. 41 9 A sad set of facts here would not support a finding of
equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness.
In State v. Gamer,420 the Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the trial
court's refusal to introduce tapes of a false confession at a murder trial. 42'
Defendant, on trial for murder sought introduction of the taped confession of
an eleven-year-old boy who confessed to the crime. 422 The eleven-year-old
had been seen at the victim's house prior to the murder.423 He was
questioned by police for seven hours before defendant became the true
suspect of the crime. The eleven year old later said he made up the
confession so that he could go home and go to sleep. 424 The eleven year old
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

Id. at 80-81.
574 N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 1977).
Id. at 685.
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id.
Welch, 574 N.W. at 684.
Id.
614 N.W. 2d 319 (Neb. 2000).
Id. at 329-30.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 323.
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was available and testified at trial.4 5 The court found the tapes were
inadmissable hearsay and that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to not allow the tapes pursuant to the residual exceptionY2 There was
no guarantee of trustworthiness to the tapes made under the conditions of
this case. The court rightly decided in this situation that it was best that the
eleven-year-old, who was available for the trial, testify and be subjected to
cross examination.
In State v. Jacob,4 27 the Supreme Court of Nebraska again upheld a trial
court's refusal to allow a defendant, on trial for murder, to introduce
evidence pursuant to the residual exception. 428 In this case, Jacob sought
introduction of a videotape deposition of a used car salesman in Maine. 42 9
Jacob, who had planned to fly to England, sought to sell his vehicle in
Maine, where he had driven after killing his girlfriend and her new lover in
Nebraska. 30 He sought introduction of the videotape to show his innocent
behavior prior to his arrest.43 ' The Nebraska trial court did no analysis, but
held that the videotape would not be admitted pursuant to the residual
432
The Supreme Court found the trial court had not abused its
exception.
discretion for the "residual hearsay exception is to be used rarely and only in
exceptional circumstances. ' 433 The opinion infers that the defense did little
to show that the proffered videotape possessed any particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness. The court was correct not to admit the evidence.
As this review illustrates, the state courts are very cautious concerning
introduction of hearsay pursuant to the residual exception in criminal cases.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in three separate cases, would not allow
introduction of defense evidence pursuant to the residual exception. In
Delaware, the court, in separate cases, twice denied prosecutors the use of
residual hearsay of unreliable identifications by crime victims who were
hospitalized. The Supreme Court of Iowa gave a very thoroughgoing
analysis of appropriate indicia of reliability for introduction of the
statements in Hallum. In the four cases considered by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, the court found particularized guarantees of trustworthiness in
425. Gamer, 614 N.W.2d at 330.

426. Id.
427. 574 N.W.2d 117 (Neb.1998).

428. Id. at 139.
429. Id.
430. Id at 126-28.

at 139.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 139-40.
433. d at 139.
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only two of the cases. The Michigan courts allowed testimony pursuant to
the residual exception in one case, but not the second. The Nebraska court
gave short shrift to defendants' requests to introduce hearsay pursuant to the
residual exception in the two cases it considered. As a result of this review,
we need not fear that the use of the residual exception is being abused by
judges in state criminal court cases.
C. The FloridaCases
As noted earlier in this article, Florida does not have a residual
exception akin to rule 807. However, Florida does have two sections of its
evidence code directed to the types of circumstances where residual
exceptions often are applied. Section 90.803(23) allows the use of out-ofcourt statements of children eleven years old or younger in child abuse cases.
Section 90.803(24) allows introduction of such statements by elderly or
disabled adults. These may be viewed as "quasi-residual" exceptions.
This survey would not be complete without commenting on the cases in
Florida where hearsay statements have been offered pursuant to these
"quasi-residual" exceptions. The initial question is whether such cases
require the same type of rule 807 analysis to determine whether there are
appropriate indicia of reliability and notice to establish trustworthiness. The
answer is, of course, no. There is no need for an independent analytical
framework in Florida because the statutes in question set out the
requirements to be followed. If the requirements of the statute are not met,
the evidence is not allowed. A review of the cases reveals that the courts of
Florida are very careful with the hearsay evidence sought to be introduced
pursuant to their "quasi-residual" statutes.
The essence of both statutes is that they seek to test the reliability of out
of court statements. In criminal cases, notice must be given. In all cases the
judge must hold a hearing outside of the hearing of the jury to determine the
reliability of such statements.434 If reliable, such statements may be introduced whether the declarant is available or unavailable.43 5 If the declarant is
unavailable:
the trial judge must determine whether the hearsay statement is
reliable and from a trustworthy source without regard to
corroborating evidence. If the answer is yes, then the judge must
determine whether other corroborating evidence is present. If the
434. See FLA. R. EVrD. 90.903(23)(a)(1), 90.803(24)(a)(1).
435. See FLA. R. EviD. 90.903(23)(a)(2), 90.803(24)(a)(2).
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answer to either question is no, then the hearsay statements are
436
inadmissable.

In Doe v. Broward County School Board,437 a trainable mentally
retarded girl with Down's Syndrome had been digitally penetrated by a
mentally disabled male in an after school care program at an elementary
school in Broward County. 38 Her mother brought a personal injury lawsuit
claiming negligent supervision. 439 The victim was unavailable to testify at
the trial. The School Board made a motion in limine to exclude from trial the
victim's hearsay statements to her mother and a psychologist on the ground
that the hearsay statements were not admissible pursuant to section
90.803(23), because the victim was unavailable and there was no
corroborating evidence of the incident. 44° The trial court granted the motion
in limine. 4" The court then granted the School Board's motion for summary
judgment "based upon the court's conclusion that section 90.803(23)
preempted all other hearsay exceptions,' and
as a result, [the victim] had no
2
"
case.
her
prove
to
which
with
evidence
The Florida District Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had not
abused its discretion in finding that there was no corroborating evidence of
the incident which would allow the introduction of the hearsay statements
pursuant to section 90.803(23).443 The appeals court reversed the summary
judgment and remanded the case for the trial judge to determine whether the
victim's out of court" statements may have been admitted pursuant to other
hearsay exceptions.
i " 5 the Supreme Court of Florida reversed
In Florida v. Townsend,
defendant's conviction for abuse of a child of a two year old because of

436. Ud
437. 744 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
438. Id. at 1070.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Doe, 744 So. 2d at 1070.
443. Id.
at 1071.
444. Id. at 1073. Specifically, the court remanded the case in order that the trial court
might determine whether the victim's out-of-court statements to the psychologist, not relating
to the identity of the perpetrator, were admissible under the medical diagnosis and treatment
exception and whether the victim's out of court statements to her mother were admissible as
excited utterances. Id.
445. 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
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errors in the trial court's failure to make adequate findings for the admission
of the child victim's hearsay statement. 446 The court found that:
Section 90.803 (23) (a) (1) mandates that the trial judge, in a
hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, determine
whether a hearsay statement is trustworthy and reliable by
examining the 'time, content, and circumstances' of the statement,
the court may consider the mental and physical age and maturity of
the child, the nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the
relationship of the child to the offender, the reliability of the
assertion, the reliability of the child victim and any other factor
deemed appropriate ....Other factors may include.., a consideration of the statements's spontaneity; whether the statement was
made at the first available opportunity following the alleged
incident.., whether the child used terminology unexpected of a
child of similar age; the motive or lack thereof to fabricate the
statement... [I]n sum, as noted by the United States Supreme
Court in Wright, a court is to use a447totality of the circumstances
evaluation in determining reliability.
The court in Townsend found, however, that "the trial judge merely
listed each of the statements to be considered and summarily concluded,
without explanation or factual findings, that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statements to be admitted at trial were sufficient to
reflect that the statements were reliable."" 8 The court found such findings
insufficient under both the Florida statute and the constitutional
requirements of Idaho v. Wright.449
Similarly, in Hill v. State,450 the district court of appeal reversed and
remanded defendant's conviction for sexual battery and a lewd and
lascivious act committed in the presence of a four year old.45 ' The court
found that, although some of the child's out-of-court hearsay statements had
been found reliable pursuant to section 90.803(23), the trial court had erred
when it allowed the examining physician to testify as to the child victim's

446. Id. at 958.
447. id. at 957-58.
448. Id. at. 958.
449. Id.

450. 643 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
451. Id. at 654.
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statements about the defendant's culpability, without observing the
safeguards of section 90.803(23) with respect to such testimony. 452
In State v. Jones,5 3 the Supreme Court of Florida determined that by
providing safeguards outlined in section 90.803(23), the legislature of
Florida had sought to strike a balance between the need to consider child
hearsay statements in judicial proceedings and the rights of the accused 4
The court held that section 90.803(23) comported "with the confrontation
455
clauses of both the federal Constitution and the Florida Constitution."
In stark contrast to these child abuse cases, the Supreme Court of
Florida in Conner v. State,456 held that the use of hearsay exception for
elderly adults, pursuant to section 90.803(24), was, in criminal cases
unconstitutional.
In that case, the defendant was convicted, on a plea of
nolo contendre, of armed burglary, armed robbery and armed kidnapping.4
The victim was an eighty year old man who died prior to trial,459 The trial
court ruled that hearsay statements he gave to police about the crime were
corroborated by other evidence, and that the state would be allowed in a
hearing "to establish that' the
circumstances surrounding the statements
°
guaranteed their reliability. 4
The Supreme Court of Florida found deficiencies in the statute as it
applied to elderly persons. The court found that section 90.803(24), in
defining elderly as an adult sixty years of age or older, applies to a much
broader class of adult declarants than did the child abuse statute of section
90.803(23). "6 As written, the statute applied to all persons over sixty years
old. The court also found, unlike the child abuse statute which was limited
to acts describing child abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse, that under the
90.804(24) exception for the elderly, declarants could describe "any act of
abuse or neglect, any act of exploitation, the offense of battery or aggravated
battery or assault or aggravated assault or sexual battery, or any other violent
act." 4 2 Thus, the elderly hearsay exception would not be limited to crimes
concerning elder abuse. Finally, the court could not determine a list of
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

Id.
625 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1993).
Id. at 826.
Id.
748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2000).
Id. at 954.

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

Id. at 953.
Id. at 952.
Id at 953.
Conner,748 So. 2d at 958.
Id (quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)).
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factors for the elderly, unlike the factors for children set out in section
90.803(23), that 46
would
guarantee the reliability of the hearsay statements of
3
the elderly adult.
The case was well reasoned. From such reasoning, it is easy to presume
that though Florida has no residual rule akin to 807, the "quasi-residual"
exceptions it has adopted for the elderly and children will not swallow the
hearsay rule as we know it.
VI. CONCLUSION

This review of the twelve federal cases and twenty-two state cases,
which relied on the residual exception in some part, show that there has been
no abuse of the rule by the courts at the federal or the state level since the
1997 amendment to the residual exception. Courts appear vigilant with
respect to analyzing the need for particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
for statements proffered pursuant to the exception. Very often, such analysis
shows that the statements lack the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness needed to pass muster. We need the residual exception to the hearsay
rule. It is the exception that gives flexibility to the rule. If the states are
reluctant to adopt such residual exceptions, they may well be advised to look
at the Florida model, especially for child abuse and neglect cases.

463. Id. at 958-59.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This survey covers the decisions of the Florida courts and Florida
legislation produced during the period from July 1, 2000 through June 30,
2001 especially selected for this article as being of potential interest to the
real estate practitioner. The legislative changes affect numerous provisions.
So, the legislation comments included in this review are purely for
informational purposes. We do not intend this to be all inclusive. Reading
the complete amendments is highly recommended.
II. AGENCY
Lensa Corp. v. Poinciana Gardens Ass'n. 1 The issue in this case is
whether apparent authority can be established when the president of a non2
profit corporation negotiates and executes the sale of property.
In this case, the president of an association negotiated and executed
sales documents. The purchaser relied on the president's alleged apparent
authority and failed to comply with statutory requirements which require a
corporate resolution.4
The appellate court held that the sale of all or substantially all of a nonprofit corporation's assets is strictly controlled by section 617.1202 of the
Florida Statutes providing that a vote by the members must take place
authorizing the transaction. 5 Therefore, the purchaser was wrong in relying
on the president's position because of this statute. Also, it appears the
corporate principal never made a representation that the president was its
6
agent for this sale. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's
decision disallowing the sale.7
Ill. ARBITRATION
8

Zager Plumbing, Inc. v. JP1 National Construction, Inc. The issue
here is whether the trial court erred in finding that a contractor did not waive
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

765 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 297-98.
Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 298.
Id.
785 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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its right to arbitration when it filed an action to shorten the time in which a
construction9 lien could be foreclosed prior to making a demand for
arbitration.
JPI National Construction ("JPr'), a general contractor, entered into a
subcontract with Zager Plumbing, which contained an arbitration clause. 0
When it was not paid timely, Zager filed a construction lien against the
owner's property, and JPI filed a complaint under section 713.21(4) of the
FloridaStatutes." Under this statute, the lienor has twenty days to show
cause why its lien should not be enforced by action or vacated and canceled
12
1
of record. Failure to respond timely results in an order canceling the lien.' 3
Attached to the complaint was JPI's demand for arbitration, which was
submitted to the American Arbitration Association simultaneously with the
filing of the complaint. 14 Zager filed a motion to dismiss contending that JPI
section 713.21.15 The trial
waived its right to arbitration by filing suit under
16
court denied the motion, and Zager appealed.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that there was no waiver
of the right to arbitration. Public policy is not only in favor of the prompt
clearance of construction liens from real property, it also strongly favors
arbitration.' 8 "All questions concerning the scope or waiver of the right to
arbitrate under contracts should be resolved in favor of arbitration rather
than against it."'19
In this case, JPI acted reasonably when it invoked expedited procedure
for clearing liens from real property, while at the same time seeking to
resolve the parties' dispute through arbitration.20 Zager was not prejudiced
by the trial c6urt's decision to allow the procedure.2'

9.
10.

Id. at 661.
Id.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.(quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.21(4) (1999)).
Zager Plumbing,Inc., 785 So. 2d at 661 (quoting FLA. STAT.
Id.
Id.
Id.

17.
18.

Id. at 661-62.

19.

§ 713.21(4) (1999)).

Zager Plumbing,Inc., 785 So. 2d at 662.
Id. (quoting Beverly Hills Dev. Corp. v. George Wimpey of Fla., Inc., 661 So. 2d

969, 971 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
20. Id. at 662.
21. Id.
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IV. ATrORNEY'S FEES
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Department of Transportation.22
The
Department
took
a
temporary
construction
easement
to
facilitate
bridge
repairs. 23 It made an offer of $112,300 to compensate the landowner.2 The
landowner's reaction to the offer was to hire a lawyer. 25 Eventually, the
landowner agreed to accept $142,000 as compensation and filed a motion for
attorney's fees. 26 By statute, attorney's fees in eminent domain cases are
27
based on the benefits the lawyer achieved for the client. Monetary benefits
are defined as the difference between the compensation the client receives
and the last written offer received from the condemning authority.28 The trial
court awarded attorney's fees as thirty-three percent of the difference
between $142,000 and $112,300.29
The landowner's attorney claimed that
3
was inadequate and appealed. 0
The appeal was based on two claims. First, the landowner claimed that
its attorney had achieved nonmonetary benefits by making the Department
change its plans. 3'

However, the district court found that the trial court's

decision was supported by competent substantial evidence on the record. 32 A
trial court's award of attorney's fees should be disturbed only if the trial
court
clearly abused its discretion.3 3 Consequently, that claim was reject4
ed.

3

The second claim was more interesting. The landowner had filed a
motion to strike the Department's offer of $112,300. 35 Without that offer,
the attorney's fees would be based on achieving the benefit of $142,000, so
the award would be significantly higher.36 The basis for the motion was that
the Department had subsequently made substantial changes to its plans, so
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

788 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 73.092(l) (1999).
§ 73.092(1)(a).
Amerada Hess Corp., 788 So. 2d at 277.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 277.
Amerada Hess Corp., 788 So. 2d at 278.
Id. at 277.
Id.
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the original offer involved a different taking and could not, logically, be used
to measure the benefits achieved here. 37 The district court rejected that
argument. 38 The landowner's attorney claimed the benefit it had achieved
was "a substantial reduction in [Landowner's] costs to cure, a lesser impact
upon [Landowner's] property, and an entitlement to greater compensation. 3 9
Thus, the benefit achieved had already been used in calculating the
attorney's
fees, and it would be getting a windfall to increase those fees even
40
more.
Dow v. McKinley.41 Landowners hired a contractor to build their
single-family house. 42 A dispute arose and the landowners refused to honor
the contractor's final invoice.43 The contractor filed this suit for damages
based on, inter alia, breach of contract and to foreclose its mechanic's lien."
The landowners raised four affirmative defenses and three counterclaims
based substantially on allegations of faulty workmanship. 45 The trial court
granted judgment in favor of the contractor, but also granted judgment for
the landowners on their counterclaim." The court also entered an order for
attorney's fees under the construction lien statute. 47
The net award to the contractor was $16,026.98, but the court awarded
attorney's fees of $62,125 based on 355 hours at $175 per hour.48 The court
of appeal decided that this was erroneous. 49 The critical factor was that the
contractor had won less than thirty percent of his original claim of
$56,086.87.'o Consequently, the trial court should have considered whether
the attorney's fee should be reduced based on the level of success, a low
level in this case, achieved by the attorney.51 The district court also found
several items for which costs should not have been awarded including an

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Amerada Hess Corp., 788 So. 2d at 277.
Id. at 278.
776 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1018.
Dow, 776 So. 2d at 1018.
ld. (citing FLA.STAT. § 713.29 (1997)).
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id.
Dow, 776 So. 2d at 1018.
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appraisal report, which was not submitted into evidence, and trial transcripts,
whose use and purpose was not established. 52
5 3 Plaintiff in an eminent
Hartleb v. Department of Transportation.
domain case prevailed and was awarded attorneys' fees. 4 The Department
court.55
of Transportation deposited the money into the registry of the
Unsatisfied with the terms of his win, plaintiff filed a motion for a
57
Because a statute
rehearing. 56 When that failed, plaintiff appealed.
provided any withdrawal of the funds would result in the appeal being
dismissed, 58 plaintiff left the money in the court registry for the three years it
took to complete the appeal process. 59 Ultimately, the appeal was
unsuccessful. Then, plaintiff withdrew the money from the court registry
and moved for an award of interest for the three-year period from entry of
judgment to the withdrawal.6 Reversing the trial court, the district court
concluded he was entitled to it. The Florida Constitution mandates full
63
compensation for land taken. That mandate would be violated if a plaintiff
is denied interest on land held in the court's registry pending appeal, even if
that appeal is unsuccessful. 64
Sayre v. JMC Painting, Inc.65 Plaintiff filed her action against the
landowner and the general contractor in county court. 6 The action was
67
based on the claim that a contract had been breached. Among the counts
were claims for a mechanic's lien and the transfer bond surety.68 There were
also claims against the payment bond. 9 However, the county court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against a surety bond,70 so these
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1018-19.
778 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.at 1064.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hardeb,778 So. 2d at 1064 (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.131(1) (2000)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
Hartleb v. Dep't of Transp., 778 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
778 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at431.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sayre, 778 So. 2d at 431.
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claims were dismissed. 71 The county court then granted attorney's fees to
the two sureties. 72 Unfortunately, the county court failed to specify its basis
for granting attorney's fees.73 If attorney's fees were granted under the
Mechanic's Lien Act, 74 then the attorney's fees award was improper.
Lacking subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, the court also lacked
jurisdiction to award attorney's fees based on that claim.75 Therefore, the
case was remanded to the trial court to determine the basis of its decision to
grant attorney's fees.1
Department of Transportationv. Patel. The Department brought a
condemnation action to take part of the landowner's land. 78 At the close of
the evidence, the Department moved for a whole taking of the land, rather
than a partial taking, if that turned out to be less expensive, as was then
allowed by section 337.27(2) of the Florida Statutes.79 The landowner
opposed the motion. 8° The court denied the motion, but ordered an interrogatory verdict be distributed to the jury." The court82made a compensation
award and then proceeded to consider attorney's fees.
One component of the attorney's fees awarded was for nonmonetary
benefits achieved for the landowner, 3 including the value of the land that the
Department failed to take when the motion for a whole taking was
defeated.84 In addition, the nonmonetary benefits included the income from
that land.85 However, the district court rejected this characterization. 8 6
Rather, attorney's fees for defeating that motion should be calculated as if a
condemnation had been defeated under the other part of the statute.87 That
constituted reversible error.88 However, the Department conceded that
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 432.
FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1999).
Sayre, 778 So. 2d at 431.
Id. at 432.
768 So. 2d 1173 (FIa. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Patel,768 So. 2d at 1174.
FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1)(b) (1997).

83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Patel,768 So. 2d at 1174.

Id.
Id. at 1175.
Id. (citing FLA.
Id.
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where the attorney's efforts had extended the period that the landowner
remained in possession of the premises, there was a benefit achieved for
which attorney's fees could be recovered. 89 The trial court also committed
reversible error by awarding expert witness fees when the testimony's sole
use was as a basis for claiming attorney's fees. 90 Since the condemnee has
no interest in the attorney's fees obtained, there is no right to recover
attorney's fees and litigation costs.91
V. BROKERS
FramerRealty, Inc. v. Ross.92 Out-of-state buyers were looking for an
expensive house.
Framer showed them numerous properties when they
visited Florida. 94 They expressed particular interest in a certain house which
they had seen twice, but indicated they first had to complete an out-of-state
transaction. 95 Eventually they did return to Florida to complete the purchase,
but they used another broker, Ross, to make the offer and handle the
96
97
closing.
Ross collected and kept the entire commission.
As a result,
Framer sued Ross, who was aware that Framer had shown the house to the
buyers, for unjust enrichment. 98 The trial court granted Ross's motion for
summary judgment. 99
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed.'0 To recover, Framer
would have to show that he had an implied contract or that he was the
procuring cause of the sale. 0 1 "Genuine issues of material fact remain for a
determination by ,,102
the trier of fact as to whether Framer was a procuring cause
of the sale ....
Framer might have been entitled to a broker's
commission because he brought the buyers to see the property. 0 3 The
89.

Patel, 768 So. 2d at 1175.

90.
91.

Id.
Id.

92.

768 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.

97.

Ross, 768 So. 2d at 6.

98.
99.

Id.
Id.

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Ross, 768 So. 2d at 6.
Id.
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evidence might lead to the conclusion that he was intentionally excluded by
the buyer and seller from the negotiations that led to the sale. 104 Also, "it
could be reasonably inferred that Ross accepted the benefit of Framer's
efforts" to sell the house. 0 5 Consequently, summary judgment was inappropriate and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 0 6
Media Services Group, Inc. v. Bay Cities Communications,Inc.' °7 The8
station. 1
plaintiff had a ninety-day exclusive right to sell defendant's radio
Defendant terminated the agreement when the ninety days ran out.'0 9 However, plaintiff continued to try to find a buyer for the station.11 It was on a
list of stations that were available that plaintiff sent to Root Communications."' Plaintiff also arranged for personnel from Root to tour the
station and meet with a major shareholder of defendant." 2 Plaintiff also
sent to Root." 3 Defendant knew about
included the station in a offering
4
these efforts and cooperated."1
Plaintiff directed its sales appeals to other prospective buyers. 5 Those
efforts produced Hochman Communications which signed a "letter
agreement '" 16 with defendant.'1 7 Hochman had difficulty getting the
necessary financing, but plaintiff did not give up." 8 It worked to make the
deal happen. 1 9 Before that could occur, defendant started negotiating with
another buyer.'20 Plaintiff finally discovered that buyer was Root; so it
notified defendant that it had produced Root and wanted to be involved in
the negotiations. 121 Plaintiff was not allowed to participate. 122 The station

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Ross, 768 So. 2d at 7.
237 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2001).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1328.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Media Servs. Group, Inc., 237 F.3d at 1328.

Id.
Id. at 1328 n.1.
Id.
at 1328.
Id.
Media Servs. Group Inc., 237 F.3d at 1328.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Media Servs. Group, Inc., 237 F.3d at 1328.
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was sold to Root, and defendant refused to pay plaintiff a commission for the

sale. 123
Plaintiff sued in federal district court. 124
Its complaint for
compensation had three counts: breach of an oral contract, unjust
enrichment, and quantum meruit.1'2 The oral contract and quantum meruit
claims were tried by a jury which returned a verdict for defendant. 12 The
unjust enrichment claim, being equitable in nature, was tried by the court
without a jury. 127 The district judge held defendant liable based on unjust
enrichment. 128 Defendant appealed.129
Defendant claimed that under Florida law, a broker could not recover
for unjust enrichment.' 30 That argument was rejected. 13 1 Florida case law
showed that a broker could recover for unjust enrichment based on "either
the existence of an implied contract to pay him for [his] services in finding
and negotiating with the ultimate purchasers or that he was the procuring
factor in the sale."'132 The problem for plaintiff was that it had not negotiated
with the ultimate purchasers and the district court had expressly stated in its
final order that plaintiff was not the procuring cause of this sale. 33 The
court of appeal noted that in order to be considered the procuring cause of
the sale, "the broker must have brought the [parties] together and effected
the sale as a result of continuous negotiations inaugurated by him unless the
seller and buyer intentionally exclude the broker and thereby vitiate the need
for continuous negotiations."' 3" The facts in the record demonstrated that
this broker brought the parties together. 13 The facts in the record also
demonstrated that the buyer and seller intentionally excluded the broker
from the negotiations. 36 There was no need to show that the buyer and
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Plaintiff did not appeal. Id. at 1328-29 n.4.
127. Media Servs. Group, Inc., 237 F.3d at 1328 n.4.
128. Id. at 1328.
129. Id. at 1327.
130. Id. at 1329.
131. Id.
132. Media Servs. Group,Inc., 237 F.3d at 1329 (citations omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Sheldon Greene & Assoc., Inc. v. Rosinda Inv., N.V., 475 So. 2d
925, 927 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); rev. dismissed, Horn v. Sheldon Greene & Assoc.,
Inc., 502 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1987)).
135. Id. at 1330.
136. Id.
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seller had acted in bad faith. 37 The record also showed that the property had
been sold. 138 Consequently, the district court must have meant that plaintiff
was not the procuring cause in this case only because the buyer and seller
had prevented it from bringing the sale to closure. 139 Thus, the court's
finding of facts was consistent with defendant's being held liable.' 40 Since
that was the only possible explanation, a remand for further proceedings was
unnecessary. 141 The court of appeal could not disturb the findings of the
federal district court because they were not clearly erroneous. 142
Newbern v. Mansbach.143 Buyers sued the real estate broker and the
insurance agent for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. 144 Buyer
alleged that they would not have purchased the land if they had known that it
was located in a Coastal Barrier Resource Area (CBRA) or that they could
not get federal flood insurance. 145 The broker conceded that she represented
that the land was not located in the CBRA even though she had information
that it was.146 Because it was located in the CBRA, federal flood insurance
could not be obtained.' 47 The insurance agent knew this before the real
estate closing, but failed to reveal it, despite having represented to the buyers
that the insurance had been obtained. 148
The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants.' 49 Its
theory was that whether the land was located in the CBRA was a matter that
150
could be determined from the public records by reasonable efforts.
Consequently, recovery for misrepresentation was precluded as52a matter of
law.' 5 ' The First District Court of Appeal rejected that analysis.1

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Media Servs. Group, Inc., 237 F.3d at 1329.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Media Servs. Group, Inc., 237 F.3d at 1330.
777 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 1045.
Id.
Id.
Id.

148. Newbern, 777 So. 2d at 1045.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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The elements for recovery based on negligent misrepresentation are
borrowed from section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'53 It
provides that a person may be held liable for a negligent misrepresentation if
in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss ... if he fails
to exercise reasonable care 1or
54 competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
However, he wili only be liable for harm that resulted from justifiable
reliance on the misrepresentation. 155 "[Jiustifiable reliance is an issue of
comparative negligence that should be resolved by a jury.' 56 Therefore, the
trial court should have allowed the jury to determine if the buyers justifiably
relied upon the misrepresentations or had been negligent in not discovering
these facts from the public records.
The claim of fraudulent misrepresentation raised a slightly different
issue. The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may rely on it, "even
though its falsity could have been ascertained had he made an investigation,
unless he knows the representation to be false or its falsity is obvious to
him., 15 7 That presents questions of disputed fact that could not be properly
disposed of by summaryjudgment based on the information being available
in the public records. 8 The CBRA regulations and documents are
complicated and so the falsity of the misrepresentations was not obvious. 59
Scott v. Simpson.'60 A real estate salesman signed a contract to sell
units at a condominium project.' 6 ' The contract provided that he would
receive a 1.5% commission on each sale but it was to be payable half when
the statutory162right to rescission expired and the other half when the sale was
completed.
The contract also provided that the salesman would forfeit any
153. Newbern, 777 So. 2d at 1045.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTs § 552(1).
155. Id. § 552(2).
156. Newbern, 777 So. 2d at 1046 (citing Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.,
696 So. 2d 334, 339 (Fla. 1997)).
157. Id. (quoting from Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995, 998 (Fla. 1980)).
158. Id. at 1047.
159. Id. at 1046.
160. 774 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
161. Id. at 882.
162. Id.
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pending commissions if the contract was terminated.1 63 Eighteen units were
under contract when the salesman received notice alleging certain
shortcomings in his performance, and therefore, termination of the
contract. 64
The salesman sued for the unpaid commissions on the eighteen units
and won in the trial court, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed.
"Interpretation of a written contract is a matter of law,' ' 166 so the
appellate court engaged in a de novo review. 167 It found that the contract
clearly and unambiguously provided that unpaid commissions would be
forfeited upon termination of the contract.161 "Agreements entitling sales
persons to commissions only after the sales have actually closed are standard
16 9
in this business, and have been upheld by this and other courts.'
Consequently, the salesman was not entitled to these commissions under the
contract.
Moreover, since the parties had a valid express contract
covering these sales, the salesman could not recover on the theory of
quantum meruit.171
It is worth noting that there is no mention of any claim that the
termination was unjustified or in any way wrongful. Nor was there any
mention of a claim that disparate bargaining power was exerted to get the
salesman to agree to these terms. If such factors had appeared, they might
have changed the outcome of the case.
Southampton Development Corp. v. Palmer Realty Group, Inc. 72 The
broker negotiated a fee arrangement with the seller that provided "if my
[b]uyer goes to contract with you, the following commission schedule will
apply .... ,,173 The buyer and seller had not signed a contract when seller
filed for bankruptcy reorganization. 174 Later, with the approval of the
bankruptcy court, seller did reach an agreement with buyer. 7 After the
closing, the broker filed a claim for a commission with the bankruptcy
163. Id. at 882.

164. Id.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Scott, 774 So. 2d at 883.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Scott, 774 So. 2d at 884.
Id.
769 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1114.
Id.
Id. at 1115.
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court. 176 That claim was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the broker to
file suit in state court. 177 The broker first had to prove it did not have
adequate notice of the bankruptcy to succeed in state court. 17 The broker
was able
to surmount that hurdle, but winning on the merits was a different
9
17

story.

The district court concluded that the broker never had a contract with
the seller. 10 Careful scrutiny revealed that the fee arrangement between the
broker and seller was merely an offer to enter into a unilateral brokerage
contract.181 The offer would be accepted by performance, i.e., the buyer and
seller signing a sales contract. 18
That had not occurred before the
bankruptcy was filed. 18 Afterwards, the seller was operating as a debtor in
possession.1
The debtor in possession was considered a different person
from the debtor, i.e., the seller, who had made the offer of the unilateral
brokerage contract. 1 5 Consequently, neither the debtor in possession
signing the sales contract nor closing on the contract could be considered an
acceptance of that offer to enter into the contract to pay a commission.186 It
is worth noting that there is no mention of a claim for quantum meruit. Such
a claim might have succeeded, but it would also present interesting
theoretical problems.
VI. CONDOMINIUMS

Cooley v. PheasantRun at Rosemont Condominium Ass'n. 187 The issue
here was whether a condominium unit owner could be joined as a party to a
suit against the condominium association for an injury that occurred on the
common elements of the condominium. 188 Appellant brought an action
against appellees for an injury sustained while on the appellees property in

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Southampton Dev. Corp., 769 So. 2d at 1115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Southampton Dev. Corp., 769 So. 2d at 1115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
781 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1183.
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which he joined individual unit owners as defendants in the suit.189
Appellant alleged that he was injured while an invited guest upon the
common elements of the condominium grounds. 19° The circuit court
dismissed the individual unit owners from the suit, holding that Florida law
did not support such an action against unit owners, 92
but could only be
19
maintained against the association. 1 Plaintiff appealed.1
The appellate court held that under section 718.119(2) of the Florida
Statutes, the only liability of individual unit owners was for those additional
assessments by the condominium association in relation to the use of the
3 Therefore, the court held that the trial court properly
common
dismissedelements.1
the individual
unit owners from plaintiffs personal injury suit. 9 4
VII. CONSTRUCTION
Gainesville-Alachua County Regional Airport Authority v. R. Hyden
Construction, Inc.195 The construction contract had a change order provision. 196 In the event there were alterations in the work, those alterations, and
an adjustment in the price, were to be agreed upon by the parties. 9 7 The
parties executed one such change order which included a price increase.' 98
Subsequently, the contractor submitted another change order for another
99
price increase based upon costs associated with the earlier change order.
The Airport Authority rejected the second change order and refused to pay
the higher price. 2m The contractor sued for the higher price on the theory of
breach of contract.2°! The Airport Authority's motion for summary judgment was denied and the jury found in favor of the contractor. 2 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed. 2D3
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Cooley, 781 So. 2d at 1183.
193. Id. at 1184.
194. Id. at 1184-85.
195. 766 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
196. Id. at 1238-39.
197. Id. at 1239.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. R. Hyden Constr., Inc., 766 So. 2d at 1239.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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The change order, once executed by both parties, became part of the
contract. 2 04 Here, the executed change order clearly established the total
sum due for the work. 2 5 "[S]ince there was no ambiguity, the interpretation
' 26
of the parties' agreement is a question of law to be resolved by the court. 0
Consequently, it was reversible error to submit to the jury the question of
whether the contractor was entitled to recover the additional costs generated
by the change order.2 7 To the contrary,
summary judgment should have
2 08
been entered for the Airport Authority.
Gables v. Choate.2° 9 Prior to the completion of a luxury condominium
residence, the buyer contracted to purchase it for $700,000.210 One clause
provided that the buyer would forfeit his substantial deposit if he failed to
close.211 The contract also contained a date when construction had to be
completed and a liquidated damages provision giving the buyer a credit of
$5000 for each month of delay.212 Six months after the due date, the
construction was still not finished and the developer was in severe financial
trouble. 213 The parties entered into an improvement contract that gave the
developer thirty days to finish the construction. 4 Any delay would result in
the developer having to pay the buyer $5000 per week. 215 The buyer finally
moved into the unit over Ityear later, but the unit was far from finished and
what had been completed was done badly. 216 It still had not been finished
when the developer walked off the job six months later.217 The buyer hired
another contractor who put the apartment into proper order for about
$8000. 218 Buyer sued the developer and, based on the liquidated damages
clause, was awarded over $125,000.219

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
R. Hyden Constr., Inc., 766 So. 2d at 1239.
Id.
Id.
Id.
792 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gables, 792 So. 2d at 521.
Id.
Id. at 521-22.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 523.
Gables, 792 So. 2d at 522.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

126

: Nova Law Review 26, 1
2001]

Brown / Grohman

The developer's point on appeal was that the liquidated damages clause
was invalid because it was really a penalty. 2 The district court rejected the
argument.2 '1 The parties were sophisticated and represented by counsel. 222
Buyer had bargained for a luxury residence and ended up having to live in223a
construction zone while struggling to complete the construction properly.
Buyer had suffered "prolonged inconvenience, discomfort, invasion of
privacy and renegotiation . ,,22 Calculating damages for that injury
would be difficult and the amount was not necessarily disproportionate to
the figure agreed upon. 22 5 On this final point, Senior Judge Nesbitt
disagreed in a brief dissent.226
The Palms v. Magil ConstructionFlorida,Inc.227 The contractor sued a
landowner claiming breach of a construction contract. 228 The landowner
raised, as a defense, that the contractor did not have a license and was,
therefore, barred from recovering. 229 The contractor had applied for a
license before entering into the contract, but a license had never been
issued.2 30 The contractor asserted the right to cure its missing license
problem by obtaining a license, relying on a sentence in the statute that
stated, "[h]owever, in the event the contractor obtains or reinstates his
license, the provisions of this section shall no longer apply."2 3 1 The problem
facing the court was that the quoted sentence had been subsequently
232
eliminated by the legislature.
So the amendment would only apply to this
case if it had retroactive effect.23 3 The district court concluded that the
amendment "worked a change in the substantive rights of contractors... [s]ince [it] is a substantive change in law, the 2000 amendment does
not operate retroactively." 23 However, the court avoided interpreting the
220. Id.

221. Id.
222. Id. at 523.
223. Id.
224. Gables,792 So. 2d at 523.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 785 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 597-98.
230. Id. at 597.
231. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 489.128 (1995)).
232. See Ch. 2000-372, § 35, 2000 Fa. Laws 4307, 4338 (codified at
§ 489.128 (2000)).
233. Palms, 785 So. 2d at 598.
234. Id.
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effect of the 2000 amendment. 235 It based its ruling on the assumption that
the amendment would bar the contractor from avoiding the statute's effect
by getting a license.236
Performing Arts CenterAuthority v. Clark Construction Group, Inc. 37
When a puddle was found on the floor of the Performing Arts Center in
February, 1995, the manager suspected a roof leak and contacted the roofing
contractor. 238 An inspection revealed that the leak was in the exterior
Stucco. 239 Minor cracks were discovered and the stucco subcontractor
explained that the cracking was caused by the building settling.2 In June
1995, a consultant advised that the building could not be repainted because
the cracks in the exterior stucco were too extensive.24 After heavy rains,
another consultant concluded that the exterior walls had been improperly
designed and built.2 2 The Performing Arts Center filed suit against the
general contractor and the stucco subcontractor on May 14, 1999, less than
four years from receiving the report identifying the nature of the defect, but
more than four years after the other events.2 A3 The trial court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the four-year statute of
limitations. 2 "
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that it was a
question of fact when the plaintiff had notice of the latent defect.24 5 The
court distinguished cases in which there were leaks immediately after a new
roof had been installed because they involved a situation in which it was
"not only apparent, but obvious, that someone is at fault." 246 "However, as
in this case, where the manifestation is not obvious but could be due to
causes other than an actionable defect, notice as a matter of law may not be
inferred." 4 7

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
1983)).
247.

Id.
Id.
789 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Clark Constr. Group, Inc., 789 So. 2d at 394.
Id.
Id. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (2001).
Clark Constr. Group, Inc., 789 So. 2d at 394.
Id. (quoting Kelly v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole County, 435 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla.
Id.
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Shapiro v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation.SM r.
and Mrs. Shapiro contracted to buy a new home to be built by Centron.249
Title to the land passed from Centron to the Shapiros little more than a
month later.25 0 After a year, the house still had not been completed, and
25 1
eventually, Centron abandoned the project leaving the house incomplete.
Mr. and Mrs. Shapiro won a judgment against Centron, but were unable to
collect, so they filed a claim on the Construction Industries Recovery Fund
52
administered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation.2
Their claim was denied on the grounds that they were not the owners of the
land when the contract was signed.253 The governing statute provided: "A
person is not qualified to make a claim for recovery from the Construction
Industries Recovery Fund if: ... (c) Such person's claim is based upon a
construction contract inwhich the licensee [builder] was acting with respect
to the property owned or controlled by the licensee .... ,254
The Fifth District Court of Appeal applied the purpose approach of
statutory interpretation. The legislature passed the statute to protect
consumers who are harmed by defaulting contractors.255 To deny a
consumer protection merely because the builder owned the land at the time
of contracting would undermine the protection that the legislature had
provided. 6 Such an interpretation was "unreasonable" and, consequently,
the decision of the Board was reversed. 7
VIII. COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS

Eckerd Corp. v. Comers Group, Inc.258 The issue here is whether a
restriction in a deed prevented the use of a piece of uoperty as a parking lot
for the type of business proscribed by the restriction. 9
In this case appellant bought land to build a pharmacy.7 When it was
unable to purchase enough adjoining property, appellant sold the property
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

788 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1101.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1102.
Shapiro, 788 So. 2d at 1102.
FLA. STAT. § 489.141(2)(c) (2000).
Shapiro, 788 So. 2d at 1102.
Id.
Id.
786 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 2000).
Id. at 589.
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imposing a restrictive covenant against use of that property as a drugstore. 61
Appellant then purchased land on the opposite comer and built a pharmacy. 262 Appellees purchased the restricted property as well as an adjacent
tract of land and submitted a development plan for a competing pharmacy to
be built, with its parking lot located on that portion of the land which carried
the restrictive covenant entered by appellant.2 63 The appellate court found
that the purpose of the restricted covenant was to prevent the restricted
parcel from being used as any part of a competing pharmacy. 2 4
The appellate court held that the restricted parcel was a necessary part
of the proposed pharmacy.265 Therefore, use of any part of the restricted
266
parcel for parking or ingress or egress violated the restrictive covenant.
IX. DEEDS
American General Home Equity, Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc.267 The issue in this case is whether a deed is valid when it only has one
signature of an identified
witness, the signature of the grantor, and the
268
signature of the notary.
The appeals court noted section 689.01 of the FloridaStatutes provides
"that an interest in land be conveyed 'by instrument in writing, signed in the
presence of two subscribing witnesses by the party... conveying... such
...interest. ... ,,269 American argued against summary judgment because
there allegedly were questions of material fact supposedly raised by the deed
having three signatures and the notary having seen the grantor sign the deed
as evidenced by its affidavit in opposition to summary judgment.27° The
appeals court found the affidavit insufficient because it failed to state the
notary signed in the capacity of a witness. 27 ' There is no presumption that

260. Id.

261. Id.

262. Id. at 590.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Eckerd Corp., 786 So. 2d at 590.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
769 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 509.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 509-10.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

130

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

2001]

Brown / Grohman

when a notary acknowledges an instrument the notary is signing also as a
witness.272 The lower court was affirmed.273
Mattox v. Mattox.274 The issue here is whether decedent delivered a
properly executed and recorded deed to the husband. 275
In this case the decedent divided a three-acre parcel of land into three
one-acre lots by executing a deed to each lot, and by naming as grantee each
of her three sons. 276 She kept a life estate to herself in each deed and
recorded them in 1979. 277 In 1996, when decedent's -health began to fail, she
prepared a deed reconveying appellant husband's lot, appellee's lot, and onehalf of the third son's lot to appellee. 278 The deed was executed by decedent
in the hospital and was recorded by appellee. 279 After decedent's death,
appellants sued appellee to quiet title, for slander of title, and for unjust
enrichment. 280 The trial court failed to determine whether the title to
appellant husband's lot had vested and appellants filed an appeal. 28 1
The court held that the recording of the 1979 deed to appellant husband
in the absence of fraud vested ,the remainder interest in appellant282husband, so
that, upon decedent's death, he was vested with fee simple title. Therefore,
the judgment
was vacated except as to its denial of appellee's unlawful entry
3
claim.2
Zurstrassen v. Stonier.28 The issue is whether the trial court erred in
entering summary judgment for defendants in plaintiff Zurstrassen's quiet
title action where factual issues existed as to whether Zurstrassen should be
estopped from asserting that deed was a forgery, whether he waived his right
to contest the forged deed, and whether he ratified the forged deed. 28 5
In June 1997, Klaus Zurstrassen, a citizen of Germany, and his brother
Rolf, a United States citizen, purchased two lots in Indian River County with
272. Am. Gen. Home Equity, Inc., 769 So. 2d at 509 (citing Walker v. City of
Jacksonville, 360 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.App. 1978)).
273. Id. at 510.

274. 777 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
275. Id. at 1043.

276. Id. at 1042.

277. Id.
278. Id.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Mattox, 777 So. 2d at 1042.
Id.
Id. at 1042-43.
Id. at 1043.
Id.
786 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

285. Id. at 67.
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the intent to build on the lots and then sell them.2 6 On September 10, 1997,
Klaus returned to Germany leaving Rolf in charge of commencing
construction. 287 A deed was recorded fifteen days later, conveying Klaus'
interest to Rolf.288 Klaus returned in October, unaware of the deed, and
contacted a realtor to list the property in February 1998.289 When the listing
agent's preliminary title search indicated that Klaus' name did not appear on
the last deed of record, his brother Rolf led him to believe it was just a mix
up and that he shouldn't worry about title problems. 29 0 The two brothers
entered into a written agreement that stated title was in Rol' s name alone
and then outlined the process by which the proceeds of sale would be
distributed after closing.291 Because his visa was expiring, Klaus had to
return to Germany shortly thereafter.292
In June of 1998, Rolf transferred title to both lots to David Stonier by
quit claim deed.293 Two months later, Stonier transferred title to the
Wihlborgs by warranty deed. 294 The deed was inadvertently recorded in the
wrong county and not correctly recorded in Indian River County until
November 23, 1998.295 Klaus had received notice while in Germany that the
lots had been sold, and as soon as he returned to the United States, he
investigated the title and filed a suit to quiet title to the property and for
rescission.29 6 The lis pendens was recorded on November 10, 1998, thirteen
days before the Wihlborg deed.297
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 298
The court concluded that Klaus either waived or was estopped from
asserting his rights to object to the forged deed when he entered into the
February 1998 agreement with his brother, on the basis that he was aware of
299
the forged deed in 1998 and failed to take action.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 67.

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 68.
299. Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 68.
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The appellate court held that because the deed from Klaus to Rolf was
void, it had no legal effect to transfer Klaus' ownership of the property to
Rolf.3° "[A] forged deed is void and thus creates no legal title nor affords
protection to those claiming under it."30 1 If fraud in the inducement 30is2
present, then the deed may still convey title but be voidable in equity.
When applied to titles of land, a party who allows another to purchase title to
the property under an erroneous opinion of title and who by acts, words or
silence, does not disclose his claim, cannot come back later and exercise his
legal right against the purchaser. 30 3 In this case, because Klaus made no
representations to either Stonier or the Wihlborgs, and the record contained
no evidence indicating he knew of the forged deed at the time he entered into
the February 1998 agreement with his brother, the trial court erred 3in°4
concluding he had knowledge of the forgery and failed to take action on it.
Appellees' argument for equitable estoppel fails because they cannot show
Klaus misrepresented a material fact (clear title) that they relied on to their
detriment. 3°
The appellate court also found issues of fact as to whether Klaus
waived his right to contest the forged deed. 306 In order to waive a right, a
party has to have: "(1) ...a right, privilege, advantage or benefit which may
be waived; (2) the actual or constructive knowledge of [that] right; and (3)
the intention to relinquish the right., 30 7 "Waiver of fraud can occur308where a
party should have discovered the fraud through ordinary diligence.,
Waiver can also be implied; forebearance for a reasonable time alone is
not enough, but conduct that leads a party to believe a right has been waived
may imply such a waiver. 309 In this case, the appellate court found questions

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. at 68.
Id. See McCoy v. Love, 382 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1979).
Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 68.
Id. at 69; see also Coram v. Palmer, 58 So. 721, 722 (Fla. 1912).
Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 70.
Id. at 71.

306. Id. at 70.
307. Id. See also Leonardo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 675 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
308. Zurstrassen, 786 So. 2d at 70; see Humer v. Mut. Bankers Corp., 191 So. 831,
833 (Fla. 1939).
309. Zurstrassen, 786 So. 2d at 70; see Am. Somax Ventures v. Touma, 547 So. 2d
1266, 1268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Arbogast v. Bryan, 393 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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of fact existing as to whether Klaus used due diligence in discovery of the
forgery.3 1°
The appellate court also found that the lower court erred in granting
summary judgment on the issue of ratification of the fraud. 31 1 Ratification of
fraud is an issue of fact. 312 If Klaus knew of the fraud, did not reject it, and
took a material act inconsistent with an intent to avoid it, or delayed in
asserting any remedial rights, then he would have ratified the fraud.3 13 Here,
there was no evidence indicating he had knowledge of the fraud. 314 The
document acknowledging title in Rolf's name alone and authorizing Rolf to
sell the property was based on his good faith belief that the title problems
35
were merely a mix up, not the true state of ownership of the property. 1
X. EASEMENTS
316

Perkins v. Smith.
The issue is whether the trial court erred in its
finding that a recorded easement agreement between Perkins' predecessor in
title and Smith precludes317Perkins from obtaining a statutory way of necessity
across Smith's property.
Perkins purchased a landlocked parcel of land for residential and
318
agricultural purposes.
His land is bordered by property owned by Smith, a
Mr. Clemmons, the South Florida Water Management District, and the
Kissimmee River.319 He accessed his property by using an existing private
road over Smith's land, which had been there for eight years. 32 Perkins
knew before taking title that his seller had entered into an easement
agreement with Smith regarding the use of the road. 321 The recorded
agreement required extensive improvements to the road, at the expense of
the grantee for permanent use of the road. 322 Smith offered Perkins the same

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 70-71.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. See Ball v. Ball, 36 So. 2d 172, 177 (Fla. 1948).
Zurstrassen,786 So. 2d at 71.
Id.
794 So. 2d 647 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Perkins, 794 So. 2d at 648.
Id.
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contractual use of the easement afforded his seller.121 Perkins took the
position that this was a unilateral offer, and he declined. 32 There was
testimony at trial that if he built a new road, Perkins could access his land
from a public road to the north. 325 Although the route would be shorter than
the one presently used, the new road would have to be built over mostly raw
land and bodies of water. 326 The trial court entered a judgment that Perkins
had "an express right to build a paved road onto his property" pursuant to the
recorded easement and Smith's offer.327
The appellate court reversed, holding that Perkins was not barred from
the benefits of section 704.01(2) of the FloridaStatutes.2 A statutory way
of necessity, exclusive of any common-law right exists when a parcel of land
is landlocked so that no practicable route of egress or ingress is available to
the nearest public or private road.329 The land must be outside any
municipality and either used or intended to be used for residential or
agricultural purposes. 330 The owner or tenant thereof may use and maintain
an easement over the lands lying between the landlocked parcel and the
nearest practical route.331
The term "practical" used in section 704.01 of the FloridaStatutes is
defined in section 704.03 of the FloridaStatutes to mean "without the use of
bridge, ferry, turnpike road, embankment, or substantial fill. ' 332 In this case,
in order for Perkins to reach the public road to the north, he would have to
construct a road over mostly raw land and bodies of water, requiring
embankment, and involving substantial fill.333 Based on the foregoing
reasoning, the appellate court concluded that the existing road across
Smith's land constituted the shortest, practical route, and Perkins was
entitled to a statutory way of necessity across Smith's lands, notwithstanding
the terms of the easement.3 34
323. Id.

324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Perkins, 794 So. 2d at 648.

327.
328.
329.
330.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing FLA.
Id.

STAT.

§ 704.01(2) (1999)).

331. Perkins, 794 So. 2d at 648.
332. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 704.03 (1999)).
333. Id. See Keene v. Jackson, 732 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999);
Trammell v. Ward, 667 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Walkup v. Becker, 161 So.
2d 893 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
334. Perkins,794 So. 2d at 648.
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XI. EMINENT DOMAIN

Armadillo Partners, Inc. v. Department of Transportation.335 The
Department was engaged in a road improvement project that required taking
part of the landowner's parking lot. 336 The landowner was entitled to
severance damages for the loss in value the taking effected on its remaining
land.337 Ordinarily, severance damages are calculated as the difference
between the value of the land before the taking and after.338 However, an
alternative valuation is the cost of curing the harm the taking caused.339 In
this case, the Department took seventy-three of the 140 parking spaces in the
parking lot.3 4 The Department proposed a plan to cure part of that loss b
locating twenty-six parking spaces elsewhere on the landowner's land.3
Over the landowner's objection, the trial dcurt admitted valuation testimony
that was based upon that plan. 342 The district court found that testimony
inadmissible because it was based
on a misconstruction of the law and,
343
consequently, reversed the case.
The Department's expert used the relocation of twenty-six parking
spaces to reduce the severance damages suffered by the landowner. 3
However, the expert failed to offset the loss the landowner would suffer by
that relocation. 345 In this case, the twenty-six parking spaces were to be
carved out of an "Arbor Area" located in front of some of the businesses.
"In a consistent line of cases, Florida courts have held that where property
outside the parcel taken is converted to parking to effect a cure of severance
damages, the loss of that property must be taken into account in determining
severance damages."34 7 The valuation did not include independent consideration to the landowner's loss
of that area, so the valuation should not have
3
been admitted into evidence. 48
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

780 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Armadillo Partners,Inc., 780 So. 2d at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 235.
Armadillo Partners,Inc., 780 So. 2d at 236.
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id.
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The cure was also based upon a proposal to build new driveways at
particular locations. 349 However, the driveways could not be built there
without violating the regulations of the Water Management District.3 5° Thus,
351
the cure was based upon mere speculation that it could be put into effect.
Equally important, the relocation of the driveways did not appear in the
It was an
pleadings or in the construction plans entered into evidence.
error to allow testimony about a plan that was inconsistent with the plans
that were in evidence. 3
Cordones v. Brevard County.3 54 The county condemned an easement to
the beach as part of a beach renourishment project. 35 5 Evidence showed that
without the project, the beach would erode through the dune line.356 In order
to obtain federal funds, the county needed at least a fifty-year easement.3 57
The landowners unsuccessfully asserted that the county had not established
the taking was necessary for the public purpose claimed.358 The district court
rejected this claim. 359 It recognized that "[n]o bright line test is available to
determine what constitutes 'reasonable necessity' for a taking by a condemning authority." 36 However, "[a] trial court's order approving condemnation of private property for public use should not be disturbed on appeal
when the taking is supported by good faith considerations of cost, safety,
environmental protection and long-term planning. ' 36' The county had
followed the directions of the United States Corps of Engineers and
362
Thus, there was
condemned only what was required to do the job.
suggest bad faith
evidence
to
and
no
sufficient evidence of a public purpose
or over reaching by the county. 63

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id. at 236-37.
Armadillo Partners,Inc., 780 So. 2d at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
781 So. 2d 519 (FIa. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 521-22.
Cordones, 781 So. 2d at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522.
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The landowners also claimed that the county failed to introduce a valid
appraisal into evidence. 36 The county's appraiser had not produced a
written report, but testified that he used his perceptions of the market and
how the taking would reduce the value of the servient lands. 365 The court
recognized that the valuing of easements is problematic and that no Florida
case establishes how they should be valued. 366 Because the property taken
367
was unique, the normal valuation methods would not be appropriate.
368
Consequently, the method used was appropriate.
The trial court, however, made an error in granting a temporary
easement of unlimited duration. 369 All the testimony, including the County's
Resolution of Necessity, concerned the taking of a fifty-year easement.37 °
The order should have set the duration of the easement at fifty years and the
case was remanded for the trial court to modify its order accordingly.37 '
3
The landowner owned a 512-acre tract.
Nutt v. Orange County.
The county took a triangular parcel of 2.545 acres for a road straightening
project that was scheduled for the distant future.374 Exactly how the road
would be straightened had not yet been determined.375 The landowner
sought severance damages because one possible route across the triangle
would have had a serious negative impact on the value of the remaining
land. 376 However, the trial court rejected the claim for severance damages
and the district court affirmed. 37 7 "Everyone is at the mercy of future
37 9
378
However, that risk is not compensable.
governmental planning."
Severance damages can be recovered only for the diminution in value caused
when part of one's land is taken, not because of the potential uses to which

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Cordones, 781 So. 2d at 523.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Cordones, 781 So. 2d at 522.
Id.
Id. at 524.
769 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Nut, 769 So. 2d at 453.
Id.
Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

138

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Brown / Grohman

2001]

the taken land may eventually be put.38 Consequently, this landowner was
not entitled to severance damages based upon these facts. 381
This
Youth for Christ of Sarasota, Inc. v. Sarasota County.
apparently involved a quick taking pursuant to chapter 74 of the Florida
Statutes, which allows the condemning authority to take the property first
and litigate the taking later.383 As required by the statute, the county made a
"good faith" estimate of the property taken and deposited that amount into
the court's registry. 384 The landowner withdrew the money, so the only issue
remaining for trial was the amount of compensation to which the landowner
was entitled. 385 To the landowner's surprise, the jury decided that the
county's deposit was too generous and that the county was owed a refund of
over fifty-seven thousand dollars.3 86 Accordingly, a final judgment for that
amount was entered in favor of the county. 387 The landowner subsequently
filed a motion to tax costs, and the parties reached an agreement as to the
appropriate figure. 388 Then the county convinced the judge to enter an order
to amend the final judgment, offsetting the costs the county owed the
landowner against the refund the landowner owed the county. 38 When the
landowner's objection was overruled, the landowner appealed. 390
The district court determined that amending the final judgment was a
reversible error. 391 The county had not filed a timely motion to amend the
final judgment as required by rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.392 The time for filing such a motion had run. 393 Thereafter, the
trial court no longer had jurisdiction to amend the final judgment.3 94 On
remand, the trial court was ordered to enter a judgment for costs in favor of
the landowner.395
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 453-54.
Id. at 454.
765 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 795.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 74.051, .061 (1993)).
Id. at 795.
Id.
Youth for Christof Sarasota,Inc., 765 So. 2d at 795.

388. Id.

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Youth for Christ ofSarasota,Inc., 765 So. 2d at 795.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at796.
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XII. EQUITABLE LIENS
Liddle v. A.F. Dozer, Inc. 396 The contractor's complaint included
claims for the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, and also for the imposition
and foreclosure of an equitable lien.397 Apparently, both claims were based
on the same facts because the trial court found that the contractor was
entitled to a mechanic's lien in the amount of $11,042.08 and an equitable
lien in the amount of $11,042.08.398
A party may seek more than one remedy to redress a particular
wrong.3 "[I]f the remedies are concurrent or cumulative, and logically can
coexist on the same facts, the doctrine of election does not apply until the
injured party has received full satisfaction for his [or her] injuries."''
The
plaintiff here was not required to elect one of the remedies until it was time
for the court to enter the judgment. 40 1 However, the entry of judgment
containing both the mechanic's lien and the equitable lien was reversible
error because it amounted to a double recovery.
Spridgeon v. Spridgeon.40 3 Years after their divorce, former spouses
were on such friendly terms that the ex-husband loaned his ex-wife the
money she needed to purchase a condominium apartment.4 He also loaned
her money to make repairs and renovations.40 Their understanding was that
these loans would be repaid when the ex-wife was able to get a conventional
406
mortgage loan.
However, when the opportunity arose to get a conventional mortgage at favorable terms, the ex-wife refused to apply.40 7 That is
when the friendship dissolved into this suit.4

8

The circuit court granted the ex-husband an equitable lien on the unit. 9
The ex-wife appealed, claiming that the ex-husband failed to prove she had
committed fraud or misrepresentation, or that they had an agreement that the
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

777 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id.at 422 n.1.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Liddle, 777 So. 2d at 422.
Id.
779 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

408. Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 501.

409. Id.
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property would secure the loan.41 The district court rejected those claims,
holding such a showing was not necessary because an equitable lien could be
imposed on property, even homestead property, based upon unjust
enrichment.411 In this case, the ex-wife accepted the benefits of the loan
while knowing that her ex-husband was relying upon her promise to use the
property, once renovated, as security for a mortgage loan and use the
proceeds to repay him.41 2 Allowing her to enjoy the benefits of that
3
agreement while escaping her obligation would unjustly enrich her.4
Conversely, imposing the lien would put her in no worse position that she
would be in had she performed as promised, but it would protect her exhusband from injury.4
XIII. EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc. v. Community Ass'n Services,
Inc.4 1 5 The developer of a common interest community filed this action
based on the management company's failure to take the steps needed to
collect assessments from the homeowners. 416 The management company
represented to the developer that it took those steps, despite its knowledge to
the contrary. 7 Believing that the assessments were being collected
properly, the developer did not take any action of its own to collect the
assessments or see that they were collected.4 18 The failure to collect the
assessments produced a shortfall for the association. 9 Under the terms of
the declaration, the developer was liable for such shortage. 42° The trial court
dismissed the developer's four-count complaint, but the Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed on the counts of fraud and equitable
4
subrogation. 21
The elements of fraud are: "(1) a false statement concerning a material
fact; (2) knowledge by the person making the statement that the
410. Id.
411. Id. at 502.
412. Id.
413. Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 502.

414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

Id.
770 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at717.
Id. at718.
Id.
Id.
Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc., 770 So. 2d at 718.
Id. at417.
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representation is false; (3) the intent by the person making the statement that
the representation will induce another to act on it; and (4) reliance on the
representation to the injury of the other party. '4 22 The facts alleged included
allegations of fact sufficient to establish all of the elements if proved.42 3
Moreover, when the developer paid the shortfall to the association, it was
paying the debt for assessments owed by individual homeowners to the
association. 424 That sets up a claim for equitable subrogation, i.e., that the
developer would be subrogated to the associations right to collect unpaid
assessments. 4z A person is entitled to subrogation when: "(1) the subrogee
made the payment to protect his or her own interest; (2) the subrogee did not
act as a volunteer; (3) the subrogee was not primarily liable for the debt; (4)
the subrogee paid off the entire debt; and (5) subrogation would not work
any injustice to the rights of a third party.' '426 The developer was secondarily
liable under the terms of the Declaration. So a developer should "be given
the opportunity to show that the equities are in its favor in this action.
Liddle v. A.F. Dozer, Inc.
The contractor's complaint included
claims for the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, and also for the imposition
and foreclosure of an equitable lien.429 Apparently both claims were based
on the same facts because the trial court found that the contractor was
entitled to a mechanic's lien in the amount of $11,042.08 and an equitable
lien in the amount of $11,042.08.430
A party may seek more than one remedy to redress a particular wrong.
"[I]f the remedies are concurrent or cumulative, and logically can coexist on
the same facts, the doctrine of election does not apply until the injured party
has received full satisfaction for his [or her] injuries. ' 4" The plaintiff here
was not required to elect one of the remedies until it was time for the court to
enter the judgment. 432 However, the entry of judgment containing both the

422. Id. at 718 (quoting Lance v. Wade, 457 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 1984)).
423. Id. at 719.

424. Id.
425. Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc., 770 So. 2d at 719.
426. Id. at 718.
427. Id. at 719.
428. 777 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
429. Id.
430. Id. at422, n.1.
431. Id. at 422 (quoting Goldstein v. Serio, 566 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990)).
432. Id.
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lien was reversible error because it
mechanic's lien and the equitable
433
amounted to a double recovery.
Sander v. Ball.434 The option violated the Rule Against Restraints on
Alienation because it lacked a time limit.435 The trial court was wrong to
reform the option by adding a time limit so as to avoid the rule violation.
Reformation is available to make the writing agree with what the parties had
actually agreed. It cannot be used to cure a defect in their agreement. Here,
the parties never even discussed a time limit for the o tion.436 The court
could not supply the term under the guise of reformation.
Spridgeon v. Spridgeon.43 8 Years after their divorce, former spouses
were on such friendly terms that the ex-husband loaned his ex-wife the
money she needed to purchase a condominium apartment. 439 He also loaned
her money to make repairs and renovations. 440 Their understanding was that
these loans would be repaid when the ex-wife was able to get a conventional
mortgage loan.441 However, when the opportunity arose to get a conventional mortgage at favorable terms, the ex-wife refused to apply.442 That is
when the friendship dissolved into this suit.443
The circuit court granted the ex-husband an equitable lien on the unit.44
The ex-wife appealed, claiming that the ex-husband had failed to prove she
had committed fraud or misrepresentation, or that they had an agreement that
the property would secure the loan. 445 The district court rejected those
claims, holding such a showing was not necessary because an equitable lien
could be imposed on property, even homestead property, based upon unjust
In this case, the ex-wife accepted the benefits of the loan
enrichment.
while knowing that her ex-husband was relying upon her promise to use the
property, once renovated, as security for a mortgage loan and use the
433. Liddle, 777 So. 2d at 422.
434. 781 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001). This case is discussed infra in Part
XXI.
435. Id. at 528-29.

436.
437.
438.
439.

Id. at 530.
Id. at 530-31.
779 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 501.

440. Id.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id.
Id.
Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 501.

Id.

445. Id.
446. Id. at 502.
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proceeds to repay him." 7 Allowing her to enjoy the benefits of that
agreement while escaping her obligation would unjustly enrich her.8
Conversely, imposing the lien would put her in no worse position than she
would have been in had she performed as promised, but it would protect her
ex-husband from injury." 9

XIV. FORECLOSURES
Dailey v. Leshin.45 This is an appeal of a final summary judgment
against Dailey and Warmus "on their counterclaims raising Truth-in-Lending
Act ("TILA") violations as a defense to a mortgage foreclosure. ' 4Sl The
main issue is whether
property terminates a mortgagor's
• 452
• a contract to sell
The second issue is whether
right to rescind a refinance transaction.
appellants' motion alleging new and different TILA violations was
erroneously dismissed by the trial court as moot and should have been
construed as a motion to amend their counterclaim based upon its
substantive content and not its heading.4 53
Nancy Dailey and Thomas Warmus, appellants, experiencing financial
difficulties, hired attorney Randall Leshin to represent them in various
matters. 54 Leshin put them in touch with Arthur M. Walker as Trustee, who
agreed to hold a mortgage on their homestead property.455 Dailey and
Warmus executed a promissory note and mortgage for $100,000 in April
1998 and a $300,000 future advance and note at the end of May 1998. 456
They were never given the required TILA notice of their right to rescind the
transaction.4 57 When Leshin received the future advance proceeds of
$300,000, he refused to disburse it to Dailey and Warmus, claiming they
owed him attorney's fees for earlier work. 458 Dailey and Warnus

447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.

Id.
Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 502.
Id.
792 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 528.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 532-33.
Id. at 529.
Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 529.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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subsequently failed to make the mortgage payments to Walker because they
believed Leshin and Walker were conspiring together. 45 9
Walker filed an action in 1998 to foreclose the moqtgage, and appellants
filed an answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaim.
The counterclaim
did not allege any TILA claims, but in its prayer for relief, sought rescission
and cancellation of the $300,000 note due to fraudulent inducement and
negligent non-disclosures.46 1 During this litigation, Dailey and Warmus
entered into a contract to sell the subject property in March 1999.462 The
pending foreclosure action resulted in a cloud on their title, and the original
closing date of April was extended to May, but there is no indication that the
transaction actually closed.46 3 On May 3, 1999, Dailey and Warmus' motion
to amend their answer and counterclaim to allege TILA violations, RESPA
violations and violations of the Mortgage Brokers Act and Fair Credit
Reporting Act was granted." 4 Walker moved for summary judgment on the
amended counterclaim, claiming that appellant's right of rescission under
TILA had expired because they contracted to sell the property.45 The trial
court granted the summary judgment and determined that all remaining
motions were moot.4 6 Walker subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment on the foreclosure complaint, attaching an affidavit of the amounts
due under both notes at the default interest rate of eighteen percent.4 7
Dailey and Warmus responded with a motion alleging new TILA violations,
which was never heard by the court.
The property was eventually sold in
December 1999.69 Walker was paid, and Dailey and Warmus then appealed
470
the summary judgment entered in Walker's favor on their counterclaim.
The appellate court first addressed the issue of whether Dailey and
Warmus' contract for sale in March 1999 terminated their right of rescission

459. Id.
460. Dailey,792 So. 2d at 529.

461.
462.
463.
464.

Id.
Id.
Id.
id.

465. Dailey,792 So. 2d at 529.

466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Dailey,792 So. 2d at 529.
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under Section 1635(f) of the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act. 47'
1635(f) provides:

Section

An obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the
date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the
property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact that the
information and forms required under this section or any other
disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the
obligor .... 472
A consumer has the right to rescind up to three business days after the
closing of the transaction or delivery of the TILA disclosures.473 If the
consumer does not receive the disclosures, the right to rescind expires three
years after the closing date or upon the sale of the property, whichever
occurs first. 474 Following the analysis used by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals,47 5 the appellate court held that Dailey and Warmus' TIWA claims
based on failure to disclose the right to rescind expired when they entered
into a contract to sell the property.
In this case, when Dailey and Warmus
contracted to sell their property in March, their right to rescind expired
before they exercised it in April. 477 The fact that the sale is pending is
sufficient to trigger the expiration of the right to rescind. 47s The transaction
does not have to close. 479

471. Id. Section 1635(a) provides that where a security interest is retained or acquired
against the principal residence of the obligor in a consumer credit transaction, "the obligor
shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day
following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and
rescission forms required under this section," whichever is later, by notifying the creditor of
his right to do so. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1997).
472. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1997) (emphasis added).
473. Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 530.
474. Id. at D1547-48.
475. See Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 384 (9th Cir. 1989) (contract for sale of
property terminates the right of recission pursuant to section 1635(f) rather than the actual
sale).
476. Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 530. See Hefferman, 882 F.2d at 384. A sale is defined as a
"contract between two parties," in which the seller, "in consideration of the payment of money
or promise of payment .... transfers to the [buyer] the title and possession of the property."
Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 531 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1200 (5th ed. 1979).
477. Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 532.
478. Id.
479. Id.
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The appellate court then reviewed the issue of whether the trial court
should have heard Dailey and Warmus' motion filed in response to Walker's
motion for summary judgment.48 0 In reviewing the motion, the appellate
court found that even though it is not titled a "Motion to Amend the
Counterclaim," in substance it seeks to amend. 48 1 The prayer for relief
requested that the court "address the issues of the motion as a new and
separate" TILA violation.4sz Motions to amend should be liberally granted.483 The motion described an arguable additional violation of TILA that
caused appellants additional damages. 484 For this reason, the trial court
improperly concluded it was moot.4 85 So, the appellate
court reversed to
486
permit the lower court to hear and rule on the motion.
Deluxe Motel, Inc. v. Patel.48 7 The issue is whether due process rights
have been violated when the right of redemption granted
in an order has
488
expired prior to the time the order is signed by the court.
The parties had entered into a land sale contract where appellees were
to purchase appellants' motel. 4 9 The consideration for the purchase
consisted of an unsecured promissory note and another promissory note
secured by a mortgage on the property with installment payments over the
course of twenty years. 49 The appellee defaulted on both promissory notes,
and appellants foreclosed on the property with the court granting the
foreclosure.491 Appellees argued mistakes in the trial court's order essentially denied them the right to exercise their right of redemption. 492 The
appellate court noted that the trial court's order providing appellees' right of
redemption was eliminated prior to the execution of the order.493 The court
held a right to redeem foreclosed property was considered to be an estate in
land and was a valued right. 494 As such, the failure of a trial court to provide
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

Id.
Id.
Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 532.
See Dimick v. Ray, 774 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Dailey,792 So. 2d at 533.
Id.
Id.
770 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 284.
Id. at 283.

490. Id.
491. Id
492. Patel,770 So. 2d at 284.

493. Id.
494. Id.
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that opportunity was not harmless error. 495 Therefore, the court reversed and
remanded the matter to allow appellees the right to exercise their redemption
rights. 496
Indian River Farms v. YBF Partners, InC.497 The issue in this case is
whether the right of redemption was timely and properly exercised.498
Appellee purchased property at a judicial sale, and a certificate of sale was
filed with the clerk on the same day. 499 Appellants objected to the sale, and
the trial court overruled appellants' objections.500 The assignee of appellants
intervened and attempted to exercise their right of redemption by tendering
payment to the clerk of the court, which was refused. 50 1 A certificate of title
was issued to appellee, and appellants moved to compel the clerk to accept
502
assignee's tender for redemption of the property.
The appellate court
found that appellants' objections did not concern any defect or irregularity
with the foreclosure sale itself which is required in order to be a legally
sufficient ground to set aside the sale.50 3
However, the appellate court did find that when assignee tendered
payment under the judgment of foreclosure to the clerk of court, it properly
exercised its right of redemption and did not require the court's
permission. 5°4 The appellate court held that while the clerk of court erred in
failing to accept tender, such error did not render assignee's exercise of its
right of redemption untimely because its tender was made prior to the filing
of the certificate of title. 0 The case was reversed and remanded .5
Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. King.50 7 This is a petition for writ of
certiorari seeking review of a non-final order of the Broward County Circuit
Court.50 8 The issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering Norwest
Mortgage, Inc. to issue a satisfaction on its mortgage when it received a
portion of its payoff amount and the funds remaining on deposit in the court
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

Id.
Id.
777 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1097.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Indian River Farms, 777 So. 2d at 1098.
Id.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
789 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
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accruing on
registry did not allow for additional interest, expenses or costs
"0
the note/mortgage subsequent to the payoff statement date.
Norwest Mortgage, Inc. commenced foreclosure proceedings against
Barbara King in 1997.510 At that time, the outstanding principal and interest
totaled approximately $8000. 5 11 Its motions for summary judgment were
continued repeatedly in order to allow King to quiet title to the property and
then arrange financing to satisfy the mortgage. 512 King received a payoff
statement on December 20, 1999, valid until January 14, 2000.513 The
payoff was for $23,396.47, and included Norwest's payment of taxes and
insurance on the property for the period of time during which the mortgage
was in default.514 King requested a breakdown of the payoff amount along
with copies of invoices and receipts. 51 5 Because she did not receive them
timely, she did not satisfy the mortgage by January 14, 2000.' 16 She did,
however, close on new financing, and funds were withheld to pay off
Norwest.5 17 In March 2000, King filed a motion for expedited final hearing
and to shorten the discovery period and time for production.5 18 She
requested that the court toll the interest and attorney's fees on the open
mortgage from the date of her closing.519 Norwest argued that it did not
produce the requested information timely because, as a result of the delays in
waiting for King to quiet title and arrange financing, some of the records
were hard to obtain.
The trial court granted King relief, and on May 25, 2000, ordered
$23,396.47 (the December 20 payoff statement amount) placed in the court
registry.52 1 Of these funds, $11,228.34 was to be disbursed to petitioner, and
the disputed balance would remain in the court registry pending a
determination of the appropriate expenses. 522 In addition, the order required
Norwest to issue a satisfaction of its mortgage within ten days of its receipt
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.

ld. at 1140.
Id.
Id.
King, 789 So. 2d at 1140.
Id.
Id.

515. Id.
516. Id.
517. King, 789 So. 2d at 1140.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
King, 789 So. 2d at 1140.
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of the $11,228.34. 523 Norwest appealed the order on5 the basis that the
due. 2
amount recovered is insufficient to cover the amount
Under Florida law, a mortgagee is required to issue a satisfaction of
mortgage after full payment of the obligations contained in the note. 5' The
appellate court quashed the order, holding that it could lead to irreparable
harm to Norwest if it were later discovered that Norwest was entitled to
additional interest and expenses. 526 The issuance of a satisfaction of
mortgage terminates the right to foreclose on the property to collect for any
additional funds owed. 527 In this case, because the payoff amount was in
dispute, absent an evidentiary hearing, the trial court was unable to
determine that Norwest was not entitled to receive additional funds in excess
528
The amount deposited did not include
of the payoff figure quoted.
additional interest, advances, or funds for attorney's fees and costs that
continued to accrue subsequent to January 14, 2000 through the date of an
evidentiary hearing. 529 The appellate court concluded that the trial court
forced Norwest to settle its foreclosure action on King's terms, with or
without an evidentiary hearing, which constitutes a departure from the
essential requirements of law.
531
en banc. 532
Secretary of Veteran Affairs v. Tejedo. This is a rehearing
The issue in this case is whether the court will grant leave to amend a
complaint when the original case was heard over a year ago and the party
who instigated the original lawsuit seeking redemption sold the propeity in
question.
In this case, the appellant instigated a suit to force redemption against
the appellee, an omitted lienor in a foreclosure action.534 During the course

523. Id.
524. Id.
525. RA. STAT. § 701.04(1) (2000).
526. King, 789 So. 2d at 1140.
527. See generally Atkins v. Rybovich Boat Works, Inc., 561 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), quashed on other grounds, 585 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1991); State-Wide Constr.
Inc., v. Dowda, 424 So. 2d 198, 198-99 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hallmark Mfg. Inc. v.
Lujack Constr. Co, 372 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
528. King, 789 So. 2d at 1140.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. 774 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
532. Id. at 712.
533. Id.
534. Id.
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of the trial, the appellant transferred the property without notifying the court
or appellee.535
The appeals court held that this "amounts to mala fides and cannot be
condoned."
Also, "[p]arties must come to courts of equity with clean
hands as equity does not condone concealment of affirmative niisconduct. ' 537 The Appellate Court remanded the case with instructions allowing
for leave to amend the pleadings to seek damages for the difference between
the property's fair market value and the amount tendered by appellee, plus
costs and fees.538
South Palm Beach Investments, Inc. v. Regatta Trading Ltd.539 The
issue raised here is whether an emergency motion to intervene, filed by a
prior titleholder, was properly denied by the trial court. 540
South Palm Beach Investments sold its property, and the new owner
obtained a mortgage at closing.541 When the mortgage was foreclosed, South
Palm Beach Investments filed a motion to intervene, which was dismissed. 542
The appellate court affirmed the order.54 3 Once a party has conveyed
all of its rights, title, and interest in a parcel of land to another, that party
will not be a proper party to a suit foreclosing the mortgage. 5" Here,
Regatta Trading was seeking only
to foreclose its mortgage. 45 It was not
seeking a deficiency judgment.546
XV. HOMESTEAD

Dyer v. Beverly & Tittle, P.A. 547 The issue here is whether the marital
property or homestead can be subject to forced sale when the home is
awarded as a form of child support under the divorce proceeding.
535. Id. at 713.
536. Tejedo, 774 So. 2d at 713.
537. Id. (citing Dep't of Revenue v. David, 684 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.

Id.
789 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id.

543. Id.
544. Regatta Trading Ltd, 789 So. 2d at 397.
545. Id.
546. Id. at 397.
547. 777 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
548. Id. at 1056.
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In this case, the couple divorced and the house was awarded to the wife
as a form of child support.549 The court also awarded the wife her attorney's
fees.55 0 The wife then assigned her orders of final judgment for attorney's
fees to her attorneys so that they may pursue their fees.5 51 The attorney's
placed a judgment lien against the home5 52
that the wife lived in which was
owned in the name of the former husband.
The appellate court found that the homestead exemption statute is to
protect not only the husband, but also his family from destitution and
becoming public charge.55 3 The courts have declined to act in equity to
permit the forced sale of a homestead property,
unless there is evidence of
55 4
the debtor's fraudulent or egregious conduct.
The appellate court held that the evidence presented in this case did not
support the application of equitable exception to the homestead exemption
and, therefore, reversed. 55
Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill.556 This is a certified question of law
to the Supreme Court of Florida, from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, that is determinative of a case pending in the federal
courts for which there appears to be no controlling precedent. "Does Article
X, Section 4557 of the Florida Constitution exempt a Florida homestead,
where the debtor acquired the homestead using non-exempt funds with the
specific intent of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors in violation of
Fla. Stat. § 726.105 or §§ 222.29 and 222.30?558
In 1981, Havoco sued Hill, claiming damages for fraud, conspiracy,
tortious interference with contractual relations, and breach of fiduciary
duty.559 When the case finally went to trial, nine years later, a jury found for
549. Id.
550. Id. at 1057.
551. Id.
552. Dyer, 777 So. 2d at 1057.
553. Id. at 1059 (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 1950)).
554. Id. (citing Smith v. Smith, 761 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
555. Id. at 1059-60.
556. 790 So. 2d 1018 (2001).
557. Art. X, Section 4(a)(1) of the Florida Constitution provides in part:
There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of
taxes and assessments thereon; obligations contracted for the purchase,
improvement or repair thereof; or obligations contracted for house, field, or other
labor performed on the realty ....
Id.
558. Hill, 790 So. 2d at 1019.
559. Id.
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Havoco and awarded it $15,000,000 in damages. 56 The district court
entered judgment in accordance with the verdict on December 19, 1990; the
judgment became enforceable on January 2, 1991. 561 Hill purchased the
Destin property on December 30, 1990, for which he paid $650,000 in cash
and spent approximately $75,000 for household furnishings. 62 Hill clainis
of Tennessee, he intended to make
that although he was a long time resident
5 63
the Destin property his retirement home.
In July, 1992, Hill filed a voluntary Chapter Seven bankruptcy petition,
in which he claimed that real property located in Destin, Florida was exempt
as his homestead under Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution.56
Havoco objected, arguing that Hill converted nonexempt assets into the
homestead with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors. 65 The
bankruptcy court denied Havoco's objections to Hill's homestead claims,
concluding that Havoco had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that Hill acted with the specific intent to defraud his creditors. 6 6
Havoco appealed, and the district court reversed, finding error in the
bankruptcy court's conclusion that a debtor's specific intent to defraud his
creditors could provide a ground to deny the homestead exemption. 67 The
mandate ordered the bankruptcy court "to determine whether and under what
circumstances Florida law prevented debtors.., from converting nonexempt
property to exempt property. '568 On remand, the bankruptcy court held that
under Florida law, Hill was not prohibited from converting nonexempt assets
into a homestead, even if he had the intent to put those assets outside the
reach of his creditors.5 69 They further held that a debtor's right to the
homestead exemption is not affected by Florida's fraudulent conveyance
statute. 70 The district court affirmed the decision and Havoco appealed.57 '
The Eleventh Circuit certified the instant question to the Supreme Court of
Florida, detailing the inconsistent treatment of the issue in the bankruptcy
560. Id.
561. Id.

562. Id.
563. Hill, 790 So. 2d at 1019.

564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 1020.
567. Id.
568. Hill, 790 So. 2d at 1020 (citing Havoco of Arm., Ltd. v. Hill, 197 F.3d 1135, 1138
(11th Cir. 1999)).

569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Id.
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courts based on prior applications of the homestead exemption by the
Supreme Court. 2
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the
"The transfer of nonexempt assets into an exempt homestead
affirmative.
with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is not one of the "three
4. 574
exceptions to the homestead exemption provided in article X, section
The court applied a liberal construction to the exemption in the interest
of protecting the family home, but a strict construction of the exceptions
contained therein.575 In applying strict construction to the exceptions, the
Court has refused to allow civil forfeitures of property following convictions
under the RICO Act or findings of fact that debtors converted nonexempt
assets into exempt homestead property with the intent to defraud their
creditors.5 76
The disparate treatment of the exception appears in cases where the
Supreme Court of Florida, in certain instances has allowed the imposition of
equitable liens against homestead property under the "doctrine of equitable
subrogation. 57 7 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected Havoco's argument
that its equitable lien jurisprudence created a fourth exception in cases where
fraud or conversion of nonexempt assets into a homestead for purposes of
578
avoiding creditors.
the
Moss v. Estate of Moss.57 9 In this case, the issue is 5whether
80
descendants.
spouse's
deceased
the
to
inures
homestead property
The decedent died testate leaving no surviving spouse or minor
children. 581 The personal representative of the estate, who is also a beneficiary under decedent's will, filed a petition to determine homestead status of
572. Id.
573. Hill, 790 So. 2d at 1019.
574. Id. at 1028.
575. Id. at 1021.
576. See Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1992) ("[A]rticle X, section
4 expressly provides for three exceptions to the homestead exemption. Forefeiture is not one
of them."); Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Lang, 898 F. Supp. 883, 887 (S.D. Fla. 1995),
("[H]omestead exemption does not contain an exception for real property which is acquired in
the state of Florida for the sole purpose of defeating the claims of out-of-state creditors.").
577. Legal Subrogation, a/k/a equitable subrogation. Subrogation that arises by
operation of law or by implication in equity to prevent fraud or injustice. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

1440 (7th ed. 1999).

578. Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1024 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.

2000).
579. 777 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
580. Id. at 1111.
581. Id.
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real property.
The petition requested an order to determine 1) that the
decedent's condo was homestead property; 2) that the condo descended to
the beneficiaries named in the will; and 3) that the constitutional exemption
of a decedent's homestead from creditors' claims against the decedent's
estate inured to the beneficiaries. 83
A creditor of the estate filed an objection to the petition, claiming the
petitioner failed to establish that the devisees of the real estate were qualified
heirs of the decedent. 584 The trial court found that the constitutional
exemption from claims of the decedent's creditors inured to three intestate
heirs, but the exemption did not inure to the heirs of the predeceased spouse
of the decedent. 85
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the
brother of the decedent's last deceased spouse and the niece of the decedent's last deceased spouse as devisees of the decedent's homestead. 8
Reinish v. Clark.58 7 The appellants raise three separate issues as to why
they and the class like them should receive homestead exemption on their
Florida house. 8
The first count alleged that denying the homestead tax exemption to the
Reinishes and their class solely on the basis of their out-of-state residency
was a constitutional and statutory discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.589 The appellate
court held that:
Whether the person is a Florida resident or not, only one
homestead exemption is allowed, irrespective of how many other
residences the person owns. Thus, the exemption distinguishes
between real estate used in good faith as a Florida permanent
residence, on the one hand, and (by implicit exclusion) any other
real estate such59 as secondary or vacation residences or rentals, on
the other hand. D

582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.

Id.
Id.
Moss, 777 So. 2d at 1111-12.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1113.
765 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 201.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 205.
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The appellate court found that the statute did not treat Florida residents who
had more than one home in Florida any differently than those from out of
town.59'
The second count alleged that the Florida constitutional and statutory
homestead tax exemption provisions unconstitutionally infringe upon the
fundamental rights to travel interstate and to own property, in violation of
592
The appellate court held that the
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
exemption is closely and substantially related to the State's valid objective to
promote and protect taxpayers' financial ability to purchase and maintain the
primary shelter, which is totally unrelated to state residency.593 The
appellate court found that because the Reinishes had not demonstrated the
denial of a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
count was properly dismissed.
The third count alleged that the constitutional and statutory homestead
tax exemption provisions constitute a per se violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause in that they "attempt to create customs duties, barriers, or
taxes that discriminate against and unduly burden interstate commerce and
impermissibly impose a tariff on citizens whose primary residence is located
outside Florida." 5 The appellate court found no facial discrimination
against interstate commerce nor any burden on interstate commerce that
outweighs its potential benefits. 5
The appellate court concluded, "the
Florida exemption is an even-handed regulation that promotes the legitimate,
strong public interest in promoting the stability and continuity of the primary
permanent home. ' 597 The case was affirmed. 5 8
Spridgeon v. Spridgeon.599 The issue here is whether an equitable lien
can be placed on a homestead. 600
In this case, the parties were divorced from each other and had
remained friendly after the divorce. 6 1 Mr. Spridgeon purchased a condo and
performed renovations on it for Mrs. Spridgeon.
It was determined by the
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.

Id.
Reinish, 765 So. 2d at 207.
Id. at210.
Id.
Id. at210-11.
Id. at 215.
Reinish, 765 So. 2d at 215.
Id.
779 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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trial court that Mr. and Mrs. Spridgeon had agreed that this was to be a loan
to Mrs. Spridgeon that she would repay by getting a conventional loan with a
603
bank and paying the proceeds to Mr. Spridgeon.
The court looked to the case of Palm Beach Savings & Loan Ass'n v
Fishbein0° in which the wife received the homestead in a divorce.6 5 In that
case, the husband had forged her name onto a note from the savings and loan
company. 6 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that an equitable lien
should be placed on the property to the extent the funds were used to pay
down the previous mortgage on the property. 607 The court held that Ms.
Fishbein was in no worse position than she would have been if the mortgage
had not been paid off.6 8
In this case, the judge followed Fishbein. 9 Here, the judge ruled that
an equitable lien was proper to prevent unjust enrichment and that Mrs.
Spridgeon was
no worse off than she would have been had she honored her
610
agreement.
XVI. INVERSE CONDEMNATION

Department of Environmental Protection v. Youel. 61' The trial court
awarded judgment for the plaintiff based upon a finding that there had been
a temporary taking when the Department improperly asserted jurisdiction
and imposed612development conditions that deprived the landowner of all use
of the land.
The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued a
final notice of violation to the landowner, but the landowner never appealed,
so she is bound by the finding that the violation existed. 613 "Basically, the
trial court's finding of a temporary taking was predicated upon a theory of
estoppel-i.e., that DEP misled Youel in regard to permitting and
mitigation. 61 4 Equitable estoppel can only be applied to the state in

603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.

Id.
619 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993).
Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 502.
Id.
Fishbein,619 So. 2d at 270.
Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d at 502.
Id.
Id.
787 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 923-24.
Id. at 924.
Id.
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exceptional cases. 615 Essential to the claim is proof that the reliance was on
the positive act of an authorized official. 616 However, the record lacked
those elements. 617 Youel was never denied a development permit because
she never tried to get a development permit, and the official with
61 8 whom she
was dealing was not even in the permitting division of the DEP.
Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami.619 Two cases were joined for
consideration by the Supreme Court of Florida. 620 Both involved the forcible
closing of multiple dwelling unit structures by a Nuisance Abatement Board
following the finding of a pattern of illegal activity on the premises. 62 1 The
Supreme Court of Florida, in a unanimous opinion, upheld the action of the
Nuisance Abatement Board in one case but not in the other. 6 2 The court
first concluded that the temporary closing of a motel or a rental apartment
building might constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment so as to
require the payment of compensation. 3 The prospective regulation did not
change that conclusion. 6 2 The court approved the district court's reliance
on Lucas.6 25 There had been no physical invasion of the properties, but the
owners had been deprived of the beneficial use of their properties for the
proscribed time because the structures could not be reasonably
used for any
626
but the prohibited uses during the period of the prohibition.
A critical question was whether the governmental action fit within the
nuisance exception. 627 If the activity was a public nuisance, it could have
been prohibited by a court at common law.62' Consequently, governmental
action preventing that nuisance activity would not be a taking under the Fifth
29
Amendment.6
Both and
cases
illegal prostitution
activities: one
case asinvolved
sales of illegal drugs
theinvolved
other involved
as well
illegal

615.
616.
617.
618.

Id. at 924-25.
Youel, 787 So. 2d at 925.
Id.
Id.

619. 26 Fla. L. Weekly S469 (July 13, 2001).
620. Id.
621. Id.

622. Id. at S472.
623. Id. at S470.
624. Keshbro, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at S471.

625. Id. (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
626. Id. at S471-72.
627. Id. at S472.
628. Id.
629. Keshbro, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at S472.
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So both would fit within the nuisance exception. 631
drug sales and usage.
However, "[ilt is well settled in this State that injunctions issued to abate
public nuisances must be specifically tailored to abate the objectionable
conduct, without unnecessarily infringing upon the conduct of a lawful
enterprise." 632 The nuisance exception had the same limits. The record
revealed that in the Miami case, 633 the record supported the Board's
conclusion that the operation of the motel "had become inextricably
,634 The only way to
intertwined with the drug and prostitution activity ....
prevent the nuisance activity was to close the motel, so that order was
upheld. 635 However, in the St. Petersburg case, 636 the record had evidence of
only two cocaine sales.637 Consequently, closing the entire apartment house
was far beyond what was necessary to prevent future sales and, in fact,
prohibited legal activity as well as the illegal. 638 Such an overly broad order
could not fit within the nuisance exception, so it could not be allowed to
stand.6 39
Millender v. Departmentof Transportation.6" In 1975, the Department
of Transportation moved the channel in the Carrabelle River.' The change
caused the landowner's river front land to begin eroding.6 2 After the
hurricane of 1985, state agents issued to the landowner, along with many
others, permits to put in sea walls.' 3 However, after the seawall was
completed, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection cited the
seawall as illegal. 6 4 Eight years of litigation followed.6 5 The Department
of Environmental Protection finally prevailed, and in 1993, the landowner
was forced to remove the seawall. 646 Without the seawall, the erosion
continued and the landowner said, "[o]ur property is vanishing, going in the
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Id.
634. Keshbro, Inc.,

26 Fla. L. Weekly at S472.

635. Id.

636. City of St. Petersburg v. Kablinger, 730 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
637. Keshbro, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at S472.
638. Id.
639. Id.
640. 774 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
641. Id. at 768.
642. Id.
643. Id. at 771 n.4.
644. Id.
645. Millender,774 So. 2d at 768.
646. Id.
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river, washing down the river ....Our docks is (sic) torn down, our
buildings is falling in,......7 The landowner brought this inverse
condemnation suit for damages and an injunction. 648 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the Department of Transportation based9 on the statute
of limitations, but the First District Court of Appeal reversed.6
Under the Continuing Tort Theory, an injunction may be granted to
prevent further tortious conduct even though the statute of limitations would
bar suit for the original tort. 65° Where the tort is a continuing one, the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the last tortious act.651' Therefore,
the trial court should not have ruled as a matter of law that the landowner
652
could not get injunctive relief under these circumstances.
Furthermore, the district court recognized the Dickinson Stabilization
653
That doctrine is based on the United States Supreme Court's
Doctrine.
1947 decision in United States v. Dickinson. s It provided that the statute of
limitations for inverse condemnation does not begin to run until the situation
"becomes stabilized., 65 5 While the doctrine had never been officially
adopted in Florida, it had been cited in one earlier Florida case. 656 This court
found that the doctrine was sound and should be applied in Florida, but it did
certify the question of the doctrine's viability in Florida to the Supreme
Court of Florida. 7 Furthermore, the district court concluded the doctrine
should be applied in this case because the landowner was the victim of an
unforeseeable future event, the order of the Department of Environmental
Regulation, that prevented the landowner from stopping the erosion with a
seawall. 58
647. Id.at 768 n.2.
648. Id. at 768.
649. Id.
650. Millender, 774 So. 2d at 769.
651. Id.
652. Id. at 771.
653. Id. at 769.
654. 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
655. Id. at 749.
656. See Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v. Benitez, 200 So. 2d 194, 200 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
657. The exact question certified as being of great public importance was: "DOES
THE DOCTRINE STATED IN UNITED STATES V.DICKINSON, 331 U.S. 745 (1947),
APPLY IN AN APPROPRIATE FLORIDA CASE SO AS TO DELAY THE ACCRUAL OF
AN ACTION FOR INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF?"
Millender, 774 So. 2d at 771 (citations omitted).
658. Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

160

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Brown ! Grohman

2001]

659

Sayfle v. Department of Transportation.
In order to encourage
abutting property owners to donate rights of way for the construction of
Alligator Alley across southern Florida, the following language was inserted
into the donation deeds: "Reserving to the Grantor, his heirs or assigns, the
right of access from his remaining property to any service road which may
be constructed on the outer 50 feet of the right of way described above."
This gave those abutting landowners access to a service road, if one ran
parallel to Alligator Alley. 66' Generally, the service road did exist and had
an entrance to the highway at two-mile intervals. 62 Years later, the
Department expinded Alligator Alley into a modem multilane, high speed,
limited access highway, Interstate-75.66 3 To do so, the Department acquired
an additional 125-foot-wide strip on the southern side of Alligator Alley. 566
The plaintiffs here claimed compensation based on their loss of access. 5
The trial court had granted summary judgment to the Department based on
an earlier case that had denied claims for compensation to landowners on the
north side of 1-75 .666 However, the district court found that case
distinguishable because the claimants here had land on the south side, the
side on which the Department had expanded.667 In effect, the claimants here
had lost their easement to the abutting land where the service road might be
built and that was a compensable loss.668
Departmentof EnvironmentalProtectionv. Burgess.66 9 The landowner
acquired undeveloped wetlands in 1956.670 He had the vague idea that the
land would appreciate in value and thought it would be a good investment. 671
Until 1992, he used the land for occasional nature walks and fishing.672 That
year he decided to develop the land. 673 He subdivided it into smaller tracts
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.
1989)).
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.

770 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sayfie, 770 So. 2d at 194.
Id.
Id. (citing Dep't of Transp. v. Edwards, 545 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
Id. at 195.
Id.
772 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 542.
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and put them up for sale.674 He also made plans to build a large wooden
dock, boardwalk, and A-framed camping shelter. 675 To build the camping
shelter, he needed a dredge and fill permit from the Department of
Environmental Protection, but his application was refused. 676 Rather than
677
appeal, he filed this action claiming inverse condemnation of his property.
The landowner based his claim on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.678 The district court, however, pointed out that in Lucas the state
trial court had determined that the regulation had rendered the land
valueless. 679 That determination had not been challenged on appeal, so the
United States Supreme Court had not based its decision on that unchallenged
680
premise.
In contrast, in this case, the Department vigorously challenged
his claim that the land was valueless or that the regulation effected a
regulatory taking. 681 The district court concluded that no taking had
occurred.6 82
To constitute a regulatory taking, the regulation must deprive the
landowner of all, or substantially all, economically viable use of his land. s
That question turned on whether the permit denial "interfered with his
reasonable, distinct, investment-backed expectations, held at the time he
purchased the property.' 684 The record showed that, at the time he bought
the land, he had only a general hope of finding a way to make a profit from
the land in the future. 685 He did not have a specific plan that he was putting
into effect at that time. 686 However, a landowner does not have a right to
make a profit from his investment. 687 He also had an expectation that he
would be able to use the land for recreation. 688 The permit denial does not
interfere with the way he used the land for recreation for over thirty years.6 9
674.
675.
676.
677.

Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id.

678. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 542.
679. Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 542.

680. id.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.

Id. at 543.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 543.
Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 543.
Id.

686. Id.
687. Id. at 544.

688. Id.
689. Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 544.
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It merely prevents him from changing that recreational use.690 In fact, he
could still build his dock and expand the recreational use without the
permit. 691 Consequently, the landowner failed to prove his case for inverse
condemnation. 692
State Department of Transportationv. Gayety Theatres, Inc.69 A road
improvement project included the building of a concrete median down the
middle of a busy thoroughfare. 4 Before the project, drivers coming north
or south could turn directly into the theater's parking lot; similarly, patrons
leaving the theater could turn directly north or south. 95 After the project
was completed, northbound patrons would have to go a half mile beyond the
theater, make a u-turn, and come back half a mile in the southbound lane to
enter the theater's parking lot. 696 The theater sued for loss of access and won
in the trial court.69 The district court, however, reversed. 698
A landowner is not entitled to recover compensation merely because
699
government action has caused a lessening of traffic in an abutting road.
Compensation would only be due where access to the property had been
substantially diminished.7 Whether that has happened is a question for the
judge.70 This case fit squarely within the first rule because the project had
merely modified the flow of the northbound traffic.70 2 The theater still had
the same access to the roadway even if it was only from the southbound
lane.70 3
State Department of Transportationv. Suit City of Aventura.704 The
landowner operated a large shopping center at the intersection of two busy
roads. 70 5 To alleviate the severe traffic problems at the intersection, the
Department changed the traffic patterns and built elevated lanes to divert
690. Id.
691. Id.
692. Id.
693. 781 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

694. Id. at 1126.
695. Id.
696. ld.
697. Id. at 1126-27.
698. Gayety Theaters Inc., 781 So. 2d at 1128.
699. Id. at 1127.

700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Id. at 1127-28.
703. Gayety Theaters Inc., 781 So. 2d at 1127-28.

704. 774 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
705. Id. at 10.
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traffic over the intersection. 0 6 The project resulted in the closing of one
entrance to the mall and an obstruction of the view of the mall.
The
7
08
landowner sought compensation for both.
The district court found both to
be noncompensable.
Closing the entrance would be compensable only if it substantially
deprived the landowner of access to the property. 710 Here, the landowner
still had two entrances on each of the busy roadways. 7 11 In addition, the
project had, to some effect, improved the access by at least one of those
712
71 3
entrances.
So, there was no compensable loss of access.
Nor did
building the elevated lanes, which to some extent, blocked the light, air, and
view of the mall, constitute a compensable taking.71 4 The Department was
validly exercising its police power in redesigning the traffic patterns to
715
protect the public welfare.
To the extent that this interfered with the rights
of the landowner, it would be compensable only if the interference was
unreasonable. 716 The court concluded that "[r]educing the traffic distress at
this intersection by elevated lanes is certainly1 7within the discretion of the
DOT and is well within the bounds of reason."
7
State Department of Transportation v. Kirkland.718
The landowner
operated a restaurant with direct access to State Road 77.719 A short distance
from the restaurant, State Road 77 proceeded to cross the bay by a bridge.
Then the Department built a new bridge and relocated State Road 77 to cross
the bay by the new bridge. 721 The old bridge was closed and converted into a
722
fishing
pier.from
That
partState
of old
State77,Road
wasreached
renamed
and could
be reached
the new
Road
but it77now
a dead
end atstill
the

706.
707.
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Suit City of Aventura, 774 So. 2d at 14.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
Suit City of Aventura, 774 So. 2d at 13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id.
772 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pier.723 The restaurant parking lot still opened onto that road in exactly the
same way as it had before, but the landowner brought this inverse condemnation action.724 The district court concluded that no compensable taking had
72 That
occurred. 72 What occurred here was the mere redirection of traffic.727
access.
of
landowner
the
was not a taking because it did not deprive
VLX Properties, Inc. v. Southern States Utilities, Inc. 728 Glenn Abby
Golf Course ("GAGC") owned a golf course. 729 VLX owned a portion of
James Pond which was adjacent to and, to some degree, within the confines
of the golf course. 730 GAGC was prohibited from watering the golf course
with water from its wells, so it entered into a contract with the Public Utility
for reclaimed wastewater.731 However, when the Public Utility began
discharging the reclaimed wastewater, James Pond was flooded.
VLX
claimed the flooding caused the water quality in the pond to deteriorate
seriously. 733 The trial court concluded that wastewater had been discharged
directly into James Pond but that did not amount to a taking because VLX
73 4
had not been deprived of all reasonable and beneficial use of its property.
The findings of fact were not challenged on appeal, but VLX claimed that
the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard. 735 The three-judge panel
of the Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed.73 6
The court noted that "a distinction has been made between categories of
takings in inverse condemnation cases. 737 For example, taking may occur
"by physical occupation, flooding, governmental regulation, and taking of
access rights."738 The legal standard to be applied in determining whether a
taking occurred depends on which category of taking is alleged.739 In this
723. Kirkland,772 So. 2d at 567.
724. Id.
725. Id. at 568.

726. Id.

727. Id.
728. 792 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

729. Id. at 506.
730. Id.
731. Id.
732. VLX Props., Inc. v. S. States Utils., Inc., 25 Fla. L. Weekly D1745 (5th Dist. Ct.
App. July 21, 2000).
733. Id.
734. Id.
735. Id. at D1746.
736. Id.
737. VLX Props.,Inc., 25 Fa. L Weekly at D1745.
738. Id. at D1745-46.
739. Id. at D1746.
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case, the trial court considered the allegation to be that a taking that had been
effected by flooding which was caused by the Public Utility.7 4 That would
be an indirect invasion and, consequently, it required the claimant to prove
that the flooding had deprived the claimant of all reasonable and beneficial
use of the land.74 ' However, close analysis revealed that the claim was really
that the Public Utility directly occupied VLX's land by discharging
74
74
A direct invasion is a per se taking. 1
wastewater directly into the pond.
The claimant need only show entry upon its land for more than a momentary
period, under warrant or color of legal authority that devoted it to public
use.7 " Those factors were clearly established in the trial court's findings of
fact.745 Any showing of the size of the encroachment or the economic loss it
caused would only be elements of damages, not essentials to establishing
liability. 746 In sum, the trial court had erred in characterizing this case as one
where flooding was alleged to having caused the taking when, in fact, it was
a case in which the taking had caused the flooding.747
The Fifth District Court of Appeal granted a motion for rehearing en
banc.7 " The panel's opinion was withdrawn, and it decided to recede from
its 1997 decision in this very litigation. 749 The en banc opinion
characterized the dispute as VLX's attempt to claim damages for the
invasion of the wastewater into those parts of the pond that it had obtained
after it had agreed to a flowage easement.7 50 Over Judge Sharp's and Judge
Peterson's spirited dissents, the court found a flowage easement existed
because it had been intended by all the necessary parties based on the
facts. 75 1 The court then
invoked the "tipsy coachman" rule to uphold the
752
decision.
court's
trial
740. Id.
741. Id.
742. VLX Prop.Inc., 25 Fla. L. Weekly at D1745-46.
743. Id. at D1746.
744. Id. (citing Shick v. Fla. Dep't of Agric., 504 So. 2d 1318 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1987), which in turn quoted from Poe v. State Road Dep't, 127 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1961)).
745. Id.
746. Id.
747. VLX Prop. Inc., 25 Fla. L. Weekly at D1745.

748. VLX Prop., Inc. v. S. States Util., Inc., 792 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2001), referred to by the court as "VLXI." See Ronald Benton Brown & Joseph M. Grohman,
Property Law: 1998 Survey of FloridaLaw, 23 NOVA L. REV. 229, 275 (1998).
749. VLX Prop., Inc., 792 So. 2d at 506.

750. Id. at 506-07.
751. Id. at 507.
752. Id. at 509.
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The "tipsy coachman" rule is that a decision that produces the right
result will be affirmed even if it was reached for the wrong reasons. In this
case, the trial court had ruled for the defendants because, it decided, no
taking had occurred. The trial court should have ruled for the defendants
because they had a flowage easement which allowed them to disburse the
wastewater as they had. The "tipsy coachman" rule may be, to most of us,
more interesting than the other parts of this tortured litigation. The phrase is
based on a verse, first quoted from Goldsmith's RETALIATION for this
purpose in 1879 by the Supreme Court of Georgia:
The pupil of impulse, it forc'd him along
His conduct still right, with his argument wrong;
Still aiming at honor, yet fearing to roam,
753
The coachman was tipsy, the chariot drove home;
In essence, if the coach gets home safely, the fact that the coachman was
tipsy becomes irrelevant. This verse was repeated by the Supreme Court of
Florida in 1963754 and, therefore, the "tipsy coachman" rule has become part
of our legal culture.
XVII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Bailey v. Brickell Key Centre-FBEC,L.L C.755 The landlord brought an

action for possession, damages and recovery on a guaranty.

6

The trial court

issued a final judgment of eviction and ordered a writ of possession to
issue.757 The judgment reserved jurisdiction on collateral matters that

included, but were not limited to, attorney's fees."
The landlord later
requested and was granted a judgment for damages against the tenant's
guarantor.759 The guarantor appealed on the basis that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to issue and the district court of appeal reversed. 760 The eviction
753. Lee v. Porter, 63 Ga. 345, 346 (1879). For the complete poem, see
RETALIATION: A POEM which is reprinted with some explanatory notes on BOB'S
BYWAY at http://shoga.wwa.com/-rgslxgoldsmi.htm or http://cluster.wwa.com/-rgslxgold
smi.htm.
754. Carraway v. Armour & Co., 156 So. 2d 494,497 (Fla. 1963).
755. 778 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

756. Id.
757. Id.
758. Id.

759. Id.
760. Bailey, 778 So. 2d at 386.
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order here was final as to damages because there was no reservation of
jurisdiction on that issue.761 Once a trial court issued that final judgment, it
lost jurisdiction to award further damages. 7762
76
Beacon Property Management, Inc. v. PNR, Inc.
PNR bought a
restaurant. 764 As part of the transaction, the commercial lease for the
restaurant space was assigned to PNR. 7 65 The corporate landlord was run by
two shareholders who were also the corporate officers, identified herein as
"A" and "B. 766 PNR alleged that A induced PNR to complete the
transaction by certain statements regarding the landlord's future plans for the
premises.767 Unfortunately, the landlord allowed the premises to fall into
such a bad state that one wall collapsed. 76 8 After repairs were made, PNR
tried to reopen the restaurant, but gave up after a short time. 769 The landlord
evicted the tenant from the closed restaurant.770
The tenant then filed this suit seeking damages from the corporate
landlord, the company that managed the premises, and A and B. 771 The
landlord did not appear to defend and A settled.7 72 That left B and the
management company to face the charges of violating Florida's Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act, 773 fraud, negligent representation, tortious
interference with contract, and wrongful eviction. 774 The jury verdict
awarded PNR compensatory and punitive damages, but the district court
reversed.775
The district court held that the alleged conduct here could not constitute
a violation of the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. 776 That act
provides that: "[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or
practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
761.
762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.
768.

Id. at 386.
Id.
785 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 566 n.1.
Id. at 566.
PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 566.

769. Id.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.

Id.
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 501.204 (2001).
PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 566.
Id.
Id. at 567.
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trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." Mt The court noted the
plain meaning of these terms and concluded, "[a] single instance of doing
something does not make it a method or a practice. ' 778 Here the evidence
was limited to a single lease, so a violation had not been established." 79
Having reached that conclusion, the court found it unnecessary to address
the question of whether the act even applied to commercial leases, a question
that had been raised by the landlord.
The district court also found that a case of fraud or negligent
representation had not been proven against these defendants.78 1 The alleged
misrepresentations had been made by A. 782 There was no 783evidence that A
was acting on behalf of B or the management company.
A had been
acting on his own behalf or on behalf of the corporate landlord.7s There
was no basis for applying any legal theory which might hold shareholders of
the corporate landlord personally liable for the statements of the corporation
or another investor.785
The claim of tortious interference with a business relationship was
initially based on the claim that the landlord's conduct had prevented the
restaurant from attracting future patrons. 786 On its face, this claim should
have failed because the tort requires the existence of a present relationship,
not merely hopes of a future one.78 7 PNR also tried to claim that B and the
management company tortiously interfered with the lease.788 That also failed
to satisfy one of the elements of the tort which was that the interference must
be done by a third party. 789 B and the management company were not
strangers to the lease transaction.
Their involvement was on behalf of the
791
landlord and the conduct complained of, in fact, benefited the landlord.

777. § 501.204 (1).
778. PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 568.

779. Id.at 567.
780. Id.
781. Id. at 568.

782. Id.
783. PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 568.

784. Id.
785. Id.

786. Id.
787. Id. at 569.
788. PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 569.

789. Id.
790. Id.
791. Id.
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Finally, the wrongful eviction claim against B and the management
company was also fatally defective. 792 Neither B nor the management
company had brought the eviction action.793 It had been brought on behalf of
the corporate landlord by A. 9 So any wrongful eviction claim would have
to be brought against A or the landlord.7 95
Camena Investments & Property Management Corp. v. Cross.796
Tenant leased the property as the location for her restaurant.
The leasing
agent assured her that she would be able to open for business by October
1St.798 However, when the tenant sought approval of her plans, she learned
that there were zoning and restrictive covenant obstacles. 799 Eventually, she
was able to open the restaurant, but it was not a sucdess.
When she failed
80 1
to pay the rent, the landlord brought an eviction action in the county court.
The tenant raised the affirmative defense of fraud in the inducement.802 The
parties later agreed that the defense could be stricken and a default judgment
for possession entered in favor of the landlord.80 3
The landlord then brought an action for the unpaid rent in circuit
court. 8 04 The tenant counterclaimed for damages based on fraud in the
inducement and breach of contract. 80 5 The landlord first claimed that the
counterclaim was barred by res judicata based on the judgment in the
eviction action.808°6 That argument was rejected. 807 The district court concluded that the tenant had voluntarily abandoned fraud in the inducement as
a defense. 808 It likened that to taking a voluntary dismissal which is without
prejudice because it is not an adjudication on the merits. 8°9 Thus, res
judicata would be inapplicable.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.
801.
802.
803.
804.
805.
806.
807.
808.
809.

Id.
PNR, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 569-70.
Id. at 570.
Id.
791 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cross, 791 So. 2d at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cross, 791 So. 2d at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 597.
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The landlord also claimed that the tenant could not claim fraud in the
inducement because she took with notice of what was on the public
810
1
It asserted that Pressman v. Wolf n stood for the proposition that
records.
statements concerning public records can never form the basis for a claim of
actionable fraud.812 The district court held that there was no such general
rule.813 The question is whether a person in the plaintiff's position would
have been able to ascertain the true facts by taking reasonable steps such as
checking the public records. 8 14 A buyer acting reasonably would check the
public records. 815 A contractor pulling a permit would be expected to check
the public records. 6 However, "these types of searches are not expected to
be performed as standard procedure by a party entering into a commercial
lease. 8 1 7
The district court did, however, reverse the trial court's dismissal of the
tenant's motion for tax attorney's fees for lack of evidence.818 The tenant
had presented an expert witness who testified to having reviewed the
agreement between the tenant and her attciney, what the agreed rate was,
and that he had reviewed the time sheets kept by the attorney.819 The tenant
had moved for rehearing on the attorneys' fees issue, but that had been
denied. 82
"We fail to appreciate what was missing in [the tenant's]
8 21
presentation of evidence regarding the amount of attorney's fees .... ,
stated the district court. At the very least, the trial court should have granted
the motion for rehearing and denying that motion was an abuse of discretion
that required reversal.
Horizon Medical Group, P.A. v. City Center of Charlotte County,
Ltd.82 2 The commercial tenant signed a five year lease in March 1999, but
less than nine months later the landlord filed this action alleging that tenant

810. Id.
811. 732 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
812. Cross, 791 So. 2d at 597 (citing Pressman,732 So. 2d at 361).
813. Id.
814. Id.
815. Id.
816. Id.
817. Cross, 791 So. 2d at 598.
818. Camena Inv. & Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Cross, 791 So. 2d 595, 598 (3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
819. Id
820. Id.

821. Id.
822. 779 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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had breached the lease. 823 The tenant admitted that it had abandoned the
premises and owed back rent, so the trial court entered a final summary
judgment. 82 The damages awarded by the court included unpaid back rent
and accelerated future rent for the entire term and the cost of reletting the
premises. 82
The possibility of reletting was the basis for the partial
reversal. 826 A landlord is not entitled to the windfall of collecting rent for a
property from two different tenants. 827 So if the landlord did relet the
premises and collect rent from a third party for time covered by this lease,
the tenant was entitled to credit against the accelerated future rent. The trial
court was ordered to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of considering a
motion by the tenant for an accounting to consider any credits to which it
might become entitled
based upon the landlord reletting the premises to a
828
replacement tenant.
The Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act was amended during
the 2001 legislative session. 829 The first change is to give the landlord more
time to notify the tenant of an intent to impose a claim against the security
deposit. Now the landlord has thirty days, rather than fifteen, to send the
tenant notice by certified mail."'
The Disposition of Personal Property Landlord and Tenant Act has also
been modified. 83' This act provides the method by which the landlord may
dispose of personal property left behind by the tenant without incurring any
risk that the tenant may later reappear and assert a conversion claim against
the landlord. 832 The lease may now contain a provision which relieves the
landlord of the statutory duty to give notice that personal property has been
left behind to the tenant or any other person the landlord thinks to be the
personal property's owner. 833 Under the prior law, if the landlord reasonably
believed that the personal property left behind was worth less than $250,
then the landlord could simply keep it rather than have to sell it at a public
823. Id. at 546.

824. Id.
825. Id.
826. Id.
827. Horizon Med. Group, 779 So. 2d at 546.

828. Id.
829. FLA.
830. FLA.

STAT. § 83.49 (2001).
STAT. § 83.49(3)(a) (2001)

as amended by Ch. 2001-179, § 1, 2001 Fla.

Sess. Law Serv. 581 (West).
831. FLA. STAT. §§ 715.10-.111 (2000).
832. Id.
833. See

FLA. STAT.

§ 83.67(3) (2001) as amended by Ch. 2001-179, § 2, 2001 Fla.

Sess. Law Serv. 581 (West).
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sale.8 34 That threshold has been raised to $500. 835 The notice forms sent to

former 83
tenants
and other possible owners have been modified to reflect this
6
change.

The legislature has also taken steps to provide further protections to
members of the Armed Forces of the United States. If the tenant is a
member of the military whose post is moved more than thirty-five miles
from the rental unit or who is unexpectedly deactivated, that tenant may
terminate the lease upon thirty days notice to the landlord. 7 The tenant
must include a copy of the military orders with the termination notice that is
sent to the landlord to invoke this provision.8 38 If the member of the militar8
dies while on active duty, the lease may be terminated in a similar fashion. 79
Following termination, the landlord shall be entitled only to the prorated
rent.8 ° If the lease was terminated more than fourteen days before the tenant
was to take possession, the landlord is not entitled to any rent.841However, if
the landlord has suffered actual damages due to the early termination of the
lease, the landlord may recover liquidated damages, although the amount
is
842
limited if the lease was terminated after a period less than six months.
XVIII. LIENS
Slachter v. Swanson.843 The issue in this case is whether a subsequent
property purchaser's claim to property takes priority over the holder of a
disputed mortgage.84
In this case, a mortgage company assigned a mortgage to its former
president, mortgagee.845 The company filed a foreclosure action against the
mortgagors which was dismissed with prejudice." The mortgagors then
sued the company for wrongful foreclosure and fraud, and were awarded
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.
841.
842.
843.
844.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 715.109(1) (2000).
§ 715.109(1) (2001).

Id.

§ 83.682(1)(a) (2001).
Id.
§ 83.682 (1)(b).
FLA. STAT. § 83.682 (2) (2001).
Id.
§ 83.682 (3).
26 Fla. L. Weekly D586 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2001).
Id.
FLA. STAT.

845. Id.

846. Id.
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damages. 7 In order to collect on the judgment, the mortgagors got a trial
court order discharging the note and mortgage as paid in full. 4
The
discharge judgment was duly recorded.849 But, the discharge judgment
ultimately was reversed by- a Supreme Court of Florida decision that dealt
with numerous investors and appellants although the spelling and phonetics
of the name were not the same. 850 Thereafter, the mortgagors transferred the
property by warranty deed to appellee. 85 After this transfer, the trial court
vacated the discharge judgment.
Appellant then sued appellee to foreclose
on the 8 roperty and appellee's partial summary judgment motion was
granted.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment because appellant failed to
show appellee had knowledge of appellant's claim that the mortgage had
been reinstated after it was supposedly discharged, and thus, did not
establish he had implied actual knowledge of that reinstatement or that it was
readily ascertainable because of the difference in names in the Supreme
Court of Florida decision. 854 Therefore, the appellate court held that he was
a bona fide purchaser of the property whose
claim to that property took
855
priority over appellant's disputed mortgage.
Legislative amendments to changes in section 55.10 of the Florida
Statutes, revising the duration period of certain liens, provide in
subparagraph (1) that if a certified copy was first recorded between July 1,
1987 and June 30, 1994, the judgment, order, or decree is valid for an initial
period of seven years from the date recorded. 856 If the certified copy is first
recorded on or after July 1, 1994, it is a lien for an initial period of ten years
from the date of recording. 857 Subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) clarify the rerecording language. 85 8 The lien in subsection (1) or an extension of that lien
as provided by subsection (2), may be extended for an additional ten years. 859
As an example, if a lien was recorded between July 1, 1987 and June 30,
847.
848.
849.
850.
851.
852.
853.

Id.
Slachter,26 Fla. L. Weekly at D586.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Slachter, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D586.

854. Id. at D587.
855. Id.

856.
857.
858.
859.

S.B. 178, 102d Sess. (Fla. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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1987 one can re-record it twice to reach the twenty year statute of limitations
provided under section 55.081.

XIX. Lis PENDENS
Seligman v. North American Mortgage Co.860 The issue is whether
notice of a lis pendens creates a property right that has priority over a
mortgage, later recorded, when the property is part of the marital property in
a marriage dissolution case. 861
Appellee tried to foreclose on its mortgage to appellant.
The
mortgage in question was executed by appellant's former husband as a single
man after appellant filed a notice of lis pendens regarding the property, upon
her petition for dissolution of their marriage. 863
Appellant properly recorded the notice of lis pendens and also properly
procured a valid extension of the lis pendens.864 The lis pendens remained in
effect, and was not dissolved at the time appellee's
mortgage
was
,
•
865 executed
and recorded and at the time appellee' s foreclosure suit was filed. Because
of the common law doctrine of pendente lite, the court in a dissolution of
marriage proceeding, had jurisdiction over the property until final judgment,
and whoever purchased or encumbered the property took subject to the
dissolution judgment. 86 The former husband was not allowed to encumber
or alienate the property pending litigation. 867 Appellee had record notice of
the pending dissolution and should have known the husband was not in fact
single. 868 This court held that the fact that the notice of lis pendens referred
to the action filed as a dissolution of marriage and listed the property at issue
was sufficient for the requirements of section 48.23(1)(a) of the 1997
Florida Statutes to set forth the relief sought.869 The trial court's decision
87
was reversed.
0 The matter was remanded for entry of judgment for
T
appellant.17
860. 781 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
861. Id. at 1161.
862. ld. at 1160.

863.
864.
865.
866.
867.

Id.
Id. at 1163.
Seligman, 781 So. 2d at 1163.

Id.
Id.

868. Id.

869. Id.
870. Seligman, 781 So. 2d at 1164.
871. Id.
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XX. MORTGAGES

Michel v. Beau Rivage Beach Resort, Inc.872 The issue in this case is
whether a lien on a home is proper when it represents security for a
commission earned by the real estate broker. 8 "
74
In this case, the broker earned a commission on the sale of a property.
The broker allowed the seller to be paid the funds owed to him, so the
purchaser could get a loan in the amount of the commission from the
875
seller.
The trial court construed section 475.42(1)0) of the Florida
Statutes, which prohibits a broker or salesman from placing a mortgage in
the public records in order to collect a commission, to disallow what
occurred here. 6 The appellate court found that the broker was placing a
lien on the property. 7 Here, the broker allowed the seller, who was
obligated to pay the commission, to use the commission to grant a loan to the
purchaser. 878 The appellate court held that the funds were the seller's to do
with as he pleased, and that the trial court had misconstrued the statute in
880
this instance.879 Therefore, the dppellate court reversed the trial court.
8 81
Suntrust Bank v. Riverside National Bank of Florida.
The issue in
this case involved the priority of a first mortgagee's refinanced loan. 8 2
In 1993, appellant recorded a balloon first mortgage of $148,500.883 In
1995, appellee recorded a $100,000 second mortgage.884 In 1998, appellant
refinanced the first mortgage, lending $136,800. 8 The sums paid off the
original mortgage and appellant recorded a satisfaction of the original first
886
mortgage
andmortgage
its new mortgage.
Appellant
that its new
mortgage
was the first
because its title
search assumed
did not disclose
the appellee's

872.
873.
874.
875.
876.
877.
878.

774 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 901.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 902; see also FLA STAT. § 475.42(1)0).
Michel, 774 So. 2d at 902.
Id.

879. Id.
880. Id.
881. 26 Fla. L. Weekly D513 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2001), withdrawn, 26 Fla. L.
Weekly 2109 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2001) (filling an identical opinion).
882. Id.
883. Id.
884. Id.
885. Id.
886. Suntrust Bank, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D513.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

176

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Brown / Grohman

2001]

mortgage. 8 7 When the property went into foreclosure, appellant discovered
the priority difficulties. 8 8 The trial court denied appellant relief.8s9
The appeals court reversed, holding that the previous two cases upon
which the trial court relied were incorrect, and that appellant was entitled to
relief under the equitable subrogation doctrine.8 g9 However, the appellate
court held that appellant was only entitled to equitable subrogation to the
extent that appellee would be no worse off than it would have been if
appellant's original mortgage had not been satisfied. 891
XXI• OPTIONS
Sander v. Ball.8 92 Buyer was interested in seller's land, but the parties
anticipated that part of the seller's land would be taken by the county. So,
buyer purchased a purchase option. 894 The price would be $483,351, but
provided that the buyer would get credit for whatever the county paid for the
price of $30,000 times
acreage taken.895 Furthermore, it placed a maximum
•896"nfute
The option further
the number of acres left after the condemnation.
provided that it would continue until October 24, 1998, but would be
automatically extended until the seller had received the condemnation
proceeds.897 So, in effect, the option did not include a time limit. Regretting
the deal, the seller filed this action to have the option declared null and
void. 9 8 The buyer apparently counterclaimed for reformation and won in
the trial court. 899 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed. 9°
The court concluded that the option was void because it violated the
Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation. 901 Consequently, the
court did not consider the assertion that the option violated the Rule Against
887.
888.
889.
890.
891.
892.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at D514.
Suntrust Bank, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D514-15.
781 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

893. Id. at 528.

894.
895.
896.
897.
898.
899.

Id.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Sander,781 So. 2d at 528.
Id.at 528.
Id.

900. Id. at 531.
901. Id.
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Perpetuities. The maximum price set by the option made it sufficiently
similar to the fixed price repurchase option held invalid in Inglehart v.
Phillips.9°2 As the Supreme Court of Florida said in Inglehart, "[t]he
validity or invalidity of a restraint depends upon its long-term effect on the
improvement and marketability of the property. Once that effect is
determined, common sense should dictate whether it is reasonable or
unreasonable. ,9 03 An option with a price cap and no time limit failed that
test.9°
The rule could not be avoided by reforming the option as the trial court
had done. 90 5 It simply added a time limit based upon circumstances in which
the agreement was reached. 9 6 Reformation, however, is available only to
make the writing reflect what the parties had actually agreed. 90 7 It cannot be
used to cure a defect in that agreement. 9°8 Here, the parties had not even
discussed a time limit for the option, so the9 court could not supply the term
under the guise of reforming the document. W
XXII. SALES
Bunner v. Talbot.9 1° Seller was a real estate broker. 9 1 Buyer was an
91 2
attorney who had represented the seller in previous real estate matters.
Seller was in financial trouble. 1 3 A valuable property was encumbered by
liens and mortgages.9 14 Worse, it was about to be auctioned off for unpaid
taxes. 915 They agreed to the following deal: buyer would loan seller the
money to pay off the tax deficit and seller would sell the land to a land trust
that buyer would create. 916 The contract, which buyer hired another attorney
902. 383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980).
903. Sander, 781 So. 2d at 529 (quoting Inglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 614-15
(Fla. 1980)).
904. Id.
905. Id. at 530.
906. Id.
907. Id.
908. Sander, 781 So. 2d at 530.
909. Id.
910. 784 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
911. Id. at539.
912. Id.
913. Id.
914. Id.
915. Buttner, 784 So. 2d at 539.
916. Id.
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to draft, required seller to deliver marketable title. 1 7 An addendum provided
that if the sale was not consummated, the seller would give buyer a note918for
the tax money advanced and secure that with a mortgage on the property.
Buyer did advance the cash seller needed, and seller used that to pay off
the taxes. 919 Then, it appears that seller had second thoughts about the
wisdom of the deal because his accountant advised him that the price was
too Iow. 9 2° Buyer insisted on closing and had a title search done.92' Several
liens and encumbrances were discovered and seller was notified that they
would have to be cleared. 922 Seller claimed he did not have the money to do
that and refused to close, so buyer filed suit for specific performance.
Seller's first defense was impossibility, that is, that he could not deliver
marketable title.924 That defense was rejected.?
The marketable title
provision was in the contract to protect -the buyer, not the seller.926 It could
be waived by the buyer.927 In this case, the buyer had done so by insisting on
closing. 92 The addendum requiring the seller to execute a note and
mortgage for the money advanced did not change that. 92 9 The addendum
was only designed to provide buyer protection against the loss of the money
she had already advanced if the sale was not completed due to unmarketable
title.930
Seller also asserted that buyer was the trustee for a trust that had not yet
been created and, therefore, could not bring the action. 931 The district court
pointed out that this argument had not been raised below until the motion for
rehearing.932 Consequently, it had been waived.933 However, the court
offered the dicta that it would not have been a successful argument
917. Id.
918. Id.

919. Id.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.

Buttner,784 So. 2d at 540.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

925. Buttner,784 So. 2d at 540.

926.
927.
928.
929.
930.
931.
932.
933.

Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Buttner, 784 So. 2d at 541.
Id.
Id. at 540.
Id.
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anyway. 934 Under Florida law, a conveyance may be made to a person as
trustee without reference to any trust document or beneficiary.9 35
Consequently, the plaintiff could have completed the closing by taking title
in a deed to her as trustee. Since she had the ability to close, she could
enforce the contract by specific performance.
Seller also claimed the contract lacked consideration.
This argument
failed because the contract called for buyer to execute a purchase money
mortgage and allow seller to live on the property for two years in addition to
advancing the cash to pay off the back taxes.
Finally, seller asserted that buyer should be denied equitable relief
because she had unclean hands.
The essence of this claim rested on
plaintiff being a lawyer who had represented him in the past and the price
being, allegedly, inadequate. 939 The court found this claim unconvincing. 940
Buyer did not act as a lawyer in this transaction. 941 Another lawyer had been
942
engaged
to draft ,the documents.
All that the record reflects is a 943
case of
,,
seller's remorse" once it had enjoyed part of the benefits of the deal.
Cavallaro v. Stratford Homes.944 The buyers put down a $500 deposit
and signed an agreement reserving a particular lot in the defendant's
development. 945 Under the terms of the agreement, the parties were expected
to enter into a formal construction, purchase, and sale contract which would
provide for the construction of a house by seller on the designated lot and the
subsequent sale of that lot to the buyers. 94 The reservation agreement
provided that if the construction, purchase, and sale contract was not
executed within fourteen days, either party could void the lot reservation
agreement. 947 A dispute arose and the buyers sued for specific performance
of the sales agreement. 94 The seller's defense was that the parties had never
934. Id.
935. FLA. STAT. § 689.07(1) (2001).
936. Buttner, 784 So. 2d at 541.
937. Id.
938. Id.

939. Id.
940. Id.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.

Buttner, 784 So. 2d at 539.
Id.
Id. at 541.
784 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 621.

946. Id.
947. Id.
948. Id.
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reached agreement on the terms of the contract of sale and, even if they had,
enforcement was barred by the Statute
of Frauds.949 The trial court awarded
950
seller.
summary judgment to the
The record below revealed that the parties had gone through several
different sets of plans and pricing calculations. 951 However, they had never
reached
agreement as to the essential terms of construction
•• a final952
,..and .the
951
ultimate price.
Consequently, the summary judgment was affirmed.
The court went on to offer interesting dicta about the Statute of Frauds.95 4 In
this case, there admittedly was not a single document that was signed by the
buyers and the seller. 955 Buyers sought to satisfy the Statute of Frauds by
combining an agreement and addendum that had been signed by them with
the seller's price list.956 Assuming the price list was a writing "signed" by
the seller, the court still found the list insufficient because
there was nothing
957
in the unsigned writing referencing the signed writing.
The court also rejected the attempt to invoke the doctrine of part
performance to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. 5 8 When
dealing with a contract for the sale of land, only delivery of possession will
be sufficient part performance to take the contract out of the Statute of
Frauds. 959 In this case, the buyers were never put into possession, so the
doctrine was inapplicable.96°
Furthermore, the seller could not be held liable for breaching an
obligation of good faith or fair dealing.96 Those
962 are duties that are imposed
on a party in the performance of the contract.
However, those duties never
arose because, "in this case.., the
parties
never
reached an agreement or
963
executed an enforceable contract."

949. Cavallaro,784 So. 2d at 621.

950.
951.
952.
953.
954.
955.
956.
957.
958.
959.
960.
961.

Id. at 620.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Cavallaro,784 So. 2d at 621.
Id.
Id. at 621-22.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Cavallaro,784 So. 2d at 622.
Id.
Id.

962. Id.
963. Id.
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Kroitzsch v. Steele. 964 Mr. and Mrs. Kroitzsch encountered serious
financial difficulties and lost their home in a mortgage foreclosure sale.9 5
Title was acquired by Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA"). 9"
At that point, Mr. and Mrs. Kroitzsch came into some money and wanted to
buy the house back from FNMA. 967 Under the circumstances of their
financial problems, they believed that they could not make the purchase in
their own names, so they arranged for Varner to be the buyer, using their
money, and then execute a lease to Mr. and Mrs. Kroitzsch.968 Only Mr.
Kroitzsch signed97 the one-year lease. 969 The tenants never paid rent or a
security deposit. 0
The problem arose when Varner sold the house to the buyers four years
later.971 Varner told them the tenants were residing in the house, but that
they were behind in their rent.972 He also showed them the lease. 973 The
buyers drove by the property and observed that the house was occupied as
they had been told.974 They also checked the public records which
confirmed that Varner was the owner of record and the title seemed to be
unencumbered. 975 After becoming the owners, the buyers were never paid
any rent, so they began this eviction proceeding. 976 The trial court ordered
the eviction of the tenants, but the district court of appeal reversed.977
"[S]uccessors to legal title take title subject to those equitable interests
of which they have notice." 978 The plaintiffs here did not have actual notice
that Mr. and Mrs. Kroitzsch were the equitable owners of the land rather
than merely delinquent tenants.979 However, there were delinquent tenants
in possession under a written lease that had never been properly executed
and that appeared to have expired years earlier. 980 Thus, "there were
964.
965.
966.
967.
968.
969.
970.
971.
972.
973.
974.
975.
976.
977.
978.
979.
980.

768 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kroitzsch, 768 So. 2d at 516.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kroitzsch, 768 So. 2d at 516.
Id.
ld.
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 517.
Kroitzsch, 768 So. 2d at 516.
ld.
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sufficient red flags raised in this residential purchase to require further
inquiry by the [b]uyers. ' '98' But the plaintiffs did not make the inquiry that a
reasonably prudent buyer would have made under the circumstances.982 They
did not contact the tenants to find out what claims they might have. 983 They
did not get an estoppel certificate from the tenants. 9 4 They did not get an
affidavit from the seller before the closing.9 5 They6 did not get title
insurance protecting against the claims of the occupants. 98 All they did was
ask the seller and check the public records.987 That is not sufficient. 9 88
Kroitzsch's interest and
Consequently, they took
989 subject to Mr. and Mrs.
could not evict them.
XXIII. TAXATION
FairhavenSouth, Inc. v. McIntyre.99 0 The issue here is whether the trial
court erred in upholding the property appraiser's denial of Fairhaven's
applications for a homestead exemption on the ground that Fairhaven failed
to establish that the property was used for a charitable purpose. 991
A nonprofit home for the aged qualified for homestead exemption under
section 196.1975 of the 1995 FloridaStatutes if: 1) it qualifies as a not-forprofit corporation under section 501(c)(3) of the InternalRevenue Code; and
either over the age of
2) at least seventy-five percent of its residents are
992
permanently.
or
partially
disabled,
are
sixty-two or
Fairhaven applied for a homestead exemption for the years 1996, 1997,
and 1998, and attached documentation that its corporate charter is not-forprofit and a certificate of exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.993 It also established that at least seventy-five percent of its
residents were over the age of sixty-two or were totally and permanently
981. Id. at 518.
982. Id.

983. Id.
984. Kroitzsch, 768 So. 2d at 518.
985. Id.

986. Plaintiffs did get a tide insurance policy, but it contained the usual exception for
claims of parties in possession. Id.
987. Id.
988. Id.
989. Kroitzsch, 768 So. 2d at 518.
990. 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1466 (2d Dist. Ct. App. June 8, 2001).
991. Id.
992. Id. at D1467.
993. Id.
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disabled, that some portions of the home were used exclusively for religious
or medical purposes, and that at least twenty-five percent of the home's
residents had incomes below the maximum limitation.994 The property
appraiser denied Fairhaven's applications, asserting that Fairhaven must also
"meet the requirements of section 196.195 (determining the profit or
nonprofit status of an applicant) and section 196.196 (determining whether
property is entitled to charitable.., exemption). 995 Fairhaven appealed.9 96
The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court should have
based its decision solely on section 196.1975. 997 The appellate court
examined the legislative history of section 196.1975 and Article VII, Section
6(e) of the Florida Constitution in reaching its decision. 99 Prior to 1987, the
exemption of a non profit home for the aged was based on Article VII,
Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution. 999 At that time, property was
required to be used for charitable, educational, literary, scientific, or
religious purposes.1'0 Section 196.1975(7) now provides that subsection 3
relates to Article VII, Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution, and the
remaining subsections implement section 6(e) of the constitution, for
purposes of granting homestead exemptions to homes for the aged. 100 '
Because Fairhaven met the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code
and those of section 196.1975(1) and (2), it was entitled to homestead
exemption for
1996 through 1998, without regard to the "charitable" use of
00 2
the property.
Florida Governmental Utility Authority v. Day. 100 3 The issue here was
whether a property owner must file suit within sixty days of receipt of
assessment when the property owner is a governmental utility.'004 Appellant
appealed a final summary judgment entered by the circuit court against it,
994.
995.
996.
997.

Id.
FairhavenSouth, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1467.
Id.
Id.

998. Id.

999. Id.
1000. FairhavenSouth, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D1467.
1001. Id. Article VII. Section 6(e) of the Florida Constitution provides: "[b]y general
law and subject to conditions specified therein, the [lIegislature may provide to renters, who
are permanent residents, ad valorem tax relief on all ad valorem tax levies. Such ad valorem
tax relief shall be in the form and amount established by general law." FLA. CONST. art. VII, §

6(e).
1002. FairhavenSouth, Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D1467.
1003.784 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
1004. Id. at 495.
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the Osceola County property appraiser, and the tax collector, after the court
found appellant's complaint to be untimely. 00 5
The utility was created by an interlocal agreement in accordance with
the Florida Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1969.10 6 The tax collector
disallowed the tax exemption to the utility because the utility was created
under chapter 163 of the FloridaStatutes and not chapter 196.'007 Appellant
argued that section 163.01(7)(g)(4) of the Florida Statutes specifically
' 1 °°8
provided for exemptions "for entities created by interlocal agreements.
The utility received a tax assessment that did not reflect its exempt status
and filed suit. 1 ° The assessor tried to get the suit dismissed because it was
not filed within sixty days of the assessment. 010 This court held that the
utility was not subject to the sixty-day period of section 194.171(2) of the
Florida Statutes because the lawsuit did not challenge the tax assessment,
the valuation of the property, but rather, only the classification of the
property for valuation purposes.1011
Greater Orlando Aviation Authority v. Crotty.1°I The issue here was
whether a privately
operated hotel, located on municipal property is subject
10 13
to property taxes?
The City of Orlando appealed a judgment in favor of the property
appraiser for Orange County, which ruled that real and personal property
used in the
operation of a hotel on airport property was subject to ad valorem
1 4
taxation. 01
The Greater Orlando Airport Authority (GOAA), an agency of the city
of Orlando, occupied, used, controlled, and operated an airport built on land
owned by the city1015 Article VII, Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution
made land owned by a municipality exempt from ad valorem taxation under
certain circumstances.101 6 "The trial court ruled that the property was not

1005. Id.
1006. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 163.01 (2001).
1007. Day, 784 So. 2d at 495.
1008. Id.
1009. Id. at 496.
1010.Id.

1011. Id. at 497. Classification at issue was status as a non-exempt governmental entity.

Id.
1012.775 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1013. Id. at 979.
1014.Id.
1015.Id.
1016. Id. at 980.
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l t7
exempt because GOAA was using it for private, profit-making purposes.,
In affirmation of the case, the appellate court agreed with the trial court's
conclusion that the hotel property did not provide for the comfort,
convenience, safety, and happiness of the citizens of Orlando.' 018 The
purpose of the hotel was to serve persons who resided elsewhere and
required public accommodations. 01 9
The Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre.
The issue was whether
an ad valorem tax exemption is valid when property is being used for a
governmental-proprietary purpose. 121
Appellants got a review of the decision of the District Court of Appeal
of Florida which made a part of section 196.012(6) of the 1994 Florida
Statutes unconstitutional.10 2 The portion that was invalidated would have
created an ad valorem tax exemption for certain private enterprises by
statutorily defining these types of activities as "serv[ing] a governmental,
municipal, or public purpose or function.' 0 23
The appellate court found operation of the raceway to be commercial,
proprietary, profit, and not governmental functions.' 0
The exemptions
covered in the statute deal with "governmental-governmental" uses as
opposed to "governmental-proprietary" uses.' 025 Legislatively deeming a
governmental-proprietary purpose to be a "govemmental-governmental"
purpose did not change its true nature and did not result in the constitutional
awarding of a tax exemption where, absent the legislation, there clearly
could be no exemption. 0 2 It is not for the court or legislature to decide who
shall receive tax exemptions when we have the Florida Constitution by
which to abide.1027
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Todora. ° 2 8 The issue in this case was whether
sales tax should be included in the valuation of property. °29

1017. Crotty, 775 So. 2d at 980.
1018. Id. at 981.
1019.Id.
1020.783 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2001).
1021.Id. at 240.
1022. Id. at 242.
1023.Id.
1024. Id. at 246-47.
1025. McIntyre, 783 So. 2d at 242.
1026. Id.
1027.Id. at 243.
1028.791 So. 2d 29 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
1029. Id. at 30.
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This case involved the assessment of tangible personal property used in
The
one of Wal-Mart's stores, such as store fixtures and equipment.
question was whether any sales tax included as part of the original purchase
price of the property, as reported on the tax return, was a "cost of sale" that
must be deducted when determining just valuation. 1 3 1 The appellate court
found no error in the assessment, and Wal-Mart's argument about not
reducing the tax for valuation unavailing. 0 32 Since this court disagreed with
an earlier decision,
it certified the question based on conflict to the Supreme
10 33
Court of Florida.
Wells v. Vallier.10 34 This is a substituted opinion for the earlier
opinion. 10 35 The issue in the case was whether the appellants qualified for
° 36 The trial court granted a
the homestead exemption for property taxes.
0 37
final summary judgment in favor of appellee.1
The appellee's sole reason for denying the homestead exemption tax
deduction to the appellant was that the appellant received a $100 per year

residency based property tax credit in the State of New Hampshire. 8 Other
than receiving the tax credit in New Hampshire, the appellants for the past
sixteen years: 1) have maintained a valid Florida's drivers license; 2) had
one or more motor vehicles registered in Florida; 3) have been registered
voters in Florida; 4) listed their Florida residence as their address for federal

income tax purposes; 5) maintained their primary personal checking and
savings accounts in Florida; 6) have been physically present for an average
of seven to eight months a year; 7) had their primary physicians,
accountants, brokers and church within Florida; 8) maintained family
0 39
keepsakes; and 9) have executed their last will and testament in Florida.
The appellate court held that while a tax credit received in another state
may be a consideration in determining the individual is a permanent resident
of the State of Florida, it alone is not a conclusive determining factor.'=
The appellate court found that the overwhelming weight of the evidence
1030. Id.
1031. Id.
1032. Id. at 31.
1033. Todora,791 So. 2d at 31.
1034.773 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1035.1d. at 1198. For the earlier opinion, see Wells v. Vallier, 25 Fla. L. Weekly
D1280a (2d Dist. Ct. App. May 26, 2000).
1036. Wells, 773 So. 2d at 1198.
1037. Id.
1038. Id.
1039. Wells, 773 So. 2d at 1198.
1040. Id.
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proved that appellants were residents of the State of Florida and have
10 4
complied with the requirements for receiving a homestead tax exemption. '

XXIV. TAX DEEDS
Sugarmill Woods Oaks Village Ass'n v. Wires.1 42 The issue in this case
was whether the issuance of a tax deed
to a lot extinguished a homeowner
0 43
association's lien placed on such lot.
The declaration of covenants recorded prior to issuance of the tax deed
permitted the homeowners association to record a lien in its favor for
delinquent payments of homeowner association assessments, pursuant to the
declaration prior to the issuance of the tax deed. ' " The association placed
such a lien on the subject property prior to the tax deed. 10 45
In construing section 617.312 of the Florida Statutes, the appellate
court found "[tihe [legislature could have expressly provided that liens
assessed against lots by homeowners associations also survive the issuance
of a tax deed; however, it did not."' 0
With that, the appellate court
affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of the appellees.
XXV. TITLE INSURANCE

Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Butler.1 4 The issue in this case was
whether certain statutes prohibiting title insurance agents from rebating a
portion of their premiums is unconstitutional. 0 49 The Supreme Court of
Florida after considering the arguments of both sides found the statutes unconstitutional.
The court found the anti-rebate statutes infringed on the
citizens' property rights and unconstitutionally restricted the citizens' rights
to freely bargain for services.105

1041. Id.
1042.766 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1043. ld. at 488.
1044. Id. at 489.
1045. Id. at 488.
1046. Id. at 489.
1047. Wires, 766 So. 2d at 489-90.
1048.770 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2000).
1049. Id.at 1211.
1050. Id.
1051. Id. at 1215.
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XXVI. ZONING

Dixon v. City of Jacksonville.0 5 2 The issue here was whether a hotel is
a proper use consistent with the counties' comprehensive plan when the
hotel is to be built in an area zoned RPI 0 53 Appellants challenged an order
of the circuit court denying appellants' motion for an injunction to prevent
the implementation of an ordinance adopted by appellee, which
0 would have
rezoned certain real property to permit construction of a hotel. Appellee adopted a comprehensive plan for development and later
adopted an ordinance to rezone certain portions of the real property to permit
construction of a hotel on a site.10 55 Appellants tried to get a temporary
and/or permanent injunction to prevent the implementation of the ordinance
and argued that appellee's comprehensive plan for development did not
permit construction of
the hotel at the site.1 56 The trial court denied
10 57
injunction.
appellants'
The appellate court applied the strict scrutiny standard in its review of
the ordinance to see if it was consistent with the comprehensive plan for
development.1 58 The appellate court found that the trial court erred in its
interpretation of appellee's comprehensive plan. 05 9 The appellate court
ruled the hotel was not a proper land use consistent with any type of
permissible use under the comprehensive plan's functional land use
designation.1m
City of Jacksonville Beach v. Car Spa, Inc.1 6 The issue in this case
was whether the city aroperly denied Car Spa, Inc.'s application for a
conditional use permit. 2
Car Spa filed an application for a conditional use permit for a car wash,
automotive service, and gas service facility. 0 63 The staff of the Jacksonville
Beach Planning Commission concluded the use was consistent with relevant
zoning and comprehensive plan policies, and recommended approval with
1052.774 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1053. Id. at 764.
1054. Id.
1055. Id.

1056. Id.
1057. Dixon, 774 So. 2d at 764.

1058. Id.
1059. Id.
1060. Id. at 765-66.
1061.772 So. 2d 630 (Fa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

1062. Id.at 631.
1063. Id.
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certain conditions.10
The Commission held a public hearing following
which, the Commission denied the conditional use permit. 10 65 Car Spa filed
a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court alleging that the
application for conditional use, as well as the record of the public hearing,
clearly reflects that all criteria were met by Car Spa's proposed use and that
there was no substantial or competent evidence of any fact proving or even
inferring that the conditional use would be contrary to the public interest.10M
The appellate court reviewed the circuit court's decision based on
whether the circuit court (1) "afforded procedural due process" and (2)
"applied the correct law. 10 67
The circuit court concluded that Car Spa carried its initial burden of
demonstrating entitlement to the conditional use permit, and as a result, the
burden shifted to the city to demonstrate that Car Spa had not satisfied the
relevant code criteria, and that the conditional use requested was, therefore,
contrary to the public interest.1068 The appellate court found that at that
point, the circuit court failed to review the entire record to make its
determination and only used portions of the record, and re-weighed the
evidence, substituting its own judgement for that of the Planning Commission as to the relative weight of the evidence.' 0 69 The appellate court
found that the circuit court rejected testimony of a professional land-use
planner regarding non compliance of the proposed use with the comprehensive plan and that it also rejected testimony of an individual who had
conducted tests to determine whether noise levels associated with the
proposed use violated local noise ordinances.
In addition, the circuit
court failed to include the testimony of neighbors regarding traffic problems
and realtors as to the value of the property. 1 7 The appellate court reversed
72
and remanded the lower court's decision.
Lee v. St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners.10 73 This case
dealt with how long one has to bring an action when there are allegedly
1 74
inconsistent actions which aggrieve a party. 0
1064. Id.
1065. Id.
1066. CarSpa, Inc., 772 So. 2d at 631.
1067. Id. (quoting City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982)).
1068. Id.
1069. Id. at 631-32.
1070. Id. at 632.
1071. CarSpa, Inc., 772 So. 2d at 632.
1072. Id.
1073.776 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
1074. Id. at 1111-12.
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Here, appellee developers filed an application to re-zone land from rural
to a planned urban development, and appellee Board of County
Commissioners re-zoned the land. 10 75 The county zoning agency then
approved appellee's final development plan for the property.0 76 Appellant
requested a review of this aproval
from appellee, which ultimately agreed
°
with the agency's decision.)
Less than thirty days later, appellant filed suit alleging that the rezoning of the property and the order approving the final development plan
were inconsistent with the county's comprehensive plan. 18 The trial court
dismissed the suit as untimely filed. 1 79 On review, the appellate court
reversed. 10 80
The appellate court held that in order to challenge allegedly inconsistent
actions under section 163.3215 of the FloridaStatutes, appellant had to sue
the governmental entity whose actions aggrieved her within thirty days of
such actions. 1 81 Appellant missed the deadlines for the zoning agency's
actions, but her claim as to the appellee board's approval of the development
plan was timely.1082 The court decided that because appellee's board had
the right to review the zoning agency's actions de novo, its decision0 was
the
final one which commenced the running of the thirty day time limit. 83
XVII. CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey of cases and legislation presents selected
materials of significance to real estate professionals. Although there seems
to be no consistent pattern to the case law and legislative development, the
survey is useful in maintaining contact with the progression of real property
law.

1075.Id. at 1111.
1076.Id.

1077.UL
1078. Lee, 776 So. 2d at 1111-12.
1079. Id. at 1111.
1080. Id.
1081. Id. at 1112.
1082. Id.
1083. Lee, 776 So. 2d at 1113.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This article spans the several stages of public employment, beginning
with the law governing the hiring of employees. Part II surveys current
issues arising out of residency requirements for public employees; how
privatization, also known as "outsourcing," a process high on Governor Jeb
Bush's list of priorities, is fundamentally changing the nature of public
employment; how Florida voters rejected a bid to change electing trial
judges to appointment; how the teacher shortage is playing out in public
schools; how cities and counties face liability if they fail to check the
criminal background of applicants; how the police department has come up
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with a novel way of recruiting police officers; how some public employees
have been caught cheating on hiring exams and finally, Part II closes with a
brief discussion of issues related to promotions.
Part III looks at the law governing the terms of public employment. This
Part opens with a series of new developments on the hours and wages of
public employees. The lion's share of Part III is devoted to current issues
involving employee benefits, ranging from health benefits to public
pensions; from disability and death benefits to occupational safety and health
issues.
Part IV explores the wide array of legal issues surrounding the
disciplining and discharging of public employees. While it is harder to
dismiss an employee for off-duty misconduct than for on-the-job wrongdoing, both categories are addressed. Public employers must address the
claims of whistle-blowers who report public misconduct to ensure that any
sanction meted out is not in retaliation for expressing a view protected, for
example, by the First Amendment. Part IV also looks at federal and state
anti-discrimination laws that safeguard public employees from becoming
targeted on grounds of race, gender, age, disability, or sexual orientation. A
brief section touches on reductions-in-force, downsizing that becomes
necessary when budgets are squeezed. Finally, Part IV addresses issues
arising from the array of remedies public employees may recover in the
event they prevail in court: damages, attorneys' fees and costs.
Part V surveys public sector collective bargaining issues, such as
current issues involving public unions, the types of impasses unions and
public employers face as they bargain in good faith over the terms and
conditions of employment, and finally, Part V looks at a recent Supreme
Court ruling that may result in more employment-related cases going to
arbitration rather than to courts.
II.

HIRING, RETENTION, AND PROMOTION

A. Residency
Former prosecutor Gina Mendez was removed from the Miami-Dade
ballot because she lives in Pembroke Pines.' Miami-Dade judge Teri-Ann
Miller was removed from the Broward ballot for failing to comply with
residency rules.2
1.
Larry Lebowitz & Jay Weaver, Miller Files Ballot Lawsuit, MiAMI HERAw, Sept.
12, 2000, at lB.
2.
Id.
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Florida law requires school board members to live in the voter district
when they file to run for a school board seat.3 One candidate for a District4
Seven seat in Miami-Dade allegedly registered to vote in District Six.
Under state law, a rival, or some other District Seven resident must challenge a candidate's qualifications before a court can rule.5 Later, the candi6
date who claimed to live in a metal tool shed was ousted from the ballot.
B. Privatization
Florida has become a leader in the movement to privatize governmental
agencies. For example, in the last year Governor Bush pressured state
agencies to shed 1800 state jobs in order to privatize posts ranging from
janitors to food service. The move toward privatizing state jobs is fueled by
the Governor's belief that "government can deliver high quality services
with greater efficiency and lower costs." 8 Grass cutting and cabin
maintenance at state parks are also marked for privatization despite criticism
about such "piecemeal privatization." 9 The Department of Corrections and
Transportation have likewise slated hundreds of positions for privatization.' 0
The state entered into a twenty year, $700 million contract that
privatizes a statewide police radio system." "No other state has privatized
2 The old radio system was so old, parts had to be
its police radio system."'
13
Russia.
from
ordered
In a move that reverses teacher unions' hostility toward privatization, a
Miami Dade public school teachers' union forged a partnership with New4
York-based Edison Schools to run ten charter schools in Miami-Dade.1
3.

Analisa Nazareno, Residence an Issue in Dade Schools Race, MiAMi HERALD,

July 25, 2000, at 7B.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id.
Residence Requirement, N.Y. TIMES (Miami), Nov. 5, 2000, § 1, at 40.
Lesley Clark & Steve Bousquet, State Agencies Tab 1800 Jobsfor Elimination,

MIAMI HERALD,

8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.
HERALD,

12.

Sept. 16, 2000, at 9B.

Phil Long, Two Companies Battling for State's Police Radio System, MIAMI

Sept. 24, 2000, at 6B.
Id.

13. Phil Long, Communications Network Has a Checkered History, MIAMI
Sept. 24, 2000, at 6B.
14.

HERALD,

Analisa Nazareno, Dade Teachers' Union Enters Deal to Run 10 Charter

Schools, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 8, 2000, at 7B.
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they
Traditionally, teachers' unions have opposed charter schools, claiming
5
divert money from public schools, leaving the system weakened.1
National polls make clear that most voters oppose privatization
especially when it comps to "more-complex services such as law enforcement, health inspections, fire protection, child support,
16 nursing-home care,
environmental protection and unemployment benefits."'
The Miami-Dade County Commission enacted an ordinance that will
privatize the new building inspection procedure.' 7 The move has been
be selected by the owners
criticized on grounds that private inspectors would
8
and developers of the projects under scrutiny.'
Governor Jeb Bush's move to privatize the care of ill veterans came
under attack from some of Florida's 1.7 million veterans.19 The initiative is
part of Bush's goal of reducing government by twenty five percent over the
next five years. 20 What remains unclear is how a private firm can achieve
better care than the state while also turning a profit. One lawmaker warned
that so called "outsourcing" (i.e. privatization) removes civil service
21
protections that make it harder to discipline or dismiss an unfit worker.
C. Selection of TrialJudges; Hiring SeniorJudges
Fort Lauderdale's attorney asked the Florida Attorney General's office
to issue an opinion about the constitutionality of Broward's reliance on
senior judges from other counties. 22 Questions were raised over whether this
practice3 deprives voters of the right to a trial in front of a locally elected
jurist.2
A measure on the November 2000 ballot that would have replaced
elections for Florida trial court judges with an appointive system was

15.
16.
HERALD,

Id.
James Fendrich, Privatization Costs Floridians Millions of Dollars, MIAMI

May 4, 2001, at 13B.

17. Robert Steinback, Privatizing Inspections: Promise and Peril, MIAMI HERALD,
July 18, 2001, at 3B.

18. Id.
19. Steve Bousquet, Veterans Blast Bush Plan to Privatize,MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 29,
2001, at IA.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id
Sue Reisinger, Ruling on Senior Judges Delayed, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 15, 2000,

23.

Id

at 3B.
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defeated by wide margins in every county.2 The outcome was touted as a
signal victory for Hispanic, black and female lawyers who have secured
more slots on the bench in recent elections7 2
D. Teacher Shortage
In light of Florida's need to hire over 162,000 new teachers in the next
decade, the state legislature considered a bill that would allot $200 million
annually for three years to raise teacher salaries.26 The average teacher's pay
in Florida is $35,916, about $5000 below the national average. 27 Along with
an impending teacher shortage, the Broward County school district also
faces a shortage of substitute teachers. 28 Apparently, "low pay, a lack of
respect and the strong economy" make the job unattractive. 29 Substitute
teachers must pass a state and federal background check and have earned 60
hours of college credit.30 In Broward County, substitutes earn $9.60 an hour;
"permanent substitutes" earn $12 an hour but receive no health benefits. 3'
Governor Jeb Bush has proposed a $51 million teacher recruitment and
retention plan. 32 Under this program,33first-time teachers in Florida public
schools receive a $1000 signing bonus.
State law requires school districts to hire new teachers for the next
school year by May.34 In light of this deadline, Broward's school district had
a March 1 deadline on replacing interim substitutes with full-time-certified
teachers. 35 But pressure from the teacher shortage led the district to
eliminate the March 1 deadline. 36 In response, the teachers union claims the
24. William Glaberson, States Taking Steps to Rein in Excesses of Judicial
Politicking, N.Y. TIMES (Miami), June 15, 2001, at Al.
25. Jay Weaver, County Voters Reject Bid to Allow Governor to Appoint Trial
Judges, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 8, 2000, at 14B.
26. Teacher Shortage, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 21, 2001, at 12B.
27. Id.
28. Susan Ferrechio, Shortage of "Subs" Troubling Schools, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 21,
2001, at 1BR.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Governor Bush in Miami Plugging Teacher Retention Plan, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
3, 2001, at 7B.
33. Id.
34. Jason Grotto, Substitute Teachers Rule Upsets Some, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 26,
2001, at lB.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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substitutes (without benefits) instead of
district broke its contract by hiring
37
permanent, full-time teachers.
Teachers are entitled to a ten percent discount on their rent if they live
in units owned by Equity
38 Residential Properties Trust, one of the country's
firms.
apartment
biggest
E. Background Checks
An associate dean at Florida A & M University resigned after the
While the
University found out about a 1996 rape conviction in Texas.
University conducts background checks for some positions, none is required
for jobs entailing primarily teaching and administrative duties.' Similarly,
Miami offered the directorship of the General Services Administration to a
man forced to resign from a position in Homestead for lying on his resume. 41
The offer of employment is under review. 42
The Florida Legislature approved a bill calling for "greater disclosure
of incidents of inappropriate behavior by teachers" in the wake of reports
about Broward teacher Harry Dellas, charged with propositioning a student
to have sex for money. 43 The law makes clear that problem teachers cannot
avoid losing their jobs merely by transferring to another district. 44 The law
also penalizes a district superintendent who fails to report problem teachers
to the Florida Education Commissioner's office. 45
F. Police Recruitment
To fill 200 job openings, Miami is resorting to forty billboards
portraying police officers in action as a recruitment tool.4 Police candidates
undergo rigorous tests and background checks as well as completing a half-

37.

l

38.
39.
40.
41.

Rent Discount is Offered to Teachers, MIAMI HERALD, May 22,2001, at 3B.
Dean Quits After Conviction Revealed,MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 30, 2000, at 13B.
let
City of Miami Official's Resume Under Scrutiny, MIAMI HERALD, May 18, 2001,

42.
43.
44.

Id.
Charles Savage, "Bad Teachers" Bil-Eyed, MIAMi HERALD, May 4, 2001, at 7B.
Id.

45.
46.

Id.

at3B.

Mireidy Fernandez & Tere Figueras, Billboards to Entice Police for Recruits,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 18, 2000, at4B.
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year stint at the police academy to become an officer. 47 Pay starts at $27,561
a year.48
G. Cheatingon Hiring Exam
The state and the Broward School District allege that an assistant
principal at a Pompano Beach middle school cheated on the Florida Educational Leadership Exam by finding a substitute to take it for him.49 Handwriting analysis and non-matching Social Security numbers tipped off the
authorities. 50 The state could revoke the principal's certification.
H. Promotions
The proper procedure for making temporary promotions in Miramar's
fire department came before the city's Civil Service Board.52 The board
addressed whether the city follows its own rules involving temporary
promotions after a firefighter alleged the city wrongly passed him over for a
temporary promotion to captain. 3 Under the city's rules, temporary
promotions last up to six months.54 Then the post, if still unfilled, goes to the
top scorer on the captain's exam.

III.

TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT

A. Hours and Wages
The United States Supreme Court handed down two decisions last term
that have an impact on the hours and wages of public employees. In United
States v. Hatter,55 the Court ruled that the compensation clause did not bar
Congress from withholding Social Security taxes from judicial salaries.5 6
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Elena Cabral, Schools: Assistant Principal Cheated, MAMI HERAlD, Mar. 17,
2001, at lB.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Natalie P. McNeal, Miramar Board Hears Promotion Complaints, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 10, 2001, at 6B.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 121 S. Ct. 1782 (2001).
56. Id. at 1787.
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All the same, the Court held that the Compensation Clause did prohibit
Congress from collecting Social Security taxes, but not Medicare taxes, from
federal judges appointed before the tax became law. 7
In United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 8 the Court ruled
that back wages are subject to Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA")
and Federal Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") taxes according to the year
in which wages are in fact paid, not the year(s) when they were earned.
In keeping with Governor Jeb Bush's aim of tying bonuses to
performance, Florida Education Secretary Jim Home's bonus package was
put off until 2003.60 Florida Board of Education members, however, say
be substantially raised to
Florida's top education official's salary must
61
compete with other states for education leaders.
Broward school district's $18 million payroll computer upgrade
suffered software glitches, delaying hundreds of school workers'63 checks. 62
About 12,500 of the district's employees work during the summer.
Miami-Dade County commissioners voted to double their expense
accounts by $1000 a month.6 Critics of the current system say elected
65
officials should be held accountable for how they spend their allowances.
Some claim expense accounts are simply a way to sidestep the county
charter, which limits commission salaries at $6000 a year.6
Schools that either earned an "A" or bettered itself by one grade level
receive bonuses.' South Plantation High School won $244,000 which came
out to $1500 per teacher who returned for the 2000-01 term.68 One teacher
who returned but left in the middle of the year is suing the school board after
69
she was denied the bonus money.
57.

Id.

58.
59.
60.

121 S. Ct. 1433 (2001).
Id at 407.

61.

Id

Governor Urges Delay in Education Bonuses, MIAMI HERALD, July 31, 2001, at

9B.
62. Steve Harrison, Computer Woes Delay Hundreds of School Workers' Checks,
MiAMI HERALD, Aug. 1, 2001, at 8B.

63.
64.

Id.

Don Finefrock, Dade Leaders May Hike Payfor Expenses, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
19, 2000, at 9B.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Susan Ferrechio, Schools Hit with Suit over Bonus, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 5, 2001,
at3B.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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Soaring overtime pay led the Miramar Fire Department to put in place
cost-saving measures, including clamping down on sick leave.
Overtime
71
rose as five members of the department retired on disability.
Under Miami-Dade County's Efficiency and Competition Commission,
public employees earn incentive
bonuses for suggesting cost-saving ideas
7
2
productivity.
higher
to
lead
that
Broward County is considering a proposal to increase the minimum
wage for county workers from $5.15 an hour to $8.56, patterned after an
ordinance adopted in Miami-Dade County in 1999. 73 Sixty counties and
cities have enacted so-called living wage ordinances since 1994.74
Governor Jeb Bush's 2001 state budget contains an increase of $739
million, or six and three tenths percent, for Florida public schools.75 A
group of educators, however, claim that most of that money goes to "onetime teacher 76bonuses and program funds, not salaries for teachers and school
employees.,
B. Benefits
1. Jury Duty Release
Under state law, employers are prohibited from dismissing employees
or threatening to fire them because of jury duty.7 7 Even so, a Hallandale
Beach firefighter had to turn in his badge when he did not show up for work
78
and complete his
A judge had ordered the jurors to go
79 shift after jury duty.
rest.
home and

70. Natalie P. McNeal, Overtime Cut Back by Fire Officials, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 8,
2000, at lB.
71. Id.
72. County Employees Save Taxpayers $43 Million over Last Two Years, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 21, 2001, at 5B.
73. Brad Bennett & Lisa Arthur, HigherMinimum Wage is Proposed,MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 11, 2001, at lB.
74. Id.
75. Amanda Riddle, Bush Urged to Devote Vetoed Funds to Teacher Pay, MIAMI
HERALD, June 27, 2001, at 9B.
76. Id.
77. Daniel de Vise, Firm Citedfor FiringJurorNow Facing Judge, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 22, 2000, at lB.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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2. Disability and Death Benefits
Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth approved a $25,000 payment
from a crime victim's fund to the same sex companion of a slain police
officer. 80 At the same time, Tampa is assessing its benefits policy that
denies pension benefits, life insurance, health insurance and family leave to
same sex partners. 81
In State v. Herny, a claimant secured a health insurance subsidy
because of his eligibility for state disability retirement. 83 The subsidy aids
state retirees in paying health insurance premiums. 84 It does not qualify as a
disability benefit.' 5 For this reason, the court did not treat the subsidy as a
benefit from a collateral source which may be offset against workers'
compensation benefits based upon claimant's receipt of in the line of duty
disability retirement and social security disability benefits.86 The Supreme
Court of Florida sustained the decision of the judge of compensation claims
and the decision of the First District Court of Appeal to refuse to include the
claimant's subsidy within
the limit on benefits under section 440.20(15) of
87
Statutes.
Florida
the
3. Public Pensions
a. Legislation
Governor Jeb Bush and his cabinet approved a proposal that gives
650,000 state employees more control over their retirement. 88 Existing
defined benefit pensions would be replaced by defined contribution plans
89
that enable employees the chance to invest in funds with higher returns.
Under the program, about $15 billion of the $107 billion of the state's

80.

State Gives Slain Cop's Companion $25,000, MIAMI HERALD, July 21, 2001, at

81.
82.
83.

Id.
781 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2001).
Id. at 1068.

84.

Id.

9B.

85. Id.
86.
87.
88.
HERALD,

89.

Id.
Herny, 781 So. 2d at 1068; see FLA. STAT. § 440.20(15) (1985).
Brent Kallestad, New Options Proposedfor State Employees' Pensions, MA.I

Sept. 27, 2000, at lIB.

Id
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pension fund would be tapped beginning in the summer of 2002. 90 Another
bill, FIB 1505, aims at improving health and pension benefits for teachers. 9 1
Miramar city commissioners, unhappy with three different levels of the
city's contribution to firefighters' pension funds, settled on a singe amount:
thirteen and one tenth percent.92 The issue was the key reason firefighters
had been working without a contract since 1999.
b. Ethical Opinion
Florida's Commission on Ethics ruled that a Pompano Beach
commissioner, a retired firefighter, was entitled to vote on pension benefits
issues for retired firefighters on the ground
that those votes benefit a whole
93
class, not the commissioner personally.
c. Misuse of Public PensionFunds
Former Miami Chief of Police Donald Warshaw was convicted of fraud
consisting of a number of suspicious financial transactions that channeled
money from a police pension fund to an alleged embezzler. 94 Warshaw also
used a city police
pension fund check to pay for personal shopping and
95
entertainment.
An internal audit revealed that the Miami Police Department violated
federal guidelines when it spent $2.55 million in public pension fund money
on non law enforcement related activities such as on operating expenses and
charities.96 Moreover, the report turned up that the "trust had not been
audited since 1994," 97 a violation of federal tax laws.

90.

Id.

91. Teacher Shortages, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 21, 2001, at 12B.
92. Elena Cabral, Miramar OKs Changes in Firefighters' Fund,MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
7, 2000, at 3B.
93. Steve Bousquet, Case Against Jenne Fizzles, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 25, 2000, at
lB.
94.

Tom Dubocq, Warshaw Probed over Funds Taken from PensionAccount, MIAMI

Oct. 2, 2000, at 9B.
95. Tom Dubocq, Pension Fund Paid Chiefs Card Bill, MIAMI
2000, at lB.
HERALD,

96.

Sept. 10,

Charles Rabin, New Audit of Police Trust Fund Reveals Rules Were Broken,

MIAMI HERALD, Oct.

97.

HERALD,

19, 2000, at lOB.

Id.
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The president of the union representing Miami-Dade transit workers
lost his post after allegations that he may have wrongfully taken money the
county had paid the union for retirement benefits. 98
d. Forfeitureof Public Pensionover Official Misconduct
Under Florida law,99 pension boards have discretion to deny a public
employee's pension for the following reasons: embezzling public funds,
stealing from one's employer, accepting a bribe or for committing a felony
that defrauds the public. Former Miami City Manager Donald Warshaw
may lose his police pension after his conviction on public corruption
charges.' °
In Jacobo v. Board of Trustees of the Miami Police,101 a police officer
was convicted of a felony for lying on an arrest affidavit that a suspect who
was injured by a fellow office was toting a firearm at the time."' As a
result, the police pension fund board ordered the police officer's pension be
forfeited.10 On appeal, the court sustained the administrative
action,
4
trust.
public
the
of
breach
a
committed
officer
the
that
agreeing
e. Public PensionFundInvestments
Governor Jeb Bush, together with two officials who run Florida's $100
billion public pension fund voted to remove a ban on investments in tobacco
companies to take advantage of rising tobacco stock prices.105 The state
pension fund covers teachers, firefiphters, police officers and other city,
county, and state public employees.
Altogether,0 7680 public employees
Fund.1
Trust
System
Retirement
Florida
make up the
98. Karl Ross, Union PresidentRemoved After FiscalInquiry, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
14, 2001, at 12B.
99. FLA. STAT. § 112.3173 (2000).
100. Tyler Bridges, Personal Pension with City Could be at Stake, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 29, 2000, at 16A.
101. 788 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
102. Id. at 363.
103. Id. at 364.
104. lId at 365.
105. NationalBriefing, N.Y. TIMEs, June 13,2001, at A31.
106. Lesley Clark, State Pension Fund Resumes Tobacco Stock Purchases, MIAMI
HERALD, July 4, 2001, at 9B.
107. Id.
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f. ControversialPublic Pension Options
Florida's Deferred Retirement Option Program ("DROP") enables older
public employees to retire with an amount tied to their salary and years of
service. 0 8 Broward Public Defender Alan Schreiber took advantage of this
program, under which he receives between $400,000 and $500,000 when he
retires after thirty years as a state employee and another $100,000 a year. 1°9
In a controversial move touted as a cost-saving measure, the Hallandale
Beach Commission gave management credit in the general employees'
pension without forcing them to contribute, an arrangement that would be
illegal in the private sector.110 Under the arrangement, managerial employees need only contribute for future credit in the plan, but not for retroactive
credit."'
4. Privacy
a. Drug Testing
In State Department of Transportation v. Plummer,112 the court3
addressed the relationship between the state's Drug-Free Workplace Act'
and the Federal Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act and
Regulation' 4 in a discovery case.1 ' While the court sustained the hearing
officer and the Public Employees Relations Commission to the extent they
ordered discovery of drug test results of a particular employee challenging a
information on other test-takers was
disciplinary action, the order releasing
116
law.
federal
by
preempted
deemed
A Fort Lauderdale firefighter who tampered with his drug test to dodge
testing positive for passive inhalation of marijuana won both his job back

108. Beth Reinhard, A Golden Parachutefor Public Defender, MiAMI HERALD, Feb.
22, 2001, at lB.
109. Id.
110. Griff Witte, Executive Pension Shuffle in Question, MIANI HERAID, Apr. 6, 2001,
at IB.
111. Id. at2B.
112. 774 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

113. FLA. STAT. § 112.0455(11)(b).
114. 49 U.S.C. § 31306; 49 C.F.R. § 382.405(g).
115. Plummner, 774 So. 2d at 945 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
116. Id. at947.
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and a promotion to lieutenant." 7 The arbitrator ruled that the city did not
have in place a zero tolerance policy for employees who doctor a drug test,
or refuse to take it altogether. Only firefighters .who test positive for drug
use on or off duty face mandatory dismissal.
b. Disclosuresby Public Employees
In State v. Webb,"18 the court sustained the conviction of a school board
member who waited four months before allowing access to public records
and unduly restricting that access once it was allowed1 19
The Florida Legislature passed a public records exemption bill that
omits the home addresses and telephone numbers from the personnel files of
public sector human rights managers. 2° The bill aims at protecting the
privacy of public officials who are open to threats after discharging public
employees.
Under rules set by the State Bureau of Archives and Records Management, police officers' personnel records are kept fifty years after an officer's
retirement.1 But internal affairs inquiries that turn up no wrong-doing can
be destroyed after a year.123 Records are kept three years for inquiries
A Miami
leading to a reprimand and five years following discipline."
Herald editorial criticized the destruction after one year option as depriving
"both the public and the police executives of essential information indicating
patterns of behavior."'2
c. Surveillance of Public Employees' PrivateLives
A fired lieutenant in the Broward Sheriff's office complained to the
Commission on Ethics that the sheriff illegally ran background checks.'2
117. Brittany Wallman, Fired Firefighter Gets Job Back, Promotion, SuN-SETINET,
(Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 26,2001 at 3B.
118. 786 So. 2d 602 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
119. Id. at 603. See FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1)(a).
120. Beth Reinhard, Lawmakers Nibble Away at Public-Records Laws, MIAMI
HERAL, May 3, 2001, at B1.
121. Id.
122. Leslie Clark, Repeal This Rule, MIAMI HERALD, July 17,2001, at 6B.
123. Id
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Steve Bousquet, Case Against Jenne Fizzles, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 25, 2000, at
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The commission concluded such a practice is legal and threw out the
complaint. 127 The ethics panel found no evidence the sheriff sought the
information solely for personal gain. 28 State law bars public officials from
"using information not available to the public ... for the personal benefit of
themselves or others.' 29
5. Loss of Job Security
The Florida Legislature shifted over 16,000 mid-level state employees
from the career service system to management positions.130 In effect, these
workers shed job security (such as seniority and "bumping" rights) in
exchange for the chance to earn bonuses. 31 Specifically, managers and
supervisors will32 be transferred from Career Service status to selected exempt
service status.
Governor Jeb Bush's "Service First" initiative, aimed at running the
state like a business, also contemplates allowing state employees to cash in
unused sick leave or have it allotted to early retirement.
Moreover,
employees' performances would be assessed every ninety days, not just
once-a-year.'3 Opponents fear the new system will promote "cronyism,
favoritism and discrimination.' 135 The burden in discipline
cases would be
36
shifted from the employer to the employee as well.
As a Miami Herald editorial put it: "[c]ivil-service reform came to
Florida fifty years ago to stop the 'suitcase parades' occurring after every
election where the friends of the winners were rewarded with cushy jobs and
the losers were sent packing."' 37 It remains to be seen whether this year's
civil service reform does not revive patronage.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2B.
130. Top Issues of 2001, MIAMI HERALD, May 6, 2001, at 28A.
131. Id.
132. Mario Diaz-Balart, HB 369 Streamlines the Civil Service System, MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 2, 2001, at 10B.
133. Steve Bousquet, Governor Proposes Merit Pay System for State Employees,
MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 2, 2001, at lB.

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Civil-Service Reform, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 16, 2001, at 10B.
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6. Health Benefits
Beginning in 2001, Broward County put into effect
138 a self-insurance
program for public employees prescription drug coverage.
President Bush announced that he would endorse enactment of a bill
barring insurance companies and employers from applying newly developed
tests of an individual's
genetic composition to turn them down for medical
139
coverage or for jobs.
About 30,000 Broward public school district workers most likely must
pay more for their health insurance after the district's insurers failed to
honor their contracts. 14 The school system is weighing whether to sue the
insurers for damages.14' Subsequently, Humana was selected by the Broward
public school district to take over health insurance for 9000 school
employees and their families formerly insured by Foundation (who backed
out of its contract to insure the district through 2001).142 The school district
will pick up the $16.5 million rate hike Humana insists upon to deliver the
same level of service as Foundation. 43 For their part, employees may have
to forego ten million dollars earmarked for a one percent pay raise.'
A circuit court judge addressed the issue whether the city of Miami
45
promised retirees that their health insurance rates would never increase.1
The court ruled that the city broke its promise more than twenty years ago
when it increased health insurance rates for retirees.1
7. Occupational Health and Safety Issues
Hialeah firefighters held a protest over health and safety conditions at
their station where they sleep and work. Remodeling has generated

138. Charles Savage, County Overhaul Aims to Create Self-Funded Insurance,MIAMI
HERALD,

Sept. 15, 2000, at 5B.

139. David E. Sanger, President: Genes Shouldn't Bar Insurance or Job, MiAMI
HERALD,

June 24,2001, at 26A.

140. Susan Ferrechio, School Employees Face Insurance Hike, MIAMI
31, 2000, at 3B.

HERALD,

Oct.

141. Id.
142. Susan Ferrechio, Schools Insurance Fix Could be Costly, MiAMi HERALD, Nov. 7,
2000, at 3B.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Charles Rabin, PensionFeud is Boiling, MIAMI
146. Id.
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construction dust, exposed ceilings and weak walls.' 47
Teachers at a center for youthful sex offenders had to leave after the
state fire marshall uncovered several safety violations.' 4 For example, keys
to exit doors were not easily accessible; combustibles were left in the
stairwell, furniture was blocking the hallway, and there were dangerously
dangling electrical cords.149
8. Teacher Training
Governor Jeb Bush vetoed $275,000 set aside in the 2001 state budget
that enables teachers to study Florida's history, literature and culture for a
week. 1505 1 Florida currently spends $36 million on teacher-training programs.
9. Tort Insurance for Teachers
Even though state law accords immunity for teachers who act properly
within the scope of their employment, the legislature earmarked $1.2 million
for liability insurance for public school teachers.1 2 Instead of requiring
competitive bids for teachers' insurance, the bill designates a specific private
company known as an anti-union firm.
IV. DISCIPLINE, DISCHARGE, AND REDUCTIONS-IN-FORCE

A. Off-Duty Misconduct
A Miami-Dade police officer was prosecuted for plotting with a fellow
patrolman and others to steal drugs and money from dope dealers. 53 The

147. Carolyn Salazar, Job Conditions Trigger Protest by Firefighters,MIAM HERALD,
May 27, 2001, at 3B.
148. Susan Ferrechio & Carol Manbin Miller, Power Failure Forces Teachersfrom
Center Again, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 15, 2001, at 3B.
149. Id.
150. Bush Budget Cut Leaves Teachers Seeking Funds, MIAMI HERALD, July 10, 2001,
at 7B.
151. Id.
152. Steve Bousquet & Lesley Clark, InsurerPlans Raise Issues, MIAMI HERALD, May
4, 2001, at 6B.
153. Frances Robles, Six Go to Trial in Drug Ripoffs, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 2, 2000, at
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300 prospective jurors unable to sit on a
trial was notable for going through
15 4
case that lasted four months.
A labor arbitrator concluded that Miami Beach had just cause to
dismiss a police officer for conduct unbecoming an employee of the city. 55
with a seventeen-yearThe police officer allegedly committed misconduct
5
old girl, even though he was acquitted by a jury. 6
Two Palm Beach County Sheriff's deputies are under investigation for
allegedly posing on pornographic websites. 7
B. On-the-Job Misconduct
A Broward County middle school security guard was arrested for
allegedly molesting two male students.158
A state corrections officer was discharged from his job after he was
arrested for his part in a prostitution ring, run by his wife.'
About a dozen detention officers at the Krome detention center were
disciplined for alleged abuse, theft and sexual misconduct. 160
were
Two firefighters resigned from the fire department after they
6
arrested and charged for filing false tax returns and for tax evasion.1 '
Fort Lauderdale's Equal Opportunity Office director was placed on
administrative leave with pay on grounds of62a conflict of interest after she
filed a retaliation complaint against the city.'

154. Id.
155. Arbitrator Upholds Ex-Officer's Termination, MIAMI HERALD, July 22, 2001, at
3B.
156. Id.

157. Bill Douthat, Cops Probed over Porn Websites,

MIAMI HERALD,

Dec. 7, 2000, at

12B.
158. David Green, Middle-School Security Guard Accused of Molesting Boys, MIAMI

Nov. 14, 2000, at lB. The allegation was for lewd and lascivious molestation and
sexual battery. Id.
HERALD,

159. Corrections Officer Arrested in Sex Ring Bust, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 4, 2000, at

13B.
160. Alfonso Chardy, Ex Krome Center Officer Denies Wrongdoing, Admits Three
Claims,MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 19,2000, at 3B.
161. Wanda J. DeMarzo, FormerFirefighter Gets Jail Time, IRS Tab, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 20, 2000, at 6B.
162. Brad Bennett, Rights Official Orderedon Leave, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 8, 2001, at
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Former Miami Finance Director plead guilty to soliciting kickbacks
count of
from a city contractor. The plea agreement included one felony
63
laundering.'
money
and
bribery
extortion,
commit
conspiracy to
A Manatee County sheriffs deputy was sent to federal prison for
shaking down motorists, stealing from crime
64 victims and aiding another
deputy set fire to a truck to collect insurance.1
he was accused
A Florida Atlantic University professor resigned after165
gambling.
Internet
on
$7000
bet
to
cards
of using FAU Visa
In Miami-Dade County v. Jones,166 the court concluded the public
employer was vested with discretion whether to take into account or to
ignore mitigating factors before imposing67discipline on a nursing technician
dismissed for tardiness and absenteeism.
In Declet v. Dep't of Children and Families,168 the court sustained a
hearing officer's conclusion that discipline was warranted against a public
employee who lied to his supervisor and was negligent in the performance of
his duties. 169 Specifically, the employee told his supervisor he had reviewed
the file of a child who later died170 from abuse when in fact the public
employee had not reviewed the file.
The state attorney's office issued an opinion concluding that a
the
candidate running for reelection as Broward clerk of courts did not break
17
jurors.
of
envelopes
payr
the
in
notes
thank-you
law when he inserted
In Bamawo v. Dep't of Corrections,' the court ruled that the
Department of Corrections was entitled to dispense with the usual ten day
notice for dismissal or suspension where the employee posed a physical
threat to supervisors. 173 Moreover, the Public Employees Relations
Commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to mitigate the discipline

163. Luisa Yanez, Miami's Ex-Finance DirectorPleads Guilty to Kickbacks,
HERALD, Aug. 7, 2001, at 3B.
164. Vickie Chacere, Judge Sends Shakedown Officer to Federal Prison,
HERALD, Aug. 19, 2000, at 5B.
165. ProfessorResigns Amid Inquiry, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 25, 2000, at 3B.
166. 778 So. 2d 409 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
167. Id.
168. 776 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
169. kd
170. Id.
171. Caroline J. Keough, Clerk's Thank-You Notes Not illegal, State Says,
HERALD, Oct. 4, 2000, at 2B.
172. 785 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
173. Id. at 611.
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imposed in light of the gravity of the employee's misconduct. 74 In this
regard, the court made clear, the employee bears the burden of proving that
his or her punishment ought to be reduced. 75
A community relations employee with the Broward County bus system
was ordered to report to work "on a daily basis" after the Miami Herald
reported that his job did not require him to come in to work and had few
176
official duties.
A twenty-two-year veteran Miami-Dade sanitation employee lost his
job after accepting money for looking the other way while someone dumped
roof material at a trash center instead of a landfill."
A prominent researcher at Florida Atlantic University is under investi17
gation over whether he used school resources to aid his private business.
In response, the university is drafting policies on conflict-of-interest7 9cases in
the area of technology transfer (i.e., turning research into business).
C. Retaliation,Whistle-Blowing, the FirstAmendment
1. Retaliation
A Fort Laudardale parking enforcement officer has alleged in a lawsuit
that she was retaliated against after she claimed that a co-worker sexually
harassed her.180 Retaliation came in the form of a poor evaluation and
insistance that she get a doctor to sign-off whenever she sought sick leave.'
Black prison guards alleged they have been harassed for suing the
Department of Corrections over racial discrimination.18 2 One guard had
been reassigned to a desk job and another alleges he was assaulted at work

174. Id.

175. Id
176. Charles Savage, Walters Told to Be at Job Daily, MAMI HERAD, Aug. 16, 2000,

at3B.
177. Joan Fleischman, Tale of 2 Waste Workers: Is This Equal Justice?, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 13, 2000, at 2B.
178. Holly Stepp, Licensing Case Puts FAU in Spotlight, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 26,
2001, at lB.

179. Id.
180. Brad Bennett, Lauderdale Worker Charges City Retaliation, MIAMI HERALD, June
14, 2001, at2B.
181. Id.
182. Lesley Clark, State to Inspect Guards' Reports of Harassment,MIAMIN HERALD,
Apr. 20, 2001, at 5B.
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owing to his role in the lawsuit. 183 Other forms of retaliation include:
184 death
training.
denied
being
and
promotion,
for
over
passed
threats, being
2. Whistle-Blowing
A Florida appeal court overturned a jury verdict entitling former
Hollywood Police Chief Richard Witt to $200,600 after finding that the city
broke the state's whistle-blower law' 8 5 when it dismissed him in 1996.186 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the city charter makes clear that the
police chief is an at-will employee who may be dismissed at the city
manager's discretion. 8 7 Florida's public employee Whistle-Blower's Act'88
has been interpreted to be a remedial act entitled to a liberal construction.1 9
A former attorney for the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Service'" recovered $238,312 in back pay in a jury verdict six years
after she had been discharged for reporting that her supervisor was
neglecting his job and falsifying time records. 19' The jury concluded the
former attorney was dismissed in retaliation for whistle-blowing. 1 2
3. The First Amendment

In Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale,19 3 the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed the discharge of a city's affirmative action specialist who claimed
94
her dismissal was in retaliation for exercising her first amendment rights.
Applying a four-part First Amendment retaliation test, the court assumed
that plaintiff's speech touched on a matter of public concern but concluded
that her first amendment right was outweighed by the city's interests:
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. State whistle-blower laws aim at protecting employees who report misconduct by
their employer.
186. Erika Bolstad, Hollywood Ex-Chiefs Legal Victory Overturned, MIAMI HERALD,
June 28, 2001, at 1A.
187. Id.
188. See ..A. STAT. § 112.3187 (2000).
189. Irven v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 790 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 2001).
190. Now the Department of Children & Families.
191. Elaine De Valle, Child Advocate Wins Whistle-Blower Case, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 11, 2001, at 6B.
192. Id.
193. 232 F.3d 836 (1lth Cir. 2000).
194. Id.
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plaintiff was not entitled to refuse to perform a lawful task well within the
scope of her duties.195
The President of Florida International University personally endorsed
then-presidential candidate George W. Bush when he campaigned on
campus before the November 2000 election. 196 Some in the FlU community
complained that FIU's President abused his position by his endorsement
while his defenders insist he was entitled to speak his mind as a matter of
academic freedom.' Apparently, no clear-cut rules govern such political
endorsements by a state university president.
The First Amendment right of on-duty police officers to engage in
partisan politics arose in South Florida before the November 2000 election. 19s Over 50 people complained after 100 Hollywood police officers
knocked on doors to urge citizens to vote for a measure involving police
service in unincorporated areas. 199 Under Hollywood's administrative
polic&,employees are barred from engaging in political activity while onduty. 20 1But a city attorney claimed that the rule only governs partisan
politics.
A Florida trial judge faced a disciplinary proceeding after referring to
an election opponent as "a part-time judge in a full-time job."' 202 A trial
judge in Pensacola, Florida,20faced
removal after calling an election opponent
3
Green."
Go
'em
Let
"Judge
Miami-Dade's firefighters' union fought with the fire chief over
members' display of mayoral campaign stickers and signs on their private
cars in employee parking lots. 204 An ordinance that governs political activity
by public employees does not address the issue. The larger question of
campaigning on public property is currently being sorted out by the county's
attorney.
195. Id.
196. Mark Silva, Outrage at FIU over President's Boost for Bush, MIAMI HERALD,

Aug. 30, 2000, at liB.
197. Id.
198. Ana Rhodes & Erika Bolstad, Police Campaign Sparks Complaints, Nov. 3, 2000,

at 5B.

199. Id.
200. Id
201. Id.
202. William Glaberson, States Rein in Truth Bending in Court Races, N.Y TIm,
Aug. 23, 2000, at Al.
203. Id.
204. Andres Viglucci, Dade Firefighters in 4-Alarm Political Feud, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 18, 2000, at 8B.
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D. Employment Discrimination
1. Generally
At least six complaints and lawsuits have been filed with the E.E.O.C.
in the last couple of years against the city of Fort Lauderdale alleging
discrimination, harassment and retaliation. Oddly enough, the city's own
diversity manager filed a bias complaint.20 5 The United States Commission
on Civil Rights is currently reviewing racial bias claims lodged by black city
of Fort Lauderdale employees. 206 The city risks losing federal funding for
roads, low-income housing and added police. 20 7 The Fort Lauderdale
NAACP has come out in support of city employees who are suing the city
for alleged racial discrimination. 208
Highway patrol troopers in Miami-Dade face intensive sensitivity
training in light of allegations that three supervisors uttered
racial and ethnic
2 9
0
job.
the
on
pictures
pornographic
over
pored
epithets and
Fort Lauderdale paralegal Brian Neiman was permanently enjoined
from practicing law without a license. 210 Among other cases, Neiman filed a
civil rights lawsuit on behalf of twenty nine employees against the Broward
21121
Clerk of Courts. 1 The County paid $1.3 million to settle the case.212
2. Race
In Crapp v. City of Miami Beach,213 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
what evidence it would admit with regard to whether a termination was the
product of unlawful race discrimination or for a legitimate reason. 214 Here,
205. Brad Bennett, Lauderdale Worker Files Bias Complaint, MIAMI HERALD, July 24,
2001, at 2B.
206. Brad Bennett, Civil Rights Complaints Studied, MIAMI HERALD, June 23, 2001, at
3B.
207. Id.
208. Brad Bennett, NAACP Asks Lauderdale to Resolve Race Bias Claims, MIAMI
HERALD, June 15, 2001, at 8B.
209. Phil Long & Marika Lynch, Troopers Will Get Wet Sensitivity Training, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 3, 2001, at 1B.
210. Sue Reisinger, Judge Wants ParalegalStopped, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 19, 2000,
at lB.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 242 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2001).
214. Id. at 1020.
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the court ruled that poor performance by the fired employees amounted to
admissible evidence that their dismissal was non-race-related. 213
In Bass v. Board of County Commissioners2 16 the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that all claims of race discrimination, no matter the skin color of the
claimant, would face the same analysis. 1 7 Specifically, claims by white
employees, instead of being framed as "reverse discrimination" claims,
218
would undergo the same analysis as any other racial bias claim. Moreover,
the court ruled that any affirmative action plan must satisfy strict scrutiny
under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.21 9
In Silvera v. Orange County School Board.,220 a black maintenance
employee, fired for an old conviction for lewd assault on a child, claimed he
221
was treated unfairly as compared to a similarly situated white employee.
The court ruled the two employees were not similarly situation: the black
employee had three additional arrests for violent assaults, two of them recent
and the employer was contractually bound not to dismiss the white employee
owing to his conviction. 22"
3 the Eleventh Circuit addressed a
In Davis v. Town of Lake Park,m
commonly litigated issue: what constitutes an "adverse employment action"
for purposes of suing under Title VII?2u In Davis, an African-American
police officer was accused of neglecting a key element of his job and was
told that any future leave requests would be denied until all his paperwork
was turned in.25 The court concluded that since the officer faced no loss of
pay or benefits or 2 suffer other discipline, he did not prove an adverse
employment action. 2
A federal jury awarded a former Fort Lauderdale city maintenance
employee $275,000 (including attorneys' fees), finding that she was the
victim of gender and race discrimination.rn Specifically, the jury awarded
215. Id.
216. 242 F.3d 996 (1 lth Cir. 2001). See cases reversed by 256 F.3d 1095.

217. Id. at 1003.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1013.
220. 244 F.3d 1253 (1lth Cir. 2001).
221. d.at 1257.
222. Id.
223. 245 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001).
224. Id.
225. Id.at 1235.
at 1246.
226. Id.
227. Brad Bennett, $275,000 to Lauderdale Bias Victim, MiAMi HERALD, Feb. 16,
2001, at3B.
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$200,000 for emotional distress in a hostile work environment and $75,000
in back pay.228
The E.E.O.C. issued a memo concluding that the Broward Sheriff's
Office "probably discriminated against five black and Hispanic deputies and
one black sergeant by denying them promotions." 229 Plaintiffs claim they
passed a written exam but that the oral portion which they failed was
subjective, allowing the employer to promote non-Hispanic whites with
equal or less experience. 23 In response, the sheriff simply recited that forty
one percent of those promoted since he took office in 1988 have been
minorities.23 1 Plaintiffs seek lost wages and punitive damages among other
remedies.232
3. Gender
In Clark County School District v. Breeden,233 the United States
234
Supreme Court further refined the law governing sexual harassment,
ruling that a hostile environment must be so severe or pervasive as to change
the conditions of the victim's 8mployment. 235
In Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Department, the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the validity of a gender-based affirmative action plan under the
Equal Protection Clause.2 37 The court sustained a county fire department's
plan that set a goal of hiring thirty six percent more female firefighters. 8 In
this regard, the court made clear that the goal was not a rigid quota and there
was no showing that the goal injured male applicants. 239 The court did

228. Id.
229. Brad Bennett, Bias Case Against BSO is Bolstered, MiAMI HERALD, July 24,
2001, at lB.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2B.
233. 121 S.Ct 1508 (2001).
234. Id. at 1509; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); FLA. STAT. §
703(a)(1).
235. Clark County Sch. Dist, 121 S.Ct. at 1509; see A Crude Remark by Supervisor
Short of Harassment,CourtRules, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 24, 2001, at 6A.
236. 253 F.3d 1288 (llth Cir. 2001).
237. Id. at 1289.
238. Id. at 1299.
239. Id. at 1300.
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caution the employer that such an affirmative action plan may not go on
forever.'m
In E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc.,241 the court found that where an
employer systematically barred women from food service positions premised
on a sexual stereotype that equated "fine-dining ambience"24 2 with all-male
employees, plaintiff established intentional disparate treatment sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.243
In Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services, Inc.,24 the court ruled that
in analyzing hostile work environment sexual harassment claims under state
law,24 5 courts are bound by federal caselaw governing Title VII. 6 Separately, the court also made clear that not all harassment between men and
women is automatically discrimination7 because of sex simply because the
words uttered have a sexual meaning.2
A Fort Lauderdale city planner was terminated for creating "a hostile
work environment ' 'u 8 for a woman he supervised by harassing her about her
pregnancy and maternity leave.24 9 In response, the planner claims he was
targeted because he is of Philippine descent.2 0
Broward County's Chief Judge was accused of sexual harassment by a
woman who served as an intern ten years ago.2 1 The issue came to light
because the woman's husband accused the judge
of aplying undue pressure
the couple's divorce.u
on another judge presiding over
A former Special Agent in the Miami-Dade
office of the inspector
3
harassment.2
sexual
for
boss
her
sued
general

240. Id.
241. 136 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2001).

242. Id at 1313.
243. Id.
244. 146 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
245. See Florida Civil Rights Act, FLA. STAT.
246. Scelta, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.

§ 760.10(1) (2001).

247. Id. at 1263.
248. LauderdaleDismissesCity Planner,MIAMI HERALD, May 31, 2001, at 3B.
249. Id.
250. Id..

251. Larry Lebowitz, Judge Accused of Sex Harassment,MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 4,2000,

at 1B.
252. Id.
253. Joan Fleischman, Legal Battle Brewing in Inspector General's Office, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 4,2000, at 12B.
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4. Age

In Hipp v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co.,254 the Eleventh Circuit
' 5

spelled out the prima facie case for establishing a "pattern and practice ,2
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),256 the
federal law barring age discrimination. 7 In this regard, a plaintiff must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that age discrimination was the
employer's "standard operating procedure. ' ' 2 5
To satisfy this burden,
plaintiffs must establish more than isolated instances of discriminatory
acts. 259 Moreover, the court concluded that a constructive discharge can
amount to an "adverse employment decision" 2 under the Act.
Here,
however, plaintiffs failed to show that the supervisor's acts were so
262
intolerable that a fair minded employee would have felt forced to resign.
In Adams v. Florida Power Corp.,2 63 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
disparate impact claims do not lie under the ADEA.264 In other words, only
intentional discrimination claims are cognizable under the Act.
5. Disability
In Board of Trustees v. Garrett,265 the United States Supreme Court
ruled that Congress exceeded its power under the enforcement provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment when it abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suits for damages under the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA), 266 the federal statute prohibiting disability discrimination in
employment. 267 As a result of this decision, state employees may not sue

254. 252 F.3d 1208 (11 th Cir. 2001).
255. Id. at 1227.

256. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1).
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1227-28.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1227-28.
Id. at 1230.
Id.
Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1244.
255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1326.
121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. V 1994).
Garrett,121 S.Ct. at 967-68.
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their state employers for damages for disability discrimination in employment. 26
The United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear two ADA cases
next term that may have an impact on Florida public employees. One,
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,269 addresses the
proper definition of disability: is it enough for a court to find that an
impairment merely affected, rather than significantly restricted, a major life
activity? 0
2
The second case, United States Airways Inc. v. Barnett,271 addresses
whether "reassignment is a reasonable accommodation to which disabled
employees should 273
have priority over nondisabled employees" 272 in violation
rights.
of seniority
In Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County,274 the Eleventh Circuit,
interpreting a key provision of the prima facie case of a disabled individual
work for six
under the ADA, ruled that an inability to drive to ....
275 months fell
short of an impairment drastically
276curbing a major life activity.
In Johnston v. Henderson, the court ruled that post traumatic stress
disorder,7 by itself, does not rise to the level of a "disability" under the
ADA.

27

A Palm Beach County traffic-light installer sued the county after he was
discharged owing to an inability to distinguish between red and green
wires. 27s The suit claims discrimination on the basis of colorblindness
violates the ADA. 279

268. See Connor v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1215 (M.D. Fla.

2001) (reciting "congruence and proportionality" test of Congress' power to abrogate state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity under enforcement clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
269. 121 S. Ct. 1600 (2001).
270. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Accept 2 Cases to Clarify Protectionfor Disabled,

N.Y. TzM
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

(Miami), Apr. 17,2001, at A13.
149 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2001).
Greenhouse, supra note 270, at A13.
Id.
250 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1329; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).

276. 144 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
277. Id. at 1350.
278. Colorblind Man Sees Red over Pink Slip, Sues County, MIAMI HERALD, June 29,
2001, at 9B.
279. l.
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6. Same-Sex Bias
Broward County's 1995 gay rights ordinance prohibits, among other
things, discrimination in employment. 280 The ordinance once again was in
the news as opponents sought for the third time to overturn it by a petition
drive. 2
This time, however, the Broward Republican Party will remain
the issue.28
on
neutral
E. Reductions-in-Force
In Moore v. Navy Public Works Center,28 3 the court addressed whether
public employees had standing to challenge the Navy's inaction that could
lead to a reduction-in-force.
The court concluded the plaintiffs failed to
meet the constitutional standards for standing 5 for the following reasons:
1) no loss of federal employment had taken place; 2) the alleged injury was
not concrete or imminent; and 3) no nexus was established between the
challenged conduct and the alleged injury. 6
In light of a $6 million revenue shortfall, Hollywood must either
increase its property tax rate or layoff "20 police officers, 10 firefighters, 10
public works employees, five building inspectors or code enforcement
officers and about 10 other jobs in various city departments. 2 7
F. Remediesfor Wrongful Discharge
1. Attorneys' Fees
The United States Supreme Court dealt a blow to civil fights plaintiffs
who were formerly entitled to recover attorneys' fees if their lawsuits
achieved their aims. 2 88 In Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia
280. Beth Reinhard, GOP Sits Out Gay Petition Drive, MIAMI

HERALD,

July 17, 2001,

at 3B.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 139 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
284. Id. at 1354.
285. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
286. Moore, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.
287. Erika Bolstad, Hollywood Must Cut Jobs or Increase Taxes, Leaders Told, MIAMI
HERALD, May 8, 2001, at 5B.
288. Linda Greenhouse, Ruling Limits Awarding of Legal Fees for Plaintiffs, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2001, at Al8.
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Departmentof Health & Human Resources,289 the Court, in a 5-4 vote, ruled
that a plaintiff must achieve an actual courtroom victory or court-approved
settlement agreement before recovering attorneys' fees. 2
29
In Kelley v. Public Employees Relation Commission,
a Florida
29 2
appeals court interpreted the meaning of the phrase "a prevailing party
for purposes of determining when attorneys' fees are recoverable. 29 Kelley
argued the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) erred in
denying him attorneys' fees and costs since PERC ruled her termination was
too severe a sanction and reinstated her.2 94 At the same time, PERC
sustained the public employer's finding that just cause existed to discipline
Kelley. 295 The court concluded PERC did296not abuse its discretion when it
denied Kelley her attorneys' fees and costs.
2. Appeals to the Public Employees Relations Commission
29 7

In City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Supervisor'sAssociation, Inc.,
the city appealed a final PERC order that the city had committed unfair labor
practices in refusing to bargain with the union over a departmental
reorganization by the city. 298 PERC ruled that the public employer owed a
duty to engage in "impact" bargaining about the consequences abolishing
bargaining unit positions and promoting employees to supervisory positions
would have upon the bargaining unit's wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. 299 In essence, PERC viewed the transfer of unit
work to the city's non-unit employees as an after effect of translating into
action a management decision which must be bargained.
On apeal, the court deemed the issue ill-suited for collective
bargaining. 30 In support of this position, the court reasoned that the
decision to subcontract is mostly a political question best handled in a
289. 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001).

290. Id. at 1843.
291. 781 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 2001).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Kelley, 781 So. 2d at 1193. (Section 447.203(3) of the Florida Statutes gives
PERC discretion in awarding attorneys' fees and costs to a prevailing party.)
297. 791 So. 2d 508 (Fla. lstDist. Ct. App. 2001).
298. Id. at 509.
299. Id
300. Id. at 510.
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political arena: "[a] public employer should have the authority to decide to
change the 'nature or direction' of its business, and must be able to freely do
so to restructure the organization of its operations. '3 '
In Hallandale Profession Firefighters, Local 2238 v. City of Hallan302
dale, the union filed a grievance over discipline imposed by the city
against three firefighters and demanded arbitration .33 At the same time, the
union filed an unfair labor practice charge with PERC, claiming that the city
activities.3 Z
wrongfully punished the firefighters for engaging in protected
The hearing officer ruled that the city had cause to sanction the firefighters
over the way they handled a 911 call.30 5 PERC affirmed. 30 6 Later, the union
sought arbitration over the same grievance but the trial court ruled that the
union was foreclosed from seeking arbitration on the same claims, relying in
part on statutory law307 and case law.308
In Palm Beach County Police Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Riviera
Beach, 0 9 a police union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the city
for wrongfully grilling and terminating three police officers for engaging in
union activities. 310 The hearing officer ruled that the police officers were
fired for engaging in protected, concerted union activity, including
311
PERC remanded the case,
supporting candidates in city elections.
instructing the hearing officer to weigh whether the city would have fired the
officers regardless of their protected political activity. 3 12 On remand, the
hearing officer reversed his views, concluding that the union did not meet its
burden for proving that the discharge was unlawfully motivated 33 PERC
affirmed, and the union appealed. 3 14 The district court found that PERC

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at511.
777 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
I. at 435.
Id.
Id.

307.

FLA. STAT.

§ 447.401 (1999).

308. Hallandale, 777 So. 2d at 435-36. See Metropolitan Dade County v. Dade
County Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1403, 575 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
309. 774 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
310. Id. at 943 (Under section 447.501(1)(a) and (b) of the Florida Statutes, public
employees may engage in protected, concerted union activities.)
311. Id.
312. Id. at944.
313. Id.
314. River Beach, 774 So. 2d at 944.
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erred in remanding the case because the hearing officer's findings of
fact
315
law.
correct
the
applied
he
and
evidence
substantial
by
were supported
IV.

PUBLIC SECTOR, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ISSUES

A. Public Unions

About 434,000 Florida employees belonged to a union in 2000, about
6.8% of the state's 6.26 million workers,' an increase from 6.5% who
316
belonged
to a union
in 1999.
together with
317
service workers,
account
for much Local
of the government
union growth.vorkers,
B. Collective BargainingIssues
In FloridaSenate v. FloridaPublicEmployees Council 79, AFSCME,318

the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the respective roles of the
legislature and the courts in the face of a collective bargaining impasse
between the union representing state employees and the governor in his role
as public employer. 319 When the legislature scheduled a public hearing to
resolve the impasse, the circuit court issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO), barring it from holding the hearing.3 On appeal, the state supreme
court, invoking separation of powers principles, quashed the TRO.32'
About 3100 unionized pharmacists and registered nurses at Jackson
Memorial Hospital ratified a three year collective bargaining agreement that
includes a nineteen percent to twenty seven percent pay increase over the life
of the contract. 322 The agreement, approved by the union representing the
public employees, must now be approved by the Public Health Trust's board
of trustees and the Miami-Dade Commission. 323 The contract will increase
315. Id.
316. Joan Fleischer Tamen, Labor Tug-of-War Swells Throughout S. Florida, SUNSENTaNEL (Ft. Lauderlale), Feb. 25, 2001, at lF.
317. Id.
318. 784 So. 2d404 (Fla. 2001).

319. Id. at406.
320. Id.

321. Id. at 409. Impasse resolution mechanisms are outlined in section 447.403 of the
FloridaStatutes.
322. James McNair, Union Ratifies Hospital Pact, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 25, 2001, at

323. Id.
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nurses hourly wages by five dollars an hour.324 The hospital is struggling to
recruit and retain nurses and pharmacists. 3
Student performance, as a method of evaluating public school teachers,
has been a key bone of contention between the Broward school district and
its teachers union.32 6 Recently, the district's method of assessing its teachers
was ruled out of compliance with state law, according to officials from the
Florida Department of Education.327
C. Arbitration
The United States Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision that may
have an impact on public employees. In Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 328 the
court ruled that employers can insist that employment disputes go to
329
arbitration rather than to court.
In response, dozens of members of Congress introduced the Preservation of Civil Rights Protection Act of 2001,
aimed at prohibiting employers from forcing workers to give up their rights
in courts, unless the employee freely opts for arbitration after the dispute
arises. Arbitration clauses in employment contracts usually govern nonunion
workers who agree to them as a condition of employment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Public sector employment and labor law ranges far and wide. Every
stage of employment, from hiring, to the terms of employment, to employment discrimination, to discipline and discharge raises its own set of issues
at the federal, state and local levels. Post-retirement also covers such issues
as public pensions, disability retirement, death benefits, set-offs from social
security and workers' compensation. Unlike the private sector which
commonly is left alone by the news media, public sector employment comes
under exacting scrutiny by local news sources. From these sources, a wealth
of information on public employment informs this area of the law.

324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Susan Ferrechio, Broward Teacher Rating System Flunks, MIAMI HERALD, Aug.
23, 2000, at 3B.
327. Id.
328. 532 U.S. 1302 (2001).
329. Id. at 235.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As usual, the past year saw numerous appellate cases concerning tort
law. This article will not attempt to review them all. Instead, it will look at
cases from the Supreme Court of Florida and important cases from the
district courts of appeal. The latter will include discussion of cases that
considered novel questions, conflicted with other districts, involved
questions certified as of great public importance, or raised interesting factual
scenarios.
Last year the courts grappled with questions concerning the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine as applied to automobiles, and those cases will be
reviewed in Section II. The courts again considered the coverage and
application of the Medical Malpractice Act to a variety of situations, which
will be discussed in Section III. There are also some cases reviewed in
Section IV that looked at other forms of professional malpractice. Section V
will look at appellate cases that discussed how the element of duty applies to
a variety of factual scenarios. Whether violations of statutes equal a
*
Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University.
J.D., Indiana University, 1978; A.B., Indiana University, 1975.
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presumption of negligence was also the subject of a number of decisions,
which are covered in Section VI of this article. The always important
question of how to calculate and apportion damages is the subject of cases
included in Section VII. Section VIm will look at a fraud case involving a
real estate transaction. Section IX includes new standard jury instructions,
which include instructions for some types of tort cases.
II. DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE (AUTOMOBILES)

The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the liability of the
lessee of a car involved in an accident while driven by a person without the
consent of the lessee in Barnett v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.1 In
Barnett, one of the friends of the teenage stepson of the lessee took the keys
to the car and drove it without permission from the lessee or his stepson.2
The court deemed that this was the equivalent of conversion or theft, which
the Supreme Court of Florida had previously
stated would relieve an owner
3
of a car from liability for its use or misuse.
The First District Court of Appeal also looked at the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine in Christenson-Sullinsv. Raymer.4 The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendant in this case, where the
defendant loaned her car to a former roommate whose boyfriend took the car
without permission and was involved in a collision with one of the
plaintiffs. 5 Because the roommate did not report that the car was missing
when she discovered it, but rather went to a local bar to play darts, the
appellate court felt that summary judgment was improper. The dissent
argued that the affidavits refuting that the defendant knew or consented to
the driver's use of the car warranted a summary judgment, and that an
obligation of an owner or user to report a conversion or theft had not
previously been imposed by Florida courts.7
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered another dangerous
instrumentality claim in Toombs v. Alamo Rent-A-Car.8 This wrongful death
action involved an automobile accident in which the surviving minor
1.

775 So. 2d 395 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

2.

Id. at 396.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 397 (citing Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959)).
765 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 957.
Id.
Id. at 961-62.
762 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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children sued Alamo for an accident in which their mother was killed while
their father was driving. 9 The court certified a conflict with the Second
District Court of Appeal in EnterpriseLeasing Co. v. Alley,10 by holding that
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine could not be applied to a situation
where a co-bailee is killed by the negligence of the other co-bailee."
Therefore, it held that the children's cause of action did not survive.12 The
Toombs decision seems to be the better-reasoned one, in part because as the
concurring opinion of Judge Harris notes, in this situation it was the
deceased who entrusted the vehicle to a negligent driver, and therefore, she
was in a better position than the rental car company to make the
determination as to the condition and fitness of the driver.'
The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed the evidence necessary for
a dangerous instrumentality claim in Leal v. Nunez.14 Under the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine, "an owner who gives authority to another to operate
the owner's vehicle, by either express or implied consent, has a nondelegable
obligation to ensure that the vehicle is operated properly."' 15 In this case the
defendant argued that her brother-in-law, who was also her employee, took
her car without permission.' 6 The court held that the trial court's entry of
summary judgment was error regarding the material fact of consent because
of the familial and business relationship between
the driver and owner as
7
well as the behavior of both after the accident.'
m. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The application of the Medical Malpractice Act18 to a wrongful death
suit under the Florida Nursing Home Act was considered by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Preston v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of
America.'9 In the case, defendant, Health Care and Retirement Corporation
of America ("Health Care"), argued that the plaintiff's failure to follow the
9.
10.
1999).
11.
12.

Id. at 1041.
728 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied, 741 So. 2d 1135 (Fla.
Toombs, 726 So. 2d at 1042.
Id.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 1043.
775 So. 2d 974 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 975. (citing Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993)).
Id.
Id. at 975.

18.
19.

FLA. STAT.

§ 766.106 (2001).
785 So. 2d 570 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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Malpractice Act's pre-suit requirements 2° required a dismissal of his
wrongful death action.2 Although the Supreme Court of Florida stated in
Weinstock v. Groth22 that a defendant is entitled to notice under the Act
when it is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence
standard of care set forth in section 766.102 of the Florida Statutes, this
court noted that chapter 400 of the Florida Statutes had been amended to
include its own pre-suit investigatory requirement and to limit vicarious
liability for the actions of health care providers. 23 It therefore concluded that
the pre-suit requirements of the nursing home statute, which was a special,
as opposed to a general statute, and which was passed subsequent to the
Malpractice Act, controlled where the allegations concern the deprivation of
a nursing home resident's statutory rights.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal was confronted with another case
trying to decipher the aplication of the pre-suit filing requirements of the
Medical Malpractice Act in Pavolini v. Bird. 26 The claimants in this case
filed a derivative loss of consortium claim in a medical malpractice action
without filing a separate pre-suit notice. 27 The appellate court held that the
spouse or minor child who sought loss of consortium damages was not the
recipient of the medical care or treatment and therefore was not a claimant
under the Act. 28 The dissent by Judge Pleuss argued that this interpretation
placed defendants in the difficult situation of not knowing how to
realistically calculate an appropriate settlement when not all of the plaintiffs
had yet been identified.29
In Bell v. River Memorial,30 the parents of a stillborn baby asked that
the body be returned to them after an autopsy, but the remains were disposed
of
an unknown
The trial
granted
a motionoftothe
dismiss
on
theinground
that themanner.
action violated
the court
pre-suit
requirements
medical

20. § 766.106.
21. Preston, 785 So. 2d at 571.
22. 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
23. Preston,785 So. 2d at 572.
24. Id. The court also noted that the decision was consistent with a case decided by
the Second District Court of Appeal, Integrated Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 783
So. 2d 1108 (FIa 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Id.
25. § 766.106.
26. 769 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
27. Id at411.
28. Id. at 413.
29. Id. at 414.
30. 778 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
31. Id. at 1031.
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malpractice statute32 and was beyond the statute of limitations for medical
malpractice.33 The court ruled that because the disposal of the child's
remains did not involve diagnosis, treatment, or care nor involved medical
skill or judgment, it was error to apply the medical malpractice statute of
limitations. 34
The applicability of the medical malpractice statutes to a contribution
suit was considered by the First District Court of Appeal in Virginia
Insurance Reciprocal v. Walker.35 In this case, the plaintiffs had been sued
for medical malpractice for failure to diagnose hypothyroidism in an infant. 36
The defendant also treated the child without testing for the condition, but
were not sued by the parents of the child.37 The plaintiffs settled with the
parents and brought this action for contribution from the defendant.38 If the
statute had not been tolled while the plaintiff conducted the pre-suit
screening requirements of the Act, the statute of limitations had expired.39
The appellate court ruled that this was a medical malpractice action subject
to its pre-suit screening procedure because the underlying basis of the
contribution action sounded in medical negligence.40 The court noted that
other jurisdictions have split over this issue and that its decision is in direct
conflict with a decision from the Fourth District Court of Appeal.'
In
considering the policy of the medical malpractice statute to encourage presuit resolution of medical malpractice claims, the First District Court of
Appeal interpretation seems more logical in a suit where the contribution
claim is based upon medical malpractice.

32.
33.

FA. STAT. § 766.101 (2001).

34.

Id.

35.
36.

765 So. 2d 229 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 230.

37.
38.

Id.
Id.

Bell, 778 So. 2d at 1034; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (2001).

39. Id.
40. Walker, 765 So. 2d at 232.
41. Id. at 234-35 (certifying conflict with Wendell v. Hauser, 726 So. 2d 378 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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IV. OTHER FORMS OF PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE

A. Attorney Malpractice
The Second District Court of Appeal considered the effect of attorney
malpractice on a client in Woodall v. Hillsborough Co. HospitalAuthority.
Woodall's complaint was dismissed for her attorney's failure to comply with
pre-suit discovery requests.43 The appellate court agreed with the trial court
that the attorney's actions amounted to gross negligence, but felt that the
client should not be punished for the misdeeds of her attorney." The court
looked at the following factors in determining whether dismissal was an
appropriate sanction:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

whether the attorney's disobedience was willful, deliberate,
or contumacious, rather than an act of neglect or
inexperience;
whether the attorney has been previously sanctioned;
whether the client was personally involved in the act of
disobedience;
whether the delay prejudiced the opposing party through
undue expense, loss of evidence, or in some other fashion;
whether the attorney offered reasonable justification for
noncompliance; and
whether the delay created significant problems of judicial
administration.

Only factor five supported the hospital's position in this case.4 The court
noted that sanctions against the attorney would be appropriate. 47
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the potential negligence
of two separate law firms in Kates v. Robinson & Spence, Payne, Masington
& Needle, P.A. 4 The first law firm in this case represented the Kates' in a

42.
43.

778 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 321.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 322 (citing Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992)).
46. Id.
47.
48.

Woodall, 778 So. 2d at 322.
786 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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personal injury action.4 9 The plaintiffs entered into a consent judgment that
did not include lessees who might have been liable, but were not joined in
the litigation.50 The Kates subsequently hired Scott Jay to collect on the
judgment. 5' The court held that the Kates had alleged a cause of action
against the first firm for failure to file suit against all of the potentially liable
parties, failure to advise the Kates of the existence of the lessees, and for
advising the Kates that no other parties were liable. 2 However, the court
held that Jay could not be held liable for failure to discover
additional
53
potential defendants when he was hired to collect a judgment.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the perplexing problem
concerning conflicts of interest when an attorney prepares a will for a client
that removes beneficiaries whom he has also represented in Chase v.
Bowen.5 4 In this case, Bowen prepared and revised a will for the plaintiff's
mother.55 At various times, he also represented the plaintiff and the
beneficiaries of the second will who were business associates of the
plaintiff's mother.5 6 The district court held that a lawyer who prepares a will
owes no duty to previous beneficiaries, even
if he represents them in another
57
matter, to oppose the changing of the will.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Sharp asserted that a remand was
appropriate to permit the plaintiff to replead.5 8 Judge Sharp noted that the
plaintiff was disabled and lived with her mother, who supported and cared
for her.59
Therefore, her complete disinheritance in favor of the
beneficiaries, who were friends of the attorney, at least raises the appearance
of potential ethical conflicts.6 Of course, even if the attorney committed an
ethical violation, that does not mean that malpractice has occurred. However,
Judge Sharp noted that Florida recently recognized the tort of intentional
interference with inheritance, and enough facts were alleged in this case to

49.

Id at 62.

50.
51.

Id. at 63.
Id.

52.

Id. at 64.

53.
54.
55.

Kates, 786 So. 2d at 65.
771 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1182.

56. Id.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id
Id at 1183.
Chase,771 So. 2d at 1183.
Id at 1184.
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raise the possibility that the plaintiff could have potentially stated a claim
under this theory if given another opportunity.61
B.

Other Professions

The Supreme Court of Florida had the occasion to look at accountant
62
malpractice in KPMG Peat Marwick v. National Union FireInsurance Co.
In this case, National Union Fire Insurance Company was the fidelity bond
insurer of Bank Atlantic, for whom KPMG Peat Marwick had conducted
independent audits. 63 National Union filed a negligence suit against KPMG,
but the trial court granted the latter's motion for judgment on the pleadings
because National Union was not entitled to relief as an assignee, contractual
subrogee, or equitable subrogee.6 4 KPMG asserted that Forgione v. Dennis
Pirtle Agency Inc.,65 in which the court prohibited the assignment of a
personal tort in an attorney malpractice case, supported its position. The
court disagreed, stating that legal malpractice claims were not assignable
because of the personal nature of legal services that entailed a confidential,
fiduciary relationship with undivided loyalty to the client. 67 The court
argued that independent auditors have a public responsibility to the
corporation's creditors and stockholders with a total independence from the
client.68 The court declined, however, to decide whether accountant
malpractice claims other than those involving audits could be assigned.69
The First District Court of Appeal looked at a claim of legal
malpractice and illegal attorney's fees in Olmsted v. Emmanuel.70 In this
case, defendant attorneys represented the plaintiff in an employment
discrimination case against Taco Bell under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 19647' and title 42, section 1981 of the United States Code.72 Olmsted, a
white male, argued that he was fired for complaining to superiors about

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1186.
765 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 2000).
Id. at 37.
Id.
701 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1997).
KPMG, 765 So. 2d at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
id.
Id. at 38-39.
783 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000).
Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1124.
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discriminatory practices against blacks at the restaurant.73 After a jury
verdict of damages in excess of $3,000,000, Taco Bell was able to get a
reduction to $300,000 because of limits on Title VII claims found in title 42,
section 1981a(3) of the United States Code.74 The damages would not have
been so limited under the section 1981 claim, but it was not invoked as a
basis for relief in the pretrial stipulation.75 The court ruled that the attorneys
neglected a reasonable duty by failing to invoke the section 1981 claim in
the stipulation.76
The court looked at a judicial estoppel argument made by the plaintiff.77
In appealing the reduction of damages to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit,78 the attorneys understandably argued that the
plaintiff had a valid 1981 claim justifying the jury verdict. 79 In the
malpractice case, the attorneys changed their position to argue that the
plaintiffs claim that he would have been successful on the section 1981
claim, had it been preserved, was mere speculation.8 0 The court noted that
judicial estoppel requires that the parties and issues involved must be the
same, which was not true here where the attorneys were not parties in the
appeal of the underlying claim.8' It also upheld the trial court's dismissal of
the malpractice claim.82
What makes this a more difficult question is that arguably the Eleventh
Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue of whether a white person can
succeed on a section 1981 claim in a retaliation case. Although other federal
courts have recognized such a claim,8 3 the court concluded that the Eleventh
Circuit would not, based upon its statements in similar cases.8 The court
also rejected the claim by plaintiff that contingent fee contracts are illegal in
cases involving federal law in federal court. 85 The court concluded the Rules

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1125-26.
Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1126.
Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457 (1Ith Cir. 1998).
Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1125.
Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1127.
Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1128.
Id.
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Regulating the FloridaBar86 did not bar contingent fee contracts in this type
of case.87
V. OTHER CASES INVOLVING DUTY

The Supreme Court of Florida examined the application of the Agrarian
rule in relationship to landowner obligations in Whitt v. Silverman,88 a case
where the owners of a gas station were sued by pedestrians struck by a
customer of the station whose view was obstructed because of a stand of
foliage. 89 The Agrarian rule provides that "a landowner owes no duty to
persons.., not on [his] property and therefore.. . is not responsible for any
harm caused... by natural conditions on the land." 9 Despite its seemingly
dated view of the rights of property owners, some courts continue to apply it
in circumstances where conditions on property hinder the view of motorists.
Such courts have argued that motorists are better positioned to prevent
accidents. 91 Even courts that have retained the rule in part, however, have
disagreed about whether the protection should extend to both natural and
artificial conditions or whether the rule should be applicable to property
located in an urban setting. 92 The Restatement (Second) of Torts excuses
liability for rural land, but recognizes a duty for urban property owners
where harm results from failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent
unreasonable risks to persons using adjoining public roads.93
After a long discussion in Whitt concerning the role of foreseeability in
both the duty and proximate cause elements of negligence, the court rejected
a blanket rule that immunized landowners from foreseeable consequences. 94
The court reaffirmed the principles that it announced in McCain v. Florida
Power Corp.95 It remanded the case for a determination as to whether the
landowners' conduct created a foreseeable zone of risk that posed a general
threat of harm toward the patrons of the business and the pedestrians and
motorists who used the abutting streets and sidewalks reasonably affected by

86. See R.REGULATING THE FLA. BAR 4-1.5(f).

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.
95.

Olnsted, 783 So. 2d at 1129.
788 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2001).
Id.at 213.
Id.
Id. at 215.
Id.at 215-16.
REsTATEmENr (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 363(2) (1965).
Whitt v. Silverman, 788 So. 2d 210, 218 (Fla. 2001).
593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992).
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the business' traffic. 96 Chief Justice Wells dissented, expressing concern
that the change would result in97extensive exposure of liability to property
owners, including homeowners.
In Sanderson v. Eckerd Corp.,98 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
examined the duty of pharmacists in relation to providing warnings to
customers. 99 There is Florida case law asserting that retail pharmacists have
no duty to warn customers or their physicians of potential adverse drug
reactions.1l° However, the court notes that three other states have applied
the voluntary assumption of a0 duty
doctrine to pharmacists and believes that
1
it could also apply in Florida.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also considered the duty of a
business that stores keys in a publicly accessible area in Michael & Philip,
Inc. v. Sierra.0 2 The defendant in Sierra was a gym that had a key board
located near the gym's entrance, directly across from the front desk. 0 3 A
patron stole a set of keys from the board and rear-ended the plaintiff's
vehicle, causing injuries.1' 4 The personnel on desk duty did not monitor the
keyboard. 15 The court ruled that this circumstance did not call for an
exception from the general rule that there is no duty to prevent the
misconduct of third persons. 16 It compared the Supreme Court of Florida's
rulings that held owners of vehicles liable for collisions by thieves who stole
vehicles with keys left in the ignition 0 7 or in an open glove compartment. 10 8
The district court felt that the factual dissimilarity was dispositive where the
keys were not left in the car and the gym did own the car.1 9 Judge Klein
dissented, noting that Florida courts have treated automobile negligence
96.

Whitt, 788 So. 2d 222-23.

97.

Id. at 223.

98. 780 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
99. Id.
100. Johnson v. Walgreen Co., 675 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
101. Sanderson, 780 So. 2d at 932 (citing Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d
557 (I1. 1992); Kasin v. Osco Drug Inc., 728 N.E.2d 77 (111. App. 2000); Baker v.- Arbor
Drugs, 544 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. App. 1996); Ferguson v. Williams, 374 S.E.2d 438 (N.C.
App. 1988), appeal after remand,399 S.E.2d 389 (N.C. App. 1991)).
102. 776 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
103. Id. at 295.
104. Id. at 295-96.
105. Id at 297.
106. Id. at 298.
107. Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. 1977).
108. Schwartz v. American Home Assurance Co., 360 So. 2d 383, 384 (Fla. 1978).
109. Sierra,776 So. 2d at 299.
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differently, asserting that whether the theft was foreseeable was a question
for the jury. 110
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a jury verdict in a slip and
fall case in Lester's Diner II, Inc. v. Gilliam,"II where the plaintiff presented
no evidence as to how an alleged oily substance reached the floor or how
long it had been there.1 2 The court noted that "conjecture and pyramiding
inferences" cannot be relied upon to establish the important facts necessary
to show the actual or constructive notice needed by the property owner to
establish negligence. 13
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the dut of law enforcement officers pursuing fleeing felons in Bryant v. Beary. 1 4 In this case, a
sheriff's deputy pursued a teen without a license who was driving a car
without permission of the owner and ran through a stop sign.' 1 5 Despite
advising dispatch and his superior that he was terminating the chase, he
continued to pursue the teen. 1 6 The teen ran another stop sign, killing
himself and a motorcyclist.' 7 Although recognizing a duty to bystanders,
the court rejected the argument by the teen's estate that law enforcement
owes a duty, to a violator fleeing the law as a result of his criminal
misconduct.
Although not a case that establishes new law, one with curious facts is
the case of Jackson v. Sweat, 19 in which the First District Court of Appeal
ruled that the plaintiff stated a cause of action where the owner of a store left
it lit and unlocked, creating the appearance that it was open, although he set
the silent burglar alarm.1'0 The police responded and arrested the plaintiff.'12
In Tudor v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement,122 the First
District Court of Appeal found that a plaintiff did not have a cause of action

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 300.
788 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 285.
Id. at286.
766 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Id.at 1160.
783 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1207-08.
Id. at 1208.
768 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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against the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
for failure to comply
123
records.
criminal
expunge
to
with a court order
VI. NEGLIGENCE PRESUMPTIONS

The Supreme Court of Florida clarified the rebuttable presumption of
negligence that attaches to a rear driver in a rear-end collision established in
1
a case from the Second District Court of Appeal in McNulty v. Cusack, "
which it endorsed in Gulle v. Boggs. In Clampitt v. D.J. Spencer Sales,"'
it considered whether a sudden stop, standing alone, is sufficient to
overcome the presumption. 27 The Clampitt case involved a three-vehicle
collision in which the plaintiff was in the middle vehicle.1 8 At trial, the
plaintiff was granted summary judgment on the issue of fault."' The district
by the defendant was
presented
•
130
court reversed, • ruling that the evidence
The court stated that the
sufficient to overcome the presumption.
presumption is grounded in the belief that the rear driver is more likely to
have the evidence of why he was unable to stop' 3' and the policy that such a
driver is charged with being prepared to stop without hitting the vehicle in
front because he is in control of the following distance. 132 The court noted
that it is well settled that an "abrupt stop" by the front vehicle is insufficient
evidence on its own to overcome the presumption. 33 What is needed is a
sudden stop at a time and place where it could not reasonably be expected by
the rear driver. 34 Despite testimony by the defendant that he did not see the
front vehicle activate its turn signal or illuminate its brake lights nor did he
see the plaintiffs vehicle slow or activate her brake lights, the court held
that the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment. 35
123. Id. at 1243.
124. 104 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
125. 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965).
126. 786 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2001).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 571.
129. Id. at 570.
130. Id. at 572.
131. Clampitt,786 So. 2d at 573.
132. Id. at 576. The court also noted that section 316.0895(1) of the FloridaStatutes
requires that "[t]he driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely
than is reasonable and prudent.... ." Id. at 575.
133. Id. at 576.
134. Id.
135. Clampitt,786 So. 2d at 575.
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The court noted that the accident took place on a stretch of a two lane
roadway bordered by several commercial establishments, residential
complexes, and Central Florida Junior College. 136 Thus, it apparently
believed that turns and stops should have been anticipated.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal analyzed the applicability of a
statute regulating self-service gasoline stations in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Forbes.137 In this case, the plaintiff slipped and fell in a puddle of gas
approximately six feet in circumference at a service station. 138 Section
526.141(3) of the FloridaStatutes requires that self-service stations have at
least one attendant on duty whose responsibilities include immediately
handling accidental spills. 139 The court applied the Supreme Court of
Florida case that outlines the doctrine of negligence per se in statutory
violations in deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.140 In looking at
the statute as a whole, the court determined that it was meant to protect the
general public, as opposed to a particular class of persons, from injury
caused by fire. 14' This seems to be a reasonable interpretation as evidenced
by references in the statute to flammable and combustible liquids, sources of
ignition, and fire extinguishers. 14 Thus, the court ruled that a violation of
the statute was not negligence per se because the plaintiff did not suffer the
type of injury protected by the statute; and it was one meant to protect43the
general public. Therefore, violation was merely evidence of negligence.1
The Second District Court of Appeal also considered the negligence per
se rule in Golden Shoreline Ltd. Partnershipv. McGowan.14 In this case,
the plaintiff was injured when an elevator malfunctioned. 14 5 Within three
days preceding the incident, problems necessitated the service company
46
being called six times, including three calls on the day of the accident.1
Section 399.02(5)(b) of the Florida Statutes makes an elevator owner
responsible for the safe operation and proper maintenance of its elevators.
The court held that violation of this statute was negligence per se as long as
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 573.
783 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1217.
FLA. STAT. § 526.141(3) (2001).
281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
Forbes,783 So. 2d at 1219.
FLA. STAT. § 526.141(1)-(4) (2001).
Forbes,783 So. 2d at 1219-20.
787 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 110.
Id.
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plaintiff could demonstrate that the defendants violated their duty to properly
maintain the elevator.147
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the releyance of the
unattended motor vehicle statute to a car accident in which the thief is killed
in Graham v. Stephens.!" Section 316.1975(1) of the Florida Statutes
makes it a noncriminal traffic violation to leave a motor vehicle without
stopping the engine, locking the ignition, and removing the key. In this case,
the deceased, a seventeen-year-old girl, took a car in which the key was left
in the ignition and let a thirteen-year-old boy drive it. 149 The boy lost control
of the vehicle, killing the girl and another passenger.'-5° The court ruled that
the person who stole the vehicle could not be considered part of the class
protected by the statute.' 5 ' The court noted that the duty arising from this
the public who use the highways and are
statute extends to members of 152
vehicles.
stolen
these
by
injured
VII. DAMAGES
The Supreme Court of Florida considered the noneconomic damages
limit in the medical malpractice statute in St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. v.
Phillipe153 This appeal involved a consolidation of two cases with similar
legal issues.'- 4 In both cases, the claimants were awarded noneconomic
damages that totaled more than $250,000.15 First, the court rejected the
argument of appellants that section 766.212(2) of the Medical Malpractice
Act's limitation on the ability to stay the execution of an arbitration award
unconstitutionally encroached on the court's rule making authority, which
provides for an automatic stay of a money judgment under rule 9.310(b) of
the FloridaRules ofAppellate Procedure.'5 The court held that the parties'

147. Il
148. 779 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
149. Id at 650.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id at 651 (citing Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla.

1977)).
153. 769 So. 2d 961 (FIa. 2000).
154. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 699 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997);
Franzen v. Mogler, 699 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
155. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d at 963-64.
156. Phillipe, 699 So. 2d at 1019.
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also entailed consent to the
voluntary participation in the arbitration process
157
limited stay and review procedures of the Act.
Next the court considered the application of the Act's limit of $250,000
in noneconomic damages per incident. 18 The court first noted that this
provision was neither clear nor unambiguous.159 It held that the cap was a
limit on each individual claimant, but did not prevent the total noneconomic
damages of all of the claimants in a particular case from exceeding
$250,000.'60 The majority concluded that the contrary interpretation would
The court also rejected the argument
present equal protection problems.
that the economic damages available in medical negligence cases that result
in death are limited by the Wrongful Death Act, which provides a narrower
range of damages. 62 Justice Anstead dissented, arguing that the plain
language of the statute and the court's prior interpretation of the statute in
University of Miami v. Echarte163 required that the cap of $250,000 be
applied to each incident of medical malpractice.164
The question of sovereign immunity was considered in Cunningham v.
66
City of Dania,165 by the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
This case
167
A wrongful death
involved the fatal shooting of a minor in a public park.
action was commenced against the City of Dania and the Broward County
The park in which the drive-by shooting occurred was the
Sheriff.
location of at least seven shootings over eight years as well as a "high
incidence of gang related activity, assault, battery, sexual battery, robbery,
illegal possession of various weapons, and drug-related offenses."
In determining the applicability of governmental tort liability, the court
looked at the controlling Supreme Court of Florida precedent, Trianon Park
Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah,17 which established that there must
157. Phillipe,769 So. 2d at 967.
158. Id. Section 766.207(7)(b) of the Florida Statutes provides: "[n]oneconomic
damages shall be limited to a maximum of $250,000 per incident."
159. Phillipe,769 So. 2d at 968.
160. Id.at 971.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 973.
163. 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Phillipe, 769 So. 2d at 974.
771 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
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be "an underlying common law or statutory duty of care." 17' The district
court held that the City had a duty to maintain and operate the park, which
would include the duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable
criminal acts on the premises. 172 Because of the history of violent criminal
acts, the court felt that a duty of care could arise on behalf of the City, but
not on behalf of the Sheriff because a law enforcement
officer's duty is to
13
the public as a whole as opposed to an individual. 7
In Value Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Grace,'74 the Second District Court of
Appeal was asked to apply the parental immunity doctrine in an indemnity
action by the plaintiff rental car company. 75 In this action, the wife and
child of the driver of the rental car sued Value, which sought indemnity from
Mr. Grace pursuant to contractual and common law theories.' 76 Mr. Grace
filed an affirmative defense arguing that the parental immunity doctrine
177
prevented recovery by his minor child or persons claiming on his behalf.
The court noted that the Supreme Court of Florida has held that parents are
immune from suits by their children except to the extent of applicable
liability coverage. 78 The court rejected the argument by the defendant that
the plaintiff was required to plead the existence of liability coverage in its
complaint. 79 The court argued that plaintiffs are not generally required to
plead facts negating every potential affirmative defense that may be
raised. 8 °
Of perhaps more interest in this case is the concern raised by acting
Chief Judge Altenbemd's concurring opinion.' 81 In Altenbernd's concurring
opinion, the judge notes that it is an unresolved issue as to whether family
immunity should bar an indemnity claim brought by a party who is only
vicariously liable for the damages.' 82 As noted, the family immunity
doctrine is often asserted as a protection of family resources, but a payment
by a vicariously liable party in a case like this one would actually increase
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
1063 (Fla.
179.

Id. at 917.
Cunningham,771 So. 2d at 14.
U at 16.
26 Fla. L. Weekly D737 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 14,2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Joseph v. Quest, 414 So. 2d
1982)).
Grace, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D737.

180. Id.

181. Id
182. Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

242

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 26:225

family resources.1 83 Thus, allowing family immunity in this type of case
would arguably turn such defendants into insurers with no protection in
family claims without advancing the major justification for parental
immunity. 18 One hopes that this interesting policy question will be resolved
in the future in this case or a similar one where the question is at issue.
The Fifth District Court of Apeal also considered an apportionment of
damages issue in Doig v. Chester.18 In Doig, the plaintiff sued Dr. Doig and
Halifax Hospital for medical malpractice. 18 6 Halifax settled for $150,000
during pre-suit proceedings, and the plaintiff recovered $507,321 through
87
arbitration with Doig, of which $250,000 was for non economic damages.1
The issue was "whether the Halifax recovery should be offset against the
Doig award.' 88 The plaintiff did not want the per-incident limit on total
noneconomic damages in the medical malpractice statute' 89 to limit her total
non economic damages from the two defendants. 19° The appellate court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to only $250,000 in total noneconomic
damages.191 It did however certify the following question to the Supreme
Court of Florida as one of great public importance: "IS IT APPROPRIATE
TO SETOFF AGAINST THE NON ECONOMIC DAMAGES PORTION
OF AN AWARD AGAINST ONE TORTFEASOR IN AN ARBITRATION
OF A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION THE AMOUNT RECOVERED FROM SETTLEMENT FROM ANOTHER192RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
SAME INCIDENT CAUSING THE INJURY?'
In the case of Letzter v. Cephas,193 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
has certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Florida: 1) "Has the
doctrine of Stuart v. Hertz194 been abrogated by the Tort Reform and
Insurance Act of 1986, Chapter 86-160, Laws of Florida?;" and 2) "Does
Stuart v. Hertz apply when the initial cause of action is one in medical

183.
184.
185.
(2001).
186.
187.
188.

Id. at D738.
Grace,26 Fla. L. Weekly at D738.
776 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); see also FLA. STAT. § 766.207

Id. at 1044.
Id.
Id.
189. FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7)(h) (2000).

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Doig, 776 So. 2d at 1044.
Id. at 1045.
Id.at 1047.
Letzter v. Cephas, 792 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
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malpractice and both the initial and subsequent tortfeasors are sued in the
same action'?"' 95
In Letzter, Mr. Cephas, a diabetic, consulted Dr. Letzter concerning a
wound on the little toe of his right foot.196 It was alleged that Letzter was
negligent in not performing distal bypass surgery in a timely manner. 197
Because of continuing pain in his foot, the plaintiff sought treatment at an
emergency room in a nearby hospital where Dr. Armand performed a forefoot amputation and a femoral-to-popliteal artery bypass on Cephas' right
leg. 9s Experts testified that Armand's actions also were negligent in some
2 °
respects. 99 Eventually Cephas required a below the knee amputation. 0
The trial court agreed to give the Stuart v. Hertz instruction. The instruction
generally states that one who negligently causes another's personal injuries
is also liable as a proximate cause of damages suffered when the injured
party exercises reasonable care in securing the services of a competent
physician or surgeon, but suffers aggravation or increased ijury by the
negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of the physician or surgeon.
Dr. Letzter argued that the instruction was erroneous because he and
Dr. Armand were joint tortfeasors. 202 Although it would not have been
appropriate to present such an instruction in that case, the court ruled that
whether the doctors were joint tortfeasors was a jury question from which
the evidence could support either conclusion. 2 3 However, because the jury
found that Dr. Armand was the legal cause of damage, but allocated fault
between the two medical practitioners, the court ruled that the jury must
have rejected joint liability, and therefore held that the trial judge's refusal to
apportion non-economic damages was error under section 768.81 of the
Florida Statutes.204 As noted in the concurring opinion of Judge Klein,
chapter 86-160 of the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 provides that
courts shall enter judgments against parties based upon each party's

195. Letzter, 792 So. 2d at 488.
196. Id. at 484.

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Letzter, 792 So. 2d at 485.

201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 486.
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liability. 2 0 5
percentage of fault and not on the basis of joint and several
6
Thus, the court questions whether Stuart is still good law.2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the applicability of
drunk driving by a nonparty in a comparative negligence context in Hyundai
Motor Co. v. Ferayorni.2°7 In this case, the deceased was killed in a car
accident in which she was improperly wearing her shoulder harness under
her arm.2°8 Her death was due to internal injuries caused by the underarm
use of the seatbelt. 20 9 Two trials ensued in which, in addition to other
claims, the plaintiff argued that Hyundai provided inadequate warnings
about improperly using the seatbelt in this manner.210 The court ruled that
the negligence of the drunk driver who caused the accident should have been
considered in apportioning fault even though the drunk driver was not a
defendant in this action. 211 This decision puts the court in conflict with the
Third District Court of Appeal, which in Nash v. General Motors Corp.2t 2
held that drunk driving was an intentional tort and thus, should not be
considered.2 13
The First District Court of Appeal considered the effects of a release
signed pursuant to a settlement in a damages action against a jointly liable
defendant in Schnepel v. Gouty.2 14 In Schnepel, plaintiff Gouty was injured
by a bullet fired from Schnepel's gun.21 5 Gout sued Schnepel and the gun
manufacturer, Glock, with whom he settled for $137,500 before trial. 21 6 At
trial, the jury found that the plaintiff suffered $250,000 damages, of which
half were economic, and that Schnepel, but not Glock, was at fault. 21 7 The
court noted that the jurisdictions are split as to whether a release of one
person from liability in tort is affected by the fact that the person was not in

205. Letzter, 792 So. 2d at 488.
206. Id. Judge Klein notes some courts have held the Act only applies to joint tortfeasors and is therefore not applicable to cases where there are sequential, but not joint,
tortfeasors. See, e.g., Beverly Enters. Fla., Inc. v. McVey, 739 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999); Ass'n for Retarded Citizens-Volusia, Inc. v. Fletcher, 741 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
207. 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1983 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2001).
208. Id.
209. Id.

210. Id.
211. Id. at D1985.

212 734 So. 2d 437, 440-41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
213. Id.
214. 766 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
215. Id. at 419.

216. Id.
217. Id. at 420.
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fact liable. 218 The court decided that Florida's setoff statutes 219 required a
setoff in this case. 220 However, the court certified the following question as
one of great public importance:
Where the plaintiff has delivered a written release or covenant not
to sue to a settling defendant allegedly jointly and severally liable
for economic damages, should the settlement proceeds. apportionable to economic damages be set off against any award for
economic damages even if the settling defendant is not found
liable? 1
Judge Van Nortwick dissented on the interpretation of the setoff
statutes by the majority. 222 Judge Nortwick reasoned that the statutes do
apply to economic damages where the parties are jointly and severally liable,
but that they were not applicable here, where Schnepel was found to be
100% at fault.m On policy grounds, the dissent argues that if a party is to
benefit from such a settlement, it should be the injured party as opposed to
the tortfeasor, and that the majority's construction of the statute discourages
settlements with less than all of the defendants with potential joint and
several liability. 224
In Somberg v. FloridaConvalescent Centers, Inc.,22 5 the Third District
Court of Appeal reviewed the issue of survival of pre-death pain and
suffering in a nursing home statutory violation case."' The FloridaStatutes
require that nursing home residents "receive adequate and appropriate health
care9227 and creates a private right of action for deprivation of the statutory
rights of nursing home residents. 22 The nursing home was granted summary
judgment pursuant to its argument that the Wrongful Death Act excludes
claims for personal injuries that result in death.229 In an area in which the

218. Id. at 420-23 (citing Goldsen v. Simpson, 783 So. 2d 46 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)).
219. FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(2), 768.041(2) (2000).
220. Schnepel, 766 So. 2d at 423.
221. Id. at 419.

222 Id. at 424.
223. Id. at 425.

224. Id.
225. 779 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
226. Id. at 668.
227. FLA. STAT. § 400.022(1)(1) (2001).

228. § 400.023(1).
229. § 768.20.
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districts are divided, the court concluded that the claim survives 23° because
the nursing home statute provides that suits claiming
1 infringements or
deprivations of rights survive the death of the resident.2
The Third District Court of Appeal considered the application of the
offer of judgment statute to personal injury protection (PIP) actions in U.S.
Security Insurance Co. v. Cahuasqui.232 The plaintiff refused an offer of
judgment from U.S. Security Insurance.2 33 The jury found that the plaintiff
was not entitled to recovery.2 34 Subsequently, U.S. Security filed for
attorneys' fees under the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79 of the
Florida Statutes.235 The plaintiff argued that this was not permissible
236
because of the attorney's fees section of the PIP statute,
which only
provides for attorneys' fees for insureds or beneficiaries.2 37 The appellate
court held that the offer of judgment statute applied to all civil actions and
did not conflict with the PIP statute.238 It would appear from looking at the
language of the latter statute, that the dissent by Judge Fletcher provides the
better interpretation of that statute under normal statutory construction of
specific statutes governing over more general ones.239
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the relationship of the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine and indemnity theory in Hertz Corp. v.
Rhode Island Hospitalm Both doctrines establish vicarious liability. In
this case, the former creates vicarious liability for automobile lessors and the
latter under the doctrine of respondeat superior.4 Citing Hertz Corp. v.
Ralph M. Parsons, Co.,242 the court argued that the negligence of the driver
and its employer is primary as compared to the secondary negligence of the
owner, and therefore an indemnification action by the latter is allowed

230. Somberg, 779 So. 2d at 668; accord Beverly Enters. Fla., Inc. v. Spilman, 661 So.
2d 867 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); contra First Healthcare Corp. v. Hamilton, 740 So. 2d
1189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
231. FLA. STAT. § 400.023(1) (2001).
232. 760 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
233. Id. at 1103-04.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1104.
236. FIA. STAT. § 627.428 (2001).
237. Cahuasqui,760 So. 2d at 1104.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1108.
240. 784 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
241 Id. at 507.
242. 419 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1969).
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against an employer of an employee driving a rental car in the course and
scope of employment. 243

VII. FRAUD
A fraud claim was considered by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Azam v. M1I Schottenstein Homes, Inc.2M The Azam case dealt with a claim
by the plaintiff that defendant developer falsely claimed that a site where a
school was to be built was going to be a permanent natural preserve.2 45 The
defendant claimed that an action for fraud in inducement or negligence
cannot exist in the sale of a home where the information relied upon is a
matter of public record. 6 The Azam court disagreed with the defendant,
holding that the statements concerning public records could form the basis of
a fraud action as a question of fact.247
IX. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The Supreme Court of Florida also published new standard jury
instructions, some of which relate to tort cases.2" These include new
instructions concerning parental loss of filial consortium. 24 9 Included in the
new instructions are explanations of expenses for care and treatment, loss of
services and earnings, as well as loss of companionship, society, love,
affection, and solace. 250 In addition, the instructions include amendments to
the instructions on negligent misrepresentation claims. 25' These include
instructions concerning comparative negligence 252 as recognized by
the
253
Supreme Court of Florida in Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier,Inc.

243.
244.
245.
246
1999)).

Hertz, 784 So. 2d at 507-08.
761 So. 2d 1195 (Ha. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1195-96.
Id. at 1196 (citing Pressman v. Wolf, 732 So. 2d 356 (Ha. 3d Dist. Ct. App.

247. Id.
248. Standard Jury Instructions-Civil Cases, 777 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2000).
249. Id. at 379.
250. Id. at 380.

251. Id. at 380-82.
252. Id. at 383.
253. 696 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1997).
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X. CONCLUSION

As can be seen, Florida appellate courts have again been busy during
the past year in clarifying the constantly evolving area of tort law. Courts
have attempted to clarify the breadth of the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine as applied to automobiles and the coverage of the Medical
Malpractice Act. They have also revisited the persistent problems of the
existence of legal duties, the application of the negligence per se doctrine,
and the calculation of damages. Although some points have been clarified,
new questions have been raised in other areas. Perhaps some of these new
questions will be answered in the next year.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The bifurcation of personal injury cases is becoming more prevalent
since the article by Judge David L. Tobin, To B... or Not to B. .. "B. .."
Martindale-Hubbell A-V rated, Florida board certified civil trial attorney, and
shareholder in the law firm of Cytryn & Wolfe, P.A., Tamarac, Florida.
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Means Bifurcation.1 The debate regarding the bifurcation of personal injury
cases has drawn both supporters and critics. Retired Judge Tobin appears to
support the bifurcation of personal injury cases on the issues of liability and
damages in automobile, slip and fall, products liability, and general
negligence cases.2 The purpose of this article is to provide an opposing
viewpoint regarding whether bifurcation is appropriate in these types of
cases, and to consider the impact that bifurcation has upon a plaintiffs
success at trial. Unlike other law review articles on the issue of bifurcation,
this article delineates, in part, the
positive and negative impact of bifurcation
3
by type of personal injury case.
The legal term bifurcation is sometimes used interchangeably with the
term severance in case law.4 However, the difference is that bifurcation
ultimately results in one enforceable judgment, whereas severance "divides
the lawsuit into two or more independent causes. ' 5 Instead of one judgment,
severance results in separate and enforceable judgments.6 Rule 1.270 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part: "(b) Separate
Trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross claim, counter claim, or third-party
claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross claims,
counter-claims, third-party claims, or issues."7 Importantly, the comment to
the rule contains language not present in its federal counterpart: "Generally,
justice requires that an action not be handled piecemeal when it reasonably
can be avoided ... ,,s
In the following sections, some of the concerns that support this
comment will be discussed. Part 1I provides a brief overview of Florida case
law and decisions of other states. Part III discusses the potential impact of
bifurcation on different types of negligence cases. Part IV considers the
potential bias and prejudice to the plaintiff. Part V refutes some of the
assertions Judge Tobin made in his article and Part VI provides a statistical
analysis of the success rate of plaintiffs in bifurcated versus non-bifurcated
1.
David L. Tobin, To B... or Not to B. .. B... " Means Bifurcation, FLA. B.J.,
Nov. 2000, at 14.
2.
See id.
3.
See, e.g., Miering de Villiers, A Legal and Policy Analysis of Bifurcated Litigation, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 153 (2000); Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75
WASH. L. REV. 705 (2000).
4.
See, e.g., Hardee Mfg. Co. v. Josey, 535 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
5.
BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY 148 (5th ed. 1979).
6.
Id.
7.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b).
8.
Author's Comments, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270 (1967).
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trials. Finally, this article concludes that bifurcation of liability and damages
in personal injury cases should be the exception rather than the rule, and
should be permitted only when the benefit ,of bifurcation clearly outweighs
9
the detriment and prejudice to any party opposing the bifurcation of a case.
I. REVIEW OF CASE LAW

A. FloridaCase Law
There have not been many Florida appellate decisions that address
bifurcation of the liability and damage issues in personal injury cases. Before
the adoption of rule 1.270 of the FloridaRules of Civil Procedure,the first
Florida case that squarely discussed the issue stated that the bifurcation of
personal injury cases on the issues of liability and damages was ordinarily
not permitted.
The court held that the bifurcation of issues in a cause
"should be the exception rather than the usual procedure."'"
Vander Carv. Pitts,12 pointed out that the authority for the trial court to
bifurcate was then-existing rule 1.20(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, effective July 1, 1962, which essentially mimicked 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the bifurcation of liability and
damages was upheld, the appellate court noted: "a single trial generally
tends to lessen the delay, expense and inconvenience to all concerned, and
the courts have emphasized that separate trials should not be ordered unless
such disposition is clearly necessary, and then only in the furtherance of
justice."
In Watts v. Mantooth,14 the appellate court held, upon plaintiff's
motion, that it was not an abuse of discretion to bifurcate the trial on liability
and damages for determination by separate juries where the judge's trial
docket ended on Monday, the trial was beginning on Friday, and unless the
case was bifurcated, the jury would have had to sit through the trial on
Saturday and possibly Sunday.1 5 In addition, both of the plaintiff's medical
9.
This article is not intended to discuss the bifurcation of the determination of the
amount of punitive damages from the main portion of the trial, which procedure was approved
by the Supreme Court of Florida in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1994).
10. Bowen v. Manuel, 144 So. 2d 341,343 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
11. Id. at 343.
12. 166 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
13. Id. at 839.
14. 196 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
15. Id. at232.
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doctors resided in Tennessee, and they would have had to come to Florida to
testify.16 The trial court granted plaintiffs request to determine liability first
so that the jurors, the court, and the parties would not have to try the case
over the weekend, and so that the plaintiff could potentially avoid the cost of
7
bringing these two medical doctors to Florida from Tennessee.1
In Marley v. Saunders,18 the Supreme Court of Florida, in dicta,
discussed the issue of bifurcation in a case where bifurcation had apparently
been agreed to by both parties.' 9 The court never addressed the issue of
prejudice or the application of bifurcation to different types of personal
injury lawsuits. The issue in the case was whether the Third District Court of
Appeal erred in dismissing the plaintiffs appeal after the trial court ordered
a new trial for the defendant on the issue of liability alone. 20 The court held
that the trial court did2 not err in granting a new trial for the defendant on the
issue of liability only. '
There does not appear to be another Florida appellate decision
pertaining to the issue of bifurcation of liability and damages in personal
injury trials for the next seventeen years. Then, in 1988, the court in Hardee
Manufacturing Co. v. Josey22 held that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in denying a motion to bifurcate the issues of liability and
damages in a rear-end collision where the injuries were severe and the issues
of liability were close. 23 The appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal
to bifurcate because factors pertaining to the cause and nature of the injuries
would have had to have been introduced into evidence if the trial had been
bifurcated and the liability aspect tried first. 24
Several years later, in Scandinavian World Cruises (Bahamas) Ltd. v.
25
Barone, a slip and fall case, the appellate court affirmed a trial court's
order granting a new trial where the "trial court's bifurcation of the issues of
liability and damages prejudiced the plaintiff .... " since the plaintiff had
suffered a brain injury, and medical testimony was required to explain the
confusing and inconsistent testimony of the plaintiff. The next decision
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
249 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1971).
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at35.
535 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 656.
Id.
573 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 1037.
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that mentioned the bifurcation of liability and damages in a personal injury
case was Dade County School Board v. Garcia27 There, the appellate court,
without any explanation as to how they arrived at their decision, held, inter
alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in bifurcating an automobile
accident case.28
At the time of the writing of this article, the Fourth District Court of
29
Appeal rendered its decision in Roseman v. Town Square Ass'n. The case
involved a claim for personal injuries sustained when a front door of a
condominium complex allegedly closed quickly on the plaintiff.30 The trial
court granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial on liability and
damages, holding that the issue the jury would decide in the liability phase
was as follows. "[W]as there negligence on the part of Town Square
31
Association which was a legal cause of the door striking Mindy Roseman?,
In holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to
allow bifurcation of the case, the court found, "[tihere was no dispute as to
where on Roseman's body she was struck or how hard the blow was.0 2 The
court also pointed out that "[tihere was no dispute at trial regarding whether
the incident actually occurred. ' 33 Further, the court stated that any claim
that medical care and treatment rendered immediately after the incident
would buttress plaintiff's claim was "immaterial to the liability issues
of
' 34
negligent maintenance or failure to warn of the dangerous condition."
There have been a total of eight decisions in Florida since the first one
thirty-nine years ago, discussing the issue of bifurcation of the liability and
damage aspects of personal injury cases. None of these decisions provides
any meaningful standard for trial courts in determining whether bifurcation
is appropriate.
B. Case Law of OtherStates
A review of the case law of other states provides mixed results. For
instance, Illinois and Texas do not allow the bifurcation of liability and
27. 723 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
28. Id.
29. 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1833 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. July 25, 2001). At the time this
article went to publication, plaintiff's motion for re-hearing and for clarification had not been
decided, and the decision was not final.
30. Id. at D1833.
31. Id.
32. Id. atD1834.
33. Id.
34. Roseman, 26 Fa. L. Weekly at D1834.
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damages in personal injury cases under any circumstances. 35 In contrast,
New York mandates bifurcation in most personal injury cases.36 It appears
that thirteen states, Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming, have not taken a position on the issue. Ten states allow bifurcation of the liability and damage aspects of personal injury cases only in
extraordinary or exceptional situations. 37 The remaining twenty-four states
appear to allow bifurcation on a discretionary basis. In addition, the federal
courts generally appear to favor the bifurcation of personal injury cases.
III. EXAMINING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF BIFURCATION BY TYPE OF CASE

It is important to remember that "[t]he decision to separate the trial of
liability from damages... is not merely a matter of trial management [but]
involves a decision that could very well impact and influence the outcome of
the trial. ' 38 Trying a personal injury case on the issue of liability alone is
like trying a case in a vacuum, or in a laboratory setting. The jury doesn't
hear the whole story, but only part of the story. It is analogous to telling a
story without an ending, or telling a joke without a punch line. For an
injured plaintiff, the potential impact on her case is certainly no joke. The
"laboratory" or "sterile" effect and its impact on a negligence action has
been described as follows:
35. See Mason v. Dunn, 285 N.E.2d 191 (Ill. App. 1972); Iley v. Hughes, 311 S.W.2d
648 (Tex. 1958).
36. See, e.g., Fetterman v. Evans 612 N.Y.S. 2d 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
37. See Coburn v. Am. Liberty Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d 717, 719 (Ala. 1977) (holding
bifurcation should be ordered "sparingly" and in "exceptional cases"); Randolph v. Scott, 338
A.2d 135, 137 (Del. 1975) (calling the bifurcation procedure in personal injury cases
"extraordinary"); Brake v. Central Serv. Co., 7 N.W.2d 184, 185 (Iowa 1942); Detloff v.
Taubman Co., 315 N.W.2d 582, 583 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding bifurcation permitted
"only upon the most persuasive showing"); Grosfield v. Clearwater Clinic, 417 N.W.2d 640,
642 (Minn. 1988) (calling the use of bifurcation on personal injury cases an "extraordinary
remedy"); Griffin v. Werner Enters. Inc., 1999 WL 419900 (Neb. Ct. App. 1999) (calling
bifurcation an "extraordinary measure"); Wertz v. Kephart, 542 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Pa. 1988)
(stating bifurcation should be "cautiously applied"); Burks v. Harris, 1992 WL 322375 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1993) (holding bifurcation allowed "in only the most exceptional cases and upon a
strong showing of necessity"); Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 407 P.2d 461, 464 (Wash. 1965)
(stating bifurcation should be "cautiously applied"); Andrews v. Reynolds Mem'l Hosp., Inc.,
499 S.E.2d 846, 856 (W.Va. 1997) (stating "bifurcation should be granted only when clearly
necessary").
38. Cavender v. McCarty, 479 S.E.2d 887, 893 (W. Va. 1996).
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According to the sterile-trial theory, bifurcation obscures the
magnitude of the case itself and the significance of the jury's
decision. In other words, juries that do not hear evidence regarding
the plaintiff's injuries and damages will not feel sympathy, and
therefore are less likely to care about what they are doing. This
concern may be valid because sympathy does appear to be an
omotional trigger for taking matters more seriously. In this respect,
sympathy enhances legal decision making by acting as a natural
emotional signpost that points out: (1) the existence of a "justicerelated matter," (2) relevant facts that might be overlooked in a
non-sympathetic environment, or (3) the path towards the 'just"
outcome. Hence, sympathy can help juries decide cases within the
law by grabbing their attention and highlighting the fact that
someone has been hurt and may deserve the juries help. By putting
aside evidence that might invoke sympathy, bifurcation presents a
risk that the jurors will lack the natural stimulus to give the issues
serious consideration ....[W]here the circumstances require a
greater impression, the trial court might allow the plaintiff to
present a limited amount of injury evidence during the separated
liability stage so the jury can "begin to comprehend the
significance of the claims to the plaintiffs. Trial judges and
litigants can and will think of other means to ensure that the jury
appreciates39 the significance of the issues and takes its role
seriously."
In light of these concerns and the following issues, it will become apparent
why the whole story is generally necessary for a fair trial of a personal injury
case.
A. Automobile Accident Cases
Certainly, in automobile accident cases, the jury can determine the
percentage of fault of each party to an accident in the liability aspect of a
bifurcated proceeding, but what if there is a seat belt issue? For instance,
medical testimony regarding the injuries suffered by the plaintiff has to be
elicited in order for the jury to determine the issues of the comparative
negligence of the plaintiff who did not wear a seatbelt or shoulder harness.
The seatbelt issue necessitates both liability and damages testimony because
medical testimony is required to determine the extent of comparative

39.

Gensler, supra note 3, at 767-69.
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negligence of the plaintiff. Therefore, bifurcation of such a case would
never be appropriate.
Bifurcation may also be inappropriate in other automobile accident
cases not entailing a seatbelt issue. Even if liability is admitted by the
defendant in a personal injury trial, testimony and evidence as to the extent
of the impact is relevant to prove or disprove damages. 40 Further, speed and
force of impact testimony may also be relevant for the jury to consider in the
damages phase in determining whether a particular collision could cause the
injury claimed. 41 In an auto collision case, it may be necessary to present
testimony of police officers, witnesses to the accident, accident reconstructionists, and biomechanical engineers in both the liability and damage
aspects of a bifurcated personal injury trial, because that testimony may be
relevant to both liability and damages. The potential need to call the same
witnesses in both aspects of the trial mitigates against bifurcation because
there may not be any cost, or time-savings if the same witnesses have to be
called in both phases of the trial. 42
Bifurcation of liability and damages in vehicular collision cases can
actually increase the time and expense of litigating a case. The increased
cost and time can occur in cases where a defendant would otherwise have
admitted liability and simply chosen to try the case on causation, or on
causation and damages alone. Where bifurcation is allowed, a defendant
may have an increased desire to contest liability. That is because without
bifurcation, a defendant fears that its decision to contest liability may
adversely affect it on damages, particularly if the liability defense is
somewhat tenuous. With the trial bifurcated, the fear dissipates, especially if
separate juries will be used for each phase.
B. Non-VehicularAccidents
Bifurcation of the liability and damage portions of non-vehicular
accidents presents additional problems. For example, in a trip or slip and
fall case, where the plaintiffs injuries are not visible at the time of trial, or
40. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kidwell, 746 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999);
Traud v. Waller, 272 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that photographs of
property damage to vehicles may be admissible as tending to prove the extent of the forces or
lack thereof in the collision).
41. See Bryant v. Buerman, 739 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
42. This assumes the use of two different juries to try the liability and damage aspects
of the trial. The use of different juries for each aspect of the trial is discussed infra in section
IV.B.
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do not visibly appear serious, jurors will be likely scratching their heads
trying to figure out why the plaintiff is even bringing a claim, especially if
they have no idea what injuries the plaintiff suffered. Jurors are unlikely to
care about what caused the plaintiff to fall if they are not told about the
extent of the injuries sustained.
C. ProductsLiability Cases
In a products liability case with a strict liability count, the main liability
issue usually is whether the product is unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer. 43 How can jurors in a bifurcated trial on liability determine
whether the product is unreasonably dangerous to users or consumers, if they
do not know the extent of the damage that the product caused to the injured
plaintiff? For example, the jurors might determine that a product that can
cause a cut to a finger is not unreasonably dangerous, but that a product that
causes a finger to be cut off is unreasonably dangerous. In a products
liability case, jurors should know what damages and what injuries a product
can cause, and have caused in a particular case, in order to be able to
determine liablity. For example, whether the product is defective and
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. If the case is bifurcated,
the jurors will likely be precluded from learning that important information
in the liability phase. Bifurcation is therefore generally inappropriate in
products liability cases.
D. Medical MalpracticeCases
Bifurcation of liability and damages is inappropriate in medical
malpractice cases as well. A medical malpractice case requires medical
testimony in the liability, causation, and damage aspects of the trial. In most
cases, the treating physician's testimony will be required to establish both
liability and damages. It is impractical to bifurcate the trial because it is
difficult to separate at what point the medical testimony on liability ends,
and the medical testimony on causation and damages begins. If the plaintiff
prevails on liability, not only will there not be a time savings, but the same
treating physicians who were called to testify in the liability aspect of the
case may well have to be called again for the damages aspect of the case."
43. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
44. See Dobress v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 678 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1998) In medical malpractice cases, because liability and damages invariably requires the
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Where the plaintiff prevails in a bifurcated case, the case will have taken
longer because there are two jury selections, two openings, two closings, etc.
Therefore, there is no time savings, as the case may take more time than a
unified trial. Further, there may be extra costs involved in having to call
witnesses in both aspects of a bifurcated trial. Even in New York, where
bifurcation is the general rule in personal injury cases, the bifurcation of the
issues of liability and damages has been recognized as inappropriate in most
medical malpractice actions. 5
E. Intentional Tort Claims
Intentional tort claims are also generally inappropriate for bifurcation.
For example, in an assault and battery or false arrest case, the conduct of the
defendant leading to the determination of liability is relevant to a
determination of the amount of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. In a
false arrest case, how the plaintiff was treated by the defendant is relevant to
determine the extent of the mental anguish suffered by the plaintiff. Further,
for example, the jury may have to assess the extent of the conduct in determining whether future psychiatric care is reasonably required, based upon
the circumstances surrounding the incident. Bifurcation is inappropriate in
these types of intentional tort claims.
F. Cases with a Punitive Damage Claim
Personal injury cases with a punitive damage claim should not be
bifurcated for trial on liability and damages with different juries, because the
same jury that hears liability and damages must also hear the punitive
damage phase in order to have any semblance of judicial economy.
Otherwise, the entire trial will have to be repeated for the new jury in the
punitive damage phase. To avoid that, the only part of the personal injury
claim that should be bifurcated is the determination of the amount of
punitive damages. 46

testimony of the same medical expert witnesses, "there is no real saving in terms of time or
court facilities." Id. at 872.
45. Id. But see Barracca v. St. Francis Hosp., 634 N.Y.S.2d 941 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995).
46. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1994).
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G. Death Cases

In any case involving a death where a person has a claim for their
mental pain and suffering resulting from the death, bifurcation is
inappropriate. This is because the circumstances surrounding how the
person died, "the liability aspect," very likely will be relevant to the claim
for mental pain and suffering. That is because the more horrific or elongated
the circumstances surrounding the death of a loved one was, the more
credible is the claim for a larger mental pain and suffering award.

IV. BIAS AND PREJUDICE
If jurors are not told of the extent of the damages suffered by the
plaintiff, the bias factor against the plaintiff will increase. 47 That is the case
because many jurors verbally express in jury selection that they are not
interested in cases where the damages are small or not obvious.48 That being
the case, why should jurors be interested in a case where there is no visible
injury to the plaintiff and the injuries have not been explained to the jury?
Having personally selected at least eighty juries in personal injury trials, I as
well as any experienced trial lawyer or judge, can tell you that it is
commonplace that many jurors do not want to be there in the first place.
Further, many jurors have
biases and prejudices against many different types
49
of personal injury cases.
Judge Tobin's proposal to "instruct the jury that the plaintiff has
injuries, and in some cases it would be appropriate for the court to state that
the plaintiff has either serious or significant injuries," 50 doesn't resolve the
problem, and may actually create a new problem. For instance, instructing
the jury that the plaintiff has serious or significant injuries prejudices the
defense. A competent defense attorney should only agree to allow the court
to say that the plaintiff "alleges" she has sustained injuries as a result of the
incident, not that the plaintiff "has -sustained" serious or significant injuries.
47. See generally Fazzolari v. City of W. Palm Beach, 608 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992). During jury selection, half of the jury panel in this non-bifurcated personal
injury trial stated that they had negative feelings about personal injury lawsuits. Id.
48. See, e.g., Goldenberg v. Reg'l Imp. & Exp. Trucking Co., 674 So. 2d 761 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing a juror expressing the opinion that if there is not a
substantial injury, she feels the person making the claim is dishonest).
49. See generally Sisto v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 689 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that it is reversible error to fail to allow attorney in jury selection to
inquire of opinions, feelings, or beliefs ofjurors concerning personal injury lawsuits).
50. Tobin, supra note 1, at 16.
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On the other hand, using the word "alleges" does nothing for the plaintiff
except raise the level of suspicion of the jurors as to the legitimacy of the
case as a whole, particularly when they are not going to hear anything about
the plaintiffs injuries in the bifurcated trial on liability. There is potentially
an insurmountable array of problems that go into the discussion concerning
whether jurors should be told of the extent or existence of injuries in the
liability portion of a bifurcated trial, and there is no satisfactory resolution.
A. Causationof Injury and Damages
Causation of injury is a significant problem area when personal injury
cases are bifurcated for separate trials on liability and damages. Simply
because an incident occurred (for example, a slip or trip and fall), does not
necessarily mean that a person was injured as a result of the incident. If the
jurors are not told details about causation and the extent of the injury, and if
the plaintiffs injuries are not visibly apparent, jurors may have difficulty
conceptualizing why they are in the courtroom. Further, in many cases, the
medical evidence may "be important to both the liability issue as well as to
the damages issue." 51 That is why evidence pertaining to causation and the
extent of damages in most cases is a relevant part of the equation that a jury
must have in order to render a fair verdict.
The issues of causation and damages are especially important to the
liability issue in non-vehicular collision cases where there might be unusual
liability situations. Unfortunately, it is these types of unusual cases where
trial judges have the greatest tendency to bifurcate the case. The more
unusual the liability situation, the more difficult it will be for the plaintiff to
win the liability aspect of a bifurcated trial 2 That is because the jurors may
very well have difficulty perceiving how the incident caused the damages.
Even though causation of injury and damages are not issues that the jurors
are supposed to consider in the liability phase, their inability to understand
how the incident caused damages will play a role in their deliberations in the
liability phase. To eliminate the prospect of that occurring, bifurcation
should be avoided in unusual or atypical liability situations.
New York is the only state in the United States where bifurcation in
personal injury cases is the general rule. However, even in New York,
bifurcation in a personal injury trial is not permitted where it is necessary for
51. See, e.g., Griffin v. Werner Enters., Inc., 1999 WL419900 (Neb. Ct. App. 1999).
52. See, e.g., Randolph v. Scott, 338 A.2d 135, 137 (Del. 1975) (holding "nebulosity
surrounding the exact circumstances of the accident" is a factor mitigating against
bifurcation).
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a plaintiff, in order to establish liability, to offer medical evidence of the
injuries and of the force necessary to cause such injuries.53 Further, medical
proof of the plaintiffs
injuries may be necessary to determine the actual
54
force of the impact.
B. Same Jury Trying Both Issues
The use of the same jury to try both liability and damages in a
bifurcated trial is extremely prejudicial to the plaintiff because the jurors are
more likely to render a defense verdict. Jurors will know that they will be
required to return to try the damages phase if they find for the plaintiff on
liability. If the judge intends from the beginning that the trial is to continue
on damages with the same jury, the jury will have to be told the approximate
length of the trial and asked how long they can stay. Therefore, when it is
time for them to deliberate on the liability aspect of the trial, considering
how long the trial has already taken, the jurors will figure out that if they
find for the plaintiff they will have to return and decide damages.5 5
Unless the jurors are incensed over the conduct of the defendant, the
natural tendency of the majority of the jurors will be to get on with their
lives and go back to their work, school, and families. Even though we know
that jurors generally tend to do the right thing, subconsciously, at best, and
consciously, at worst, the jurors will want to leave as soon as possible in
order to avoid spending several extra days or even weeks in the courtroom. It
is simply human nature to try to accomplish a result in the quickest possible
time frame. The only way for the jurors to get out of jury service quicker is
for the jury to render a defense verdict on liability.
C. Different Juriesfor Same Case
Separate juries for liability and damages pose at least three additional
problems that mitigate against bifurcation. First, an additional session of
jury selection is required, so that the time savings hoped to be gained by the
53. Cybulski v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 68 N.Y.S.2d 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999);
Roman v. McNulty, 471 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Tate v. Stevens, 713 N.Y.S.2d
598 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
54. Aldous v. Honda Motor Co., 1996 WL 312189 (N.D.N.Y.) (holding where
evidence of plaintiffs injuries is necessary to establish liability, bifurcation should be denied).

55. Jurors may know this from any of the following sources: 1) having previously
served on a personal injury case; 2) having family members who have gone through a personal
injury trial; 3) having attorney friends or people involved in the personal injury field; or 4)
their own common sense and life experiences.
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bifurcation is reduced. Second, the plaintiff is prejudiced because if the
plaintiff wins, the trial on the damages aspect most likely will be scheduled
months away, because the trial judge will be inclined to let the case sit,
hoping that the parties will settle after the first part of the trial. Additionally,
different juries for each phase of trial may pose constitutional problems or
be held to violate statutory provisions regarding how a jury is to be
comprised.
V. THE RECENT ARTICLE ON BIFURCATION
The article on bifurcation by Judge Tobin overlooks several other
significant problems. First, two of the three cases mentioned in the article as
alleged authority for bifurcation are not Personal injury cases. For instance,
Microclimate Sales Co. v. Dougherty involved a cause of action for
in the article
infringement upon patent license rights. 7 Another case cited
58
was a cause of action for specific performance of a contract.
Second, the article overlooks the unfairness to the parties. Under the
59
method proposed in To B. . .or Not to B. .. "B. .." Means Bifurcation,
if the plaintiff prevails on liability, the case is then delayed with the hope
that the case will settle. 60 If the case does not settle, both the plaintiff and
the defendant will have to attend two trials. A trial causes upheaval in a
person's life. It affects their work schedule and their personal lives. A trial
is a traumatic experience to the majority of litigants and to the average
person, and with bifurcation, both parties may have to go through two trials
instead of one.
Third, the main benefactor of the bifurcation is the defendant and/or her
insurance carrier, whose money is earning interest while the plaintiff waits
additional time for the damages phase of the trial to be concluded. Certainly,
bifurcation may induce settlement in some situations.6' On the other hand,
an argument can be made that bifurcation could actually discourage
settlement. For instance, bifurcation gives the defense two separate shots at
the plaintiffs case. With separate juries, the threat that the jury will punish
the defendant for frivolously contesting liability is eliminated. If the trial on
56.
57.

731 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. See generally Randolph, 338 A.2d at 136. (stating that bifurcation hypothetic-

ally makes "it more difficult for a party to obtain a legal remedy").
58.
59.
60.
61.

Hernandez v. Leiva, 391 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
Tobin, supra note 1, at 14.
Id. at 16.
Id.
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damages is deferred, defendants may be more willing to contest liability
because the potential time period when the plaintiff will be eligible to collect
is further deferred.
Most cases that are separated into two phases, with damages to be tried
after a break, will likely discourage settlement because a significant factor
that encourages the defendant to settle a case is the imminent threat of a final
judgment. Cases settle on the "courthouse steps" because there is the
imminent threat of a final judgment. The deferral of the ultimate outcome,
i.e., a potential final judgment, almost never operates as an inducement for
the defendant to offer an early settlement. In such cases, bifurcation
promotes none of the purposes for which it was intended.
Additionally, no plaintiff wants to wait, who knows how long, to go
through two trials. Bifurcated cases may settle at a higher rate than nonbifurcated cases, but only because most plaintiffs would rather take less then
have to go through two trials and a much longer delay to get full
compensation. Any experienced trial lawyer knows that very few individual
plaintiffs or defendants are enamored by the concept of sitting through any
type of trial. Surely, the concept of having to potentially sit through two
separate trials is even less appealing to most litigants.
VI. STATISTICAL DATA

Circuit Judge David L. Tobin's statistical data is relevant only to prove
62
that more bifurcated cases in his division settled than non-bifurcated cases.
What the article does not address is how unfairly the bifurcation process
affects the plaintiffs whose cases are bifurcated. Additionally, his statistics
regarding jury verdicts are unclear. 63 He states that since 1997, there were
forty-two cases on his trial calendar that were bifurcated, but he is unclear
regarding how many of those trials resulted in defense or plaintiff verdicts.6
This writer performed a study using Westlaw's Florida Jury Verdict
Reporter database (FL-JV). 65 The research, as of February 2001, reflected a
62.

Id. at 18.

63.

Ud

64. Tobin, supra note 1, at 18.
65. This study was accomplished by performing several Westlaw searches on the
FloridaJury Verdict database (FL-JV). For example, to ascertain the number of verdicts for
the plaintiff in bifurcation trip or slip and fall cases, the search performed was "verdict /3
defendant and slip! or trip!" and "liability only" or "bifurcate!" (The author maintains a copy
of all searches performed and the specific data, as it is too cumbersome to be included in this
article).
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66
database of 8769 personal injury cases, of which 102 were bifurcated. The
difference in the success rate of plaintiffs whose cases were bifurcated,
versus those whose cases were not, was stunning. Although plaintiffs won
(received any verdict) in 59.5% of all personal injury cases that were not
bifurcated, 6laintiffs prevailed only 23.5% of the time when the cases were
bifurcated.
In slip or trip and fall cases, although plaintiffs received a verdict in
47.3% of cases that were not bifurcated, plaintiffs only prevailed in 12.1% of
68
In motor vehicle collisions, although
those cases that were bifurcated.

66. A telephone call to the Florida Jury Verdict Reporter, a publication of Florida
Legal Periodicals, Inc., at 1-800-446-2998, on July 16, 2001, revealed that 60% of cases
published are through contracted employees of Florida Legal Periodicals, Inc., and the
research performed by them. The other 40% of cases are submitted by attorneys. On the
inside cover of the latest edition of the Florida Jury Verdict Reporter, it is stated that:
[t]he information contained in this publication is derived from trial court
Post-trial alteration or
records and from submissions by attorneys.
modification by appellate courts is not generally reflected. Cause and nature
of injury are generally those alleged by counsel for Plaintiff. The Florida Jury
Verdict Reporter (FJVR) is directed primarily to tort cases and publishes both
Plaintiff's and Defendant's verdicts as well as settlements .... This
publication is designed solely to provide information concerning the subject
matter covered. It is not disseminated for the purpose rendering legal or other
professional advice. While we strive for utmost accuracy in our reporting, no
warranties are made regarding the accuracy of information contained in the
case reports. Verification should be sought in court documents and/or with
attorneys of record. Any and all liability for inaccuracies in our published
reports is hereby disclaimed.

67.

BIFURCATON oF PEsONAL INJuRY CAsEs: Disposition of Cases Without Bifurcation

TYPE OF CASE
All Cases
Trip or Slip and Fall
Motor Vehicle Accidents
Product or Strict Liability
Medical Malpractice
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VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF

VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT

Number / Percentage
5155/59.5%
562/47.3%
2613 /72%
224/46.5%
262 / 36.1%

Number / Percentage
3512/ 40.5%
626/52.7%
1016/28%
258 /53.5%
463 / 63.9%
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plaintiffs received a verdict of any sort in 72% of those cases that were not
bifurcated, plaintiffs only received a verdict in 27.8% of those cases that
were bifurcated. 9
These statistics are alarming and are remarkably similar to a study
conducted forty years ago. 70 The forty-year-old study demonstrated that
while plaintiffs won 58% of the time when personal injury trials were not
bifurcated, plaintiffs only won 21% of the time in bifurcated cases.? One
author states, "these statistics, if still valid, would suggest that defendants
can substantially alter the nature of the proceedings as to time employed and
result obtained by merely implementing the procedural mechanisms afforded
by the rule. 72 Furthermore, as was stated by Jennifer M. Granholm and
William J.Richards in Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting Devices
Defeat the Jury's Role:73 "[b]ifurcation thus appears to tilt the scales of
justice in favor of defendants," 74 and "threaten[s]
the ultimate goal of the
'75
legal system-the fair resolution of disputes."

VII. THE APPROPRIATE USE OF BIFURCATION IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES
Bifurcation may be appropriate and beneficial to the plaintiff in one
instance. For instance, in cases where the plaintiff has failed to be candid
BIFURCATIONOFPERSONALINJURYCASES: Disposition of Cases with Bifurcation

TYPEOFCASE
All Cases
Trip or Slip and Fall
Motor Vehicle Accidents
Product or Strict liability
Medical Malpractice
Other Negligence

VEDICr FORPLARa
Number /Percentage
24/23.5%
4/12.1%
10/27.8%
1 / 20%
N/A
9/33.3%

VERIcrFOR DEEENDANT
Number / Percentage
78/76.5%
29/87.9%
26/72.2%
4 /80%
1 /N/A
18/66.7%

Statistics from the FloridaJury Verdict Reporterand Westlaw since 1987.
68. Id.

69.

Id.

70. Bruce J. Berman, FLORIDA CIVIL PROCEDURE 282 n.43 (1998 ed.) (quoting from
Vander Car v. Pitts, 166 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 26 U. TOL L. REv.505 (1995).
74. Id. at 513.
75. Id. at 506.
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with regard to prior medical history or prior injuries, and that evidence will
be presented at a unitary trial, a jury will have the tendency to punish the
plaintiff for the false statements or omissions. These false statements or
omissions regarding prior medical history or prior injuries are legally
irrelevant to the liability phase in a bifurcated trial. Thus, in an appropriate
case, the bifurcation of the issues of liability and damages can preclude a
jury from hearing irrelevant evidence, which in all likelihood, would tend to
prejudice them against the plaintiff. However, a plaintiff should not seek
bifurcation of a trial simply because the plaintiff has made misrepresentations. Before a plaintiff seeks bifurcation, the plaintiff must be certain that
the problems previously delineated in this article do not outweigh the
potential benefits of precluding the jury from hearing about the false
statements or omissions during the liability phase of a bifurcated trial.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Although the bifurcation of liability and damages may be appropriate in
very limited circumstances in personal injury cases, it should be the
exception rather than the rule. The appellate courts should adopt a standard
for the trial court to apply in determining whether bifurcation is appropriate.
Although several states have adopted standards such as: bifurcation should
be cautiously applied; allowed only in extraordinary circumstances; or
sparingly applied; these standards really provide no guidance to trial
courts.The standard that should be adopted is that bifurcation of liability and
damages is permitted only when the benefits of bifurcating the proceedings
clearly outweigh the detriment and prejudice to any party opposing the
bifurcation. The abuse of discretion standard can then be applied by the
appellate court to ascertain whether the trial court abused its discretion in
applying this standard. Further, bifurcation should always be permitted
when all of the parties agree.
The test for the trial court to consider in determining whether
bifurcation is appropriate should include consideration of the following
factors:
1.

76

Are the benefits of bifurcation outweighed by the prejudice
to any party opposing the bifurcation order?

See id. at 514 n.37.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Will many of the same witnesses determining liability be
required to testify in the damages phase of the trial?
Have the defendants admitted causation of injury?
Is a significant cost and time savings reasonably likely to
occur as a result of the bifurcation?
Will causation and/or damage issues and testimony be
required for the jury to have a thorough understanding of
the liability aspect of the case?
Is the factual scenario a commonplace occurrence that the
jury will easily comprehend, or are the facts unusual and a
scenario that the jurors may not comprehend how the injury
was caused without hearing the evidence of causation and
damages?

These factors are self-explanatory, except perhaps number three, which deals
with causation. Whether the defendant has admitted causation is important,
because if not, medical testimony may be required in the liability phase to
prove that the incident in fact occurred. In other words, if the defendant is
contesting whether the incident actually occurred, or whether it occurred in
the manner alleged by the plaintiff, then causation and perhaps even damage
testimony will be required to corroborate the plaintiffs claim.
As stated previously, the standard of appellate review would be abuse
of discretion, with the paramount consideration being the avoidance of
prejudice to any party. In other words, a trial court abuses its discretion
when the trial court orders bifurcation and the benefits of bifurcation are
outweighed by the prejudice to any party opposing the bifurcation order.
Bifurcation in personal injury cases is a procedure that is highly
favorable to the defense. Although there may be some overall time-savings
in the bifurcation of some personal injury cases, the constitutional rights of
all litigants to a fair trial are more important than a potentially small timesavings. Bifurcation of liability and damages in personal injury cases should
be reserved for the limited circumstances set forth in this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"Should a civilized society levy its most extreme punishment against
someone who cannot fully understand it? Against someone who could not
help his own lawyers defend him? Against someone who may have
confessed to 'help out' the police, not realizing he's just helped himself to
the death chamber?"' Today, on death rows across the United States, sit a
number of men and women with the minds of children awaiting execution.
These people are mentally retarded. Typical of these individuals is Ernest P.
McCarver, who is currently on death row in North Carolina. 2 McCarver was
convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon, and
he was sentenced to death. 3 Although McCarver is now forty-one years old,
he has the mental capacity of a ten-year, five-month-old child, 4 and an IQ5 of
sixty-seven. 6 "[His] impairments [are] such that he could not perform
typical daily activities. For example, he [is] unable to use the telephone
book to find a place where he could order pizza." 7 "In other words, his
capacity to perform these activities satisfactorily without assistance is more
like that of a preadolescent youth than an adult."'
McCarver is to be executed despite the fact that he is mentally retarded
and has the mind of a ten-year-old. In challenging his sentence, McCarver's
1.
Rosa Enrenreich & Jaimie Fellner, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and
Offenders with Mental Retardation, 13 HuM. RTs. WATCH No. I(G), at 2 (2001), availableat
http://www.hrw.orglreports98/pbsjanjun2kl.htm.
2.
Death Penalty Information Center, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty,
(1997), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgldpicmr.html (last visited July 23, 2001).
3.
State v. McCarver, 402 S.E.2d 25, 31 (N.C. 1995).
4.
Id.
5.
"An intelligence test that generates an IQ score measures the intellectual
functioning of mentally retarded people and any impairments in their adaptive behavior."
Mary D. Bicknell, Constitutional Law: The Eighth Amendment Does Not Prohibit the
Execution of Mentally RetardedConvicts, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 357, 360 (1990).
6.
McCarver,402 S.E.2d at 25; see also Raymond Bonner, Ban on Execution of the
Retarded is Vetoed in Texas, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 2001, at Al (stating Ernest McCarver's

IQ).
7.
Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 7-8, State v. McCarver, 402 S.E.2d 25 (1995) (No. 008727) [hereinafter Pet. For Writ. Of Cert.].
8.
Id. at7.
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basis for prohibiting such executions is that his "execution would violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
because [he] is retarded and there is now a national consensus against
executing the mentally retarded." 9 In McCarver's case, the United States
Supreme Court considers whether attitudes have changed over the past
twelve years to the point where executing people with mental retardation
violates society's ideas of what is decent.' Ernest McCarver is not a rarity
among death row inmates. Although it is unknown how many of the 3700
people on death row in the United States are mentally retarded, experts say
"between 200-300 inmates" 11 suffer from mental retardation.
On June 12, 2001, Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed into law a bill
banning the execution of mentally retarded persons. 12 The United States
Supreme Court, in its term beginning in October, will consider the question
of whether executing those with mental retardation offends society's
"evolving standards of decency" and thus violates the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment.13 Whether executing the mentally
retarded offends society's "evolving standards of decency" and hence a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, is a question that has plagued the
criminal justice system and state legislatures since the Supreme Court
decided Penry v. Lynaugh14 twelve years ago. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, on behalf of the majority, wrote "[w]hile a national consensus
against execution of the mentally retarded may someday emerge reflecting
the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,' there is insufficient evidence of such a consensus today"'1615 to
conclude that it is "categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."'
Id. at 6; see also Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
9.
10. See Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
11. Chris Adams, Executing the Mentally Retarded Cruel and Unusual?, CHAMPION,
May 2001, at 10; see Raymond Bonner & Sara Rimer, Executing the Mentally Retarded Even
as Laws Begin to Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000, (stating that of the 3600 people on death

row, approximately ten percent of the inmates are mentally retarded).
12. FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2001).
13.

Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 7, at 9-14; see also Bonner, supra note 6, at Al

(discussing the Court's consideration of whether executing mentally retarded defendants
offends society's evolving standards of decency); Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty,
supra note 2 (discussing the Court's consideration of whether executing mentally retarded
persons offends society's evolving standards of decency).
14. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that executing persons with mental retardation was
not a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
15. Id. at 340.
16. See generally Jonathan L. Bing, Comment, Protecting the Mentally Retarded
From Capital Punishment: State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future,
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At the time of the decision in Penry, in which the Supreme Court held
that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execution of the mentally
retarded, only one state with the death penalty, Georgia, and the federal
government barred execution of the mentally retarded. 7 Since Penry, fifteen
laws prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded
more states have enacted
8
capital offenders.1
Florida, however, is the first state well-known for its frequent use of the
death penalty to pass a law banning such executions.1 9 Therefore, the
Supreme Court may finally determine that sufficient evidence exists to
establish a national consensus indicating that society no longer approves of
nor wishes to sanction the execution of the mentally retarded. Accordingly,
Florida's new law is important to our scheme of justice and is indicative of a
national trend among states with the death penalty to pass such legislation
outlawing the execution of the mentally retarded.
This article begins by explaining in detail Florida Senate Bill 238,
which created section 921.137 of the FloridaStatutes, titled, "Imposition of
the death sentence upon a mentally retarded defendant prohibited." Part II
discusses the importance of Florida's legislation. Part III explains the
difference between mental retardation and mental illness. Part IV examines
common attributes shared among individuals who suffer from mental
retardation. Part V analyzes the rationales for executing the mentally
retarded, and whether penological goals are furthered, focusing specifically
on the elements of capital homicide, the inefficiency of capital punishment
as a deterrent, and means of retribution when applied to mentally retarded
defendants. Additionally, it examines the relevant Eighth Amendment
principles and the mentally retarded defendant's capacity to satisfy the
culpable mens rea. Parts VI and VII give a brief overview of significant
prior case law, and examine the United States Supreme Court's position in
Penry v. Lynaugh. Finally, Part VIII highlights the potential impact Florida
22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1996) (discussing the emerging national consensus
argument); Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death:
Chartingthe Development of a NationalConsensus to Exempt the Mentally Retardedfrom the
Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REv. 911, 925-29 (2001) (discussing Justice O'Connor's
considerations in reaching the Court's decision in Penry); Mental Retardationand the Death
Penalty, supra note 2.
17. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2; Bing, supra note 16, at
105.
18. Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty, supranote 2.
19. Bing, supra note 16, at 105 (stating that Florida is well-known for its use of the
death penalty).
20.

FLA. STAT. § 921.137.
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Senate Bill 238, banning the execution of mentally retarded persons, will
have on future United States Supreme Court decisions and the emerging
trend to ban such executions among states that have the death penalty.
This article addresses the issue of whether the application of the death
penalty upon persons with mental retardation should be prohibited, because
such a penalty is contrary to society's ideas of what is decent. In addition,
this article explains the reason the death penalty is not necessary to
accomplish the legitimate legislative purposes in punishment, since a less
severe penalty, such as life imprisonment, would adequately serve the same
purpose. Finally, this article discusses the impact Florida Senate Bill 238
will have on future death penalty cases and the emerging trend banning such
executions among those states that have the death penalty.
This article ultimately concludes that the use of capital punishment
against people who suffer from mental retardation is cruelly inhumane and
without justification. Furthermore, Florida is indicative of both a growing
national movement to end such executions, and American standards of
decency that have evolved to the point where capital punishment inflicted
upon the mentally retarded can no longer be tolerated.
I. FLORIDA STATUTE § 921.137: IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE
UPON A MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANT PROHIBITED

A.

Statutory Requirements

Florida Senate Bill 23821 was enacted to ban the imposition of the death
penalty on a defendant who suffers from mental retardation. Under section
921.137(1), mental retardation refers to "significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive
behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age
[eighteen]." 22 Under section 921.137(1), the term "significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning... means performance that is two or more
standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence

21. Id.
22. FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2001); see generally Jamie Marie Billotte, Is It
Justified?-The Death Penalty and Mental Retardation, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETICS & PUB.
POL'Y 333, 338 n.23 (1994). "The American Association on Mental Retardation defines
mental retardation as 'significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental
period."' Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2001

273

Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 26:269

test." 23 Florida Senate Bill 238 does not stipulate how low a defendant's IQ
level must reach to be considered retarded, but uses a definition that
considers defendants "retarded if they have below-normal intellectual
functions and behavior."' "Legislative employees[,] however,] found that
the bill would likely spare any inmate with an IQ of 70 or less."5
A diagnosis of mental retardation requires the presence of impairments
26
in adaptive behavior in addition to the deficit in intellectual functioning.
Adaptive behavior is defined as an individual's effectiveness or degree in
meeting the "standards of personal independence and social responsibility
expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community." 27 Individuals'
adaptive behavior refers to how effectively individuals cope with the
demands and ordinary challenges of everyday life, such as cognition,
communication, and impulse control. 28
Under section 921.137(4), a defendant who has already been convicted
and sentenced to death may file a motion with the trial judge to determine
whether the defendant has mental retardation. 29 Accordingly, two court
appointed independent experts examine the defendant to determine whether
he or she is retarded. 30 In addition, defense attorneys and the state can present evidence from their own experts on whether the defendant suffers from
23. § 921.137(1); see generally James W. Ellis and Ruth A. Luckasson, Symposium
on the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards: Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 414, 422 (1985). 'The AAMD's definition sets the upper
boundary of mental retardation at an IQ level of 70, which is approximately two standard

deviations from the mean score of 100." Id.
24. Fla. Law Bans Execution for Retarded (June 13, 2001), available at
http:llnews.findlaw.comlap-storieslother/ll 1016-13-2001/20010613003744530.html
(last
visited June 13, 2001).
25. Id. See generally Enrenreich, supra note 1.
The vast majority of people in the United States have IQs between 80 and 120, with an
IQ of 100 considered average. To be diagnosed as having mental retardation, a person
must have an IQ below 70-75, i.e. significantly below average. If a person scores
below 70 on a properly administered scored IQ test, he or she is in the bottom 2 percent
of the American population and the first condition necessary to be defined as having
mental retardation.
Id.
26. Ellis, supra note 23, at 422.
27. § 921.137(1).
28. Billotte, supra note 22, at 338; see generally Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 913-14
(discussing definitions of mental retardation); Enrenreich, supra note 1 (analyzing limitations
in adaptive skills, "e.g., communication, self-control, home living, social skills, community
use, self-direction, health and safety ... leisure, and work.").
29. § 921.137(4).
30. Id.
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mental retardation.31 If the trial court concludes by clear and convincing
evidence that the criminal defendant suffers from mental retardation, he or
she is exempt from the death penalty. 32 The criminal defendant, however,
remains subject to the other penalties that may be inflicted on a person
convicted of a capital offense, such as life imprisonment.33
Florida's bill banning the execution of the mentally retarded is fairly
weak. It does not contain a set IQ level, but does use a definition that
considers intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior. 4 Contributing to
the weak nature of Florida Bill 238 is the fact that Florida does not do what
most states practice, which is making the determination of mental retardation
before trial. 5 In Florida, the determination of mental retardation will go to
the jury while deliberating the sentence. 36 This means that the defendant has
already been convicted and sentenced to death. Thus, the defendant must
petition the trial judge to appoint mental health experts to make the
determination after the jury has returned a recommended sentence of death.3 7
Since the jury considers mental retardation during the sentencing phase of
trial, after already hearing the evidence of guilt, the jury is somewhat tainted.
Section 921.137 of the FloridaStatutes is not retroactive. Thus, it does
not apply to any of the 387 people now on Florida's death row,38 all of
whom were sentenced prior to June 12, 2001. 39

31.
32.

Id.
Id.

33. See § 921.137(6). Other penalties that may be imposed on a mentally retarded
person convicted of a capital offense are quite severe and include: "1) life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, 2) life imprisonment without the benefit of probation or
parole until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-five years, 3) life imprisonment, or
4) a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years or more than fifty years." Entzeroth,
supranote 16, at 931.
34. S. 238.

35.

Telephone Interview with Paula Bernstein, Information Specialist, Death Penalty

Information Center, Washington, D.C. (July 23, 2001); e.g., ARK. CODE

ANN.

§ 5-4-618

(Michie 1993) (Prior to trial, the court will determine whether the defendant is mentally
retarded.

The jury will not be "death qualified" if it is found that defendant is mentally

retarded. However, if defendant is convicted, the jury will sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.).

36.

Telephone Interview with Paula Bernstein, Information Specialist, Death Penalty

Information Center, Washington, D.C. (July 23, 2001); S. 238.
37. S. 238.
38. Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
39. § 921.137(8).
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The Importance of Florida'sLegislation

Florida's legislation is important to discuss, because it is the first state
well-known for its frequent use of the death penaltyt ° to pass legislation
banning the execution of mentally retarded capital offenders. As noted
above, on June 12, 2001 Governor Jeb Bush, a Republican who is a strong
supporter of the death penalty, signed Senate Bill 238 into law. The bill
"unanimously passed the Florida Senate in March and was only one vote
short of passing the House unanimously in May.' 41 According to Governor
Bush, "people with clear mental retardation should not be executed.' 42 Bush
the
also said "[t]his legislation will provide
' 43 much-needed protection for
process.
judicial
the
in
retarded
mentally
Over the last twenty-four years since the death penalty was reinstated in
1976, at least thirty-five offenders with mental retardation have been
executed in the United States. 44 Florida has executed four mentally retarded
inmates4 5 since 1976.46 Of the 3700 inmates currently on death row it is
estimated "between 200-300 inmates are mentally retarded.' 47 Executing
offenders who have retardation is unconscionable and inhumane. The
Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, which "has
40. Bing, supra note 16, at 105 (mentioning that other states well-known for their
frequent use of the death penalty are Texas, California, and Louisiana).
41.

Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2; see also Bonner, supra

note 6, at Al (discussing Florida's new legislation banning the execution of the mentally
retarded).
42. Bonner, supra note 11., at Al.
43.
44.

Fla. Law Bans Executionfor Retarded, supra note 22.
Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2 (listing defendants with

mental retardation executed in the United States since 1976, as updated by The Death Penalty
Information Center). "William Ed, attorney with the Office of the Capital Collateral Counsel
in Florida and an expert in death penalty and people with developmental disabilities, has
identified at least nine persons to add to the list." Telephone Interview by Human Rights
Watch with William Ed,Attorney, Office of the Capital Collateral Counsel in Florida (Feb. 6,
2001) (Human Rights Watch can be found at www.hrw.orglreports).
45. Arthur F. Goode, III, a white male with an IQ between sixty and sixty-three, was
executed April 5, 1974, James Dupree Henry, a black male with an IQ in the low seventies,
was executed on July 12, 1974, Mollie Lee Martin, a white male with a dual
diagnosis/mentally insane, was executed on May 12, 1992, and John Earl Bush, a black male
with borderline mental retardation and organic brain damage, was executed on October 21,
1996. Death Penalty Information Center, Executions of Those with Mental Retardation, at

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgdpicmrexecs.html (last visited June 15, 2001).
46.

Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty, supra note 2.

47. Adams, supra note 11, at 10; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 911 (stating
"[b]etween twelve and twenty percent of current death row inmates are mentally retarded").
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been interpreted to include punishment that is disproportionate to the gravity
of the offense and the defendant's
moral culpability, and imposes
'
purposeless pain and suffering. "
The Florida law banning the execution of mentally retarded persons
protects people who do not have the capacity to understand the nature of the
crime they have committed. In addition, when combined with the other sixteen states 49 and the federal government that explicitly prohibit sanctioning
the mentally retarded to death, these legislative enactments send out a
stronger message of a national consensus. 50
Moreover, public opinion polling data also reflects society's consensus
that the death penalty should not be imposed upon the mentally retarded.5 '
For example, in Florida, a 1986 statewide survey revealed Floridians oppose
the use of the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants by seventy-one
percent to twelve percent. This figure is noteworthy, because Florida is a
death penalty state where eighty-four percent of 53
residents favored capital
punishment, while only thirteen percent opposed it.
Whether a national consensus has developed against executing those
with mental retardation is the question the Supreme Court will consider this
fall. This question is very important, as will be set forth in detail, because
Justice O'Connor found that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause must be viewed in light of American conceptions of

48. Enrenreich, supra note 1.
49. Currently fifteen states forbid execution of the mentally retarded: Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New

Mexico, New York, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. The governors of
Connecticut and Missouri have similar legislation sitting on their desks awaiting approval.
Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty, supra note 2.

50. In Penry, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, said that presently there was
no emerging national consensus against executing those with mental retardation convicted of
capital offenses to conclude that it is "categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."
492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989). See generally Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra
note 2; Bing, supra note 16, at 105 (discussing the emerging national consensus argument);
Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 921-22 (discussing Justice O'Connor's considerations in
reaching the Court's decision in Penry).
51. John Blume & David Brack, Sentencing The Mentally Retarded To Death: An
EighthAmendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REv. 725, 759 (1988).
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Cambridge Survey Research, Inc., Attitudes in the State of Florida
on the Death Penalty: A Public Opinion Survey 7, 61 (1986)). See also Bicknell, supra note
5, at 369 (discussing the Cambridge Survey).
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decency.5 4 Although "the Supreme Court has not set a minimum number of
states needed to represent a [national] consensus, 5 5 the Florida law could
strongly evince society's newly evolved consensus against executing the
mentally retarded.
III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MENTAL RETARDATION AND MENTAL ILLNESS

It is critical for courts to understand the distinct differences between
mental retardation and mental illness, rather than lump the two together as
courts often do. 56 This has serious and unfortunate consequences in the
criminal justice system. It is imperative to recognize that mental retardation
is not the same thing as mental illness.5 7 The most significant difference is
that "mental retardation is not an illness. '5 8 This is not to say that mental
retardation and mental illness are mutually exclusive; some mentally
retarded individuals might also suffer from mental illness.5 9 "Indeed,
between twenty to thirty-five percent of all non-institutionalized mentally
retarded persons also have been diagnosed with some form of mental
illness."6
Mental retardation is a developmental or functional disorder that is
permanent, affecting a person's abilities to learn. 61 The mentally ill, by
contrast, encounter disturbances in their thought processes that may be
episodic, temporary, or cyclical. 62 Some forms of mental illnesses have the

54. Entzeroth, supra note 16, 925-26 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 33031(1989)).
55. Bing, supra note 16, at 105.
56. ld. at 71.
57. Ellis, supra note 23, at 423-25; see also Bing, supra note 16, at 71-72 (stating
mental retardation and mental illness are not the same thing, although the courts have lumped
them together); Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating "[ilt is important to recognize
that mental retardation is not a form of mental illness.").
58. Ellis, supra note 23, at 423; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating
mental retardation is not the same as mental illness).
59. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915; see also Ellis, supra note 23, at 425 (stating
"some mentally retarded people are also mentally ill").
60. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915.
61. Ellis, supra note 23, at 424; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating
"mental retardation.., is a permanent developmental or functional disorder").
62. Ellis, supra note 23, at 423.
The American Psychiatric Association defines 'mental disorder' as 'an illness with
psychologic or behavioral manifestations and/or impairment in functioning due to a
social, psychologic, genetic, physical/chemical, or biologic disturbance. The disorder
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prospect of being cured through appropriate psychiatric treatment or
medication. 63 In contrast, psychotherapy or medication will do nothing to
help a mentally retarded individual, although the mentally retarded
individual may be taught how to cope and function with day-to-daa
challenges in order to improve self-sufficiency and adaptive behavior.
Thus, it is not possible to restore a mentally retarded individual's
competency, unlike that of a mentally ill individual. 65 In order to restore
one's competency, one must be competent to begin with.6 Often, mental
retardation manifests itself either at birth or early childhood; therefore,
67
restoration of competence to stand trial is inappropriate and meaningless.
In contrast, "[o]ften mental illness does not emerge until after the individual
is eighteen years old. 68
IV. MENTAL RETARDATION: CHARACTERISTICS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION

To simply define mental retardation as "a condition in which there are
limits in conceptual, practical, and social intelligence 6 9 does not necessarily
help one understand what it means to be a person with mental retardation.
Moreover, it is imperative to understand the problems that the mentally
retarded individual faces in everyday life that a non-retarded individual does
not. Thus, it is essential to examine characteristics of mentally retarded

is not limited to relations between the person and society. The illness is characterized
by symptoms and/or impairment in functioning.'
Id. at 423; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating "the mentally ill experience

disturbances in their thoughts... [while] mental retardation is not a psychological or medical
disorder").

63. Ellis, supra note 23, at 424; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 916 (stating
"certain forms of mental illness can be treated with medication or psychotherapy").
64. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 916; see also Bing, supra note 16, at 71 (stating "the
mentally retarded person can never be stripped of his retardation, though his abilities can be
improved").
65. Ellis, supra note 23, at 424.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 916 (stating "mental retardation
manifests itself by the time the mentally retarded individual is eighteen").
68. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 916.
69. Bing, supra note 16, at 72 (quoting AAMR).
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individuals, especially since several of those
character traits have important
70
implications for the criminal justice system.
Many mentally retarded people have limited communication skills, poor
impulse control, 71 an underdeveloped concept of moral blameworthiness and
causation, a denial of their disability, a lack of knowledge of basic facts, and
increased susceptibility to the influence of authority figures.72 People with
mental retardation will have limitations in cognitive functioning. 73 A mentally retarded person will have limited abilities to learn in areas such as
reading, writing, and arithmetic. 74 Furthermore, he or she will have limited
abilities to reason, plan, understand, judge, and discriminate. 75 Moreover, a
person with mental retardation will have grave problems in logical
reasoning, strategic thinking, and foresight. 76
As a result of a retarded individual's limited cognitive abilities, most
people with mental retardation will know less than most people without

70.

Many of the following descriptions are borrowed from James Ellis' and Ruth

Luckasson's symposium article, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, supra note 23, at

427-32. Although any attempt to describe individuals who suffer from mental retardation as a
group risks false stereotyping, "[s]ome characteristics occur with sufficient frequency to
warrant certain limited generalizations." Id. at 427; e.g., Blume, supra note 51, at 732.
71. ' 1his characteristic is related to deficits in attention and involves attention span,
focus, and selectivity in the attention process. Thus, a mentally retarded person may have
difficulty, or under some circumstances, totally fail to weigh the consequences of the act."
Blume, supra note 51, at 733.
72. Ellis, supra note 23, at 428-32 (listing characteristics of people with mental
retardation); see also Blume, supra note 51, at 732 (recapitulating Ellis and Luckasson).
73. Enrenreich, supra note 1; see Bing, supra note 16, at 72.
74. See also Enrenreich, supra note 1 (discussing limitations in cognitive functioning).
75. Id.
[One expert has summarized the attributes of mental retardation as follows:] Almost
uniformly, individuals with mental retardation have grave difficulties in language and
communication. They have problems with attention, memory, intellectual rigidity, and
in moral development or moral understanding. They are susceptible to suggestion and
readily acquiesce to other adults or authority figures ....People with mental
retardation have limited knowledge because their impaired intelligence has prevented
them from learning very much. They also have grave problems in logic, foresight,
planning, strategic thinking, and understanding consequences.
Id. (quoting Ruth Luckasson, The Death Penalty and the Mentally Retarded,22 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 276 (1994)).
76. Bing, supra note 16, at 72; see Blume, supra note 51, at 732-34; Ellis, supra note
23, at 427-32; see also Enrenreich, supra note I (explaining the characteristics and
significance of mental retardation).
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77
mental retardation, even concerning the most basic aspects of life.
Furthermore, mental retardation limits the person's ability to understand
abstract concepts, including moral concepts. Often, the mentally retarded
are unable to comprehend the relationship between cause and effect,78 and
cannot understand certain results or consequences of their actions.79 While
many mentally retarded defendants who have committed a crime know they
have done something wrong, they often cannot explain, or are unable to
understand, why the act was wrong.80 For example,

At the trial of a man with mental retardation convicted of raping
and murdering an 87-year-old woman, a clinical psychologist
testified that while the defendant could acknowledge that rape was
"wrong," he was nonetheless not able to offer any explanation for
why. 'Pressed for an answer, [the defendant] admitted not
receiving 'permission' for the rape .... Pressed further, in
desperation, he blurted out, 'Maybe it's against her religion!' The
jury gasped at such an explanation."81
As a result of the inability to comprehend abstract concepts, a mentally
retarded person may be incapable of fully understanding the meaning of
death or murder.8 2 For example, "Morris Mason, whose IQ was between
sixty-two to sixty-six, was executed in 1985 in Virginia after being convicted
of rape and murder. Before his execution, Mason asked one of his legal
advisors for advice on what to wear to his funeral. 8 3
Overall, people who suffer from mental retardation have problems with
attention, memory, intellectual rigidity, and moral development and
understanding.8 4 "The entirety of these characteristics may result in some

77. Ellis, supra note 23, at 431; Blume, supra note 51, at 734 (stating that people with
mental retardation know less than most people without mental retardation).
78. Bing, supra note 16, at 72.

79. Blume, supra note 51, at 733. "[A] mentally retarded individual frequently has
incomplete or immature concepts of moral blameworthiness and causation." Id. See also
Bing, supra note 16, at 72 (stating that many mentally retarded persons have an
underdeveloped conception of blameworthiness); Ellis, supranote 23, at 431.
80. Enrenreich, supra note 1 (explaining limitations concerning the ability to

understand abstract concepts, including moral concepts).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Bing, supra note 16, at 72.
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V. RATIONALES FOR SENTENCING A MENTALLY RETARDED PERSON TO
DEATH: ARE LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL GOALS FURTHERED?

A.

The Eighth Amendment's ProhibitionAgainst Cruel and Unusual
Punishment

As noted above, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment has been interpreted to include punishment that is
disproportionate to the severity of the crime and the defendant's moral
culpability, imposes purposeless pain and suffering, or does not measurably
further the penological goals of either retribution or deterrence.8 6 The
Eighth Amendment has not been interpreted as a static concept.87 The
amendment is interpreted in a "flexible and dynamic manner that reflects
society's evolving standards of decency. '' S The Supreme Court has consistently said that in interpreting the meaning of the amendment, they look to
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. ' ' 9 Thus, an assessment of how contemporary society views the
infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth
Amendment. 9° If the punishment is found to be contrary to society's
standards of decency, then the punishment is prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. 9
When these Eighth Amendment principles are applied to a mentally
retarded defendant who has impaired reasoning abilities, inability to control
85. Id.
86. See generally Blume, supra note 51, at 737-38 (discussing relevant Eighth
Amendment principles); Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 922-26 (analyzing the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Enrenreich, supra note I (discussing
summary and recommendations and United States law).
87. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976).
88. Id. at 171.
89. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); accord Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 788-89 (1982); see also Blume, supra note 51, at 738 (stating punishment is
constitutionally impermissible if it offends the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society"); Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 935 (analyzing the Court's
decision in Penry).
90. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
91. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989).
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impulsive behavior, and lack of moral blameworthiness, the ultimate penalty
of death is always and necessarily disproportionate to his or her
blameworthiness, and hence unconstitutional serving no legitimate
penological goal.92 Additionally, sentencing a mentally retarded person to
death offends contemporary standards of decency; inherent in mental
retardation is the person's diminished ability to make responsible decisions,
to appreciate the full consequences of his or her acts, and to relate
competently and independently to the world around him or her.93 "At a
minimum, 'the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution.., of those who
are unaware
of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to
94
suffer it.'
B.

The Mentally RetardedDefendant's Capacity to Satisfy the Culpable
Mens Rea
1.

Elements of Capital Homicide

Given the reduced ability found in every dimension of the retarded
individual's functioning, the question is whether a mentally retarded
defendant has the capacity to satisfy the mens rea ("guilty mind") 95
requirement to be sufficiently culpable of murder. 96 In the thirty-eight states
that presently authorize the death penalty, "the trier of fact must determine

92.

Id. at 346.

[Quoting from documents prepared by the American Association of Mental
Retardation, Justice Brennan reasoned that] all [mentally retarded individuals] share
the common attributes of low intelligence and inadequacies of adaptive behavior [as
well as] 'a substantial disability in cognitive ability and adaptive behavior.' The
impairment of mentally retarded offender's reasoning abilities, control over impulsive
behavior, and moral development ... limits [their] culpability so that, whatever other

punishment might be appropriate, the ultimate penalty of death is always and
necessarily disproportionate to [their] blameworthiness and hence is unconstitutional.

Id. at 344-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Blume, supra note 51, at 738 (stating death
is constitutionally excessive punishment serving no legitimate penological goals when applied
to a mentally retarded individual); Enrenreich, supra note 1 (quoting Justice Brennan's dissent
in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 344-46, 1989)).
93. Blume, supra note 51, at 738-39.
94. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986).
95. JostUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINALLAW § 10.01, at 101 (2d ed. 1995).
96. William K. Wetzonis, CapitalPunishmentfor Mentally Retarded Defendants: A
Boundaryfor the EighthAmendment Is Drawn, 34 How. L.J. 651, 656 (1991).
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whether the elements of capital homicide have been met. '97 For purposes of
imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded capital offenders, the trier
of fact may consider evidence of mental retardation as a mitigating factor. 98
In general, mental retardation is offered in mitigation of punishment. 99 It is
also offered to "prove the existence of one or more statutory mitigating
factors, [for example,] 'the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired,' or that the defendant
suffered from a mental disease or defect."'0
The death penalty is reserved for the most culpable capital offenders
who commit the most heinous crimes. 10 A defendant may be sentenced to
death if the defendant acted deliberately and unreasonably and would
continue to be a threat to society.1 2 Acting deliberately, however, is not the
only culpable mental state sufficient for a defendant to be sentenced to
death.1 3 In Tison v. Arizona,1 4 the Supreme Court held that reckless
indifference for human life is a highly culpable mental state sufficient to
deserve death. 0 5 In sum, for a defendant to be sentenced to death, the
sentencer, at a minimum, must conclude that either the defendant intended to
kill the victim and knew that there was a possibility that the victim could die,
or was reckless and acted without excuse, justification, or in the heat of
passion.1 6 Since a mentally retarded person is of lower intelligence and has
97.
98.
99.

Billotte, supra note 22, at 337.
Blume, supra note 51, at 741.
Id.

100. Id.
101. See also Beyond Reason, supra note 1 (stating that mentally retarded offenders
should never be placed in the category for the most culpable offenders for whom the death
penalty is reserved).
102. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 310 (1989); see also infra text accompanying
note 197; see also Billotte, supra note 22, at 337-38 (stating that if a defendant acted
deliberately and unreasonably and would continue to be a threat to society, then the defendant
may be sentenced to death).
103. Billotte, supra note 22, at 338.
104. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
105. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987).
In Tison, the defendant, after helping his father escape from prison, watched his father
murder a family of four. The defendant did not participate in the murder but also did
not help the victims. The defendant drove away from the scene of the crime with his
father in the victims' car. Although the defendant did not kill anyone, he was
convicted of felony-murder due to his reckless disregard for the victims' lives.

Billotte, supra note 22, at 338.
106. Billotte, supra note 22, at 338. "Under the Model Penal Code, a defendant is
guilty of murder when: '(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed
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reduced ability in language, ability to control impulsivity, self-concept, selfperception, moral development, knowledge of basic facts, and motivation, it
is unlikely that such an10individual
could posses the requisite mens rea to be
7
found guilty of murder.
2.

Deterrence and Mentally Retarded Offenders: Inefficiency of Capital
Punishment as a Deterrent

General deterrence is one of the purposes that can justify capital
punishment. 10 8 It focuses on a punishment's effect on society, and whether
the rest of society will be deterred from committing criminal acts. 0 9 General
deterrence occurs when the punishment of one person discourages others
from criminality, because of one's desire to avoid the punishment that a
particular wrongdoer has suffered." 0 That is, "[the defendant] is punished in
order to convince the general community to forego criminal conduct in the
future.""' The driving force behind general deterrent justification
is the fear
2
punishment.1
in
result
will
convicted,
if
action,
one's
that
[Thus, the defendant's] punishment serves as an object lesson to
the rest of the community; [the defendant] is used as a means to a
desired end, namely, a net reduction in crime. [The defendant's]
punishment teaches us what conduct is impermissible; it instills
fear of punishment in would-be violators of the law; and, at least to
a limited extent, it habituates us to act lawfully, even in the absence
of fear of punishment."13
The penological goal of deterrence is not advanced when applied to
mentally retarded defendants. The threat of execution cannot deter a
mentally retarded individual. Deterrence is premised upon the assumption
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."'
Wetzonis, supranote 95, at 656.
107. Wetzonis, supra note 96, at 656-57.
108. Billotte, supra note 22, at 336, 356; e.g., Enrenreich, supra note 1.
109. Billotte, supra note 22, at 356.
110. Id. at 356.
111. DRBSSLE, supra note 95, § 2.03[B], at 10.
112. Billotte, supra note 22, at 357. While general deterrence is concerned with
deterring others from committing a criminal act by punishing a particular wrongdoer,

"[s]pecific deterrence focuses on the criminal actor and whether he will commit his criminal
act again." Id. at 356.
113. DRrSSLER, supra note 95, § 2.03[B], at 10 (alteration in original).
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that an individual is both capable of considering and understanding the
consequences of his or her actions and capable of controlling his or her
impulses." 4 In Gregg v. Georgia,15 the court stated that whether the death
penalty is a deterrent depends on whether the possibility of the penalty of6
death will enter "into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act.""1
Accordingly, one must premeditate in order to be deterred." 7
When the deterrence rational is applied to mentally retarded defendants,
it is highly difficult to convincingly maintain that a mentally retarded
defendant has the capacity to premeditate a crime, and process and act upon
the likelihood of death as a penalty for certain proscribed actions."
As
previously noted, mentally retarded people have limited impulse control.
"[A] deterrent that depends on rational decision-making will fail to control
these impulsive acts."
A mentally retarded person may commit crimes on
impulse that he or she does not realize will result in death. In addition,
limitations in cognitive functioning lessen a retarded person's capability to
plan and calculate a crime, to understand and weigh its consequences, or
assess their options, as do persons of average intelligence or better.2
According to Justice Brennan:
[T]he goal of deterrence would not be advanced, as '[I]t is highly
unlikely that the exclusion of the mentally retarded from the class
of those eligible to be sentenced to death will lessen any deterrent
effect the death penalty may have for non-retarded potential
offenders .... ' Moreover, because of the impairments in the ability
of a mentally retarded person to understand the consequences of his
or her actions and to control his or impulses, it is unlikely that the
114. Billotte, supra note 22, at 361; e.g., Blume, supra note 51, at 742.
115. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that the death penalty is not per
se cruel and unusual punishment).
116. Id. at 185-86; see also Billotte, supra note 22, at 361 (stating the death peanlty as
a deterent depends on "whether the possibility of execution will enter 'into the cold calculus
that precedes the decision to act"'); e.g., Blume, supra note 51, at 742 n.67.
117. Blume, supra note 51, at 742.
118. Id. E.g., Billotte, supra note 22, at 361.
119. Bing, supra note 16, at 80.
120. Ellis, supra note 23, at 429; see Blume, supra note 51, at 729-30 ("[M]ental
retardation is a significant and devastating mental impairment which reduces a mentally
retarded person's moral blameworthiness to a level different in kind from other non-retarded
persons accused of murder.").
121. Ellis, supra note 23, at 429; see also Billotte, supra note 22, at 361 (discussing a
mentally retarded persons difficulty to weigh consequences); Blume, supra note 51, at 733
(discussing impaired impulse control).
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execution of the mentally retarded would deter other mentally
122
retarded criminal defendants from committing capital offenses.

Furthermore, mentally retarded individuals often cannot adequately
understand the correlation between the imposition of a punishment on
another wrongdoer and the result that would occur if they committed a
similar crime.' 23 Thus, because the death penalty serves as a deterrent only
when the criminal offense is a result of at least some premeditation and
deliberation, "the execution of the mentally retarded cannot be justified
under the deterrence rationale."' 24

3.

Means of Retribution When Applied to Mentally Retarded Defendants
Retribution is the second justified purpose of the death penalty. Some

believe that punishment is justified if and only if the criminal defendant
deserves it.125 "It is deserved when the wrongdoer freely chooses to violate
society's rules."' 126 Retribution looks backward and focuses on the past
behavior of the criminal defendant. 127 Punishment is justified solely on the

122. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 928 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 348
(1989)).
123. Bing, supra note 16, at 80. In Penry,
Justice Brennan argued... that the execution of mentally retarded offenders violates
the Eighth Amendment because such executions do not measurably further the goals of
either retribution or deterrence. He reasoned that... deterrence cannot be furthered
because the intellectual impairments of persons with mental retardation preclude their
ability to weigh the possibility of the death penalty and calculating different courses of
action. As a result, "the execution of mentally retarded individuals is 'nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering."'
Enrenreich, supra note 1.
124. Bing, supra note 16, at 80; see Blume, supra note 51, at 742. Justice Brennan
found, the "very factors that make [capital punishment] disproportionate and unjust to execute
the mentally retarded also make the death penalty the most minimal deterrent effect so far as
retarded potential offenders are concerned." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 348 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 95, § 2.03[C], at I1 (stating "[rletributivists
believe... punishment is justified when it is deserved"); Billotte, supra note 22, at 362
(stating "punishment is 'just' if and only if the criminal deserves it").
126. DRESSLER, supra note 95, § 2.03[C], at 11. The rationale of retribution is based
on the "view that humans possess free will and, therefore, may justly be blamed when they
choose to violate society's mores." Id.
127. See id. See also Billotte, supra note 22, at 363 (stating "[r]etribution... focuses
on the past behavior of the criminal rather than the future effect of his punishment").
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basis of the voluntary commission of the crime. 128 Thus, the defendant is
punished based on what crime he committed and what he deserves.' 29
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized, for purposes of
imposing the death penalty, that it is essential that a defendant's punishment
be limited to one's "personal responsibility and moral guilt."'"3 Critical in
"determining personal responsibility and moral guilt, is the mental state of
the defendant." 131 The Supreme Court has recognized further that, "it is
undeniable... that those who are mentally1 32retarded have a reduced ability to
cope and function in the everyday world.
Retribution is premised on the assumption that the defendant punished
had full culpability of his own actions.' 33 Culpability is a crucial aspect to
retributive thought. 34 With retribution, the result of a defendant's criminal
actions does not determine the punishment; culpability must be factored in as
well. 135 Factors that influence moral development include intelligence,
chronological age, mental age, living in an enriching environment, and
opportunity for interaction with others.' 36 As noted above, the common
attributes shared among mentally retarded individuals are low intelligence
and inadequacies of adaptive behavior. In addition, they suffer from a
reduced ability in areas of functioning such as the ability to control
impulsivity, to communicate, remember, and understand. 37 The severity of
mental retardation diminishes the retarded person's ability to both manage
with and perform in the world. 38 It is this diminished ability to function and
the impaired mental state which limit the retarded defendant's moral

128. DRESSLER, supra note 95, § 2.03[C], at 11.
129. Id. See also Billotte, supra note 22, at 363 (stating "[a] criminal is punished
based on what he did and what he deserves").
130. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); see also Billotte, supra note 22, at
365 (stating "the appropriateness of the death penalty is a question of 'personal responsibility
and moral guilt'); Blume, supra note 51, at 743 (stating "the appropriateness of the death
penalty is essentially a question of 'personal responsibility and moral guilt"').
131. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987); see Blume, supra note 51, at 743-44.
132. Blume, supra note 51, at 744 (quoting Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985)).
133. Bing, supra note 16, at 80.
134. Billotte, supra note 22, at 362.
135. Id. at 363.
136. Id. at 365; accord Ellis, supra note 23, at 429 n.78.
137. Blume, supra note 51, at 744.
138. Id.
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culpability. 139 In fact, due to the severe deficits from which the mentally
retarded person suffers, such an individual cannot be said to be sufficiently
blameworthy to justify the infliction of the sentence of death, because the
defendant's culpability is reduced. 14° For these reasons,, the mentally
retarded "lack[] sufficient moral culpability to advance the goal of
retribution, which requires that a 14
criminal
sentence be directly related to the
1
culpability.
personal
defendant's
Moreover, retribution "depends on the defendant's awareness of the
penalty's existence and purpose."' 142 Reduced abilities in cognitive functioning may limit the mentally retarded individual's ability to understand the
nature and effects of the death penalty, and the reason for imposing it.' 43
Thus, executions of mentally retarded persons impose a uniquely cruel
penalty and are generally inconsistent with one of the principal purposes of
executions.' 44 At a minimum, "the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution
only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer
and why they are to suffer it."1 45
In Ford v. Wainwright,'46 the Court stated:
[T]oday, no less than before, we may seriously question the
retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehension
of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental
right to life... Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized societies
feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his
own conscience or deity is still vivid today. And the intuition that

139. See generally Blume, supra note 51, at 744 (stating that "this reduced ability to
function and the impaired mental state which changes in kind, not degree, the mentally
retarded person's moral culpability").
140. Blume, supranote 51, at 744.
141. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 928; see V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the
Mentally Retardedfrom the Death Penalty: A Comment on Florida'sProposed Legislation,

19 R.A. ST. U. L. REv. 457,467 (1991).
142. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,421 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
143. See id. at 421-22.

144. See id. at 421.
145. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). "[S]tates have more rigorous standards, but
none disputes the need to require that those who are executed know the fact of their
impending execution and the reason for it." Id.
146. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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such an execution 47simply offends humanity is evidently shared
across this Nation.1
Putting a mentally retarded individual to death does not further the
punishment goals of deterrence nor of retribution, because it does not ensure
that the criminal gets his just desserts. 148 Only when murder is the result of
49
premeditation and deliberation, can the death penalty serve as a deterrent.1
Since mentally retarded offenders lack the necessary culpability "that is a
prerequisite to the proportionate imposition of the death penalty, it 5follows
0
that execution can never be the 'just deserts' of a retarded offender."'
In summary, because a mentally retarded defendant's degree of
culpability is qualitatively less than that of a non-retarded capital murderer,
the legitimate penological goal in deterrence and retribution is neither
furthered nor served by executing a mentally retarded offender. Thus, the
death penalty when imposed upon the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual
punishment, and hence unconstitutional, because it is excessive.15
VI. SIGNIFICANT PRIOR CASE LAW

In 1972, the Supreme Court held in Furman v. Georgia,112 that the
states cannot impose the death penalty on a selected group of offenders in an
147. Id. at 409; see also Blume, supra note 51, at 744 n.74 (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986)).
148. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 348 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982).
150. Penry, 492 U.S. at 348.
Even if mental retardation alone were not invariably associated with a lack of the
degree of culpability upon which death as a proportionate punishment is predicated,
[Justice Brennan argued that he] would still hold the execution of the mentally retarded
to be unconstitutional... [since there is] no assurance that an adequate individualized
determination of whether the death penalty is a proportionate punishment will be made
at the conclusion of each capital trial....
Lack of culpability as a result of mental
retardation is simply not isolated.., as a factor that determinatively bars a death
sentence.

Id. at 346-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151.
In Gregg v. Georgia... the Court defined "excessive" as consisting of two elements. First, "the
punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain[,]" which means that
the death penalty as imposed must advance the penological goals of retribution and deterrence.
Second "the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."

Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 925.
152. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner based solely on the offense
In 1976, the Supreme Court reexamined the death penalty
committed.
of the Eighth Amendment. In Gregg v. Georgia,154 the
context
issue in the

plurality of the Court declared that the Eighth Amendment must be
"interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner" that reflects society's
evolving standards of decency, 55 which is the standard used by the Court to
test the validity of a punishment under the Eighth Amendment.1 56 The Court
made clear, "so long as the class of murderers subject to capital punishment
is narrowed, there is no constitutional infirmity in a procedure that allows a
jury to recommend mercy based on the mitigating evidence introduced by a
defendant.' 5s7 The decision in Gregg further narrowed the class of people
upon which the death penalty may be imposed. 158
Later, in Ford v. Wainwright,159 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth

Amendment prohibits execution of the insane. 16 In reaching its decision,
the Court considered that common law prohibited executing the insane. 61 In
addition, the Court found that a national consensus existed, since no state
permitted the execution of the insane, and twenty-six states had statutes

expressly requiring stay of the execution of a capital murderer who became
153. Id. at 255-57; see generallyCohen, supra note 141, at 463.
154. Id. at 171 (plurality opinion).
155. Id. at 171.
156. See id. at 173; see also Cohen, supra note 141, at 463-64 (discussing the holding
of Gregg v. Georgia). The Court looks primarily to existing state legislation to define these
'evolving standards' and the decision in Gregg emphasizes that, when considering capital
punishment, great deference will be given to state legislatures. Id. at 464.
The Court stated: In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Legislature
that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong.
Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legislature to
evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the death
penalty and its social utility as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of
more convincing evidence, that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is
not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.
Id. at 464 n.71 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 186-87 (1976)).
157. Penry, 492 U.S. at 327.
158. See Cohen, supra note 141, at 464; Bicknell, supra note 5, at 363 (discussing the
significance of Gregg v. Georgia).
159. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
160. Ford,477 U.S. at 409-10; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 363 (discussing the
death penalty and significant cases).
161. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-07 (1986); see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 363-64
(discussing the death penalty and the significance of Ford v. Wainwright); Cohen, supra note
141, at 466 (discussing the holding in Ford v. Wainwright).
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insane. 162 Moreover, the Court noted the insane should not be executed,
because such an execution has questionable retributive value, no deterrent
effect on people who cannot understand the reason for their execution and
the full implication of the penalty, 16 nor are they able to assist in their own
defense.'6 Finally, the Court declared that executing insane defendants
offends humanity.'
More recently, the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Thompson v.
Oklahoma'66 held that executing a criminal defendant who was under the age
of sixteen years old at the time of their offense constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.167 In
examining the objective evidence of American conceptions of decency, the
plurality found that eighteen states explicitly established in their death
penalty statutes that the defendant has attained the minimum age of sixteen
at the time of the offense. 168
In 1989, the Supreme Court's decision addressing the death penalty in
Penry v. Lynaugh, did not continue its narrowing of the class of murderers
eligible for the death penalty. 69 The Court refused to find that executing a
mentally retarded person was a per se violation of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.170 Instead, the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment did not necessarily preclude the execution of all
mentally
personsthat
simply
by virtueis of
their disability
alone.as17 1toThe
Court
did retarded
hold, however,
the accused
entitled
to instructions
the

162. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408-09 n.2; see, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334
(1989); see also Cohen, supra note 141, at 466 (stating the common law prohibition against
execution of the insane and that most state legislatures exempt the insane from capital
punishment).
163. Bicknell, supra note 5, at 363-64.

164. Cohen, supra note 141, at 466.
165. Id. See also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 363-64 (discussing the death penalty and
the significance of Ford v. Wainwright).

166. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
167. Id. at 838; see Bicknell, supra note 5, at 364 (discussing the Court's decision in
Thompson v. Oklahoma); see also Cohen, supra note 141, at 465. "In reaching its conclusion,

the Court looked to society's evolving standards of decency, the diminished culpability of
minors, and the recognized goals of capital punishment." Id.
168. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989).
169. id. at 338-39; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 364 (discussing the Court's
decision in Penry).
170. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340. See also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 364 (discussing the
Court's decision in Penry).
171. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
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mitigating effect of mental retardation. 72 The Court reasoned, so long as
mitigating circumstances are considered by the sentencer, "an individualized
determination whether173'death is the appropriate punishment' can be made in
each particular case."
In examining objective evidence of the public's attitude toward executing the mentally retarded, the Court found that only one state banned the
execution of retarded persons who have been found guilty of a capital
offense, and that one state was insufficient to constitute a national consensus.174 In addition, the Court noted that Maryland had enacted similar
1 75
legislation, but the statute would not take effect until the following week.
VII. SUPREME COURT'S POSITION IN PENRY V. LYNAUGH: ALLOWING THE
IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE MENTALLY RETARDED

In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court, in a five to four vote, held the
Eighth Amendment did not categorically prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty on mentally retarded defendants. 176 This was the first time the
Supreme Court explicitly sanctioned the execution of a mentally retarded
person.1 77 In the Court's decision, Justice O'Connor wrote, "there is
insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally
retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is
categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment., 178 Penry was convicted
in Texas of brutally stabbing Pamela Carpenter with a pair of scissors after
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 334.
175. Id.
176. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
On the other hand, the Court has ruled that a person who is insane at the time of his
execution may not be executed. Nonetheless, on January 24, 1992, Rickey Ray Rector,
a man with obvious and profound mental defects, was killed by lethal injection in
Arkansas. Rector shot and killed a police officer, then shot himself in the forehead; he
underwent brain surgery that required removal of three inches of frontal brain tissue.
There was no question that Rector's mental abilities were significantly impaired. In the
days leading up to his execution, Rector's behavior included such bizarre acts as
barking like a dog, stamping his feet, snapping his fingers, repeatedly calling out the
nickname of an old friend, and laughing. When his last meal was served, Rector
devoured his dinner, but saved his dessert to be eaten later-after his execution.
Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 918 n.72 (citations omitted).
177. Entzeroth, supranote 16, at 918.
178. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
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he raped and beat her in her home.179 Pamela died a few hours later while
receiving emergency treatment. 80 Before dying, however, she was able to
identify Penry as her attacker. 81 Subsequently, 183
Penry confessed twice to the
182
murder.
capital
with
charged
was
He
murder.
At a competency hearing before Penry's trial, expert testimony was
presented showing he was mentally retarded. 184 Evidence showed that
previous testing indicated that his IQ fell between fifty and sixty-three,
indicating mild to moderate mental retardation.185 The effect of mild to
moderate retardation is, "mildly retarded individuals may learn skills up to
the sixth grade level, and persons with moderate mental retardation
are
' 86
unlikely to achieve academic skills beyond the second grade level."'
179. Id. at 307.

180. Id.
181. Id.

182. Id.
[E]vidence suggests mentally retarded persons accused of crimes confess much more
readily than do other defendants. This in all likelihood due to the fact that mentally
retarded persons react readily to both friendly suggestions and intimidation, and thus
are particularly susceptible to coercive police techniques. Any confession given by a
mentally retarded individual also presents especially difficult questions concerning
whether he had the mental capacity to understand and validly waive his constitutional
rights under Miranda and the fifth and sixth amendments. Many mentally retarded
people simply cannot understand the Miranda warnings, especially in the form and in
the manner that they are likely to be given by police or prosecutors. This determination
involves inquiry of not only whether the individual understands the concepts contained
in the warnings, what a "right" is, but also whether he understands the language used
to convey the concepts. Even a defendant functioning in the mildly retarded range will
often be unable to understand the concept of legal terms such as "waiver" or even the
elements of the offense with which he is charged unless special efforts are made to
explain them.

Blume, supra note 51, at 736-37.
183. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.

184. Id.
185. Id. at 307-08.
In addition to his mental retardation, Penry grew up in a home where horrible abuse
was regularly inflicted upon him. Shortly after his birth, Penry's mother suffered a
nervous breakdown and was comnitted to a mental hospital for ten months. When she
returned to her young son, she subjected him to severe beatings, including blows to his
head and cigarette bums on his body. Penry dropped out of school in the first grade

and was in and out of state institutions until he was twelve years old, after which he
went to live with an aunt. It took his aunt a year to teach Penry the simple task of
printing his name.
Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 919.
186. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 919.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

294

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

2001]

Raphael

Before the competency trial, IQ testing indicated that Penry had an IQ
of fifty-four. 117 Additionally, the evaluation revealed that Penry, who was
twenty-two years old at the time of the murder, had the mental age of a six
and one-half year old child, "which mean[t] that 'he ha[d] the ability to learn
and the learning or the knowledge of the average 6 year old kid."" 88
Penry's social maturity, his ability to function in the world, was that of a
nine- or ten-year-old child.189 "H]e could not read or write, name the days
of the week or months of the year, or name the president of the United
States."' '9 The psychiatrist who tested Penry testified that, "'there's a point
at which anyone with [Penry's] IQ is always incompetent, but, you know,
this man is more in the borderline range."' 191 The jury found Penry
competent to stand trial.1 9
During the guilt/innocence phase of Penry's trial, the trial court found
93
Penry's two confessions to be voluntary and were admitted into evidence.1
Penry raised an insanity defense, presenting testimony that his moderate
mental retardation and organic brain damage,1 94 "resulted in poor impulse
control and an inability to learn from [his] experience[s]." 195 Additionally,
the psychiatrist testified that the brain damage, which Penry was suffering
from at the time of the offense, resulted in the inability "for him to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his [action and] conform his conduct to the
law." 196 In rebuttal, the state put two psychiatrists on the stand that testified
Penry was sane at the time of the crime. 197 They conceded, however, that
Penry had a limited mental ability, an inability to learn from his experiences,
and a tendency to be impulsive and to violate society's norms. 198

187. Pemy v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 (1989).
188. Id.

189. Id.
190. Jamie Fellner, U.S. Execution of Mentally Retarded Condemned (Mar. 20, 2001),
at http://www.hrw.orgpress/2001/03/mrexO320.htm.
191. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308.

192.
193.
194.
Id. at 307.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. at 308-09.
The organic brain damage was "probably caused by trauma to the brain at birth."
Id. at 308.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 309.

Id.

198. Id. At the close of the penalty hearing, the jury was instructed, pursuant to the
Texas death penalty statutory scheme, to answer three "special issues" to determine Penry's
sentence. Id. at 310. Under § 19.03 of the Texas Penal Code, the jury had to answer:
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Although Penry was sentenced to death, the Supreme Court overturned
his sentence, because the trial court failed to instruct the jury "that it could
consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental
retardation and abused background by declining to impose the death
penalty." 199
The Court concluded that, by failing to provide the proper instruction,
the trial court did not provide the jury with a "vehicle for expressing its
'reasoned moral response"' to Penry's evidence of mental retardation in
20
handing down its sentence. 0
After Penry was sentenced to death, he sought, and was denied, habeas
corpus relief in the United States District Court.2 1 Penry appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's
decision, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.. 2 Justice
O'Connor acknowledged the common law prohibition against punishing
"idiots" with the sentence of death, and that such a prohibition suggests that
the execution of a severely retardedjperson may indeed be "cruel and
unusual" under the Eighth Amendment.
The majority opinion strongly expressed that the insanity defense and
their decision in Ford v. Wainwright afforded severely mentally retarded
1)

2)
3)

whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;
whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.

Id. at 310; e.g., Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 920-21. "If the jury answered "yes" to all three
questions, the penalty of death would be imposed. The jury answered "yes" to all three
questions, and accordingly, the trial court sentenced Penry to death." Entzeroth, supra note
16, at 921.
199. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
200. Id.
201. Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365.
202. Penry, 492 U.S. at 312; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365.
203. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331-33; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365 (discussing
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion).
204. In Ford, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of
people who cannot understand the full implication of the punishment they are about to suffer
and the reason for suffering it. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989) (citing Ford v.
Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986)); see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365 (stating the
holding in Ford).
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defendants protection in the criminal justice system.0 5 Since Penry did not
classify as profoundly or severely retarded, the Court reasoned that he could

not qualify for the defense of being unaware of his punishment or its
consequences. 206
Unfortunately, the Court failed to recognize the differences between
mental illness and mental retardation, so they lumped the two together. As

noted above, it is imperative to recognize that mental retardation is not the
same as mental illness. 0 7 The most significant difference between the two is

that mental retardation is not an illness.20 8 While some forms of mental
illness can be treated with medication or psychotherapy, the same does not
hold true for mental retardation. 20 9 Medication or psychotherapy treatment

will do nothing to minimize or cure a mentally retarded individual who is not

mentally ill.2' Thus, the Court's conclusion was flawed when it decided
that a mentally retarded defendant is afforded adequate protection under the
insanity defense when the mentally retarded are not insane, and under Ford
v. Wainwright, where the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
execution of the insane.2 tl

Although the Court declared that mental retardation alone does not
forbid execution, Penry explicitly states that courts must specifically instruct
205. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365 (discussing the
Court's rationale).
206. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365 (stating the "Court
reasoned that only severely or profoundly retarded persons could qualify for the defense of
being unaware of their punishment or its consequences").
LT]he Court held that Penry did not classify as severely retarded. The Court reached
this decision based on evidence that Penry, as a "borderline" mentally retarded person,
had the ability to consult with his lawyer, and could rationally and factually understand
the proceedings. From this information, the Court held that mental retardation alone
cannot exempt retarded persons of Penry's abilities from the death penalty.
Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365.
207. Ellis, supra note 23, at 423-25; see also Bing, supra note 16, at 71-72 (stating
mental retardation and mental illness are not the same thing, although the courts have lumped
them together); Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating "it is important to recognize that
mental retardation is not a form of mental illness").
208. Ellis, supra note 23, at 423; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating
mental retardation is not the same as mental illness).
209. Ellis, supra note 23, at 424; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915 (stating
"certain forms of mental illness can be treated with medication or psychotherapy").
210. Ellis, supra note 23, at 424; see also Bing, supra note 16, at 71 (stating. "the
mentally retarded can never be stripped of his retardation, though his abilities can be
improved"); Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915 (stating "mental retardation cannot be
ameliorated by drugs or psychotherapy").
211. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
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the jury to consider and give effect to all mitigating evidence of mental
retardation and history of abuse.21 The Court reasoned that this instruction
imposed must be directly related to
was necessary because any punishment
2 13
the defendant's personal culpability.
VIII. A NATIONAL CONSENSUS: A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SOCIETY'S
STANDARDS OF DECENCY REGARDING THE MENTALLY RETARDED SINCE
PENRY V. LYNA UGH

In Ernest P. McCarver's case this October, the Supreme Court will be
revisiting the issue of whether attitudes have changed over the past twelve
years to the point where executing people with mental retardation violates
society's ideas of what is decent. 214 One of the reasons the Supreme Court
refused to exclude all mentally retarded defendants from the death penalty in
Penry was that the defendant did not present any legislation showing that the
215
states were narrowing their sentencing procedures to exclude the retarded.
In order for the Penry decision to be changed and for the execution of the
mentally retarded to end, the Supreme Court must look to "objective
evidence, [such as actions of state legislatures,] to determine how our society
views [this] particular punishment today., 2 16 Therefore, the Court must
217
assess whether this punishment offends American concepts of decency.
In the twelve years that have passed since Penry, there has been a
pivotal change in the public's perceptions of standards of decency with
respect to sanctioning a mentally retarded person to death. 2 18 At the time of
the decision in Penry, in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment did not categorically prohibit the execution of the mentally
retarded, only one state, Georgia, and the federal government banned

212. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989); see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at

366 (stating that the decision in Penry clearly requires that courts "give specific jury
instructions that allow the consideration of all mitigating evidence of mental retardation").
213. Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 366 (stating the
Court held the instruction necessary, "because any punishment inflicted must be directly

related to the personal culpability of the defendant").
214. See Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2.

215. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333-34.
216. Id. at 331. Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 7, at 12 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
217. Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 7, at 10.
218. Id.
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executions of people with mental retardation. 219 Maryland had enacted
legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded, but it did not
go into effect until one week after the Court decided Penry.220 In her
opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that even when the Georgia and Maryland

statutes prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded individuals were
"added to the [fourteen] States that have rejected capital punishment

completely, [such legislation did] not provide sufficient evidence at present
of a national consensus'22t to exempt the mentally retarded from the

punishment of death.
Since the decision in Penry, fifteen more states: Arizona, Arkansas,

Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Washington have recognized that sentencing the mentally retarded to death
iscruelly inhumane and therefore have outlawed such executions.22 Today,
half of the states ban executing the mentally retarded-seventeen of the
thirty-eight death penalty states prohibit executing the mentally retarded and

twelve states and the District of Columbia do not have the death penalty at
all. Also, the federal government does not allow for the mentally retarded to
be executed. When combined, the majority of jurisdictions in this country
prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded. 223

219. Id. at 11; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 926 (stating at the time the Court
decided Penry, only Georgia and the federal government prohibited executing the mentally
retarded); Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that
Maryland and Georgia prohibited executing the mentally retarded).
220. See Pet. for Writ bf Cert., supra note 7, at 11; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16,
at 926 (stating that Maryland's legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded
went into effect a week after Penry was handed down).
221. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
222. Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 7, at 11; see also Bonner, supra note 7, at Al
(stating that "the federal government bars such executions, as do [fifteen] states"); Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2 (naming the states that currently forbid
execution of the mentally retarded).
223. Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 7, at 11-12. It is important to note, however,
that the Court has held:
[N]either the jurisdictions which do not impose capital punishment, nor the criminal
law practices of the federal government, should be taken into account the figuring of a
national consensus. The jury also discounted the use ofjury determinations as a factor
in consensus determination. The fact that sentencing juries were reluctant to impose
capital punishment on the retarded was irrelevant to the question of a national
consensus.
Bing, supra note 16, at 103.
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The standard for determining the unconstitutionality of this challenged
sanction is whether the selected penalty, here death, is cruelly inhumane and
disproportionate to the crime committed. 2 4 In addition, this constitutional
test is intertwined with actions of state legislatures and an assessment of
American contemporary standards. 2 As noted above, the primary and most
reliable indication of a consensus is the pattern of legislative enactment
reflecting public attitude toward sanctioning mentally retarded individuals to
death.226
The fact that seventeen states now specifically prohibit death sentences
for the mentally retarded sends out a stronger message of national consensus
than existed when Penry was decided. However, it is unknown how many
states are needed to represent a consensus, since the Supreme Court has not
set a requisite number. In 1994, when eleven states banned the execution of
mentally retarded individuals, these states accounted for only thirteen
227
percent of total executions since the reinstatement of the death penalty.
Most likely, the Supreme Court would have found that these eleven states
did not represent a national consensus.
Today, however, there is plenty of objective evidence of a strong
national consensus against executing retarded persons. So far, this year
alone, four states, Florida, Missouri, Arizona, and Connecticut passed
legislation outlawing the execution of mentally retarded individuals. 22 Since
the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, Florida has executed fifty-one
inmates, four who were mentally retarded, Arizona has executed twenty-two
inmates, one who was mentally retarded, and Missouri has executed fifty229
Connecticut has not
one inmates, two of which were mentally retarded.
230
Overall, as of 2001, these four states
executed any inmates since 1976.
23
account for 17.71% of total executions in the United States. 3' When
combined with the other thirteen states banning the execution of the mentally
retarded, they account for twenty-three percent of the total number of
232
seembut
like
a major
inmates
executed.
This percentage
may not
this
is onlyrepresentadue to the
tion of the
national consensus
in the United
States,
224.
225.
226.
227.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).
Id.
Penry,492 U.S. at 330-31.
Bing, supra note 16, at 105.

228. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2; see also Bonner, supra

note 7, at Al (discussing states that bar the execution of mentally retarded individuals).
229. Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty, supra note 2.

230. Id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
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233 Texas, by
fact that Texas accounts for such a high number of executions.
234
date.
to
itself, accounts for 34.58% of total executions
Florida's legislation is indicative of a national trend towards abolishing
the execution of mentally retarded individuals. As previously noted, on June
12, 2001, Florida became the fifteenth state to ban such executions. In the
post-Furnan era, one of the leading states for executions is Florida. 5
Florida accounts for 7.29% of total executions. 236 It is the country's third
237
Missouri became
largest death penalty state, currently tied with Missouri.
the sixteenth state, on July 2, 2001, to outlaw the execution of mentally
retarded inmates.238 When combined, Florida and Missouri account for
14.17% of nationwide executions. Because Florida is well-known for its
frequent use of the death penalty, it could influence other states to follow the
national trend banning the execution of the retarded. 239
In contrast, one week after Florida's Governor Jeb Bush signed Senate
Bill 238, Texas Governor, Rick Perry, vetoed similar legislation that would
have banned the execution of those with mental retardation.m Although
Governor Perry chose to veto this bill, the legislature passed it.2' Texas's
own representatives voted to ban executing the retarded, but unlike Governor
Bush, Governor Perry himself did not stand behind the legislation. Texas,
the country's number one death penalty state, has executed ten people this
year, and 249 since 1982. 2
Because it accounts for such a large number of executions, Texas could
have a negative influence on the Supreme Court when it assesses the
public's attitude towards inflicting the death penalty on the mentally

233. Virginia is the country's second leading death penalty state accounting for
11.39% of total executions. Together, Texas and Virginia alone carried out 300 of the 720

executions, accounting for 45.97% of total executions. Id.
234. Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
235. It is important to note, however, that in 2000, Florida executed six inmates, and in
2001, executed one. Id. Compare to Texas, which executed forty inmates in 2000 and ten

inmates in 2001. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Bing, supra note 16, at 105.
240. Bonner, supra note 6, at Al; see also Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty,
supra note 2 (stating that Texas Governor vetoed legislation that would have prohibited the
execution of the mentally retarded).
241. Telephone Interview with Paula Bernstein, Information Specialist, Death Penalty
Information Center, Washington, D.C. (July 23, 2001).
242. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2 (these estimates are
current through July 17, 2001).
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retarded. Perhaps until a state like Texas passes such legislation, the
Supreme Court may continue to find that there is insufficient evidence of a
national consensus against executing mentally retarded individuals. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court looks to the public's perceptions of decency,
which is ultimately reflected in legislation. Most likely, the Texas
Legislature passed the bill according to how Texans view this particular type
of sanction. The fact that Governor Perry vetoed the bill does not necessarily
mean that the people of the state of Texas support his decision.
Governor Perry vetoed the bill, reasoning that Texas did not execute
mentally retarded offenders, and that there are existing judicial safeguards
implemented to protect the mentally retarded. 243 While Governor Perry
claimed that Texas has never executed anyone who was mentally retarded,
supporters of the legislation and the Death Penalty Information Center both
say six inmates with IQs of seventy or below have been executed since 1982,
two of them while President Bush was governor.2
While the majority of Americans support the death penalty, opinion
polls show that the majority of those people oppose the execution of the
mentally retarded, "even in the fiercely pro-death penalty state of Texas. ' ' 45
Governor Perry's decision to veto, "runs counter to a trend among states that
have the death penalty."2 46 Whether the movement to end the execution of
the mentally retarded has reached the numbers necessary to reach a national
consensus in the eyes of the Supreme Court is unknown. But one thing is for
sure-if leading death penalty states like Florida continue to enact
legislation banning such executions, there is a greater chance the Supreme
Court will find there is an emerging national consensus against executing the
mentally retarded, and that society no longer wishes to or agrees with
sanctioning the mentally retarded to death.
IX. CONCLUSION

The use of capital punishment against people suffering from mental
retardation is a penalty that is cruelly inhumane and without justification.
Imposing society's most severe punishment on individuals who possess
significant impairments in intellectual functioning and adaptive skills, and
who cannot understand the nature of the crime they have committed or
243.
244.
supra note
245.
246.

Bonner, supra note 6, at Al. But see Cohen, supra note 141, at 460.
Bonner, supra note 6, at Al; see Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty,
2.
Bonner, supra note 11.
Bonner, supra note 6, at Al.
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punishment imposed, do not deserve this ultimate penalty. Sanctioning one
of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups to death is nothing short of
barbaric.
The Supreme Court has made clear that it is up to the state legislatures
to protect, and hence exclude, the mentally retarded from execution by
passing legislation.2 7 The only way the Supreme Court will find a national
consensus exists against executing this particular group of people, is if
states, particularly large death penalty states like Florida, continue to enact
legislation banning execution of the retarded.
American standards of decency have evolved to the point where capital
punishment inflicted upon the mentally retarded can no longer be tolerated.
Executing those who may not even understand what death is or why they are
being executed is a practice that must be ended. It is time for our state
legislatures, whom we elect, to take a strong stance on this issue by
outlawing the execution of the mentally retarded. Exempting the mentally
retarded from the death penalty is not an issue of crime, but an issue of
humanity.
Florida and the other sixteen states that oppose the execution of the
mentally retarded do not argue that they should not be severely punished or
held accountable for their crimes. They simply argue that the ultimate
punishment of death, which is reserved for the most culpable criminals who
commit the most heinous crimes, should not be sanctioned upon those
individuals who are less morally culpable.2
The legislation clearly
recognizes that it is excessively harsh to execute a mentally retarded person
with limited intelligence and culpability instead of applying other
punishments that will both punish the guilty and protect society.
Lindsay Raphael

247. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
248. Id.
249. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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In the Wake of a Tragedy: The Earnhardt Family Protection
Act Brings Florida's Public Records Law under the Hot
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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 18, 2001, "[i]n a sudden, shocking instant, on the last turn
of the last lap in stock car racing's greatest spectacle, the Daytona 500, Dale
Earnhardt was called into the pits by a power even greater than he."' Dale
Earnhardt was considered by most racing fans to be the greatest stock car
3
v2
driver in history and NASCAR's greatest superstar. The speculation over
Dale Earnhardt's exact cause of death left several news organizations
scrambling to obtain Dale Earnhardt's autopsy photos for an independent
medical evaluation.4 Dale Earnhardt's widow managed to have a Volusia
1.

Richard Prince, Dale and the Vette,

SPORTS CAR INT'L,

July 2001, at 60.

National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing [hereinafter NASCAR].
Mark Bechtel, Crushing,SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 26, 2001, at 38.
3.
See Jim Leusner et al., Earnhardt Head Injury Detailed in Report: Medical
4.
Expert Rules Out Seat-Belt Failure as Direct Cause of Racer's Death, SUN-SENTNEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Apr. 10, 2001, at 1A (discussing the Orlando Sentinel's settlement agreement
with Dale Earnhardt's wife, which allowed the news organization to have a court appointed
medical expert study the autopsy photos). The expert "reject[ed] NASCAR's theory" of Dale
Earnhardt's death, in that Earnhardt died when his "head whipped violently forward" which
would have happened regardless of whether Earnhardt's seatbelt had torn or not, giving
credence to the alleged cover up by NASCAR. Id.
2.
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County judge seal the autopsy photos before they were requested by the
Orlando Sentinel and other news organizations. These news organizations
had the constitutional right in Florida to view and copy Dale Earnhardt's
autopsy photos. However, Florida's Legislature came to the rescue of the
Earnhardt family, allowing them the right to mourn in privacy without Dale
Earnhardt's autopsy photos on the cover of every newspaper in the nation.
The Florida Legislature responded in quick fashion with the Earnhardt Family Protection Act. Governor Jeb Bush, accompanied by Dale Earnhardt's
widow,7 signed the Act into law March 29, 2001, with "wide public
support. '' However, a round of legal challenges awaiting the Act were
unleashed, and they are a long way from being exhausted.
The Earnhardt Family Protection Act exempts "a photograph or video or
audio recording of an autopsy" from Florida's public records law found in
section 119.07(1) of the FloridaStatutes, and Article I, Section 24(a) of the
Florida Constitution. 9 In making autopsy photographs, video, and audio,
confidential and exempt, the Florida Legislature has raised some constitutional issues. A Volusia circuit judge in the Earnhardt case has upheld the
new exemption under claims of its unconstitutionality, however, the
exemption has yet to work its way through the appellate process.10 The
Independent FloridaAlligator" and Websitecity' 2 are the news organizations
leading the charge, and they are ignoring the pleas from Earnhardt's family
and supporters to end the pursuit for Earnhardt's autopsy photos and to "[1]et

5.
6.

Id. at 6A; see also Pat Dunnigan, Off Track?, FLA. TREND, June 2001, at 76.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a).

7.

Dunnigan, supra note 5, at 79.

8.

Patrik Jonsson, Can 'Sunshine Laws' Sometimes Shed Too Much Light?,

(Boston) May 22, 2001, at 2 (discussing the "trend is toward
limiting [media] access," in favor of protecting privacy, which in turn has worried public
access advocates who say the "public benefits mightily when reporters use sunshine laws to
uncover stories").
9.
FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (2001) (discussing various people in the deceased's family,
and various agencies who still have access to a photograph, video, or audio recording of an
autopsy).
10. Mike Branom, Autopsy Photo Review Denied, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
June 14, 2001, at 10B (discussing how the release of the autopsy pictures would cause the
Earnhardt family pain and would constitute an "invasion of privacy to the highest degree");
see also Dunnigan, supra note 5, at 79.
11. This is a University of Florida student run news organization, available at
http://www.alligator.org.
12. This is a Deland, Florida-based Web site, available at http://www.websitecity.
com.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
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Dale Earnhardt rest in peace! !, 13 An appellate challenge to the Earnhardt
exemption will determine if the constitutional right of privacy has watered
down "the most liberal public records access laws in the nation. 14
With the proliferation of websites on the World Wide Web, and "go-forthe-throat reporting," the public has demanded more and more protection for
their privacy.1 5 The Florida Legislature has responded to this request by
consistently adding to the list of exemptions found in the public records law,
however, these exemptions conflict with the age-old policy behind the public
records law. The Earnhardt Family Protection Act is a perfect exemption to
scrutinize in light of the two competing constitutional rights, those of
privacy and the right to inspect public records. No other exemption to the
public records law has brought about as much debate, especially from media
organizations. Rightfully so, since the media organizations are the ones who
suffer the most from these exemptions, since they are the predominant users
and requestors of public records. 16 The small news organizations and
websites that exploit all types of graphic autopsy photos are the real groups
to blame for the exemption. However, media organizations are the public's
main source for finding out what the government is doing, since very few
people are investigating public records themselves to uncover dishonest
government actions.
This article will examine the Earnhardt Family Protection Act and the
effect that it has had on the public's right of access to records in Florida. Part
II will provide an overview of the Florida public records law before the
recent exemption was enacted in the aftermath of the Earnhardt tragedy.
Part III will look at the Earnhardt Family Protection Act and examine the
Florida Legislature's intent in creating the exemption. Part IV will then
examine the constitutionality of the exemption, specifically, the right of
privacy, the retroactive application to Dale Earnhardt's autopsy photos, and
how narrowly tailored it is to the public necessity of the exemption. Part V
13. PaperReports Threats Over EarnhardtAutopsy Photos: PublicationPursuing its
Right of Access, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 18, 2001, at 6B (discussing hostile
flyers and messages that the University of Florida student newspaper has received since they
have been trying to gain access to Dale Earnhardt's autopsy photographs).
14. Chris Jenkins, Autopsy Photos of Drivers Raise More Issues in Florida, USA
TODAY,

Apr. 3, 2001, at 2C.

15. Jonsson, supra note 8, at 2. The article explains that the current mood of the
nation's legislatures is for more privacy and that over 200 bills dealing with public access are

in consideration. Id. at 1.
16. See generally Jenkins, supra note 14, at 2 ("The Orlando Sentinel's request to
view photos from Dale Earnhardt's autopsy reignited a common journalism controversy,
pitting the public's right to know against a family's right to privacy.").
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of the article will look at the media's role in spurring the Florida Legislature
to pass the Earnhardt Family Protection Act. Finally, part VI of this article
will look at the future of the Earnhardt Family Protection Act and the likely
effects that the new exemption may have on Florida's public records law and
an individual's right of privacy. Lastly, Part VII will include final thoughts
about the Earnhardt tragedy.
II. OVERVIEW OF FLORIDA'S PUBLIC RECORDS LAW

Florida's public records law provides that "all state, county, and
municipal records shall be open" for inspection to anyone, 17 and are
considered the nation's "'toughest of the tough' sunshine laws."' 8 This
policy is to ensure that governmental actions are brought out into the publict9
arena where they can be under the watchful eye of Florida's citizens.
Florida has validated this policy for open access to public records by
enacting an amendment to the Florida Constitution in 19 92 .20 Article 1,
Section 24, of the Florida Constitution also grants everyone the right to
"inspect or copy any public record" of any legislative, executive, and judicial
21
branch of Florida's government. If an agency unlawfully refuses to permit
17. FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (2001).
18. Jonsson, supra note 8, at 3.
19. See, e.g., Michel v. Douglas, 464 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. 1985) ("[T]he right of
access to personnel records as public records is not the right to rummage freely through public
employees' personal lives."); Forsberg v. Hous. Auth. of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 378
(Fla. 1984) ("The purpose of the Public Records Act is to promote public awareness and
knowledge of governmental actions in order to ensure that governmental officials and agencies
remain accountable to the people."); Christy v. Palm Beach Sheriff's Office, 698 So. 2d 1365,
1366 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (citing City of Riviera Beach v. Barfield, 642 So. 2d
1135, 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)); Lorei v. Smith, 464 So. 2d 1330, 1332 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Bludworth v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 476 So. 2d 775, 779 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("[T]he underlying policy of the Public Records Act-open
government to the extent possible in order to preserve our basic freedom, without
undermining significant government functions."); cf. Jonsson, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing
some disadvantages that reporters have encountered with having everything open in the public
forum, such as fewer "opinions and debate" since people are more careful in their comments
for fear that they may become public).
20. Patricia A. Gleason & Joslyn Wilson, The Florida Constitution's Open
Government Amendments: Article I,Section 24 and Article I, Section 4(e)-Let the
Sunshine in, 18 NOVA L. REv. 973, 974 (1994) (discussing the history of open public records
and the constitutional amendments that have been enacted to support the policy for open
access to public records).
21. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 24(a). The full text of Article 1, Section 24(a) of the Florida
Constitution provides:
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inspection or copying of a public record, a court shall assess reasonable
attorney's fees against the agency.22
The legislature has been delegated the power to exempt records from
being open for inspection by the public.23 All exemptions from disclosure,
however, must be narrowly construed and limited to the specific purpose for
the exemption.2 If the custodian of a record claims it to be exempt from
inspection, that custodian must state the statutory citation of the particular
(a)

Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received
in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee
of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to records
exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made confidential by this
Constitution. This section specifically includes the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government and each agency or department created
thereunder; counties, municipalities, and districts; and each constitutional officer,
board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution.

Id.
22. FLA. STAT. § 119.12(l) (2001); see also FLA. STAT. § 119.11(1) (2001) (granting
an "immediate hearing [with] priority over [all] other pending cases" when a public records
action is filed).
23.
(b)

FtA. CONST. art. I, § 24(c). Section 24(c) provides:
This section shall be self-executing. The legislature, however, may provide by
general law for the exemption of records from the requirements of subsection (a)
and the exemption of meetings from the requirements of subsection (b), provided
that such law shall state with specificity the public necessity justifying the
exemption and shall be no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated
purpose of the law. The legislature shall enact laws governing the enforcement of
this section, including the maintenance, control, destruction, disposal, and
disposition of records made public by this section, except that each house of the
legislature may adopt rules governing the enforcement of this section in relation
to records of the legislative branch. Laws enacted pursuant to this subsection
shall contain only exemptions from the requirements of subsections (a) or (b) and
provisions governing the enforcement of this section, and shall relate to one
subject.
Id. See also Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420,424 (Fla. 1979). It
is the legislature who enacts exemptions to the Public Records Act, and the judiciary
is the one who interprets the exemptions based on their legislative intent. Id. See
generally Cynthia A. Cloud & Howard R. Brennan, DisclosuralPrivacy and the
Florida Public Records Act: Open Government or Sanctioned Snooping?, 12
STTSON L. REV. 420 (1982).
24. Id. § 24(c); see also Mem'l Hosp.-W. Volusia, Inc., v. News-Journal Corp., 729
So. 2d 373, 380 (Fla. 1999) ("[A]n exemption from public records access is available only
after the legislature has followed the express procedure provided in article I, section 24(c) of
the Florida Constitution."); Tribune Co. v. Pub. Records, 493 So. 2d 480, 483 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) (discussing the limitation on exemptions to their "stated purposes").
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exemption.
When a court is doubtful about an exemption, "the courts
should find in favor of disclosure rather than secrecy." 26 Over the years the
number of exemptions to the public records law have varied in range, from
estimates as high as 800 to as low as 200. 27 However, many of these
exemptions are created
at the urging of certain groups and fail to fulfill any
28
necessity.
public
All new and substantially amended exemptions to the public records law
are subject to the "Open Government Sunset Review Act of 1995." ' 29 This
Act automatically repeals exemptions on October 2, the fifth year after
enactment of the exemption, unless the legislature reenacts the exemption.30
The legislature will maintain an exemption, if the exempted record is
sensitive and personal in nature and concerns an individual. 31
The
legislature also has to determine if the exemption is important
enough
to
32
override "the strong public policy of open government.
The Florida Statutes have defined what records shall be public as all
material "regardless of the physical form ... made or received... in
connection with the transaction of official business by any agency., 33 An

25. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(a) (2001); see also Barry Richard & Richard Grosso, A
Return to Sunshine: Florida Sunsets Open Government Exemptions, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
705, 720-21 (1985) (discussing in detail the process of requesting records and the procedure
when a custodian claims an exemption to the public records law). "In most cases the purpose
of the exemption is not to further the public interest, but rather, to accommodate the needs of
the exemption's proponent." Id.
26. Bludworth v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 476 So. 2d 775, 780 n.1 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
27. Richard, supra note 25, at 706 n.11; see generally FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(a)-(c)
(2001) (describing numerous statutory exemptions to the open public records law); Wait v.
Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1979) ("If the common law privileges
are to be included as exemptions, it is up to the legislature, and not this Court, to amend the
statute."); Robert Rivas, Access to "Private" Documents Under the Public Records Act, 16

L. REv. 1229, 1232 (1992) ("Scores of other exemptions are scattered throughout
Florida Statutes.").
28. Richard, supra note 25, at 720-21.
29. FLA. STAT. § 119.15(1), (3)(a) (2001).
30. § 119.15(3)(a).
31. § 119.15(2)(a). There are two other criteria that the legislature shall consider
during legislative review in the maintenance or creation of an exemption. § 119.15(2)(b), (c).
The exemption is needed for a governmental program to run efficiently or to keep certain
information of an entity confidential. Id.
32. § 119.15(2)(c) ("[T]he legislature shall consider the criteria in this section before
enacting future exemptions.").
33. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (2001). The full text of section 119.011(1) provides:
NOVA
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"agency" is "any state, county, district... public or private agency.., or
business entity acting on behalf of any public agency., 34 The language of
the statute makes a private company or even an individual subject to provide
access to certain records if they are working with or for a public agency.
Article I, Section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution is similar, stating that an
agency includes all "legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
government, and each agency or department created thereunder ....
,36
Further interpretation of what exactly is and is not a public record is
found in Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Associates.37 The
Supreme Court of Florida defined a "public record" as "any material
prepared in connection with official agency business which is intended to
'
perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some type. 38
Further,
"public records" do not include rough drafts or notes that are to be used in
preparing "some other documentary material" or "precursors of governmental 'records."' 39 Material that is "midway on the spectrum" of being
public records have to be "determined on a case-by-case basis. '" Public
records very often contain information about private citizens, and those

"Public record" means all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs,
films, sound recordings, data processing software, or other material, regardless of the
physical form, characteristics, or means of transmission, made or received pursuant to

law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any
agency.

Id.
34.

§ 119.011(2).

The full text of section 119.011(2) provides:

"Agency" means any state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer,
department, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of government
created or established by law including, for the purposes of this chapter, the
Commission on Ethics, the Public Service Commission, and the Office of Public
Counsel, and any other public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or
business entity acting on behalf of any public agency.

Id.
35. An analysis of the relevant case law on private entities subject to the public
records law is beyond the scope of this article. See Rivas, supra note 27, at 1234-47, for a
thorough examination of when private entities may be subject to the public records law.
36. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a).
37. 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980). This case is considered the "Seminal Case" on
defining public records and determining when a private entity is subject to the public records
law. Rivas, supra note 27, at 1234.
38. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla.
1980).
39. Id.
40. Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

310

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 26:305

records are still open to inspection or copying by every person who desires
to do so as provided in Article I, Section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution. 41
An example of a public agency would be the district medical examiner's
office, since it has been established by law. 42 A medical examiner in the
district where a death occurs shall perform investigations and autopsies
when any person therein dies by accident.4 3 The records that a medical
examiner creates in their examinations and autopsies of a person killed by
accident, would be open to the public to inspect and copy under section
119.01(1) of the FloridaStatutes and Article I, Section 24(a) of the Florida
Constitution." Autopsy photographs created by a district medical examiner's office would also fit the definition of "public record" found in the
Shevin case. 45 However, autopsy photographs of the medical examiner are
no longer a "public record" open to the public, compliments of the Earnhardt
Family Protection Act.4
Ill. THE EARNHARDT FAMILY PROTECTION ACT
With the presence of the World Wide Web and other vast media outlets,
autopsy photos can be viewed by millions of people, even by the deceased's
immediate family members. 47 The Earnhardt Family Protection Act was
41. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a).
42. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (2001).
43. FLA. STAT. § 406.1 l(1)(a)(2) (2000) the full text of § 406.11(1) provides:
(1) In any of the following circumstances involving the death of a human being, the
medical examiner of the district in which the death occurred or the body was
found shall determine the cause of death and shall, for that purpose, make or have
performed such examinations, investigations, and autopsies as he or she shall
deem necessary or as shall be requested by the state attorney.
Id.

44.

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a); § 119.01(1).
45. See Shevin, 379 So. 2d at 640.
46. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a); § 119.01(1).
47. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, ch. 2001-1 § 2, 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1, 2
(West) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (2001)). Section 2 provides:
The Legislature finds that it is a public necessity that photographs and video and audio
recordings of an autopsy be made confidential and exempt from the requirements of
section 119.07(1), Florida Statutes, and Section 24(a) of Article I of the State
Constitution. The Legislature finds that photographs or video or audio recordings of
an autopsy depict or describe the deceased in graphic and often disturbing fashion.
Such photographs or video or audio recordings may depict or describe the deceased

nude, bruised, bloodied, broken, with bullet or other wounds, cut open, dismembered,
or decapitated. As such, photographs or video or audio recordings of an autopsy are
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created by the legislature to stop this proliferation of autopsy documents,
The
ceasing any further "injury to the memory of the deceased.""
legislature also responded to the immediate family's need to grieve over
their loved one inXeace without additional "trauma, sorrow, humiliation, or
emotional injury.
This additional trauma to the immediate family could
occur because the photographs, video and audio of the deceased's autopsy
"may depict or describe the deceased nude, bruised, bloodied...
dismembered, or decapitated."50 With this statutory language, the legislature
has clearly stated the public necessity justifying the exemption required by
Article I, Section 24(c) of the Florida Constitution. 51 Whether any family
members have ever been confronted with their deceased relative's autopsy
photos on newspapers or on the Internet remains to be seen. It is obvious
that family members would suffer more sorrow if they were to see their
deceased family member's autopsy photos on those forms of media.
The Earnhardt Family Protection Act exempts "[a] photograph or video
or audio recording of an autopsy in the custody of a medical examiner" from
being inspected or copied under 52
the Florida Constitution and section
119.07(1) of the Florida Statutes.
The legislature found this autopsy
material to be "highly sensitive depictions or descriptions of the deceased."
The deceased's spouse still has access to view and copy the entire autopsy
photographs, video, and audio that the medical examiner prepared during the
highly sensitive depictions or descriptions of the deceased which, if heard, viewed,
copied or publicized, could result in trauma, sorrow, humiliation, or emotional injury

to the immediate family of the deceased, as well as injury to the memory of the
deceased. The Legislature notes that the existence of the World Wide Web and the
proliferation of personal computers throughout the world encourages and promotes the
wide dissemination of photographs and video and audio recordings 24 hours a day and

that widespread unauthorized dissemination of autopsy photographs and video and
audio recordings would subject the immediate family of the deceased to continuous
injury. The Legislature further notes that there continue to be other types of available
information, such as the autopsy report, which are less intrusive and injurious to the
immediate family members of the deceased and which continue to provide for public
oversight. The Legislature further finds that the exemption provided in this act should
be given retroactive application because it is remedial in nature.

Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 24(c).
52. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, ch. 2001-1, § 1(1), 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1,
2 (West) (to be codified tentatively at FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (2001)).
53. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § 2.
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investigation. 54 Otherwise, anyone else requesting access to view or copy
the autopsy materials must provide a court order allowing such access.5 5 A
court order will only be issued if it is shown that there is "good cause" to
view or copy records of an individual's autopsy.56 If a court grants a court
order, handling of the autopsy photos, video, or audio must be done under
the custodian's direct supervision.5 7 The surviving spouse shall be given
notice and an opportunity
to be heard, if there is a petition to view the
58
deceased's records.
The Earnhardt Family Protection Act also provides a stiff penalty for a
custodian or anyone who violates a court order regarding the exempted
autopsy photos, video, and audio.5 9 It is a third degree felony for "willfully
and knowingly" allowin 9 an unauthorized person to view or copy autopsy
photos, video or audio.
This leaves the possibility that private citizens
could risk a felony charge for viewing unauthorized autopsy material that
has been illegally copied and placed on the World Wide Web. The
legislature seems to be expressing their dissatisfaction with those record
custodians who take advantage of their positions and help in the trafficking
of graphic and disturbing autopsy material.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES BEHIND THE ACT
A. Right of Privacy
To show "good cause" and obtain disclosure of the sensitive autopsy
material, the court shall balance the public's need to evaluate governmental
performance against the intrusion into the family's right of privacy. 6 1 This
balancing of the right of privacy against the public's right of access to public
records is a major collision between Article I, Section 23 of the Florida
54. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § 1(1) (stating that "If there is no surviving
spouse, then the surviving parents shall have access to such records. If there is no surviving
spouse or parent, then an adult child shall have access to such records.").
55. Id.
56. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § 1(2)(a).
57. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, ch. 2001-I, § 1(2)(a).
58. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § 1(2)(b). Notice shall be given to the deceased
parents if no surviving spouse and then to the children if there are no living parents. Id.
59. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § 1(3)(a).
60. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § 1(3)(a), (b).
61. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § l(2)(a) (discussing how the court must also
determine if disclosure of the requested records is the least intrusive means available and the
whether other similar information is available in other public records, regardless of form).
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Constitution and Florida's Public Records Act.62 Article I, section 23
provides: "[elvery natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's
right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law."6 3 This
right of privacy in Florida "is expressly subservient to the Public Records
Act." 64 This leaves the never-ending question of which is more important
and which takes precedent, the public's strong right of access to public
records or the right of privacy in the deceased family member's memory.
The Florida Legislature would say the latter is more important when it
comes to autopsy photos, since the Earnhardt Family Protection Act gives a
deceased's family the right of privacy in such photos.
However, the
Supreme Court of Florida does not always see eye to eye with the Florida
Legislature, especially in the area of an individual's right of privacy.
The family's right of privacy was examined in Williams v. City of
Minneola,66 when videotape and photos of the deceased were displayed to
police officers and others who were not custodians of those records.67 The
family sued the officers for invasion of privacy, among other causes of
action, and the officers claimed that the autopsy photos and video were
public record; therefore, they could not be liable for displaying the photos
and video.68 The court stated the Public Records Act "does not impose a
secrecy requirement which bars a custodian from displaying a public record
entirely of his own volition." 69 The court also concurs that a person who is
62. See John Sanchez, ConstitutionalPrivacy in Florida: Between the Idea and the
Reality Fallsthe Shadow, 18 NovA L. REV. 775, 780 (1994) ("As case law on section 23 has
developed, it has become evident that it is on a collision course with Florida's Public Records

Act.").
63.

FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 23.
64. Bd. of County Com'rs. v. D.B., 784 So. 2d 585, 591 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding that an adult entertainer does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
personal information required to obtain a worker identification card, which was needed to
work as an adult entertainer in the county).
65. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § 1(2)(a).
66. 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
67. Id. at 686. The video was shown at a police officer's house since police
headquarters did not have the needed equipment, and it was shown to an officer who was not
in the same police force investigating the death of the individual. Id. at 686 n.1.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 687. The court stated,
Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution appears to guarantee the absolute right

to inspection and examination of public records... there is no indication that the
section was intended to give... agency personnel or members of the public
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the subject of a record cannot "claim a constitutional right of privacy as a bar
to requested inspection of a public record which is in the hands of a
government agency. 70 However, the law will not protect a custodian of
public records from any civil liability when they unnecessarily reveal such
records to persons outside of that agency. 71 The court did not reverse the
72
officers' summary judgment on the invasion of privacy cause of action.
The family's privacy was not invaded, only the deceased's was, and only
where there are unusual circumstances, which are sufficiently egregious,
shall the members of decedent's immediate family have a invasion of
privacy action.73
The Williams court finds itself in the majority of courts that have held
the close relatives of a victim do not acquire a derivative right to privacy. 74
The Florida Legislature in the Earnhardt Family Protection Act does not
follow the reasoning for denying a right of privacy like in the Williams case.
The legislature reaches the opposite conclusion, finding that a deceased's
family has the right of privacy regarding the deceased's autopsy photos,
video and audio.75 A logical byproduct of the family's right of privacy in the
Earnhardt exemption, would be an action for invasion of privacy if a records
custodian's behavior was similar to that of the defendants in the Williams
...immunity from all the safeguards for individual rights which the common law has
painstakingly developed over the centuries.
Id.
70. Williams, 575 So. 2d at 687. See, e.g., Michel v. Douglas, 464 So. 2d 545, 546
(Fla. 1985) (discussing Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution, in that the right of
privacy does not apply to public records and that there is not a state or federal right of
disclosural privacy that exists); Forsberg v. Hous. Auth. of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 374
(Fla. 1984); Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla.
1980).
71. Williams, 575 So. 2d at 687. The court found that the Public Records Act and the
Florida Constitution do not grant a custodian of public records immunity from tort liability
when communicating a public record to someone outside the agency unless the person
inspecting the public records has made a bona fide request to examine them, or the agency's
official business requires it to reveal the public records to someone who has not requested to
see them. Id.
72. Id. at 690.
73. Id. at 689-90. See also Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 621 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) ("[A] cause of action for invasion of the common law right of privacy is strictly
personal.... Relatives of a deceased person have no right of action for invasion of
privacy. . . regardless of how close such personal relationship was with the deceased.").
74. State v. Rolling, No. 91-3832 CFA., 1994 WL 722891, at *3 (Fla.Cir. Ct. July
27, 1994).
75. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, ch. 2001-1 § 1(1).
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case. The Williams court did not allow such an invasion of privacy action on
behalf of the deceased's family against a custodian of autopsy records since
only the deceased's privacy was violated and only the deceased had a right
of privacy in the autopsy video and photos.7 6 The Supreme Court of Florida
may wonder how the Florida Legislature justified the family's right of
privacy, is it derivative from the deceased or in the family's own right based
on Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution.
The "good cause" balancing test in the"Earnhardt Family Protection Act
is identical to the balancing test in State v. Rolling." In that case, members
of the murder victim's family had requested nondisclosure of photographs
and video of the murder scene and autopsies. 78 The media had initially
demanded to copy the photos and video, but they eventually compromised to
just view the photos and video in the presence of the clerk. 79 The court
found that the photographs and video were public record based on their
creation by public agencies. 80 However, the court also concluded the
deceased's relatives might acquire a privacy interest that was "either
derivative from the victims themselves or in their own right." 81 The court
goes on to find that substantial injury would occur to the deceased's relatives
if "confronted in the media with images of their slain and mutilated loved
'
In addition, the court applied a test, which balanced the public's
ones."82
right to know and hold public officials accountable versus the privacy
interest of the victim's relatives.8 The photographs and video at issue were

76. Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
77. Rolling, 1994 WL 722891 at *1.
78. Id. The family members of the murder victims stated how they would suffer
future emotional harm if the graphic material from the autopsies and murder scene were
disclosed. Id.

79.

Id. (stating that the media did not intend to print or publish the photographs, they

just wanted to "place themselves in the position of the jurors" to evaluate the impact of the

photographs).
80. Id. at *2 (discussing how the photographs and video were taken in the course of
the police officer's official business to become public records).
81. Rolling, 1994 WL722891, at *3.

82.

Id.at *4 ("[A]t least one federal court concluded that a relatives' right of privacy

does exist.., sufficient to prohibit disclosure of materials which would be subject to a right of
privacy were the victim alive.") (citing N.Y. Times v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C.

1991)).
83.

Id. at *5 ("[T]he court cannot substitute its judgment on the publication value of

the materials for that of the members of the media, but can decide whether the information has
significant relevance.., and whether the same information is available from other, less

intrusive, sources.").
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declared not open for any type of copying, but the court did84allow reasonable
inspection of them in the presence of the records custodian.
The Rolling court's balancing test for public records disclosure is
identical to the "good cause" test for disclosure found in the Earnhardt
exemption.85 The Rolling court and the Florida Legislature both agree that
substantial injury would occur to the deceased's family if autopsy photo86
graphs or video is freely copied and disseminated in global forms of media.
However, it took the death of a legend for the Florida Legislature to take
heed and enact a public records exemption that included a right of privacy
for a deceased's family.87 The Earnhardt exemption is long overdue
according to the Rolling court's holding and rationale. 88 The Florida
Legislature went further than the Rolling court, which allowed x~asonable
viewing of photos and video, by not allowing any viewing of autopsy photos
and video. 89 Neither the Florida Legislature nor the Rolling court explains
the history indicating that the family has a right of privacy in the deceased. 90
They both just grant a family the right of privacy, justifying it on the
possibility of substantial injury to the deceased's family, which they feel is
more important than open government. Had the Rolling case been appealed,
an exemption for graphic autopsy material may have been brought to the
attention of the Florida Legislature many years earlier, and an appellate court
may have cleared up the basis for a family's right of privacy in a deceased
relative.
In Forsberg v. Housing Authority of Miami Beach,91 tenants in public
housing sought to enjoin the public's access to information provided by
public housing tenants. 92 The tenants had to submit personal and confidential information, such as family status and relationship, income, assets,
medical history, and employment. 93 The tenants claimed that the release of
that personal information would cause them to suffer humiliation and
embarrassment.94 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the motion to
84.

Id. at *7.

Eamhardt Family Protection Act § 1(2)(a); Rolling, 1994 WL 722891, at *5.
STAT. § 119.15 (2)(c).
Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § 2.
See Rolling, 1994 WL 722891, at *5.
Earnhardt Family Protection Act § 2.
90. Id. See also Rolling, 1994 WL 722891, at *5.
91. 455 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1984).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Rolling, 1994 WL 722891 at *4; see also FLA.

92.

Id.

93.
94.

Id. at 374.
Id. at 375.
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dismiss 95 since there is no constitutional right of privacy that would prevent
96
the inspection of the housing authority's public records. The court did not
find relief in the privacy amendment of Article I, Section 23 of the Florida
Constitution, since it "specifically does not apply to public records."'
The Forsberg court reiterates the proposition that individuals have no
right of privacy in the records that are created by public agencies, contrary to
the Earnhardt exemption. 98 The Forsberg court interprets the right of
privacy in the Florida Constitution to mean, clearly and unequivocally, that
the right does not extend to situations involving public records. 99 However,
the Forsberg case did not include public records that were of a highly
graphic and sensitive nature as did the Rolling court and the Florida
Legislature in the Earnhardt case. Forsbergonly dealt with an individual's
personal information, which is less likely to cause substantial injury if it
were to be disclosed through access to public records. 1°0 The Earnhardt
exemption strays from the Forsbergcourt's finding that the right of privacy
in article I, section 23 does not apply to public records. 10'
In a very similar tragedy to that of Dale Earnhardt's, the NASA
Challenger explosion brought out the same issues underlying the Earnhardt
exemption. In New York Times Co. v. NASA,1 02 a news organization
requested copies of the audiotapes that were recorded in the cabin of the
Challenger up to the time of the explosion in which the astronauts were
killed.10' The news organization was denied the request and brought suit
under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain such audiotapes. 1°4 The
court found that an exemption to the Act provides the family of the
astronauts with a privacy interest in those records relating to the deceased
astronauts. 10 5 The Challenger families have a substantial privacy interest
since the disclosure of the audiotapes would be a "disruption of their peace

95. Id. at 374.
96. Forsberg,455 So. 2d at 374.
97. Id. The court also finds no general right of disclosural privacy provided in the
state constitution (citing Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633
(Fla. 1980)).
98. Id.
99. Id
100. Id.
101. Fosberg v. Hous. Auth. of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 384 (Fla. 1984).
102. 782 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1991).
103. Id. at 630.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 630-31.
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of mind" every time the tapes are played in their proximity.' 6 The court
also determined that the strong public interest in disclosure of the audiotapes
would not be served in any way. 1 7 The fact that NASA provided a

transcript of the audiotape was sufficient to allow the strong public interest
to be served.' 08 In determining whether to disclose the audiotapes, the court
balanced the privacy interest versus the public interest.1°9 The privacy
interest was substantial in this case and outweighed the public interest,
which was uncertain and served through the transcripts of the audiotapes. 10
While the NASA case was examined under the federal right of privacy
and the Freedom of Information Act, it gives credibility to the Florida
Legislature's intent in creation of the Earnhardt exemption."' The Freedom

of Information Act is similar to Florida's Public Records Act, in that they

both provide access to government records in the name of public interest.1
However, the right of privacy in the Florida Constitution is much broader
than that of the Federal Constitution. 1 3 Florida has shown this broad right
of privacy in the addition of Article I, Section 23 to the Florida Constitution.' 1 4 The Florida Legislature has been asleep at the wheel for not interpreting the right of privacy in a manner similar to that of the NASA court
sooner. The Florida Legislature could find numerous areas where the right

106. Id. at 632; see also Katz v. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476,
484 (D.D.C. 1994) (discussing how the Kennedy family had been traumatized by publication
of unauthorized records concerning John F. Kennedy's assassination.) The same district court
found that the family would suffer continuous anguish if those unauthorized records were to
be further published. Id.
107. NASA, 782 F. Supp. at 632. The court agreed with the news organization that the
public has a legitimate interest in completely understanding the actions surrounding the
Challenger explosion and the conduct of all the agencies involved with the tragedy. Id.
108. Id. at 633. The actual texture of the Challenger astronauts' voices and
background noises of the cabin that are on the audiotapes does not shed any additional light
on the public's interest in determining the conduct of all agencies involved in the explosion.
Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. For an in-depth discussion on the federal right to disclosural privacy and Florida's
Public Records Act. See Cloud, supra note 23, at 420.
112. See FLA. STAT. § 119.01; 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
113. See, e.g., City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 1995); Winfield
v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985) (stating the Florida
Constitution expressly provides for a strong right of privacy not found in the United States
Constitution); Fla. Bd. of Bar Exan'rs Re Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
114. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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of privacy in graphic 15sensitive public records out weighs the public interest
in open government.
The NASA court found that the public interest was satisfactorily served
through the transcripts of the audiotapes.1 6 The Florida Legislature also
comes to the same conclusion in the Earnhardt exemption by finding that the
autopsy report is sufficient to serve the public's interest in open
government.11 7 What is also interesting about the Challenger, Earnhardt, and
Rolling tragedies, was the enormous publicity surrounding them, which may
have motivated the protection of the family's right of privacy.11 Had there
not been as much publicity and debate in these tragedies, the public interest
in access to the records may have been found to be more important than a
family's right of privacy.
The NASA case also raises the question of what is a legitimate public
interest in obtaining disclosure of sensitive and graphic records. The NASA
court found that the public interest in understanding the Challenger
explosion was not served in any additional way by the release of the
audiotapes. 1 19 Florida's public interest in determining what happened to Dale
Earnhardt in the Daytona 500 can easily be served by the release and
examination of Earnhardt's autopsy report. The release of Dale Earnhardt's
autopsy photographs do not seem to serve any other legitimate public
interest, which has not already been satisfied by the autopsy report. The
NASCAR cover-up theory, which challenges the medical examiner's
findings, seems little more than a wild goose chase on the part of the media
and not a legitimate public interest.
The balance between the intent of the Public Records Law and the
privacy interest of a deceased's family, regarding graphic material, seems to
sway toward the family's privacy, except in the Williams case. 12 The
115. N.Y. Times v. NASA, 782 F. Supp 628, 633 (D.D.C. 1991).
116. Id. at 632.
117. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, ch. 2001-1, § 2, 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1, 2
(West) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (2001)) ("The Legislature further notes that there
continue to be other types of available information, such as the autopsy report .... which
continues to provide for public oversight.").
118. John F. Kennedy's family also received a right of privacy from the same district
court when John F. Kennedy's autopsy photographs were requested under The Freedom of
Information Act. The assassination of John F. Kennedy has probably received the most debate
and publicity in the twentieth century, which may have been a leading cause in the court
choosing to protect such high profile families with the substantial right of privacy. Katz v.
Nat'l Archives &Records Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476,485 (D.D.C. 1994).
119. NASA, 782 F. Supp. at 632.
120. Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

320

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 26:305

Williams case may have been different if the deceased's family had
requested that the video be undisclosed and if there was more publicity
surrounding the death of the family member like in the Earnhardt case.
However, the Rolling case and the Earnhardt exemption clearly show that
when graphic public records are at issue in the right of privacy, the policy of
open access to public records is less important. 121 A deceased's autopsy
photographs do not provide Florida's citizens with necessary or valuable
insight into their government's actions. Most individuals would be disgusted
even at the thought of an autopsy, let alone viewing such photographs. The
examination or copying of autopsy photographs and the like only facilitate
purveyors of the dark and abnormal that enjoy viewing such gruesome
material. Therefore, when it comes to sensitive and graphic material that is
not necessary information to the public, the right of privacy should prevail
against public interest.
A majority of the cases discussed in this article incorporate a balancing
test, which is essentially the "good cause" test, found in the Earnhardt
exemption.' 22 The judiciary will have the task of determining on a case-bycase basis, which is more important, the release of autopsy photos in the
public interest or the substantial injury that may befall the deceased's family.
The Rolling court bases its use of a balancing test from an examination of
the NASA case that, although23a federal case, provides a right of privacy to the
deceased's family members.
The language of Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution is still
problematic for the Florida Legislature which has established a right of
privacy in public records. The language of that section states that a person
will be free from "governmental intrusion" into their private lives, not public
intrusion.124 The government does not intrude into the private lives of
individuals when another private individual is allowed to inspect public
25
records. The "privacy provision applies only to government action,"'
which does not come into play when autopsy photographs, video, and audio
are used by private individuals or the media.

121. See State v. Rolling, No. 91-3832 CFA., 1994 WL 722891, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July
27, 1994).
122. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, ch. 2001-1, § 2, 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1, 2
(West) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (2001)).
123. NASA, 782 F. Supp at 628.
124. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
125. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995).
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Narrowly Tailored

The Earnhardt exemption must be construed narrowly and limited to the
exemption's stated purposes. 126 This could be the reason the Florida
Legislature puts on the brakes before exempting all autopsy records from
disclosure as required under Florida's Public Records Law. The legislature
makes it very clear that "there. continue to be other types of available
information, such as the autopsy report, which are less intrusive and
injurious to the immediate family" while still providing "public oversight.' ' 127 This, most likely, is to be sure that the Earnhardt exemption is "no
'1
broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the law," 2 to
pass any constitutional challenge. The Florida Legislature was probably
well aware that creating such an exemption, with as much publicity as it has
received, would eventually be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida.
The Rolling court found that allowing only inspection of the graphic
photographs and video was sufficient enough to keep those from being
exploited and causing any further injury to the deceased's family. 29 The
Florida Legislature may have gone one step too far by not allowing the same
reasonable inspection of autopsy photographs, video and audio. The purpose
of the Earnhardt exemption, similar to the Rolling court's reasoning, was to
stop the dissemination of graphic material, which in turn causes the
deceased's family injury. Ending the dissemination of autopsy photos,
video, and audio can be accomplished by doing just what the Rolling court
did, allowing only inspection of the graphic material. If people cannot copy
autopsy photos, video, and audio, then they cannot publish such material in a
form that would cause injury to the deceased's relatives. The only downfall
with inspection of autopsy photographs, video and audio, is that people may
attempt to steal the material and publish it. However, the custodians who are
in charge of the records are also known for stealing such material, hence the
third degree felony that the legislature placed in the Earnhardt
reason for the
30
exemption.
126. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(c); Christy v. Palm Beach Sheriff's Office, 698
So. 2d 1365, 1366 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Tribune Co. v. Pub. Records, 493 So. 2d
480, 483 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986); City of Riviera Beach v. Barfield, 642 So. 2d 1135,
1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
127. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, ch. 2001-1 § 2, 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1, 2
(West) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (2001)).
128. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(c).
129. State v. Rolling, No. 91-3832 CFA, 1994 WL 722891, at *4 (Fla Cir. Ct. July 27,
1994).
130. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § 1(3).
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While the autopsy report would cause less injury to the immediate
family, since it is less graphic if published, it would not facilitate a true
independent medical examination. Allowing reasonable inspection and no
copying of autopsy photographs, video, and audio, would satisfy the public
necessity that the legislature has intended and allow public evaluation of
government. In the Earnhardt accident, the Orlando Sentinel requested an
independent medical examination of the autopsy photos to determine the true
cause of Earnhardt's death. The newspaper, among others, believed the
autopsy photos would show that Earnhardt's death was caused by different
injuries than the Volusia County medical examiner had concluded in the
autopsy report.' 3 1 A medical examiner could make mistakes in his autopsy
report, and only the autopsy photographs and video would be useful to
discover such mistakes. However, there is no great public importance to
uncover mistakes and alleged conspiracies in the county medical examiner's
office.
C. Retroactivity of the Exemption
The Earnhardt Family Protection Act "should be given retroactive
application because it is remedial in nature."' 132 The Florida Constitution and
the United States Constitution do not forbid the state legislature from
enacting laws with retroactive results. 133 A retroactive law looks backward
or contemplates the past, affecting acts or facts that existed before the act
came into effect. 34 A retrospective statute may be disadvantageous to
someone, as long as the person is not deprived of any substantial right or
protection.135 The critical date in determining whether a public record 1is
36
subject to examination is the date the request for examination is made.
However, if the legislature adopts an exemption to the Public Records Law
that is remedial in nature, after the request and before it is complied with,
137
thereby being retroactive, the date the request is made is meaningless.
131. Leusner, supra note 4, at Al.
132. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, § 2.
133. Yellow Cab Co. v. Dade County, 412 So. 2d 395, 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982).

134. BLACK'S LAW DIcTnONARY 1318 (7th ed. 1999).
135. Blankenship v. Dugger, 521 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1988).
136. News-Press Publ'g Co. v. Kaune, 511 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (finding that the documents in question came into existence in June 1986, and request
for examination was made on July 2, 1986. The law became effective July 1, 1986, therefore,
the court does not have to determine if the law is remedial and thereby retroactive).
137. Id.
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There is the presumption that a law is not retroactive unless
there is "an
1 38
express manifestation of legislative intent to the contrary.9
In City of Orlando v. Desjardins,139 a statutory exemption to Florida's
Public Records Act was not enforced by the lower court since the cause of
action accrued prior to the effective date of the exemption. 14 The Supreme
Court of Florida reversed,'14 finding that the statute is remedial in nature and
should be applied retroactively to serve its "intended purposes."' 142 Protecting
substantive rights, even by remedial acts, is allowed retroactive application
especially in this case where there is the potential disclosure of sensitive
documents. 143 Therefore, a new exemption to section 119 of the Florida
Statutes is applicable to public records that were already in existence before
the exemption was enacted. 144
In a more recent case, Memorial Hospital-West Volusia, Inc. v. NewsJournal Corp., 14 the Supreme Court of Florida held that an amended statute
should not apply retroactively because it was not expressly stated by the
legislature that they intended such a result. 146 The amended statute
exempted private hospitals, which were providing public hospital services,
from the requirements of Article I, Section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution. 147 This exemption was created by the legislature in response to the
Fifth District Court of Appeal ruling, which held the private hospital was
subject to the obligations of the Public Records Act.'4 The legislature did
state in the statute that the exemption would apply to "all existing leases"
that corporations have with public health care facilities. 149 That language
was not express enough to find that the legislature intended the statute to
apply retroactively to the public records action, which was commenced
138. Seddon v. Harpster, 403 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 1981) (citing Foley v. Morris, 339
So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1976)).
139. 493 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1986).
140. Id. at 1028.
141. Id. at 1029.
142. Id. at 1028 (discussing the "intended purpose" of the statute, which was to exempt
a governmental agency attorney from providing documents that otherwise would be public
records and open to inspection or copying by the other party to a particular lawsuit the agency

attorney was involved).
143. Id.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Desjardins, 493 So. 2d at 1029.
729 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1999).
Id. at 383-84.
Id. at 375-76.
Id. at 388.
Id.
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before the creation of the exemption. 15 The Supreme Court of Florida
passed on deciding whether the statute is constitutional since the challenge
should start with an initial proceeding in the circuit court.151
Since the Earnhardt exemption is expressly remedial in nature and
thereby retroactive, it can be applied to exempt Dale Earnhardt's autopsy
photos from being released to those news organizations that requested the
photos before the exemption was enacted. The Orlando Sentinel was first to
request Dale Earnhardt's autopsy photos; however, the request was never
52
complied with due to a Volusia County judge that ordered them sealed.
Had the Orlando Sentinel's request been complied with, and the paper given
copies of Dale Earnhardt's autopsy photos, the Earnhardt exemption would
have failed to protect one of its intended benefactors, the Earnhardt family.
That would have been a similar outcome to the News-Journal Corp. holding,
the difference being that the legislative language in the Earnhardt exemption
was clearer on the issue of retroactive status.
V. THE MEDIA AND THE EARNHARDT EXEMPTION
Media organizations cannot blame anyone else but themselves for the
legislature exempting autopsy records from public disclosure. The Florida
Legislature specifically names the World Wide Web as the main culprit in
the publishing and dissemination of autopsy photos.' 53 However, even well
known organizations, such as the Orlando Sentinel, have acted with some
degree of disregard for the well being of Dale Earnhardt's family "for
'selfish, business-driven purposes."", 154 While established news organizations shy away from publishing graphic material, such as autopsy photographs, they often glorify the cause of death in a method that causes some
injury to a deceased's family. Usually those media organizations that
directly exploit graphic material, like autopsy records and photos, are small
and based on the World Wide Web.
Websitecity is one small web based news organization that has taken an
active role in obtaining Dale Earnhardt's autopsy photographs, almost certainly to exploit them. The website has already published Dale Earnhardt's

150.
151.
152.
153.

News Journal Corp., 729 So. 2d at 384.
Id.
Leusner, supra, note 4, at 6A.
Eamhardt Family Protection Act, ch. 2001-1 § 2, 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1, 2
(West) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (2001)).
154. Dannigan, supra note 5, at 78.

Published by NSUWorks, 2001

325

Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1

20011

Bailey

autopsy report from the Volusia County medical examiner's office.15 5
Websitecity has also published graphic autopsy photographs of two other
NASCAR drivers who died at Daytona back in 1994. 56 The memory of
Dale Earnhardt, in the eyes of his family and fans, would surely have been
injured had his autopsy photos been available to the media organizations like
those other NASCAR drivers that have been exploited on Websitecity. It
would be no surprise to see Dale Earnhardt's autopsy photos posted on
Websitecity had the Florida Legislature failed to enact the Earnhardt Family
Protection Act and Dale Earnhardt's widow failed to get an injunction. Even
with the protection afforded to Dale Earnhardt's autopsy photographs, they
will eventually end up on the Internet, as does everything else that is
supposedly confidential.
Various media organizations claim that the Earnhardt Family Protection
Act is an example of a public records exemption initiated for "business
interests.' ' 7 Legal counsel for the Independent Florida Alligator has
claimed that NASCAR is scared of a lawsuit for not requiring drivers to use
head and neck support.15 8 In addition, the Earnhardt family has partly
pursued the injunction of the autopsy photographs to protect the commercial
interests that Dale Earnhardt had created during his NASCAR career.159 The
injury to Dale Earnhardt's memory by release of the autopsy photographs
may come in the form of a ripple effect on Earnhardt's business ventures.
Therefore, the competing interests may go deeper than privacy rights versus
public records access, it may come down to the almighty dollar.
There are countless websites that exhibit graphic autopsy material to all
those individuals who have the stomach and curiosity to view them. This
dissemination of information through the Internet has been going on ever
since the dawn of the Internet age, there is nothing new about this fact.
in
Legislators may be taking this opportunity to simply "exploit fear'
interest
in
favor of a strong right of privacy at the expense of the public's
open and honest government. If this is the case, then the legislature and the
courts need to revisit the strong public policy for open government, and the

155. See http:lwww.websitecity.com/eamhardtlDocuments/me_docs/20010219_0001/
(last visited July 25, 2001).
156. See http:lwww.websitecity.comleamhardtlGallery/ (last visited July 25, 2001).
157. Dunnigan, supra note 5, at 80.
158. Id.

159. Id. at78.
160. Jonsson, supra note 8, at 2.
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language in Article 1, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution,
which grants
161
public records a superior position over the right of privacy.
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE EARNHARDT EXEMPTION AND PUBLIC RECORDS
According to the cases discussed thus far, the Supreme Court of Florida
has consistently found in favor of open access to public records even when
confronted with the compelling argument for the right of privacy. The
Florida Legislature has implemented judicial intervention to insure the
accomplishment of the Public Records Act, so that the right of disclosure is
not defeated by an unjust statutory exemption to the Act. 162 When the
Earnhardt exemption is eventually challenged to the Supreme Court of
Florida, the judiciary will insure that the statutory exemption does not
unjustly defeat the strong public policy for open access to governmental
records. The Supreme Court of Florida will likely find the Earnhardt
exemption meets the requirements for public records exemptions under
Article I, Section 24 of the Florida Constitution. The exemption expressly
states the public necessity and is limited to one subject. Media organizations
that have challenged the exemption will have a difficult time showing that
there is a compelling reason to see the Dale Earnhardt autopsy photographs,
but could argue that the exemption is broader than necessary to achieve the
stated purpose. The purpose in protecting a deceased person's family from
additional grief can be accomplished by allowing reasonable inspection of
the autopsy photographs, video, and audio, without copying. The Earnhardt
exemption may be broader than necessary in not allowing reasonable
inspection by the public.
The Earnhardt exemption will automatically be repealed on October 2,
2006, unless reenacted by the legislature, which is almost certain. 63 The
legislature will likely maintain the exemption against the strong public
policy for open government, since autopsy photos, video, and audio are
sensitive and personal in nature as required by the "Open Government
Sunset Review Act of 1995."'16 The exemption will also be found to
override the strong policy of open government, since the public interest can
still be preserved by examination and copying of the autopsy report.
However, the real test for the Earnhardt exemption will not come in the form
161. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
162. Lorei v. Smith, 464 So. 2d 1330, 1332 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
163. Earnhardt Family Protection Act, ch. 2001-1, § 1(5), 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1,
2 (West) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (2001)).
164. FLA. STAT. § 119.15 (1), (2) (2001).
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of sunset review, but in the Supreme Court of Florida and maybe the United
States Supreme Court.
The policy of open government as dictated in the Florida Statutes and
the Florida Constitution will continue to be one of the nations strongest,
even with the hard hit of the Earnhardt exemption. The Earnhardt exemption
only impacts one type of record out of thousands that are open to the public,
and still allows the autopsy report to be inspected and copied by anyone.
The public still has access to an enormous amount of records relating to the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of Florida's Government.
Inspecting those branches of government is why the Public Records Act was
created. It was not created to allow the media and individuals to snoop
around into the personal lives of private citizens who have lost a loved one.
However, there may be situations where the inspection of autopsy
photographs, video or audio is necessary to uncover government actions,
which are compelling in the name of public interest.
VII. CONCLUSION

All families suffer tremendous grief and sorrow when they lose someone
they love and treasure. The Earnhardt family was not any different when
they "lost a son, a father, a grandfather, a husband and a brother.' 165 The
Florida Legislature recognized the Earnhardt family's need to mourn in
peace at a time when the media was in a whirlwind over the cause of Dale
Earnhardt's death. In doing so, the legislature -created an exemption to the
Public Records Law that will protect countless other families from the
possibility of undergoing additional grief at the hands of the media and the
World Wide Web. The media organizations are the main group affected by
the Earnhardt Family Protection Act, and will continue to pursue their rights
for disclosure. For the time being, the Florida Legislature has sent a message
that the public interest is not served by having access to graphic autopsy
photographs, video and audio. However, Florida's appellate courts have not
assured that the Earnhardt Family Protection Act is a just statutory
exemption to the Public Records Act.
Regardless of the legislature's true motivation in creating an exemption
that has caused so much debate with public records advocates, the exemption
does not signal the end of Florida's policy of open government. The "good
cause" balancing test in the Earnhardt Family Protection Act assures that the
strong policy for public evaluation of government will continue to breathe
165. Prince, supra note 1, at 60.
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life. When a situation arises where the public interest is substantial in
viewing autopsy records, a court should order such viewing over the right of
privacy. The Earnhardt exemption is a victory for the majority of Florida
who hunger for a right of privacy that is not second to the Public's Records
Act as expressed in Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution. The
Earnhardt exemption is also a victory for the Earnhardt family and the
memory of the "Intimidator."
PatrickN. Bailey
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Medical Malpracticein Florida
The State of Florida is a hotbed for medical malpractice litigation.
Several factors come into play that confirm this contention, such as overall
state population, percentage of healthcare consuming population, and the
rise of tort litigation in general throughout the United States. Perhaps one of
the largest contributors to the rise in medical malpractice litigation is due to
the modem achievements in medicine. Indeed, physicians may have become
the victims of their own success. Physicians can heal people today in a way
that was not even imaginable as early as ten years ago. Certainly the medical
advancements that we observe today will be outdated in a matter of years.
Florida currently ranks third in the nation with respect to frequency of
medical malpractice litigation.1 The rise in Florida medical malpractice
See Best's Rev. - Prop.-Casualty Ins. Ed. 78 Medical Malpractice, 1999 WL
1.
10020781 (Aug. 9, 1999); see also F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians' Point of View
Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of
"Tort Reform," 23 GA. L. REv. 295, 301 (1989) (discussing other factors contributing to the
rise in medical malpractice: population growth, increased use of medical care, inflation,
changes in physician-patient relationships, changes in attitude of jurors toward physicians,
improved skills on the part of plaintiff attorneys, and a greater expectation of healing in
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litigation has not occurred overnight by any account. In fact, the most
noticeable rise came in the middle half of the 1980s during the "medical
malpractice crisis" in Florida, a name most commonly tabbed by the insurance industry due to the astronomical rise in medical malpractice insurance
premiums. The rise of medical malpractice litigation has created numerous
caused extreme frustration within the legal and medical
problems and
•• 2
communities.
The State of Florida adopted legislation in an attempt to curtail the3
Statutes
medical malpractice crisis of the 1980s. Chapter 766 of the Florida
tort.4
popular
was adopted in an attempt to control and limit the increasingly
One of the most unique aspects of Florida's medical malpractice statute is
the mandatory ninety-day pre-suit geriod for prospective plaintiffs seeking to
file a medical malpractice lawsuit. According to this pre-suit requirement, a
prospective plaintiff alleging medical negligence against a physician,
hospital or other health care provider must wait ninety days before filing a
6
lawsuit against these prospective defendants. During those ninety days,
informal discovery, including unswom statements from perspective parties
and witnesses, takes place and the prospective defendants are required to7
claims.
conduct investigations with respect to the prospective plaintiff's
Early settlement or binding arbitration is encouraged for claims of highly
probable liability.8
modem society) (citing David Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice
Dilemma, 1975 DUKEL.J. 1179, 1183 (1975)).
2.
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 313 (suggesting that many physicians are so frustrated

over, or in fear of, medical malpractice that they avoid specialties and medical procedures that
are considered high risk for claims. Id. Hubbard also notes that many physicians practice
"defensive medicine" including ordering several tests and procedures that are unnecessary, but
used solely to avoid a risk of liability). Also, physicians tend to practice more detailed record
keeping because of fear over lawsuits. Id. at n.69.
3.

FLA. STAT.

§ 766 (2000).

Id. See also Hubbard, supra note 1, at 309-12 (describing increases in medical
4.
malpractice litigation as caused by too many lawsuits filed, plaintiffs prevailing too often, and
damage awards being too high). Hubbard presents an argument summarized in six categories:
"1) recent rule changes that unfairly favor plaintiffs; 2) problems resulting from statutes of

limitations that are too lengthy; 3) inadequacy of common-law rules concerning compensatory
damages; 4) injustice of rules governing punitive damages; 5) the cost and unfairness involved
in administering the system; and 6) inadequate mechanisms to prevent 'frivolous' claims." Id.
at 310.
§ 766.106(3)(a).
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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The primary motivation behind states having a pre-suit period prior to
the filing of a formal lawsuit is to reduce the overall number of lawsuits
either by preventing the filing of frivolous lawsuits or providing an
opportunity to settle meritorious claims. 9 In addition to the mandatory presuit screening period, the prospective plaintiff must enclose a corroborating
opinion from a qualified medical expert with the notice of intent to initiate
medical malpractice litigation on the prospective defendants. 10 This opinion
must detail the alleged deviations from the prevailing standards of care or
other assertions of medical negligence on the part of the prospective
defendants.
In an attempt to monitor and curb medical malpractice litigation, the
notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation and the accompanying corroborating expert opinion are filed with the Department of Health,
Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA").12 AHCA may decide to
conduct an independent investigation and take additional action against the
licensed health care provider depending upon the seriousness of the
allegations and the probability of liability. To date, there have been no conclusive observations regarding whether or not Chapter 766 of the Florida
Statutes has had any of the intended results.
B. Rise in Complex, Scientific Based Litigation in the United States
Florida is not unique with respect to experiencing a rise in complex,
medical malpractice litigation. All in all, the United States has experienced
an alarming rise in the frequency of complex, scientific, and technological
litigation.1 3 Courts and juries are increasingly called upon to absorb large
doses of scientific theory in cases involving toxic torts, medical malpractice,
criminal charges based upon scientific evidence, products liability and most
types of personal injury cases.1 4 In fact, one study showed that ninety-seven
Jody Weisberg Menon, Adversarial Medical and Scientific Testimony and Lay
9.
Jurors: A Proposalfor Medical Malpractice Reform, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 281, 288 (1995);

see also Hubbard, supra note 1, at 324-26 (discussing that pre-suit notices of intent to initiate
medical malpractice litigation may facilitate more voluntary settlements prior to the filing of a
formal lawsuit).
10. § 766.203(2)(b).
11.

Id.

12. § 766.106(2). In addition, Professor Hubbard discusses other "internal" physician
deterrents such as ethics, physicians' concerns for healing their patients, and peer review. See
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 315 n.75.
13. See Menon, supra note 9, at 281-82.
14.

Id.
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percent of all medical malpractice lawsuits required the use of medical
5
experts to assist jurors in understanding the material presented in the case.'

A study of all California civil jury trials from 1985 to 1986 revealed
that expert witnesses testified in eighty-six percent of all civil trials and the
cases, on average, involved nearly four different expert witnesses. 6 Due to
increases in technology, science, medicine, and, subsequently, litigation,
expert witnesses have become a "mainstay" in the courtroom.1 7 More

specifically, the significant majority of expert witnesses in trials are medical
doctors. 8
1. Complexity of Litigation

With increases in complexity of litigation and technological
advancements, particularly in medicine, medical issues are often far beyond
the comprehension of the normal citizen.' 9 Because of these increases, it is

argued that most complex lawsuits "may be properly outside of the province
of the current jury system when they involve very complex issues... [such
as] medical testimony." 2 Add the adversarial manner in which this complex
21 The
information
is presented nature
it even
further perplexes the layperson.
complexity and scientific and
of litigation has increased
so much that one

15.

See id. at 289. Menon also discusses a quote from Connors v. Univ. Assocs. in

Obstetrics & Gynecology, in which the court states: "in this era of constantly developing
medical science, cases in which injuries bespeak negligence to the average person occur less
and less and complex cases predominate." 769 F. Supp. 578,585 (D. Vt. 1991).
16. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1120 (1991).
17. Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of
AdversarialProcesses,48 DEPAULL. REV. 355, 358 (1998).
18. Id.
19. See Menon, supra note 9, at 296. Menon argues that because of this fact, juries
composed of "laypersons are no longer suitable for cases involving complex medical
evidence." Id.
20. Id. at 299.
21. Keith Broyles, Taking the Courtroom into the Classroom: A Proposal for
Educating the Lay Juror in Complex Litigation Cases, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 715
(1996) (quoting B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights:" Creating
Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1244 (1993) (comparing the courtroom
to the classroom and concluding that the principle discrepancy between the two is that
classrooms encourage interaction and the exchange of information to effectuate learning and
understanding whereas, in the courtroom, jurors are "acted upon" and expected to remain
passive yet render judgment based on what they supposedly should comprehend).
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author was prompted to comment
that "jurisprudence" has now been
22

circumvented by "juriscience."

What constitutes a "complex case" has been defined using four
elements.23 These four most prominent elements are: multiple party
litigation, complex issues and case facts, cases involving "highly technical
24
evidence," and difficulties associated with providing the proper remedy.
Some of the difficulties associated with complex litigation exist because
these cases typically involve several Aarties, several issues, technical
evidence, and difficult questions of law. These types of cases commonly
turn on the believability of the respective parties' expert witnesses.
Unfortunately, with the high dollar stakes of modem complex litigation,
expert witnesses are often called upon to stretch the truth, deviate from
generally accepted scientific concepts within their respective professions, or
present fraudulent evidence or theories. The
testimony these experts provide
' 26
is commonly referred to as "junk science.
2. Science v. Law
One of the most prominent quandaries between science and law rests in
the fact that law demands absolute truths and science cannot indisputably

provide them.27 The lack of absolute certainty in science is the basis for

much of the debate in complex litigation. The legal community seems
devoid of the understanding that science is the search for truth, not the
determination of the truth. 28 Unfortunately, the influence of the courtroom
22. See Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudenceor "Juriscience?," 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 525, 532 (1984).
23. See Broyles, supra note 21, at 720; see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084-86 (1980) (identifying litigation complexity as encompassing
three common elements: the size of the lawsuit, the difficulty of the issues of the case, and the
difficulty of separating the different aspects of the case).
24. Id. (quoting Jay Tidmarsh, UnattainableJustice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of JudicialPower, 60 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1711 (1992)).
25. Id. at 737.
26. See PETER W. HuBER, GALLEO'S REVENGE 2-3 (1991). Huber describes junk
science as trial testimony provided by an expert that is unsupported by any scientific method,
valid data, and standard scientific thinking. Id.
27. Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About
Scientific Evidence: A CloserLook at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific "Objectivity," 25
CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1098 (1993) (discussing the beliefs that scientists are fair and objective

in their search for "truth" and the erroneous assumption that for every difficult scientific
question, there is always some definite answer).
28. See Markey, supranote 22, at 526-27.
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dollar may lead scientists to insist upon "justice-friendly" absolute
certainties despite the fact that few to none actually exist.
With the rise in complex litigation, junk science has invaded the
courtroom, allowing juries to determine causation when causation does not,
in fact, exist.29 One dated, yet classic, example'of a court's reliance on junk
science stems from a 1964 Pennsylvania case in which the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania upheld a trial court's decision despite the fact that the jury
erroneously relied upon evidence that suggested a rear end vehicle collision
caused lung cancer. 3° In another startling case, a woman successfully sued
for damages after she purportedly developed breast cancer from a slip and
fall.31 While these "trauma induced cancer" cases were later refuted by the
medical community, they provide an ample illustration of how a jury can be
persuaded to rely upon inaccurate medical theories. .
Law requires absolute truths on an immediate basis. When faced with
litigation involving complex scientific questions, law demands that there be
an answer to a question, and unfortunately, the courts are not patient in their
demands. Science, on the other hand, has a more patient, thorough nature.
Science, to be considered generally accepted such that law would not
question its veracity, needs to be continually tested, debated, practiced, and
proven to progress beyond initial uncertainty. 32 What is certain, however, is
that we are becoming a more complex, scientific and technologically
advanced community as a matter of societal progress. Due to this progress,
science, in one way or another, is now an everyday part of litigation.33 This
overwhelming influence of science is without a-doubt beyond that which was
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution3 or even early appellate
courts who handed down decisions regarding complex litigation.,
29.
30.

See HUBER, supra note 26.
See Baker v. DeRosa, 196 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1964). Interestingly, the Chief Justice

dissented, stating that:
Plaintiffs case is so farfetched and so filled with contradictions by the
decedent and conjectures by his doctors, while the testimony of defendant's
doctors is so positive and strong, I believe that the verdict was clearly against
the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the
interest of justice.

Id. at 392.
31. See Daiy v. Bergstedt, 126 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1964).
32. Renee A. Forinash, Analyzing Scientific Evidence: From Validity to Reliability
with a Two-step Approach, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 223 (1992).
33. Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal For Complex Litigation, 47
DEPAuL L. Rav. 49, 66 (1997).
34. Id. at 65.
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Scientific cases often involve evidence so cornlex that only attorneys,
physicians and other scientists can appreciate it.35 The American legal
system is grossly unprepared to tackle the beast of scientific litigation.
Discrepancies exist between law and science that often result in less than
36
accurate scientific theory being presented and admitted in a courtroom.
Issues as to the admissibility of "junk science" are vital to litigation reform
efforts for several reasons. Problems with scientific evidence are important
because science is often outcome-determinative in trials. The influx of
science also affects the volume of dockets and often seriously impairs lay
jurors' ability to decipher the issues of the cases.37 The courts are charged
with barring immature, untested, or inaccurate scientific data, yet questions
exist as to the court's ability, as with the ability of lay jurors, to assess the
veracity of scientific evidence. 38 As a result of the courts' gatekeeper role, it
is vital that the judge's ability to adequately test scientific theories be
improved, either by adoption of reform measures or improved guidelines
established by higher court rulings.
3. "Junk Science"
Junk science, as it is named, comes in many forms.39 Junk science
includes scientific theories that are novel, inaccurate, experimental, and
immature. 4 0 Experts may attempt to establish causation based upon a
scientific theory which is inaccurate or which is improper for the purposes
presented by the expert witness. For example, an expert medical physician
may attempt to give an exact date in time when a specific cancer
metastasized, which, by modem medical standards, is impossible to
determine to that degree of specificity. Examples of junk science are
endless; however, they often involve assertive "pinpoint" predictions of
controversial events to a specific degree, which are scientifically unfounded.
35. Id. at 75.
36. Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Based Upon Clinical Judgment and Scientific Research, 4 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 1226, 1234

(1998).
37. Kaushal B. Majmudar, Daubert v. Merrell Dow: A Flexible Approach to the
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 7 HARv. J.L. &TECH. 187, 194 (1993).

38. See Shuman, supranote 36, at 1235.
39. See HUBER, supra note 26. The term "junk science" refers to the concept of
scientific evidence that is presented in a lawsuit, either for purposes of causation or damages,
which is inaccurate, unfounded, controversial, untested or otherwise invalid in the scientific

community. Id.
40. Id.
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II. EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW PERTAINING TO COMPLEX
LITIGATION

Due to the fact that most complex cases turn on scientific evidence, the
parties often dispute the accuracy of their adversaries' scientific evidence or
opinions. These disputes can take place in a number of ways, either by pretrial motion, objection during trial, or hearings as to the admissibility of
evidentiary testimony or opinion as well as at the appellate level. The
judicial system's attempts at preventing the admissibility of junk science are
challenged by the ambiguity between just when a scientific principle or
discovery crosses the line between "experimental" and "accepted" status in
the particular scientific communities.4
A. Frye v. United States
The courts since the early twentieth century have had admissibility
standards for scientific evidence. 42 In Frye v. United States,43 the Federal
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was called upon to assess the
accuracy of a polygraph test in a criminal trial. 44 The Court held that only
scientific evidence that was "generally accepted" by a substantial portion of
the scientific community would be entered into evidence. The Frye test, as
it became known, was the standard that courts applied to cases where
scientific evidence was challenged with respect to admissibility. For
scientific evidence to be admitted for a jury to consider, it must have been
generally accepted by a substantial portion of the reszective scientific
community involved in that particular field of practice.
For half of a
century, Frye was the standard for militating against the presentation of
scientific evidence that was novel, experimental, or immature. With little
exception, Frye remains the admission standard by which scientific evidence
must pass in Florida.47

41.
42.
43.
44.

See Majmudar, supra note 37, at 187.
Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id.

45.

Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).

46.

Id.

47.

See Poulin v. Fleming, 782 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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B. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States set aside the Frye test
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4' The Supreme Court ruled
that Frye had been superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically
Rule 702. 49 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the admission of scientific
evidence in a trial must be permitted if it will assist the jury in determining
factual issues of the controversy before them. 50 The rule simply required
that the particular evidentiary position must be based upon sufficient facts or
data, a product of reliable methods, and the expert's position was applied to
the facts before the court. 5' In addition, the Supreme Court in Daubert
charged the trial judge with being the "gatekeeper" with respect to the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Justice Blackmun, who authored the
Daubert opinion, even further pronounced the majority's opinion that the
Frye test was too stringent a test to determine admissibility of scientific
evidence.5 3 Justice Blackmun blasted Frye as going against the liberal thrust
of the rules of evidence which attempt to admit opinion testimony.5 4
The "general acceptance" test, however, was not totally discarded by
the Daubert decision. Under Daubert,"general acceptance" only remains as
one of the many elements that aid a court when faced with an admissibility

48.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).

49.

Id. (citing to FED. R. EviD. 702). FED. R. Evm. 702 holds that:

[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Id.
50. FED. R. EviD.702.
51. Id. See also Majmudar, supra note 37, at 188 (discussing Daubertas setting aside
the general acceptance test of Frye making general acceptance no longer a requirement to
admissibility of scientific evidence).
52. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580; see also Majmudar, supra note 37, at 190 (discussing
that the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted
during the trial is "not only relevant, but also reliable").
53. Daubert,509 U.S. at 580.
54. Id. at 579.
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decision. 55 The much-broadened framework of Daubert permit the courts,
specifically the trial court judge, a wider, more liberal range of discretion
that was not afforded by the Frye standard. 56 The majority in Daubert have
attempted to broaden access to the courts for novel scientific evidence while
permitting the trial court more discretion with the hope of keeping junk
science out of the courtroom and thwarting a scientific "free-for-all."'', The
Daubert analysis has now become the norm for federal courts when
assessing the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Florida, unlike most of her sister states, still relies on Frye with respect
to scientific evidence in the courtroom. From 1953 to present day, Florida

courts, including the Supreme Court of Florida, have upheld the use of
Frye.58 By its refusal to follow the path of most jurisdictions in the United
States, Florida has shown a commitment to combating junk science by
maintaining the stricter, objective standards set forth in Frye, wherein a
scientific concept must conform with the "general acceptance" test.59 In
Florida, the burden for establishing the particular scientific concept is
generally accepted within the scientific communi' lies with the party
wishing to introduce the evidence and/or testimony. This gives opposing
parties better opportunity to ensure that the evidence used against them will
be the more trusted, viable scientific truth rather than junk science motivated
by a party's attempts to pull a judicial "fast one."

55. Id. at 580-81; see also Majmudar, supra note 37, at 190. Majmudar illustrates the
four principal elements cited by the Court for determining the relevance and reliability of
scientific evidence. Id. These four elements are:
1) whether the theory or technique had been tested in order to check for
falsifiability, refutability, and repeatability, 2) whether or not the evidence
had been subjected to peer review, 3) the rate of error of the technique and
the standards used to control it and, 4) the level of acceptance of the
technique within the relevant scientific community.
Id.
56. See Majmudar, supra note 37, at 203.
57. Daubert,509 U.S. at 595.
58. See, e.g., Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953); Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d
1242 (Fla. 1983); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Poulin v.
Fleming, 782 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
59. Frye, 293 Fed. 1013; see also Shuman, supra note 36, at 1236 (commenting that
perhaps the most significant aspect of Frye is that it helped shape judicial scrutiny to a level
beyond consideration of only the expert's reputation, qualification and credentials when
making a decision regarding the admissibility of evidence).
60. Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995).
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III. PROBLEMS WITH COMPLEX MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

Despite maintaining the stricter Frye standard, medical malpractice
litigation in Florida is riddled with problems. These litigation-based problems in Florida, as with other states, develop in a myriad of judicial areas,
some of which are the most fundamental to the American system of justice.
Given the rise of complex scientific litigation, the two areas that most
commonly come under attack are the jury system and the expert witness
industry.
A. JurorIncompetence
To challenge the American jury system is without question a very bold,
ominous undertaking. The American system of justice is grounded upon the
notion of having a jury of lay persons that is representative of the community
and capable of reaching a fair, unbiased decision decide the fate of their
neighbor.
The American jury system gives jurors a level of sovereign
authority that is seldom assigned to the average citizen. 62 In fact, the United
States is now the only country in the world where the jury continues to play
such a powerful and central role in case adjudication.63 The modem
controversy rests in the glaring problems associated with selecting a lay jury
that is capable of reaching fair, unbiased decisions in lengthy cases involving
scores of highly technical, confusing evidence.6
Modem lay juries are criticized for lacking the wherewithal to
understand the legal system, the evidence presented, technical or scientific
theory, and the court's instructions on deliberation and reaching a verdict.6
Juries are called upon in complex medical malpractice cases to hear
seemingly endless amounts of medical testimony and evidence, most of
which is innovative and subject to debate amongst the medical profession.
Medical malpractice cases involving numerous defendants often last for
several weeks, which charges a jury with remembering very complex
evidence and testimony presented to them by the litigants. Moreover, this
complex evidence is often presented weeks before they begin deliberation
and, in most courts, jurors are without the luxury of even taking notes to
61. Shuman, supra note 36, at 1227.
62. See Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. CoLO. L. REv. 53,
55 (2001).
63. Id. at 59.

64.

Id. See also Menon, supra note 9, at 284-85.

65.

Strier, supra note 33, at 50.
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record the information presented to them. 66 As one author aptly explained,
"[t]he law seeks the benefit of the common person's judgment but asks that
individual to apply legal rules often beyond the comprehension of one not
trained in the law." 67 This allegation is perhaps even further accredited
when difficult medical theories are added to the jurors' confusion in medical
malpractice trials. To the most trained medical expert, this would be a
difficult, frustrating, and trying task. The question has been posed and, in
fact, has been the subject of much debate: do lay juries possess the level of
competency to adequately and accurately render judgment in complex
scientific/medical cases? 68 An equal amount of debate persists as to what
reform measures to take now that it is becoming readily apparent that lay
juries cannot possibly be counted on to adequately and accurately render
69
judgment in complex scientific cases.
1. Lay Juror Comprehension
By simple logic, it seems somewhat archaic to hold a jury to render
judgment based upon facts and evidence that took the litigants months or
even years to assimilate. 70 This problem is even more compounded when
you insert complex medical or scientific evidence into the fray as
professionals, such as physicians or scientists, seemingly spend their entire
careers attempting to master an understanding of these concepts. 71 For
instance, can a lay juror honestly be expected to fully comprehend the
66.

Dann, supra note 21, at 1250-52 (advocating the permission of juries to take

notes during trial with a cautionary instruction that taking notes is not required and should not
be given greater weight than jurors' memories).
67.

Strier, supra note 33, at 52.

68.
69.

See Menon, supra note 9, at 284-85.
Id.

70. Id. at 283-84.
71. Neil Vidmar, EmpiricalEvidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards
for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 263 (1993). In
addition, Professor Vidmar notes that:
[S]ome legal professionals have questioned how a group of laypersons can
make intelligent and unbiased judgments in tasks to which professionals
devote years of education and their entire careers. At the same time, doctors
and their professional organizations have questioned whether any group of
persons other than physicians can make judgments about medical negligence
because of the difficulty and complex technical medical questions that they
allege are involved in malpractice disputes.
Id. See also HUBrER, supra note 26, at 33 (claiming that nonscientists are "unequipped to
differentiate good science from bad").
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prevailing professional standard of care 72 with respect to an issue as complex
and ill-defined as cancer staging? Not only are they charged with
understanding standards of care in medical malpractice cases, they are also
called upon to determine whether or not that ill-defined, vague standard of
care has, in fact, been breached.73
One author conducted a study involving eleven anesthesiologists from
Harvard Medical School in which these physicians were given the facts of
twelve medical malpractice cases where juries brought back verdicts against
other anesthesiologists. 74 The surveyed anesthesiologists were asked to
review the facts of these twelve cases and determine whether or not the
standard of care had, in fact, been violated as found by the juries in the
actual trials." Physician agreement with the jury verdicts was less than sixty
percent.76 It may be argued that the surveyed anesthesiologists were biased
in favor of their peers; however, it should also be noted that those physicians
surveyed had no stake in these lawsuits and their judgment, favorable or
unfavorable, had no bearing on the cases. The fact that less than sixty
percent of the verdicts were agreed with by physicians skilled in the field of
77
anesthesiology suggests that at least some errors were made by these juries.
For the most part, the less educated a juror is, the less likely they will
78
be able to comprehend this type of evidence. On the other hand, the more
education, skills, or related life experience a juror has, the more comfortable
they will be with complex cases. 79 The more educated types of jurors tend to
dominate those with less education, skills or experience.80 Education,
training, and experience play a far less crucial role in civil and criminal trials
involving shorter presentations of more simple, everyday-life evidentiary
issues. 81 Jurors in these roles can call upon their everyday-life experiences
72. "Prevailing professional standard of care" in medical malpractice cases in Florida
is defined as: "[tihat level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant
surrounding circumstances is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent
similar health care providers." FLA. STAT. § 766.102 (2000).
73. See Menon, supra note 9, at 284. Menon notes that because of this difficult
responsibility, juries are quite often "guessing when they render a verdict." Id.
74. Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical MalpracticeJury Verdicts: A Case Study of
an Anesthesiology Department,7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 121 (1997).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 129.
77. Sanders, supra note 17, at 361.
78. See Broyles, supra note 21, at 720.
79. Id. at 720-23.
80. Id. at 720.
81. Id. at 723.
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to plug in gaps in evidence or issues.82 This ability to plug in holes is widely
83
absent when it comes to complex cases. In several surveys of judges and
jurors involved in complex cases, the common theme of difficulty or
frustration was centered on technical, medical and/or scientific evidence.84
One author noted that "an uncomprehending ju could frustrate a complete
remedy and could be an instrument of injustice."
With the yearly advances in medical science and technology, medical
malpractice cases and medical standards of care are, for the most part, far
beyond the comprehension of the average citizen. 86 These advances in
medicine require practicing physicians to constantly study and update their
knowledge with respect to the changes in their respective specialties. Lay
jurors who are confronted with complex scientific issues tend to be
frustrated by the difficulty of the evidence presented to them. 7 As a result,
studies have shown that these jurors focused more on the appearances of
witnesses, the credentials of the expert witnesses, and the demeanor of the
attorneys trying the cases. 88 Jury attention span decreases in long trials,
especially when concerning technical medical evidence.8 9 These difficulties
are even further progressed by the adversarial nature with which they are
presented in trials. 90 Arguably, opposing attorneys and their retained expert
witnesses may even further confuse jurors when they attack the evidence
presented by their adversaries with equally complex and completely different
.evidence. Lay jurors are simply not qualified to accurately assess the
credibility of the evidence and the witnesses.

82.

Id.

83.

See Broyles, supra note 21, at 723.

84.

Id.

85.

Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary

on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1637 (1983) (discussing the controversial theory
that a jury not represented by educated persons could be deemed unconstitutional); see also
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (suggesting that the "practical abilities and
limitations of juries" may be a limit on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial); In re
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that lay jurors
lacked the capacity to decide complex litigation case involving antitrust issues).
86. See Menon, supra note 9, at 296.
87. See Broyles, supra note 21, at 722.
88. Id. (discussing case study by the American Bar Association).
89. Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil
Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, andAgenda-Building, 52 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs., 269,

280 (1989).
90. See Broyles, supra note 21, at 722.
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Former Chief Justice Warren Burger has been quoted on occasion
discussing the problems with jurors, particularly in complex cases. 91 In one
of his most noted comments concerning this issue, Justice Burger stated that,
"civil juries waste time and are often incapable of understanding the issues
presented to them."92 Some appellate courts have also noted the limitations
of lay juries. 9 In one appellate case, the court commented that "while the
jury can contribute nothing of value so far as the law is concerned, it has an
infinite capacity for mischief, for twelve men can easily4 misunderstand more
law in a minute than the judge can explain in an hour. '
Questions exist as to whether lay jurors even attentively consider the
evidence when it stretches beyond their realm of understanding. In Florida,
prospective jurors are often questioned during voir dire regarding jury
instructions with respect to their capabilities of harboring no sympathy
considerations for plaintiffs. 95 This is done in an attempt to set an early
mindset to jurors that they will not only be able to render a verdict not based
on sympathy but this instruction will remain in their collective minds
throughout the trial.96
Studies suggest that the more complicated the case and evidence, the
less attentive the lay jury will be.97 Jurors in one particular study involving
91. Id. at 723.
92. Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation
Process - The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 15, 17 (1990). Interestingly,

Justice Burger is not the only Supreme Court Justice who has voiced disapproval for the
modem jury system. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has commented:
It is unfortunate that, in high-profile cases in this country, which sometimes
are high-profile precisely because they are very important, courts are forced
to look high and low for jurors who never read newspapers, never watch the
news, and never give much thought to issues of public importance. I'm not
saying that those jurors are incapable of deciding cases properly. But I am
saying that those jurors probably are unrepresentative of their community,
because they probably are on average considerably less well-informed
citizens than a random cross- section would provide.
See Lilly, supra note 62, at 65 n.39 (quoting Sandra Day O'Connor, Juries: They May Be
Broken, But We Can Fix Them, FED. LAW 20,23 (June, 1997)).
93. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1948).
94. See Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 60.
95.

FLA. STD. JURY INST.

96.
97.

Id.
See Broyles, supra note 21, at 722 (citing a study conducted by Molly Selvin and

7.1.

Larry Picus of The Rand Corporation. The Debate over Jury Performance: Observations

from a Recent Asbestos Case, 24-25 (Rand Inst. For Civil Justice 1987)). Selvin and Picus
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asbestos commented that when the evidence fell outside of their level of
competency, they focused more on the appearance and demeanor of the
attorney and the expert witnesses rather than the substantive testimony being
given. 98 Collectively, the jurors in the asbestos case study had difficulty
with understanding the chemical reaction and its nature, the progression of
the chemical with respect to the human physiology, and the long-term effects
of exposure. 99 Understanding these types of concepts in all complex litigation cases is absolutely crucial to determining causation and damages as well
as adequately reaching a verdict.
2. Exclusion of Highly Educated or Skilled Jurors
One of the most common problems with modem lay juries is the
exclusion of highly trained, educated, and skilled citizens from panels.1°°
There are many reasons why college educated or other highly skilled jurors
do not make it on to panels. Attorneys, particularly on the plaintiff side, fear
that more educated jurors would be capable of seeing through weak points in
their cases and serve as leaders on jury panels who are able to sway less
educated, "follower" jurors to better understand what has been presented at
trial. 10 1 Jury consultants are often retained in one way or another to develop
a profile of the specific attributes that the attorney should look for in a juror
which appear favorable toward their case. Persons that appear to be well
educated, perceptive, and independent-minded tend to be the antithesis of
what attorneys, particularly plaintiff attorneys, want on a panel.1 2 The more
educated and sophisticated the juror is, the more he or she tends to dominate
the less educated jurors. 03 Also, the less educated jurors are commonly
preferred by plaintiff attorneys because they tend to be swayed by sympathy

illustrated that jurors involved in a class action lawsuit concerning asbestos were confused by
the adversarial presentation of scientific and medical evidence. See Broyles, supra note 21, at
722.
98. Id. See also Sanders, supra note 17, at 362 (discussing that jurors in this study
misunderstood the development of medical problems associated with asbestos exposure).
99. Broyles, supra note 21, at 722; see also Lilly, supra note 62, at 59-60 (commenting that doubts about juries, unfamiliar with the subject case material, contribute to doubts
about the fairness and efficiency of the American jury system).
100. See Strier, supra note 33, at 72-73.
101. Id.
102. See Lilly, supra note 62, at 64.
103. See Broyles, supra note 21, at 722.
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and to question the claims of the plaintiff far less than those jurors with more
education.1°4
3. Juror Sacrifice
Jurors such as doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers, and other
professionals are often stricken because of the obvious financial difficulties
they would incur from serving on jury panels during complex, lengthy
trials.10 5 Not only can these individuals not afford the financial sacrifice of
serving on a jury panel, their professional practices typically would suffer
gravely from their absence.'0 6 Imagine the problems associated with a
pediatrician, or any other physician for that matter, being suddenly taken
away from their patients because of jury duty or, even worse, a four-week
jury trial. Yet, converse to that empathy, that physician may be precisely
what the jury panel is lacking when faced with a need for an educated
professional who is capable of understanding and appreciating the complex
evidence which will be proffered at trial. It has been suggested that long,
complex trials have a built-in bias, favoring jurors who are ill-informed, less
skilled and less educated than the average citizen. 1 7 Likewise, it is difficult
to contradict the theory that a decline in the capacity and qualifications of
jurors would result in a decline in the accuracy and fairness of jury
verdicts. 1°8 In addition, regardless of where a person fits into society, it
cannot be argued that the burdens associated with jury duty are not1 9far
heavier in modem day America than were ever contemplated in the past. 0
4. Cross-Section of the Community?
Questions exist as to whether or not a jury comprised of no collegeeducated individuals is, in fact, a representative cross-section of the
community." 0 Moreover, is a jury comprised of no college-educated jurors
or other professionals really a jury of a defendant-physician's peers in a
medical malpractice trial? 1 If roughly forty percent of American citizens
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Strier, supra note 33, at 72-73.
Id.
See Lilly, supranote 62, at 65.
Id.
Id. at 61.
Strier, supra note 33, at 76.
Id.
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have at least some college education,' 2 a jury comprised of six or twelve
individuals below that educational level does not represent a cross-section.
One of the major advantages to using, or even requiring, a certain
number of college educated jurors on a complex litigation panel is that
college tends to train an individual in the art of analyzing data and various
theories to better formulate an educated understanding of what has actually
been presented to them."' It is suggested that a college-educated individual
gets less frustrated when faced with mountains of difficult information
because they have experienced at least some degree of similar challenges at
some point in college.!14 In addition, college educated jurors tend to better
understand and follow standard jury instructions which are one of the most
difficult tasks faced by juries.1 5 Unfortunately, with the rise in the collegeeducated population, there has been a resulting rise in these more caable
service.
individuals having the highest level of motivation to avoid jury
With education on the rise in society, it could be argued that a jury7
containing few educated members is not a cross-section of the community."
Arguments are made that we must find a way to make avoiding jury duty
more difficult for these higher educated jurors or begin requiring full or
partial "blue ribbon" juries comprised of certain percentage of highly
educated individuals." 8 A higher court ruling requiring a certain percentage
of educated jurors would significantly aid in the establishment of "blue
ribbon" juries."19 Opponents argue that requiring a mandatory percentage of
Proponents claim that
higher educated jurors is an elitist ideology.
requiring juries to contain an adequate cross-section of the community
112. Id. at 63 n.68; see also Lilly, supra note 62, at 62-64.
113. See Lilly, supra note 62, at 62-65 (referencing studies regarding changes in

percentages of college-educated citizens as well as changes in the national workforce); see
also Strier, supra note 33, at 59-60.
114. See Strier, supranote 33, at 59-60.
115. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A PsycholinguisticStudy of Jury Instructions, 79 COLuM. L. REv. 1306,
1320 (1979).

116. See Lilly, supra note 62, at 63. Lilly points out that "the persons apt to be the
most capable jurors are also the individuals with the greatest incentives to avoid jury duty...
the proportion of the population thathas both enhanced ability and. a heightened motivation to
escape jury service has significantly increased." Id.
117. Id. at65.
118. See Strier, supra note 33, at 60. Professor Strier discusses the likelihood that jury
decision-making would be enhanced by using specially qualified jurors. Id. at 58.
119. Id. at76.
120. Id. at 59.
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which, by all accounts encompasses a sizable percentage of college-educated
121
citizens, is not elitism; rather, it is simply functionalism or fairness.
5. The Decline of Personal Responsibility
Another area of concern that rests with juries comes from alarm over
society's growing disregard for personal responsibility as well as a general
increase in the litigiousness of the American people. One author noted the
American ideology that "those who suffer injuries are quick to place blame
upon others.' 122 Americans have quite positively embraced the notion that
someone else is always at fault.12 One of the most often cited examples of
over zealous litigation and the unpredictability of juries is the case involving

a New Mexico woman who was awarded over two million dollars for
spilling hot coffee on her lap from a McDonald's fast food restaurant.124

The rise in dollar amounts of jury verdicts in medical malpractice
lawsuits, as well as other complex tort litigation, suggests that jurors are
often sympathetic to allegedly injured plaintiffs and, as such, will often
render verdicts in favor of these plaintiffs when faced with discrepancies
over understanding complex case issues or evidence. 125 It appears the jurors
often give plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt. 126 Trials involving lay juries
require as much strategy to bring out the emotions and even biases of jurors
than strategies attacking the opposing party's case on its principles.1 27
121. Id.
122. See Forinash, supra note 32, at 251.
123. Id. at 253.
124. See Liebeck v. McDonalds Restaurant's, Inc., 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. 1994);
see also Lilly, supra note 62, at 56 n. 12. Professor Lilly also cites the example of an Alabama
jury that awarded four million dollars in punitive damages to a car buyer after the dealer failed
to disclose that the car he purchased had been repainted after being slightly damaged prior to
delivery. Id. The Supreme Court of Alabama reduced the verdict to two million dollars. See
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994). This jury verdict was
eventually reversed and the case was remanded to the Alabama trial court by the Supreme
Court of United States, but this example is an astonishing example of how far some juries will
go with excessive verdicts. Id. The Court noted that the Alabama jury's award was grossly
excessive in light of the low level of reprehensibility of the distributor's conduct. See BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
125. See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 312 (commentating that "juries are likely to be
sympathetic to the plight of victims and, therefore, may tend to resolve doubts in favor of
plaintiffs regardless of what they are instructed to do by the judge").
126. Id.
127. Lilly, supra note 62, at 57 (pointing out that cases are far too often decided on
juror sympathy and emotion rather than substance).
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B. JudicialIncompetence
Another area for examination is the role of judges in the problems
associated with complex litigation. Unfortunately, judges may very well
suffer from many of the same problems associated with lay jurors." Judges,
it seems, may be only slightly more capable of sorting through complex
scientific evidence as the common lay juror. 129 Judges are not given the
training or the tools they need to understand and control the flow of
scientific data that goes through their courtrooms. It is crucial that judges
must have some degree of a grasp of the facts, issues and evidence presented
in all cases including those involving complex scientific or medical
controversies. 130 If trial court judges are incapable of deciding highly
than these decisions surely should not be placed in the hands
technical cases,
13 '
juries.
lay
of
1. Retired Judges
In Florida, judicial competency is an even greater concern because of
the continuous assignment of retired judges to preside over trials that
promise to span for longer periods of time. 32 These trials typically all
involve complex litigation cases and are assigned to a retired judge docket
because of the docket backlog that would be created if the assigned judge
presided over a lengthy trial. 133 Due to these reassignments, the very cases
that demand the highest level of judicial competency are commonly removed
from the assigned judge and tried before a retired judge who is unfamiliar
with the issues involved in the cases as well as unfamiliar with modem
science and technology involved in complex litigation. It should be noted
that the concept of retired judges presiding over cases was designed in
Florida to permit retired judges to relieve docket backlog, fill in for judges
34
who are off sick or vacationing, or to preside over simple, shorter trials.1

128. See Shuman, supra note 36, at 1244 n.90.

129. See Menon, supra note 9, at 286.
130. Id. at 295.
131. See Jacobs, supra note 27, at 1088 n.20.
132. See Sue Reisinger, Lawyer challenges constitutionality of outside judges in
Broward,MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 12,2000, at B3.

133. Id.
134. See In re Certification of Add'I Judges, 755 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2000).
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The Constitution of the State of Florida requires judges to be elected by_
voters within the jurisdiction of the courts over which they will preside.
Retired judges who are appointed to preside over trials are not elected
officials and, therefore, are arguably not responsive to the electorate. The
right of the citizens of Florida to select their own officials is a sovereign
right. 136 Unreasonable or unnecessary restrictions on citizen's elective rights
are unconstitutional. 137 The constitutional argument that exists with respect
to the appointment of retired judges to preside over complex medical
malpractice cases is that these retired judges are no responsive to any voting
body and, therefore, have no means of being held accountable should the
citizens of the particular jurisdiction be displeased with their service.
2. Judicial Instructions
Other problems with trial court judges are predominately centered on
the judge's instructions to the jury or judicial assistance provided to juries.
The instructions that judges give to juries at the end of the presentation of
cases are filled with legal jargon and difficult for jurors to understand. Preformatted jury instructions, which are now used in most states, are unclear
138
and they lack the simplicity and comprehensibility needed by lay jurors.
One author went as far as describing jury instructions as "complex and
grammatically constructed in the most confounding way, rife with subordinate clauses and double negatives. ,,139 Juries tend to comprehend judicial
instructions at an appallingly low level.14° One court has gone so far as to
state that the presumption that jurors
understand and follow the court's
14
instructions seems highly artificial. '
Trial court judges, it is argued, should make as much effort as possible
to implement strategies for improving jury competence. 142 Unfortunately,
trial court judges are either unwilling or lack the authority to further expand
their role by making these efforts to assist juror understanding. Additionally, the administrating judges of our nations trial courts should pay careful
attention to assigning complex cases to judges who have exhibited some
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

FIA. CoNST. art. V,§

10(b).

See Treiman v. Malmquist, 342 So. 2d 972, 975 (Fla. 1977).
Id.
See Strier, supra note 33, at 53.
Id.
Id.
See Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1993).
See Menon, supra note 9, at 295.
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specialization or understanding of the respective specialized fields whenever
possible. For instance, a solution may be assigning medical malpractice
cases to judges who used to practice in this field or that have exhibited a
command for the subject matter during medical malpractice trials.
3. Appellate Courts
The principal observation with respect to appellate court problems is
the untouchable sanctity of which they hold jury verdicts. 143 Appellate
courts are free to exercise a very broad range of power with respect to the
rulings and procedures of a trial court judge, up to and including completely
overturning a trial court's decision!' 4 Yet the appellate courts, when faced
with questions as to the jury's decision-making, largely stay far and away
from tampering with jury activity. 45 Cases where it is abundantly clear that
the jury returned an incorrect, unconscionable, or clearly unjust verdict for
either side, should be subject to a more liberal attack by appellate courts.
C. Attorney Greed
Attorneys pose equal problems to the field of complex litigation. The
American tort system is criticized for being motivated by plaintiff and
attorney greed.
Some even argue that the greed associated with attorneys
and plaintiffs coupled with the sympathies found in lay jurors have disrupted
the American tort system and prevented it from properly functioning. 47 For
attorneys, science often will make or break their case. The law demands
absolute truths and attorneys tend to believe, or they would like to believe,
that the scientific theories that support their cases are completely objective
and reliable. Attorneys shop for expert witnesses who will support even the
most questionable of scientific causation theories. 148 Together with their
retained experts, attorneys present scientific evidence so far beyond the
143. Lilly, supra note 62, at 74-75.
144. Id. at 74.

145. Id. at 74-75. Lilly notes that our legal "system elevates a jury verdict to such an
impregnable point that often the only way to reverse a 'bad' jury verdict is to find fault with
the legal decisions of the judge that may have had little actual effect on the outcome." Id. If
the jury's verdict has at least some evidentiary support, it is usually upheld. Id.
146. See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 302.
147. See id. See also Menon, supra note 9, at 286 (accusing lawyers of manipulating
and abusing the adversarial system and capitalizing on the inexperience and relative ignorance
of jurors).
148. See Forinash, supra note 32, at 247.
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comprehension of average jurors that jurors often accept what is being said
as true and give plaintiffs the "benefit of the doubt."' 49
Trial attorneys can choose from a number of publications and services
that provide tips and techniques on influencing jurors as well as winning
"the battle of the experts."' 150 Attorneys with this "win-at-all-cost" mentality
seem to select experts from the "extremes of scientific belief' with the hope
that jurors, so overwhelmed with complicated evidence, will guess with
respect to their verdicts. 51 As a result, jurors rarely hear "cautious, but
accurate scientific testimony.' 52 Rather, they are stuffed with a "steady diet
of partisan exaggeration" which hinders "good science" from actually
making it into the courtroom. 53 This environment has unfortunately created
a system overshadowed by the personalities and egos of attorneys and expert
witnesses rather than one focused on educating the jury and obtaining a fair
verdict. 154
Attorneys, too, need to be specially trained to understand and deal with
complex litigation. This is particularly true in medical malpractice cases.
The rise in the complexity of litigation has created a need for attorneys
practicing in these fields to become very familiar with medicine, science,
technology, and other complex disciplines. Some attorneys have so eagerly
approached a scientific practice that they are believed, or would like you to
believe, that they know more about the field than some professionals
working in the respective fields. With the rise in complex, scientific
litigation, attorneys must commit to understanding the specialized concepts
of their fields.
Another concern involving attorneys is the contingency fee system. It is
argued that the contingency fee gives attorneys far too much of a stake in the
outcome of a case.' 55 The contingency fee system is criticized by Professor
Frank Hubbard for several reasons, two of which are that contingency fees
excessively reduce the victim's recovery and they give attorney's too great
of an incentive to bring questionable cases.156 These questionable cases are

149. id. at 230 n.39; see also Hubbard, supra note 1, at 312.
150. See Menon, supra note 9, at 286 (citing studies and articles attempting to assist
attorneys with expert presentation and juror persuasion).
151. See Jacobs, supranote 27, at 1088.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Broyles, supra note 21, at 739.
155. See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 325.
156. Id.
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brought forth with the hoe7 of capturing a "lucky verdict" or a large
"nuisance value" settlement.5
D. Expert Witnesses
The expert witness industry has become a thriving industry in the

United States. Because of the rise in complex, scientific litigation, often
several expert witnesses are needed in each case to testify as to the com-

plicated concepts presented to the jury. 158 Unfortunately, the alarming rise
in commercialized expert witness work has resulted in the creation of a
industry of experts who will compromise accurate scientific theory to

guarantee their retention and, thus, aid in proliferation
of the claim of the
' 15 9
respective party, many times by selling "junk science. ,
1. "Mystic Infallibility"
Due to the problems associated with lay juries as discussed in this
article, expert witnesses commonly present evidence that is far too complex
for a lay jury to realistically determine whether or not it is valid scientific
theory or junk science. Critics of juries and adversarial expert witnesses

charge that jurors, for the most part, hold these experts infallible because of
the expert's seemingly impeccable credentials and achievements and they

lack the training, education and competency to assess the quality of expert
witnesses.

6

Lay jurors have a tendency to give an incredibly high amount

157. Id.
158. Tahirih V. Lee, Court-AppointedExperts and JudicialReluctance: A Proposalto
Amend Rule 706 of the FederalRules of Evidence, YAMi L. & POL'Y REv. 480, 483 (1988)
(discussing how the expert witness industry has become big business and, as a result, experts
can be found to testify to almost any factual theory, no matter how unrealistic or frivolous).
Some experts advertise their intellectual wares in legal magazines. Id. at 483 n.5. Others are
affiliated with expert witness brokers with whom lawyers can shop for the expert of their
choice through the use of such services. Id at 483. An attorney who wants to file a medical
malpractice claim, for example, can usually find an expert to back any causation theory
through a medical-legal consulting firm. See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific
Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 595, 597-98 (1988). One such firm boldly promises: "[i]f
the first doctor we refer doesn't agree with your legal theory, we will provide you with the
name of a second prospective expert." See Menon, supranote 9, at 285 n.36.
159. See Black, supra note 158, at 595.
160. See Shuman, supra note 36, at 1244.
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of credence to expert witnesses' explanations of complex processes,
particularly in the school of medicine and surgery.161
2. Physician Critiquing
Prior to the explosion of medical malpractice litigation, it used to be
162
quite difficult to find a physician who would testify against a peer.
The
163
liberalization of the locality rule
has created a field of national experts
who travel to the jurisdictions of the attorneys who have retained them to
testify against local health care providers. The rise in medical malpractice
litigation64 has also caused physicians to become more critical of one

another.

Academic expert witnesses are criticized by practicing professionals
because the lack an appreciation of the unique circumstances surrounding
the proper standards of care in a clinical setting within the communities
where they are called to testify. 6 Additionally, arguments are made that
academic medical physicians should, perhaps, not be considered "average
physicians" with respect to their versions of the standards of care. Academic
physicians may have higher standards beyond those that an "average
physician" should be judged by. 16 6 These academic physicians may practice
in a unique setting surrounded by some of the best, most decorated
physicians in their respective fields.
There is often a difference between the medicine practiced in the
community and medicine taught in a university. Nowhere is this difference
more proliferated than in a hospital emergency room. Physicians working in
the emergency department of a large hospital face stressful situations with
critically ill or injured patients and they often must act with desperation in

161. Id. at 1243.
162. See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 311.
163. See Schwab v. Tolley, 345 So. 2d 747, 753-54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Couch v. Hutchinson, 135 So. 2d 18, 21 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961). In the past, standards
of care commonly required that the health care provider be judged based on the standard of
care that a similar health care provider would normally employ in that particular community.
This rule has been changed to abolish the "locality" aspects of the standard of care and now
involves only the standard of care that a similar health care provider would employ when
rendering the subject treatment. Id.
164. See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 346.
165. Id. at 310 n.63.
166. Id.
167. Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2001

355

Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1

Holloran

2001]

the quickest possible manner with a patient's life on the line. 168 Expert
academic physicians may review the medical chart of a patient in the
emergency room and cite numerous ways in which an emergency room
physician fell below the best possible treatment standards. However, that
same expert commonly fails to appreciate the anxiety and stress experienced
by that physician during that moment in the emergency room.
3. Commercialization of the Expert Witness Industry
The sheer numbers of expert witnesses have increased dramatically
over the past twenty years. 169 Some expert witnesses even attend seminars
designed toward educating them regarding the legal system, depositions, and
trial testimony. 70 These seminars, as described by one author, are "where
scruffy academics and disheveled doctors learn how to speak, act, and
handle themselves on the stand."' 71 Expert witnesses often advertise their
services in bar journals and legal periodicals. 7 2 Expert witness brokerage
firms have emerged offering attorneys services in expert location and
guaranteeing they can locate experts to support their case theories. 173 The
American Trial Lawyer's Association advertises the names of winning
plaintiff attorneys and their expert witnesses which gains notoriety for both,
but especially the expert witnesses. 174 Experts have also invaded the
internet, developing web-sites advertising their services, case
experiences
75
and directing prospective clients to victorious case references.1
1 76
Several case opinions have identified problems with expert witnesses.
Experts are commonly described as being "hired guns" who will sacrifice
168. Id. (citing Feinstein, Medical Negligence and the Tort System: What are the
Opinions?,74 J. FLA. MED. A. 774, 777 (1987)).
169. See Forinash, supra note 32, at 251.
170. Id.
171. See Huber, supra note 26, at 19.
172. See Forinash, supra note 32, at 251; see also Lee, supra note 153, at 483.
173. See Sanders, supra note 17, at 358 n.23 (discussing expert witness brokerage
firms such as Technical Advisory Service For Attorneys (TASA) which locate experts for
attorneys for a fee).
174. Id.
175. See Findlaw expert witness databank, available at http://marketcenter.findlaw
.com/experts_ consultants.html.
176. See Virginia Tech. Found. v. Family Group, Ltd., 666 F. Supp. 856, 858 (W.D.
Va. 1987) (describing how expert witnesses can play the role of a "hired gun"); Lander v.
Higgins, Inc., 71 So. 2d 242, 244 (La. App. 1954) (noticing that witness' testimony would
change if witness had been hired by the opposing party).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

356

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

358

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 26:331

true scientific methodology to present opinions that favor causation theories
for cases in which they are employed. Some experts, such as medical
physicians, may even derive the majority of their income from serving as
expert witnesses. 177 As one appellate judge stated in an opinion, "the only
review the plaintiffs' experts' work has received has been by judges and
juries, and the only place their theories and
7 8 studies have been published is in
reporters."'
state
and
federal
of
the pages
4. Attacking Expert Witnesses
As stated, juries often give a level of infallibility to expert witnesses
and even go so far as being awed by experts. 179 It is very difficult for judges
and jurors to move beyond the credentials of these experts and critically
assess the scientific reliability and validity of their opinions.' 8° Judges and
jurors both have their chances to disregard junk science. Judges are faced
8
with making a decision regarding admissibility of the scientific evidence.' '
Jurors are faced with making a decision as to the credibility regarding the
scientific evidence.' 2 Based on the facts that expert witnesses are testifying
in courtrooms today using unverified, untruthful, and, in some cases,
fraudulent science, neither judges nor juries are appropriately performing
these decision-making duties. It is argued that the judicial system in place
today, offers no real assistance to judges and juries in "sorting the scientific
sheep from the unscientific goats. ' ' ' Attorneys often attack these "hired
gun" experts by bringing forth their experience in serving as an expert
witness and illustrating a usually lop-sided percentage of cases that they
testify for the plaintiff or for the defendant. Expert witnesses commonly
testify for one side, plaintiff or defendant, on an almost exclusive basis.
This type of testimony is brought out to illustrate the possibility for bias and
partisanship by the expert, particularly due to who is paying the expert for
their opinions.
177. See Jacobs, supra note 27, at 1089 (discussing the fact that our adversary system
has spawned a large and highly specialized industry of full-time expert witnesses, many of
whom are arcane pseudo-scientists who are willing, if not eager, to testify to whatever is
necessary to assure the success of their clients).
178. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995).
179. See Sanders, supra note 17, at 364.
180. See Shuman, supra note 36, at 1227.
181. Id. at 1233.
182. Id.
183. See Jacobs, supra note 27, at 1084.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM

Reform of the complex litigation system is necessary. Just what steps
are necessary depends heavily upon whom you are asking. Medical
malpractice reform movements have two sides. On one side you have
medical malpractice insurance companies and physicians who want tort
1
reform to be a quashing movement limiting plaintiffs' access to the courts. 84
On the other side, plaintiffs' attorneys and consumer organizations fight for
more liberal access to the courts for "victims" of torts.1 For the purposes
of this discussion, two principle areas of reform measures will be illustrated,
jury reform and expert witness reform.
A. Reform of the Jury System in Complex ScientificMedicalCases
The jury system in the United States was founded on the basis that
juries are the most capable fact-finders and the best-suited tribunal for
arriving at the most accurate and just outcomes. 186 This is not the case with
respect to juries in most medical malpractice cases and other types of
complex litigation. The need for significant change of the jury system has
come, yet there remain questions as to how extreme the changes need to be.
Recommendations for reform of the jury system range from the extreme step
of abolishing the use of the civil lay jury in complex cases involving highly
technical or scientific evidence, to taking simple steps such as allowing
jurors to take notes during trial, in an attempt to help juries better understand
and memorialize the evidence presented to them. 87 Other recommendations
include requiring a certain number of college educated members to be placed
on a jury, educating the jurors on the law and the subject matter, and using
special juries of professionals in the respective fields of practice involved in
the lawsuit. 188 Changes need to be made, whether minimal or extreme, to
make the ancient jury system an "efficient instrument in the administration
of justice" particularly with respect to complex litigation.' 8 9

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 298.
Id.
Menon, supra note 9, at 281 (citing U.S. CoNST. amend. VII).
Broyles, supra note 21, at 738.
Id.

189. Id. at 735.
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1. Jury Selection
One of these changes concerns the way we, as a society, select juries. A
jury is supposed to be a "cross-section" of the community.19 As a means of
achieving this cross-section, many states select jurors at random through use
of the driver's licensing registration. 191 Jurors used to be predominately
selected from those who had registered to vote in their communities. 192 It
can be argued that juror selection through registered voters, albeit a smaller
portion of society, gives the court system a sampling of citizens who are
more prone to recognize and appreciate their civic duty. Jury service is a
civic duty. Driving an automobile, on the other hand, is a privilege widely
used by most Americans. While it is not fair to "punish" those who exercise
their right to vote with exclusively selecting them to serve as jurors, it may
possibly be that these citizens have more compassion for the civic duty of
serving as jurors and will take this role more seriously.19 3
Compensation for jurors is another serious problem. Compensation is
pathetically low for jurors who are called out of their jobs and away from
their families, often for several days or weeks.1 94 On average, a worker
making a meager $15,000 per year would require $60 per day just to be
compensated for his or her lost wages for serving on a jury panel. 195
Increasing the financial compensation for jury duty would relieve one of, if
not the highest, hardships associated with jury duty.%9 It has been suggested
that the increase in juror compensation could come from three sources: the
state, the juror's employer, or the litigants. 197 Currently, Massachusetts,
190. See The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000); see
also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1861.
192. Id.
193. See Lilly, supra note 62, at 61 n.24 (discussing a poll from the L.A. TIMES where
fifty-seven percent of respondents thought of jury duty as a personal choice rather than a civic
duty. Id. Only one-third of respondents were amenable to being called for jury duty. Id.
Almost fifty percent of the respondents thought that jury duty should be optional, not
mandatory; see also Maura Dolan, The Times Poll: Jury System is Held in Low Regard by
Most, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al).

194. See Strier, supra note 33, at 73.
195. Id.

196. See Lilly, supra note 62, at 62 n.27 (quoting Joe Sharkey, Primary Seats at
Democracy Still Only $5, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1997, 13NJ, at I who described how a New

York juror questioned the judge's "no-excuses" policy, noting that jurors only were paid five
dollars per day. Id. The juror commented that if the trial he was assigned to lasted more than
one week, he could not afford to pay his rent). Id.
197. See Strier, supra note 33, at 73.
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Colorado, and Connecticut require employers to pay their employee's wages
for the first three days of jury service and then each state begins paying
thereafter at a considerably higher rate than most states. 198 One possible
solution might be to provide tax incentives or other financial benefits for
employers who continue to compensate their employees when they are called
to serve as jurors.
As discussed, the jurors who are normally the most qualified to serve on
complex litigation panels are commonly stricken from the panel for the
reasons previously described. The reasons these jurors are not empanelled,
range from extreme financial hardship to the fact that many plaintiff
attorneys do not want highly qualified, highly educated people serving on
panels. 99 The fact that these individuals are commonly excluded from jury
panels throws into question the constitutionality of having a jury panel with
little to no representation of a large portion of society, the educated
citizenry. Is it a fair cross section of a neurosurgeon's or an oncologist's
community if he or she is being sued by a plaintiff, and there is not one
person on the jury panel with an education above that of a high school
diploma? It would seem that the Constitution is interpreted to answer this
question in the negative.200 Equally unconstitutional, seemingly, is the fact
that a jury's make-up may be significantly affected when incentives to evade
jury duty are strong and there are permissible reasons for jury avoidance that
are disproportionately available to only a select portion of society. 2 01
2. Special "Blue Ribbon" Juries
Another suggestion with respect to jury selection concerns developing a
Jurors are normally asked to fill out questionnaires
jury profile system.
when they are first called to service. Why not include a question regarding
the juror's life experiences, educational level, interests, hobbies, work
experience, and professions? 203 With even the most basic of profiling formats, the courts would be able to steer jurors to cases where they most likely
would be able to ascertain the subject matter more than a juror who has
never been exposed to such material. Matching the strengths of jurors with
198. Id.
199. Id. at 72-73.
200. See Taylor v. La., 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (mandating that a litigant has a right
to an impartial and rational jury drawn from a cross-section of the community).
201. See Lilly, supranote 62, at 61.

202. Id.at 78.
203. Id.
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cases that are scheduled for trial would enhance the performance of the jury
during trial.204
The next major reform area involves mandatory participation of college
educated jurors on civil panels. If the courts are faced with a case that is
obviously going to contain complex scientific or technological information,
it would be preferable, as well as constitutionally sound, to require a certain
level of highly educated, experienced, and/or trained jurors consistent with
the subject matter of the case.205 While finding jurors that are familiar with
the subject matter of the case through work experience or education may be
a stretch, requiring a modest percentage of jurors with at least some level of
advanced education is not. These "special juries" would presumably be
better equipped to deal with the complex subject matter involved in these
types of cases and accurately apply the judge's instructions to render a more
just verdict.2 6 While the law absolutely does not permit exclusion of jurors
because of race or sex, it does appear that exclusions based on educational
level or expertise with the subject matter are permissible.
Furthermore,
exclusion of jurors based upon educational attainment is not specifically
prohibited by the plain language of the Jury Selection and Services Act of
1968, therefore, the act could be interpreted to permit this exclusion by the
courts.20 8

3. Abolishing the Lay Jury in Complex Civil Litigation
The most extreme reform discussion concerns abolishment of the civil
jury in complex litigation. It is argued that, because of the frustrations,
difficulties, and the lack of understanding associated with complex litigation,
2M 9 The first possible way
juries
should not
permittedstep
to hear
to accomplish
thisbeextreme
is to such
have cases.
the cases
heard before special
204. Id. at 83.

205. Id.
206. See Lilly, supra note 62, at 84.
207. See Carmical v. Craven, 547 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that states may
remain free to confine the selection of jurors to citizens meeting specified qualifications such
as educational attainment).
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1861; see also Lilly, supra note 62, at 89; accordStrier, supra note
33, at 63 (commenting that "the college-educated juror should not run afoul of the crosssection requirement [of the 1968 Jury Selection and Service Act]"); Broyles, supra note 21, at
718 (discussing ambiguities in the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial which fail to
determine whether or not the framer's intended the courts to be able to adapt the jury system

to changes in society).
209. See Lilly, supranote 62, at 79.
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judges or expert panels. Allowing judges to preside over complex trials will
save time and money. 2 0 Additionally, it is argued that professional decision
makers can do a much better job than lay jurors because their legal education
and training makes them less susceptible to legally irrelevant emotional
factors.2 Furthermore, a trial court judge's knowledge and experience with
presiding over cases on a daily basis makes him or her approach the
controversy at hand with a much more realistic perspective.21 2 Judges who
are specialized in specific areas of the law would make an even better suited
decision maker for complex cases. Courts are, in fact, authorized to appoint
judges with special expertise or "special masters" when a case involves
complex subject matter.
4. Specialization of Judges, Juries, and Courts
Another use for a special master could be to serve as an advisor to the
judge and jury involved in a complex trial should the court choose not to
appoint a presiding special master. In Florida, special masters can be any
members of the Florida Bar.2 4 These members could be selected because of
their expertise in a specific field of litigation, for instance medical
malpractice or products liability. The special master could review complex
medical malpractice testimony and provide confused jurors with a
,,Ofcourse,
specialized analysis to assist them with decision-making.
difficult issues such as who should serve on a special master committee and
the manner in which the special master would address the judge and jury
would need to be decided upon. 216
Another radical yet promising specialization of the courts would be the
division of the civil courts by area of practice. For instance, specific courts
for medical malpractice, products liability, patent law, toxic torts, or
environmental law could be developed using expert judges to preside over
areas of law in which they exhibit a command for that area's subject
217
that the judge
ensure
matter.
This would
withhave
the
and involved
experiencein the
in court
dealingwould
education,
command,
at least some
210. See Menon, supranote 9, at 289.

211. Id.at 289 n.73.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 53; see also FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.490(b).
See FIA. R. Civ. P. 1.490.
See Menon, supra note 9, at 293.
Id.
Id.
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specific complex subject matter. Furthermore, he or she would be better
equipped to rule on a case or instruct a jury on how to better do so.
Also, "special juries" may be a solution to the problems associated with
complex litigation.2 8 Professionals who work in the fields, such as the
health care industry, are certainly familiar with most of the issues,
terminology and concepts that they are confronted with in their professions.
This familiarity with the health care industry would make them better-suited
jurors to be empanelled for a case involving medical malpractice. Another
example would be empanelling a group of scientists or technicians with
backgrounds identical, or at least similar, to a defendant within their
professions.219 One author argued that empanelling an "expert jury" would
best represent a balance between the litigants' right to a jury trial and their
equally important right to a fair trial.220
5. Complexity Exception
The complexity exception recognized by a few of the federal district
courts, allows especially complex cases to be removed from the jury and
tried by a judge or special panel of judges. 221 Unusually complex subject
matter confuses jurors to a point where they often guess on verdicts and, as a
result, there should be an exception permitting courts to take such cases
away from jurors in the interest of justice. 222 The controversy present with
respect to whether or not a "complexity exception" does, in fact, exist
requires further direction from the United States Supreme Court. The further
development of the complexity exception, of course, begins with and
depends upon the trial court's use of it. The balance between just when a
case is too complex for a lay jury and when the issues set forth are well
within the confines of the jury, must also be preferably established by
judicial precedent. This balance will lie somewhere between the type of
case where the situation at hand is so easily decipherable that a person with
218. See Lilly, supra note 62, at 84.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084-86 (1980)
(noting that when a jury is unable to perform its decision-making task with a reasonable
understanding of the evidence and legal rules, it undermines the ability of a district court to
render basic justice. The loss of the right to a jury trial in a suit found too complex for a jury
does not implicate the same fundamental concerns); see also Ross v. Bernard, 396 U.S. 531,
538 n.10 (1970); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
222. See Jacobs, supra note 27, at 1087.
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even a meager amount education would understand whether or not the
defendant was, in fact, negligent. 223 For example, a number of less
complicated medical malpractice cases, such as lawsuits over retained
surgical equipment, are well within the lay juries' decision making ability.2
6. Miscellaneous Recommendations for Change
Other less radical changes recommended for the jury system are aimed
at giving juries more tools to better assist them in understanding the
evidence presented. Central to these recommendations is permitting jurors
to take notes during trial.225 It is argued that taking notes during trial,
particularly long trials, may enhance a juror's ability to recall certain critical
information.
Along the lines of notebooks, other recommendations
include: providing the jury a list of witness names, photographs, copies of
relevant documents, a glossary of legal and case-specific terms, and a copy
of the jury instructions. 227
Lastly, if copies of the jury instructions. are not provided to the jury,
they need to be simplified down to a level where the average juror can
comprehend what exactly they mean. 22 The jury instructions are, perhaps,
the most fundamental element of the trial with respect to the jury. Criticism
of complicated jury instructions is widespread. 229 All the wisdom of the law
is to no avail if the jury cannot understand the court's instructions and how
to apply to them. 230 The easy solution to this problem is to simplify the jury
instructions for better understanding by the average person.
The ancient concept that juries are the best fact finder is no longer
acceptable faced with the complexity so common in modem litigation. The
judicial system's faith and insistence upon the jury system still relies upon
the notion that jurors understand the subject matter that they are empanelled
to render judgment upon.2' The ability to apply this principle rests largely
in the hands of the United States Supreme Court. Some definitive ruling,
223. See Menon, supra note 9, at 297.

224. Id.
225. See Broyles, supra note 21, at 732-33.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 733.

228. See Lilly, supra note 62, at 60 n.23; see also id. at 721 n.48 (citing studies that
indicate jurors understand less than fifty-percent of the judge's instructions).
229. Id. at 68; accordStrier,supra note 33, at 51-52.
230. See Strier, supra note 33, at 52.
231. See Broyles, supra note 21, at 721.
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other than a footnote, 232 is needed to assist litigants in obtaining accurate,
fair trials in complex litigation.
B. Stricter Standardsfor Expert Witnesses in Complex Scientific/Medical
Cases
The other major area of reform is focused on the expert witness industry. The expert witness industry is arguably motivated by partisan greed.3
Reform efforts with respect to science in the courtrooms are diverse. 2
Similar to the reform measures discussed for the jury system, scientific
reform measures range from minimal changes to radical reconstruction of the
way complex litigation operates in America's courts. 2 4 Those measures that
are considered minimal include enhancing judicial authority to keep
235 junk
science out of the courtroom and scientific education for judges.
More
drastic reform measures include mandating the use of court-appointed, nonpartisan expert witnesses and dividing courts into specialty courts with
judges who are particularly specialized
in the related areas of law such as
36
medical malpractice or toxic torts.2
1. Stricter Standards for Admission of Scientific Evidence
The federal court system has liberalized the use of professional expert
witnesses and junk science by abolishing the Frye general acceptance test in
the 1993 case of Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,lnc. 7 The State
of Florida still relies upon the Frye ruling with respect to the admissibility of
scientific evidence.238 Florida courts confirm their reliance on the more
stringent admissibility standards set forth in Frye because, as the Supreme
Court of Florida asserts, "a courtroom is not a laboratory, and as such it is
not the place to conduct scientific experiments. If the scientific community
considers a procedure or process unreliable for its own purposes,
then the
'239
procedure must be considered less reliable for courtroom use.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
See Sanders, supra note 17, at 355.
Id.
Id. at 366.
Id.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See Poulin v. Fleming, 782 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App 2001).
Id. (citing Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 193-94 (Fla. 1989)).
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2. Judicial Awareness of Expert Biases
The use of expert witnesses and science have two principle problems in
the legal system. First, the expert witness industry, it is argued, is motivated
by the courtroom dollar and is often eagerly willing to sacrifice true science
for partisan-biased scientific theories.m The courts must develop a standard
by which the reliability and validityof the parties' scientific evidence are the
product of sound scientific theory.
The courts must also develop a greater
awareness and distaste for the fact that scientific evidence can be
manipulated by an expert witness and misconstrued by the trier of fact.24 2
The goal of the courts should be to ensure that the expert witnesses are
behaving the same in the courtroom as they would if they were in
professional their environments. 3
One suggestion for improving the veracity of an expert may be to
subject the expert to peer review for their sworn testimony should it be
established that they presented fraudulent scientific testimony to the court.
For medical doctors, these disciplinary measures could then be reported to
the National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB") which reports a physician's
2
entire educational, work and disciplinary histories to a number of entities. "
Physicians take seriously the information comprised on their NPDB reports
and reporting fraudulent testimony may serve as a deterrent to stretching the
truth on the witness stand.
3. Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses
Another extreme, yet plausible, reform measure would be to mandate
court-appointed expert witnesses.
As noted, partisan experts tend to confuse jurors.2 " Considering the amount of time and expense that is spent
attempting to discredit expert witnesses by opposing parties, this radical
change may be a welcome one.24 7 Expert witnesses, less tainted by partisan
biases, may identify areas of common ground between the parties and would
be subjected to less scrutiny with respect to how often they testify, how
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See Lee, supra note 158, at 483.
See Black supra note 158, at 599.
See Forinash, supra note 32, at 256.
See Sanders, supra note 17, at 376.
National Practitioner Data Bank, at http://www.npbd.com.
See Sanders, supra note 17, at 378.
See Menon, supra note 9, at 285.
See Sanders, supranote 17, at 378.
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much they are paid, and how one-sided their history of retention is.' The
cost of neutral, court-appointed expert witnesses could be borne by both
sides who normally shell out a great deal of money on retaining their own
experts and deposing their adversary's expert witnesses.U9 Neutral experts
could also cut down on the amount of
time spent discussing and confirming
2 0
various theories in the fields of study 5
Selecting a neutral expert witness could be done in a manner similar to
the selection of mediators or arbitrators by the opposing parties. Courts
could qualify expert witnesses in specialty areas such as hematology,
oncology, emergency medicine, or obstetrics and then submit the names of
these experts to the parties requesting the use of an expert witness in those
particular fields. By most accounts, court-appointed experts would at least
cut down on juror confusion and likely be more impartial than partisan
expert witnesses.2' It is also important to note that the Federal Rules of
Evidence and United States
Supreme Court support the use of court22
appointed expert witnesses 5
V. CONCLUSION

Medical malpractice litigation is surging in the State of Florida as well
as the rest of the United States. The blame for this social problem rests with
the attorneys, the scientists and the general public.2 3 A general decline in
personal responsibility and the improvements in medical technology have
added fuel to the fire by creating a mentality amongst the American people
that if they do not have miraculous cures from, even terminal, medical
maladies, the first reaction is to sue the health care provider. Efforts to
reduce the admission of junk science into the courtroom that can unjustly
change the outcome of these cases, for the most part, have been inadequate
or have completely failed.
The ancient institution of the lay jury is ill-equipped and unqualified to
render judgment in most complex medical malpractice cases. Members of
the both sides of the bar, appellate courts, trial judges, academics, and the
legislature need to recognize the erosion of the jury system with respect to
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
(1997).
253.

Id.
Id. See also Menon, supra note 9, at 292-93.
See Sanders, supra note 17, at 378.
See Lilly, supra note 62, at 90.
See FED. R. EviD. 706; see also Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149-50
See Forinash, supra note 32, at 248.
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its performance in complex civil litigation.25 Not only recognition of this
erosion is needed, but also efforts to change the jury system need to be
examined, tested, and employed. However, keeping in mind the importance
of the jury system as a foundation in our society, any changes need to be
limited to those no greater than are absolutely necessary to protect the rights
of both litigants.Y5'
Partisan expert witnesses motivated by financial benefits manipulate
scientific theory to sometimes inaccurately influence lay jurors who are
commonly mesmerized by the complex, technical language spoken by expert
witnesses. Recognition of the glaring differences between scientific truth
and the level of truth required by the courts must occur. Courts are
responsible for making sure that expert witnesses are adhering to the same
standards and scrutiny of intellectual rigor that they face in their professional
practices. 256
The ideologies for changes are plentiful; however, the courage to
effectuate them is minute. The United States Supreme Court would be the
most ideal of the legal participants to take the raging bull, that is complex
litigation, by the horns and implement measures to better reflect justice.
Even a few of the subtle reform measures-to the expert witness industry and
the American jury system may serve to improve these two major problem
areas presently hindering the field of medical malpractice litigation in
Florida as well as the United States in general.
EdwardL. Holloran,III

254. See Lilly, supranote 62, at 54.
255. See Strier, supranote 33, at 78.
256. See Sanders, supra note 17, at 376.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's controversial decision in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County ("SWANCC') v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers' has limited the ability of the Clean Water Acte to
protect our nation's water supply. 3 In SWANCC, a narrowly divided
Supreme Court held that the United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") lacked jurisdiction over intrastate isolated waters that were not
navigable within the meaning of the Clean Water Act ("Act"). 4 Moreover,
the Court's dicta asserts that Congressional authority to regulate nonnaviga1.

531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC].

2.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).

3.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Brief of Amici Curiae
Environmental Defense et al. at 9, SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178), 2000 WL
1369436 (claiming such a holding "would roll back the scope of federal water pollution
control" to a pre-Clean Water Act level, removing "millions of acres of 'isolated' surface
waters... from federal protection") [hereinafter ED Brief].
4.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (rendering 5-4 decision).
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ble intrastate isolated waters poses "significant constitutional and federalism
questions." 5 Taking a functional approach, the dissent delivers a strong,
systematic attack on the Court's reasoning and establishes that there "is no
principled reason" to limit the Corps' jurisdiction on the basis of navigability.6 Since Congress intended the Clean Water Act to afford "comprehensive
long-range" protection for our nation's waters,7 the dissent concludes that
waters need not be actually or potentially navigable to fall within the scope
of the Act. 8
By limiting the scope of the federal regulatory permitting program
under section 404 of the Clean Water Act,9 the Court has taken "an
unfortunate step that needlessly weakens our principle safeguard against
toxic water." 10 The ruling impacts federal protection for more than twenty
percent of our nation's remaining wetlands, including cypress domes in the
Everglades. 1' In the absence of federal protection, the preservation of the
vital functions provided by isolated wetlands is left to the states.' 2 The
majority of states, including some with significant wetland acreages
currently provide little protection.13 The Court has created a gap in the
protection of isolated wetlands,' 4 yet the broader ecosystem
cannot be
5
protected unless their important functions are preserved.1
5.

Id.

6.

Id. at 176 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

7.
Id. at 179.
8.
Id. at 175.
9.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
10. Id. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water
Act and the Constitution: SWANCC and Beyond, 31 ELR 10741, 10741 (2001) (taking the

impact in light of the present political climate in which "legislative amendment is virtually
impossible," the author argues that the SWANCC decision may be the most devastating
judicial opinion affecting the environment ever).
11. Supreme Court Deals Devastating Blow to Wetlands, INT'L WILDLIFE, May-June
2001, at 8-9. One percent of the total land in the contiguous forty-eight states received
federal protection prior to SWANCC. Brief of Amici Curiae Gene Likens et al. at 24,
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1179), 2000 WL 1369410 [hereinafter Likens Brief].
Total wetlands are estimated to occupy ninety-five million acres, or four percent of the
nation's total land. Id.
12.

Jon Kusler, The SWANCC Decision and State Regulation of Wetlands (Ass'n of

State
Wetland
Managers,
Berne,
N.Y.),
(May
http://www.aswm.org./swancclindex.htm [hereinafter Kusler].
13.

See id. at 9.

14.

Id. at 15.

31,

2001),

at

15. Likens Brief, supra note 11, at 9; see also Stephen M. Johnson, Federal
Regulation of Isolated Wetlands After SWANCC, 31 ENvTL. L. REP. 10669 (June, 2001), WL
31 ELR 10669 (claiming the decision is especially disheartening since it was announced just
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are only isolated
"Isolated" wetlands
•
16 in the sense that they lack a
surface connection to downstream waters. They serve critical hydrologic
and biological functions that have downstream effects, significantly impacting the broader environment.17 The basic hydrologic function of isolated
Their preservation is vital to the
wetlands is to store and filter water.
functions of flood control, water quality filtration, and streambank erosion. 19
When they are developed and drained, water quality is affected by the
hastened release of long trapped pollutants that move downstream and
ultimately cause harm to animals and humans.20 The rapid influx of water
can likewise result in flooding and erosion. 2
The biological integrity of the nation's waters is also dependent upon
the preservation of isolated wetlands. 22 They provide distinct habitats and
breeding grounds for waterfowl, migratory birds, and amphibians that are not
served by other water bodies.23 Destruction of isolated wetlands can result
in severe consequences for biodiversity; if local species become endangered
or extinct, the food chain is disturbed.2
Florida is one of only fifteen states that presently afford considerable
protection for isolated waters and wetlands.25 Even so, the Court's decision
adversely affects the state's environment, water supply, and economy.2 This
article discusses the Supreme Court decision's impact on Florida, exposing
that the Court's holding undermines the ability of the Clean Water Act to
protect our nation's waters. Part II introduces section 404 of the Clean
Water Act and explores the case, the holding, and its potential impact. It
demonstrates that the SWANCC decision has created a gap in the preservation of isolated wetlands, which if not bridged, has severe consequences for
the nation's environment and water supply. 27 Part IlI evaluates Florida's
after a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service report indicated that the annual rate of wetlands loss has
been declining steadily).
16. There is no scientific or regulatory definition for "isolated" wetlands. Likens
Brief, supra note 11, at 11.
17. Id. at 8.

18. Id.at 9.
19. Id.at 11.
20. Id.at 16.
21.

Likens Brief, supra note 11, at 12.

22. Id. at 22.
23. Id. at 18.
24. Id. at 22-23.
25.

Kusler, supra note 12, at 9.

26. See discussion infra Part III.C.-D.
27.

Kusler, supranote 12, at 15.
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isolated wetlands law, SWANCC's practical implications for the state, and
the state's options in the aftermath of the decision. Since Florida wetlands
law is not uniform throughout the state, Florida's experience demonstrates
the state's ability to bridge the SWANCC gap as well as the political and
economic realities it confronts in doing so. The fragmentation in Florida
law also renders the state a microcosm of the nation as a whole. Florida's
inability to completely bridge the SWANCC gap confirms the dissent's
contention that comprehensive national regulation of intrastate isolated
wetlands is essential to accomplishing the goals of the Clean Water Act. 29
II. UNDERMINING THE CLEAN WATER ACT: THE SWANCC DECISION

A. WatershedLegislation: The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act's mandate is to "restore and maintain the
30
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."
Designed to "establish a comprehensive, long range policy for the elimination of water pollution,",31 the Act fundamentally changed both the scope and
purpose of federal regulation of the nation's waters.32 It extended the scope
of federal jurisdiction to all of "the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas." 33 The Act also broadened the United States Army Corps of
Engineers' mission to include protecting the nation's waters for "esthetic,
health, recreational, and environmental uses. 34
To control water pollution, the Clean Water Act established nationwide
standards and federal permitting and enforcement measures.35 Section 404(a)
of the Act affords the Secretary of the Army, acting through the United
States Army Corps of Engineers, authority to regulate the discharge of
dredge or fill material into "navigable waters." 36 Upon determining that a
discharge "will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water
supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding
28.
29.

30.

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

31.
32.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 179 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 175.

33.
34.
35.
36.
waters and
STAT.

See discussion infra Part III.C.-D.
See discussion infra Part III.E.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175.
ED Brief, supra note 3, at 11.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). "Dredging" is excavation in wetlands or other surface
"filling" is deposition of any material in wetlands or other surface waters. FLA.

§ 373.403 (13)-(14) (2001).
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areas), wildlife, or recreational areas," the Act authorizes the Corps to refuse
a permit. 37
The Act defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States.' 38
Since 1977, the Corps has defined the term "waters of the United States" for
purposes of section 404 jurisdiction to mean:
(1)

All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past,
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could
affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and
sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose
by industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of
the United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through
(4) of this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6)
of this section.
The Corps originally construed the scope of jurisdiction under section 404(a)
to cover only waters that were navigable in fact, but largely in reaction to
judicial interpretation and congressional reaction, the Corps asserted broader
authority.4
37.
38.
39.

§ 1344(c).
§ 1362(7).
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2000).
40. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 183-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating judicial
decisions encouraging the Corps to assert broader authority included Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.C. 1975) and United States v.
Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974)); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985) [hereinafter Riverside Bayview].
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The Supreme Court first addressed the scope of section 404(a)'s
jurisdiction in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes4 1 where it upheld
the Corps' authority over adjacent wetlands. 42 Reviewing legislative history,
the Court concluded that Congress intended the term "navigable waters" to
43
be construed broadly in order to achieve the goals of the Clean Water Act.
Since "[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and the pollution... will affect
the quality of other waters within that aquatic system," the Court reasoned
that the regulation of adjacent wetlands was essential to maintaining the
integrity of the nation's waters.4 Thus, in construing the breadth of the
Corps' authority under section 404(a), the Court afforded deference to the
Corps'
1977 regulations and limited the importance of the term "naviga, 45
ble."
In 1986, the year following the Riverside Bayview decision, the Corps
issued a regulation clarifying that section 404(a) authority extends to
intrastate waters:
a.

Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory
birds which cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species;
or
46
d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
This promulgation, known as the "Migratory Bird Rule," falls under
subsection three of the Corps' definition of "waters of the United States"
that ties jurisdiction of intrastate waters to interstate commerce. 47 The
Migratory Bird Rule is at the core of SWANCC controversy.

41.

474 U.S. 121 (1985).

42.
43.

Id. at 139.
Id. at 133.

44. Id. at 134 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37128 (1977)). The Court recognized that
wetlands "serve to filter and purify water," "slow the flow of surface runoff... prevent[ing]
flooding and erosion," and provide significant biological functions. Id.
45.
46.

Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 164 (2001).

47.

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2000).
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B. Narrowing the Scope: SWANCC
The legal issue decided in SWANCC was whether the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers had authority under section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act of
1977 to regulate the discharge of nonhazardous fill material by a consortium
of local municipalities into "isolated" waters in Illinois that were home to
migratory birds. 8 The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
("Agency") sought to develop a 533-acre abandoned mining site that had
evolved into a sprinkling of permanent and seasonal ponds for disposal of
their baled nonhazardous solid waste.49 After receiving the requisite county
and state permits, the Agency contacted the Corps to determine whether a
federal permit was required under section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act; the
Agency plans involved filling roughly seventeen acres of the site that
included seasonal ponds that had developed a natural character.5
Though initially concluding it lacked authority, the Corps asserted
jurisdiction under section 404(a)(3) of the Clean Water Act after the Illinois
Nature Preserves Commission exposed the fact that a number of migratory
bird species inhabited the site.5 1 Employing subpart (b) of the Migratory
Bird Rule, the Corps found that the isolated ponds, though not wetlands,
qualified as "waters of the United States."52 The Corps determined that the
Agency's plan presented an "unnacceptable risk to the public's drinking
water supIy"
.3 and that its impact on the area-sensitive species could not be
mitigated. Finding that the Agency's plan posed significant environmental
risks, the Corps denied the permit.54
The Agency filed suit in federal district court claiming that the Corps
lacked jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act and challenging the merits of
the denial. 55 The District Court granted summary judgment to the Corps on

48. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162.
49. Id. at 163.
50. Id. Excavation trenches, created by thirty years of gravel pit mining that
continued until 1960, developed into ponds ranging in size from under one-tenth acre to
several acres and in depth from several inches to several feet. Id.
51. Id. at 164. The ponds were home to a great blue heron rookery and approximately
121 bird species. Id. at 164-65. In addition to providing herons the second-largest breeding
site in northeastern Illinois, the ponds were inhabited by several protected species of
waterfowl. Id. at 194 n.16.

52.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164.

53.

Id. at 165.

54.
55.

Id.
Id.
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56

the jurisdictional issue. Abandoning its challenge to the justification of the
Corps' denial, the Agency appealed on statutory and constitutional
grounds.57 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Clean Water
Act reaches as far as the Commerce Clause allows and given the aggregate
effect of the destruction of natural habitat of migratory birds on interstate
commerce, the Migratory Bird Rule was reasonable. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed. 59
Rather than deciding the constitutional issue, the Supreme Court based
its holding on statutory grounds; the decision turns on the importance of the
term "navigable waters" in section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act.6 Since
the Court held that the term "navigable" was of "limited import" in United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court distinguishes that case.6! In
Riverside Bayview, the Court found "Congress' concern for the protection of
water quality and aquatic ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate wetlands
'inseparably bound up with 'the waters' of the United States"' and held that
the Act applied to adjacent wetlands, waters not navigable in the traditional
sense. 62 In SWANCC, the Court explains that "[it was the significant nexus
between the wetlands and the 'navigable waters"' that brought the adjacent
wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview within the scope of the Clean Water
Act and refuses to extend that jurisdiction to "ponds that are not adjacent to
open water. 6 3 Reasoning "it is one thing to give a word limited effect and
quite another to give it no effect whatever," the Court deems the term
"navigable" important to the extent that it indicates Congressional authority
for enacting the Clean Water Act. 65
Although the Court does not hold the Migratory Bird Rule unconstitutional, it asserts that Congressional authority to regulate non-navigable,
intrastate waters poses "significant constitutional and federalism ques56. Id.
57. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165.
58. The Court of Appeals found the effect on interstate commerce substantial since
interstate tourists spend over a billion dollars per year in migratory bird related pursuits. Id.
See ED Brief, supra note 3, at 13 (noting migratory bird watching is a $1.3 billion dollar per
year industry and precipitates 14.3 million trips each year, many across state lines).
59. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166.

60.
61.

Id. at 172.
Id. at 167.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 167-68.
64. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
65. Id. The dissent reads the term "navigable water" to mean "those waters over
which federal authority may be properly asserted." Id. at 162.
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tions." 66 The Court refuses to afford deference to the Corps' .regulation
since it "invokes the outer limits of Congress' power,"67 particularly where
traditional state powers over land and water use could be impinged.68
Emphasizing recent Supreme Court holdings limiting Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause, 69 the Court explains that to determine the
requisite interstate connection "we would have to evaluate the precise object
' 70
or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
The Court then indicates it is not clearly convinced that migratory birdrelated travel sufficiently satisfies the interstate connection. 7 '
C. UnchartedWaters: The Impact of the Decision
It is clear that the Migratory Bird Rule can no longer provide the sole
basis for jurisdiction over isolated waters under the Clean Water Act, but the
impact of the decision potentially reaches much further. 2 The Supreme
Court did not clearly chart the waters that fall within the scope of section
73 In theory, virtually all wetlands were
404(a)(3)
authority.prior
subject to permitting
federal regulation
to SWANCC. 74 In the aftermath of
66. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
67. The Court refused to extend the same deference to the Corps' regulations that it
did in Riverside Bayvidw absent a clear indication from Congress that it intended to reach
intrastate isolated water. Id. at 170. The dissent argues that the Court's refusal to extend
deference is inconsistent with the Riverside Bayview decision. Id. at 185 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The dissent explains that in Riverside Bayview, the Court interpreted the same
section of the Clean Water Act and found that Congress was aware of the Corps' 1977
regulations, Congress declined to narrow their scope in its 1977 Amendments, and thus
implicitly acquiesced to the Corps' interpretation. Id. at 184. The Court finds this indication
of Congressional intent "unpersuasive." Id. at 168.
68. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168. The dissent contests the Court's federalism concerns,
pointing to section 404(g) of the Act which allows state assumption of the federal permitting
program, and stresses that the Act regulates the environment, not land use. Id. at 188.
69. Id. at 173 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) and United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) as indicative of the limits on Congressional power under
the Commerce Clause).
70. Id
71. The court of appeals held that a rational relationship exists between recreational
pursuits relating to migratory birds and the Migratory Bird Rule and thus found authority
under the Commerce Clause. Id. The dissent concurs with the lower court's interpretation
and finds the connection between "the filling of wetlands and the decline of commercial
activities associated with migratory birds" direct and concrete. Id. at 195.
72. Johnson, supra note 15, at 10669.
73. Kusler, supra note 12, at 4.
74. Id. at 7 (noting that some are concurrently subject to state and local regulation).
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SWANCC, it is unclear whether the courts will uphold the Act's jurisdiction
over any intrastate isolated waters unless a clear and direct impact on
Since the Court neglected to explain
interstate commerce can be shown.
how the connection could be legally satisfied, the holding has caused
uncertainty and confusion.7 6
Following the decision, the General Counsel* of the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Chief Counsel of the Corps issued a
joint memorandum providing their interpretation of the SWANCC decision.7 7
The memorandum stated jurisdiction over "[a]ll other waters such as
intrastate lakes, rivers, streams... wetlands... or natural ponds, the use,
degradation, or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce" are "potentially affected by SWANCC. 78 The Corps and the
EPA stressed that the Court's opinion did not specifically address what
would constitute a sufficient connection with interstate commerce to support
Clean Water Act jurisdiction over these waters and indicated that legal
advice should be sought on a case by case basis.
It is difficult to gage the full impact of the decision since it is largely
dependent upon administrative and judicial interpretation. If the holding is
interpreted narrowly to mean that the Court only invalidated the Migratory
Bird Rule, not federal regulation of all intrastate isolated wetlands, the
decision potentially removes federal protection under the Clean Water Act
from thirty percent of the nation's wetlands. 81 But, the dissenting opinion
interpreted the Court's holding more broadly to mean that the Corps no
longer has jurisdiction over any intrastate isolated waters unless they are or
If thefederal
Corps protection
and courtsforinterpret
the holding
could
be the
made
navigable.
up to sixty
percent
broadly,
decision
may remove

75. Funk, supra note 10, at 54.
76. Kusler, supra note 12, at 15.
77. Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency & Robert M. Anderson, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Administrators, Commanders, and Counsels, Supreme Court
Ruling Concerning CWA Jurisdiction over Isolated Waters, 1 (Jan. 19, 2001) [hereinafter
Memo].
78. Id.at 2-3
79. Id. at3.
80. Kusler, supra note 12, at 7.
81. Id. at 1.
82. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 176-77. (2001) (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (claiming the
"Court draws a new jurisdictional line... that invalidates the 1986 migratory bird regulation
as well as the Corps' assertion over all waters except for actually navigable waters, their
tributaries, and wetlands adjacent to each").

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/1

378

: Nova Law Review 26, 1

Spungin

2001]
83

of the nation's wetlands. Within these two interpretations, the extent of
SWANCC's impact is also dependent upon how key terms including
"adjacent" and "significant nexus" are defined.8
Regardless of the interpretation, the environmental impacts will be
significant.8 5 The Association of State Wetland Managers estimates "[e]ven
if SWANCC results in only a one percent loss of America's wetlands, the
decision would cause more wetlands to be destroyed than were lost in the
past decade. ' 86 In the absence of federal protection, regulation of isolated
wetlands is devised to the states.87 Only fifteen states currently have
regulations that substantially close the gap. 8 The rest, including some with
significant wetland acreages, provide little protection. a9 Many states
have
9
relied on the federal permitting program to protect their water quality. 0
The resulting lack of regulation will likely occasion the destruction of
many wetlands and in turn adversely impact their water filtration, flood
protection, erosion, and habitat functions. 9' Regulations over isolated
wetlands will differ among and within states as they attempt to bridge the
SWANCC gap. 92 At the very least, the decision creates "serious new
vulnerabilities in water and wetland resource protection" that require federal,
state, and local adaptation in the regulation of isolated wetlands if their
critical functions are to be preserved.93

83. Kusler, supra note 12, at 7.
84. If the terms "adjacent" and "significant nexus" to navigable waters are interpreted
broadly, some isolated wetlands may be recategorized, mitigating the impact of the decision.

Id. at 8.
85. Id.
86. Id.at8.
87. Id.
88. Kusler, supra note 12, at 9 (including Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Virginia).
89. Id. at 8-9 (identifying Alaska, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas as states with large isolated
wetlands acreage and limited protection).
90. Funk, supra note 10, at 8.
91. Kusler, supra note 12, at 15.

92. Id.
93. 1&at 16.
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I. FLORIDA IN THE AFTERMATH OF SWANCC
A. Shallow Waters: FloridaWetlands
Florida has a strong economic incentive to protect its wetlands; home to
the Everglades National Park, Florida's economy is dependent upon the
health and vitality of its natural system. 94 Florida's wetlands, though,
provide more than aesthetic beauty attracting visitors from around the nation
and world; they perform important hydrologic functions including water
filtration and flood control. 95 They also serve to moderate temperatures and
maintain precipitation.96 Florida's wetlands provide distinct habitats for
migratory birds, recreational hunting foul, and for nearly half of the state's
endangered species, and serve as spawning grounds for "two-thirds of the
commercial fish and shellfish harvested along the Atlantic Coast and in the
Gulf of Mexico.... ,97
The state is "on a collision course with itself, dependent both on its
unique natural resources and the ... growth that is strangling those
resources." 98 Florida's wetlands are threatened by the consequences of
population growth and development. 99 Not only have millions of acres of
wetlands been destroyed, but the development of roads and canals has
"isolated" many wetlands by cutting them off on the surface from broader
ecosystems.1° In the aftermath of SWANCC, these artificially isolated

94. See John J. Fumero, Environmental Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law-At a
Crossroads in Natural Resource Protection and Management in Florida, 19 NOVA L. Rv.
77, 79 (1994).

95. Id. at 79-80.
96. They moderate temperatures because water warms and cools more slowly than
land and maintain precipitation through envirotranspiration, a loss of water from soil by
evaporation. Id. at 80.
97. Id. at 79-80 (citing RALPH W. TINER, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV., WEmIANDS OF THE UNITED STATES:

CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS

13 (1984)).
98. Id. at 78 (quoting Lieutenant Governor Buddy McKay, Remarks at the Inaugural
Meeting of the Governor's Commission for a Sustainable South Florida (Apr. 27, 1994)).
99. See Fumero, supra note 94, at 79 (exposing that since Florida's population is
expected to increase, effective natural resource protection and management is especially
crucial).
100. Jan Hollingsworth, Ruling Affects Florida Wetlands, TAMPA TaM., Jan. 10, 2001,
12001 WL 5490527 TAMPA TRiB 2.
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wetlands, along with other isolated Florida waters, may lose their federal
protection. 1°1
B. Chartinga Course: FloridaWetlands Law
Since the preservation of wetlands is crucial to Florida's economy and

ecology, the state has enacted substantial legislation to ensure their protection 102 Florida's current wetlands law is rooted in the Florida Environmental Reorganization Act of 1993.103 Prior to the Reorganization Act,
Florida lacked a uniform system of regulation because the entities responsible for permitting adopted independent definitions of "wetlands." 1' 4 Codified
in 1994 in part IV of chapter 373 of the FloridaStatutes, the Reorganization
Act fundamentally changed Florida's wetlands law. °5 First, it streamlined
the regulatory process by consolidating permitting "into a single regulatory
approval referred to as an 'environmental resource permit' (ERP")."'

Second, it established a uniform system for defining and delineating
Florida's wetlands that all agencies and water management districts, with the

101. Court Opens Door to Isolated Wetlands Development in Panhandle, AP
NEwsWtiRs, Feb. 5, 2001, 1 WL APWIRES 14:36:00 [hereinafter Panhandle]; see Jan
Crawford Greenburg, Top Court Puts Limit on Clean Water Act, SUN SENT. (Ft. Lauderdale),
Jan. 10, 2001, at 12A, (claiming lands in the Eastern portions of the Everglades may lose their
federal protection).
102. Florida has regulated wetland development on a statewide basis since the early
1970's. FLA. DEP'T OF STATE, Ov RvIEW OF FLORHA'S ENVIRONMENTAL REsouRCE Pmrr
PROGRAM (2001), at http:lwww.myflorida.comJenvironmentllearnlwaterprograms/wetlandsl
erp/overview.html [hereinafter OvERvIEW]. The Florida Water Resources Act of 1972
established a fundamental water policy for the state and authorized Florida's five water
management districts to regulate alterations to the landscape that affected surface water flows.
Id. The management and storage of surface waters permitting program applied to uplands,
wetlands, and isolated wetlands. Id. The wetland resources permitting program, originally
implemented in 1975 and incorporated into the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act
of 1984, provided the Department of Environmental Regulation (now the Department of
Environmental Protection) the authority to regulate dredging and filling in all waters of the
state that were connected to "named waters." Id. It did not regulate activities in isolated
wetlands unless such isolated wetlands were to be connected either naturally or artificially to
the "named waters." Id.
103. Fumero, supra note 94, at 98 (citing Ch. 93-213, 1993 Fla. Laws 2149 (codified

at FLA. STAT. § 373 (1994)).
104. Id.
105. OVERVIEW, supra note 102.
106. Fumero, supra note 94, at 83.
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exception of the Northwest Florida Water Management
District and certain
10 7
grandfathered activities, are now required to employ.
Throughout most of the state, Florida affords considerable protection 10to8
its isolated wetlands under section 373.414 of the Florida Statutes.
Section 373.414, incorporating rule 62.340.200 of the FloridaAdministrative Code, defines wetlands beginning with the same operational sentence as
the Corps' definition:' 0 9 "those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface water or ground water at a frequency and a duration sufficient to
support, and under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soils.""10 Florida's rule
further defines wetlands:
Soils present in wetlands generally are classified as hydric or alluvial, or possess characteristics that are associated with reducing
soil conditions. The prevalent vegetation in wetlands generally
consists of facultative or obligate hydrophytic macrophytes that are
typically adapted to areas having soil conditions described above.
These species, due to morphological, physiological, or reproductive adaptations, have the ability to grow, reproduce or persist in
aquatic environments or anaerobic soil conditions. Florida wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bayheads, bogs, cypress
domes and strands, sloughs, wet prairies, riverine swamps and
marshes, hydric seepage slopes, tidal marshes, mangrove swamps,
and other similar areas. Florida wetlands generally do not include
longleaf or slash pine flatwoods with an understory dominated by
straw palmetto.'
The statutory definition employed under section 373.414 is thus2 unique to
Florida's local characteristics and inclusive of isolated wetlands."
Rule 62.340.300 of the Florida Administrative Code provides the
methodology that must be used by all levels of government in the state to

107. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.4145, .414.
108. Id. § 373.414.
109. U.S ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CORPS OF ENGNEERS WETLAND DELINEATION
MANUAL 13 (1987), at www.say.usace.army.mil/permit/87 manual.pdf [hereinafter MANUAL].

110. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62.340.200(19) (2000) (codified at FLA. STAT.

§ 373.421 (2000)).
111.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62.340.200(19)

(codified at FLA.

STAT.

§ 373.019(17)

(2000)).
112. Id.
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11 3
delineate the landward extent of an area that meets the statutory definition.
It mandates that the regulating agency use "reasonable scientific judgment"
to delineate the area first "visually by on site inspection, or aerial photointerpretation in combination with ground truthing" in accordance with the
statutory definition. 1 14 If this is impossible, four other methods are presented
that base delineation on factors including the type of plants present, the
characteristics of the soil, and/or hydrologic indicators.!15 Structurally,
Florida's methodology considerably differs from the federal methodology,
16
particularly in terms of hydric soil indicators and plant classifications.
Though the federal delineation methodology encompasses a broader area
than Florida's, there are other provisions within the state methodology to
compensate and the scope is accordingly similar in practice. 7
Once wetlands are defined and delineated under section 373.414, the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection in cooperation with four of
the five state water management districts is authorized to administer the ERP
program." 8 The ERP program provides a consistent permitting approach
throughout most of the state, and allows a single application to be filed when
requesting state and federal permits. 119 ERPs are only granted when there
are reasonable assurances that state water quality standards will not be
violated and that the activity is not "contrary to the public interest."' 2°
In determining whether an activity is contrary to the public interest, the
statute directs the Department of Environmental Protection and the water
management districts to consider the impact on public health, safety, or
welfare, whether it will adversely affect the conservation of fish and
wildlife, including threatened or endangered species and their habitats,

113. FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 62.340.300 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.421(1)
(2000)). Changes cannot be made to the wetlands delineation rule without legislative
approval. FLA. STAT. § 373.421.
114. FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 62.340.300(1).
115. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62.340.300 (2)-(4).
116. Memorandum from the Wetlands Delineation Section, Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Resolution
of Differences Between the Florida and Federal Wetland Delineation Methodologies, 1
(1997) [hereinafter Resolution].
117. Id. at 2.
118. OVERvIEw, supra note 102. Responsibilities are divided based on the type of
activity being regulated. Fumero, supra note 94, at 93. The Department is responsible for
permitting most industrial activities and the water management districts are responsible for
most residential, agricultural, and commercial projects. Id. at93-95.
119. FLA. STAT. §373.4211(1) (2000).
120. § 373.414(1).
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navigation, fishing, recreational values or marine productivity in the
vicinity. 12' The statute specifically requires the responsible entities to
consider the "cumulative impacts upon surface waters and wetlands,"
thereby allowing consideration of additional projects that may be reasonably
anticipated to follow. 122 Upon determining that an activity is contrary to the
public interest, the Department or district must consider and assess
mitigation measures based on the "quality of the wetland to be impacted and
the type of mitigation proposed."' 23 If measures designed to restore, create,
or enhance the wetlands are unable to compensate for the adverse affects, the
permit will be denied. 12
Section 373.414 of the FloridaStatutes allows the governing board of a
water management district or the Department of Environmental Protection to
establish by rule additional permitting criteria for isolated wetlands in two
instances.125 First, the size threshold to be considered for permitting may be
limited "based on biological and hydrological evidence that shows the fish
and wildlife values of such areas to be minimal." 1 Second, criteria may be
established for the "protection of threatened and endangered species in
isolated wetlands regardless of size and land use."' 27
The ERP plan does not extend to certain activities grandfathered under
section 373.414 of the FloridaStatutes,1s or to lands within the geographical jurisdiction of the Northwest Florida Water Management District. 129
Section 373.4145 exempts these lands from the ERP program and regulates
them under separate, looser guidelines that do not protect isolated wetlands. 30 In these lands, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection
is authorized under rule 62.312.010 of the FloridaAdministrative Code to
issue permits for "dredging and filling conducted in, on, or over the surface
waters of the state" as defined in rule 62.312.030 of the code.13 ' Rule
612.312.030 defines "surface waters of the state" as those "which connect
121. § 373.414(1)(a)(1)-(4).
122. § 373.414(8)(a).
123. § 373.414(6)(d)2.
124. § 373.414.
125. § 373.414(2).
126. § 373.414(2)(a).
127. § 373.414(2)(b).
128. § 373.414(11)-(16).
129. § 373.4145.
130. § 373.4145. The exemption results from financial constraints placed on the
Northwest Florida Water Management District under the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST.
art VII, § 9(b). See discussion infra Part III.D.
131. Id. § 373.4145(1)(b).
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directly or via an excavated water body or series of water bodies" to waters
specifically named.1 32 Wetlands are thus only protected if they are
connected to a "named" water.133 "Isolated" wetlands are excluded because
by definition they lack a surface water connection.
C. The Ripples of SWANCC: The Impact on Florida
Though Florida generally affords isolated wetlands substantial
protection, the state will still feel the environmental and economic impact of
the SWANCC decision. Florida law is fragmented; strong throughout most of
the state, yet virtually nonexistent in the Panhandle.1 34 Throughout most of
Florida, the critical functions provided by isolated wetlands are well
preserved under section 373.414 of the FloridaStatutes.1 35 Though the ERP
program operates independently of the Corps and employs a different
delineation methodology, it is very comparable in scope to the federal program. 136 The gap is not completely filled; the statute provides exemptions
for grandfathered activities and allows the water management districts to
determine the size of isolated wetlands that will not be subject to permitting. 137 But the SWANCC decision ought to have limited economic and
environmental impact where the ERP program exists.
In contrast, the SWANCC decision will certainly impact the preservation
of isolated wetlands in Northwestern Florida. Prior to SWANCC, the state
relied on the Corps' authority under section 404(a)(3) of the Clean Water
Act to protect isolated wetlands located within the jurisdiction of the
Northwest Florida Water Management District.1 38 In the aftermath of
SWANCC, thousands of acres of Florida wetlands have become open to
development in the Panhandle. 3 9 The implications are already being felt as
developers are discarding mitigation proposals and redrafting plans to
include isolated wetlands.
In the long run, this will impair the vital water
132. The "named waters" include the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, bays, and
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62.312.030(2).
133. Id.
134. Panhandle,supra note 101, at 1.
135. FLA. STAT. § 373.414.
136. Resolution, supra note 116, at 2; OVERVIEw, supra note 102, at 4.
137. § 373.414(11)-(17); see Fumero, supra note 94, at 87 n.52 (providing a detailed

natural channels and tributaries thereto. FLA.

explanation of exempted activities).

138. Panhandle,supra note 101, at 1.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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quality protection, flood control, and habitat functions isolated wetlands
provide.
The Corps will retain jurisdiction over some of Florida's isolated
wetlands on a case by case basis if a clear and direct connection to interstate
commerce can be found; the Corps is currently exploring the connection of
beavers trapped in isolated wetlands to beaver pelt trading across state
lines.142 But uncertain whether the courts will uphold such interstate
connections, the Corps is proceeding with caution.143 The legal questions
left unanswered in the SWANCC decision have resulted in confusion and
uncertainty throughout the state.1
Florida's experience confirms that the Court's decision has created a
gap in the protection of isolated wetlands. The SWANCC decision not only
adversely affects Florida's environment, but impacts the state's economy as
well. In order to regulate isolated wetlands once under federal jurisdiction,
the state must assume financial and administrative responsibility. 14 It could
also open Florida to more court judgments since the state, rather than the
Corps would be the primary permitting authority. 146 In the absence of state
isolated waters may be completely unprotected
action, some of Florida's
47
following the decision.1
D. Bridging the Gap: Florida'sOptions
Florida law illustrates that the state is capable of protecting its
wetlands. Florida's experience in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's
decision exposes the obstacles the state confronts in attempting to bridge the
SWANCC gap. Although Florida has numerous options in the aftermath of
the decision, the state is constrained by political and economic realities.
At one extreme, Florida can do nothing at the state level. This would
leave the regulation of isolated wetlands to county and local entities.
Officials in Escambia County are already exploring whether to tighten their
141. Kusler, supra note 12, at 15.
142. Panhandle,supra note 101, at 2.
143. Id.
144. In Florida, Army Corps engineers have assigned the term "SWANCCing it" to
cases that are being re-evaluated as a result of the Court's decision. Telephone Interview with
Bryce McCoy, West Palm Beach Office, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (July 8, 2001). The
Corps is proceeding with caution in Florida. Id. The SWANCC decision has complicated the
Corps' mission; now additional research is needed to prove jurisdiction. Id.
145. See Kusler, supra note 12, at 15.
146. See id.
147. See id.
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own regulations to exert some control over their formerly protected lands. 148
Northwest Florida's local governments might begin to bridge the SWANCC
gap, but regulations will likely differ throughout the Panhandle. 49 This, in
turn, will create complexity in the state's regulation of isolated wetlands and
uncertainty for developers. 5 0
At the other extreme, Florida can enact substantial legislation to bridge
the judicially created gap. In theory, this could be accomplished by the
inclusion of the Northwest Florida Water Management District in the ERP
program. In practice, the economic and political obstacles may be insurmountable. The Northwest Florida Water Management District was
exempted from the ERP program for financial reasons and extending the
ERP program to the Panhandle would cost an estimated three million dollars
annually.15 1 The water management districts fund the ERP program through
property taxes.152 Tax caps for the districts, though, are constitutionally
mandated. 53 The four other districts can assess-taxes at a rate of up to one
dollar per $1000 of taxable property value.15 4 The Northwest Florida Water
Management District is limited under the Florida Constitution to a property
tax rate of five cents per $1000 of taxable property.1 55 Last year, the Florida
Legislature refused to put a proposed amendment on the ballot that would
cap.' 56
have increased the Northwest Florida Water Management District's
At least in the short term, extension of the ERP program is not a realistic
option.
Florida can also chart middle ground and regulate development of
isolated wetlands under the Northwest Florida Water Management District's
jurisdiction, but to a lesser extent than the ERP program would. This might
57
be possible by revising water policy, flood control, or land use statutes.
Even if the required expenditures are lower than would be needed to extend
the ERP program to the Panhandle, Florida would still have to enact new

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Panhandle,supra note 101, at 1.
See Kusler, supra note 12, at 15 (discussing the implications for states generally).
Id.
Panhandle,supra note 101, at 1. See discussion infra Part III.A.
Id. at 2.

153. FtLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b).

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Panhandle,supra note 101, at 2.
157. Jon Kusler, Model State Wetland Statute to Close the Gap Created by SWANNC,
(Ass'n of State Wetland Managers, Berne, N.Y.), Feb. 22, 2001, at http://www.aswm.orgt
index. htm.
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legislation and commit funds to administer the new policy. 5 8 Moreover,
charting middle ground would not completely fill the SWANCC gap.
Florida can also pursue state assumption of the federal permitting
program under the Clean Water Act.15 9 Section 404(g) of the Act allows the
governor of a state to apply for assumption of the permitting program for the
discharge of dredged or fill materials into navigable waters, other than
traditionally navigable waters and their adjacent wetlands. 16° Upon acceptance by the Environmental Protection Agency, the state plan replaces the
Corp's permitting program, rather than supplementing it.' 1 State assumption would allow Florida to administer the federal permitting program over
intrastate isolated wetlands that have a substantial connection to interstate
commerce.162 The benefit is in the interpretation; the Corp's Wetland
Delineation states "determination that a water body or wetland is subject to
interstate commerce and is therefore a water of the United States shall be
made independently of procedures described in this manual." ' Florida
16
could choose to interpret and administer the Court's decision narrowly.
Florida's prospects for assumption, however, are diminished by past
experience. The state attempted to assume administration under section
404(g) in 1997, and the request was denied because Florida's delineation
methodology differs from the Corps. 16s The designation of slash pine as an
upland plant, rather than a facultative one, posed the most significant
problem.16
Recognizing that slash pine is in fact a facultative plant,
Florida's methodology provides mechanisms to identify areas as wetlands
even when dominated by slash pine, but the designation still precluded
assumption. 67 Since Florida cannot change its methodology without legisla-

158. Id. at 2.
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1).

160. § 1344(g)(1). Only two states, Michigan and New Jersey, have assumed federal
permitting under 404(g). Brief for the Federal Respondents at 19, SWANCC, 121 S. Ct. 675
(2001) (No. 99-1178), 2000 WL 1369439.

161. § 1344(g)(1).
162. Id.
163. MANUA , supra note 109, at 13.
164. See Funk, supra note 10, at 50 (suggesting the interstate commerce link with
fishing is less attenuated than with migratory birds); see discussion infra Part I.B.

165. Letter from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection to Carol
Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (Sept. 17, 1997) [hereinafter
Letter].

166. Id.
167. Id.
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tive approval168 and the designation of slash pine as upland was due to
timber industry lobbying, effectuating change will likely prove difficult, 69
There is also the risk that opening the methodology to legislative debate
results in looser
regulation, especially in light of the state's conservative
170
government.
Finally, Florida may be able to partially bridge the gap by urging the
Corps to chart new legal ground. The SWANCC decision fails to distinguish
the reasons why intrastate isolated waters are in fact isolated t71 The Court
finds that Congress never intended the Clean Water Act to reach isolated
ponds in Illinois that were created as a result of mining, yet fails to consider
that not all isolated waters were created where waters did not originally and
naturally exist. 172 Unlike the ponds in Illinois that eventually developed a
natural character, 173 many of Florida's isolated wetlands were isolated by
development, not created by it.' 74 Florida could argue that this is a
distinction with a significant difference; artificially isolated wetlands may
have once been navigable in fact. The state could encourage the Corps to
assert broader jurisdiction under section 404(a)(1). Charting new ground,
though, takes time and its success is ultimately dependent upon administrative and judicial interpretation.
Economic and political realities make it difficult for Florida to
completely bridge the isolated wetlands gap created by the SWANCC
decision. Since Florida's current government is unlikely to extend itself to
protect the environment, the gap is likely to remain unfilled in the short
term. 75 In the interim, many of Florida's isolated wetlands have become
open to development. 176 Only time will reveal the SWANCC decision's full
impact on Florida's environment and water supply.

168. FA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 62.340.300 (2000).
169. Telephone Interview with John Toby, Wetlands Delineation Section, Florida

Department of Environmental Protection (July 8, 2001).
170. Id.
171. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 179 (2001).

172. Id. at 171.
173. Id. at 163.
174. Panhandle,supra note 101, at 2.
175. Telephone Interview with John Toby, Wetlands Delineation Section, Florida
Department of Environmental Protection (July 8, 2001).
176. See Panhandle,supra note 101, at 1.
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E. Making Waves: The Court's "Isolated" Decision
The fragmentation in Florida law renders SWANCC's impact on the
state a microcosm of the decision's impact on the nation as a whole.
Florida's experience suggests that states will not completely bridge the
SWANCC gap, leaving the vital functions of isolated wetlands unprotected.
Since the Court's holding has created a gap that has severe consequences for
the nation's water supply and environment,
the decision is itself "isolated"
177
from the goals of the Clean Water Act.
Florida law demonstrates that a state will only afford strong protection
to the functions of its isolated wetlands where it is in the state's individual
interest to do so. 178 Where Florida has a strong economic incentive to
protect its isolated waters, the state has generally enacted strong and
comprehensive legislation to protect its wetlands. 179 But in the Panhandle,
where the Everglades are distant and the economic incentive is lacking,
Florida neglects to protect its isolated wetlands from development on a
statewide basis.
Florida's experience thereby exposes the need for comprehensive,
federal regulation in order to effectuate the goals of the Clean Water Act.
Florida has a particularly strong incentive to protect its isolated wetlands.
But the state's interest may be as unique as the Everglades.18° Absent such
interest, most states are faced with the economic and political realities that
Florida confronts in the Panhandle. If a state determines that the benefits of
development outweigh the associated environmental costs, Florida's
experience suggests that the functions of isolated wetlands are unlikely to
receive strong protection under state law.
While the benefits of dredging and filling
in isolated wetlands are local,
81
the burdens do not respect state boundaries.'
The harm from wetland development is cumulative, not individual.
. [A] state's perspective ... might differ from that of other states,
or the national interest .... Nearly every contested federal wetlands permit decision-and they are numerous-is one that, by
federal regulation, already received all necessary state approvals. If
177.
178.
179.
180.
resources).
181.

See Likens Brief, supra note 11, at 9-10.
See discussion infra Part III.A-C.
Id.
See Fumero, supra note 94, at 78 (noting the uniqueness of Florida's natural
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 195; ED Brief, supra note 3, at 15.
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the interests of receiving states-of ,downstream and downflight
Americans-are going to be represented, those interests must be
182
protected by more than an agency of a state ....

Since water moves in hydrologic cycles, pollution must be controlled at the
source.13 Florida's experience implies, that many states will lack the

incentive to control water pollution at the source. Since the impacts of
development on the hydrologic and biological functions of "isolated"
wetlands reach beyond state lines, water quality, flooding, erosion, and
habitats in other states may be adversely affected.'8 Water pollution is a

national problem that has "substantial, cumulative impacts on interstate
commerce... requir[ing] a uniform, nationwide solution. ' 185 Unless, the
critical functions of isolated wetlands are protected at the national level,6 the
Clean Water Act's ability to protect the nation's waters is undermined.1
Finally, the decision's impact on Florida illustrates that the Court's
federalism concerns are unwarranted.1 87 Though in theory the Court's

decision supports state rights, 188 in practice it has complicated Florida's

ability to protect its wetlands and water quality. 189 Florida has economically

and environmentally benefited from the Corp's authority over its intrastate
isolated wetlands. 19° In Northwest Florida, the state has relied on the Corps
182. ED Brief, supra note 3, at 19.
183. Id. at 15; Likens Brief, supranote ll, at 10.
184. ED Brief, supra note 3, at 15.
185. Id. at 12.
186. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 175 (2001) (Stevens. J., dissenting); Brief of Amici
Curiae Cal. et al. at 12, SWANCC, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178), 2000 WL 1369438
[hereinafter Cal. Brief].
187. The dissent counters the Court's federalism concerns by arguing that the Clean
Water Act regulates the environment, not zoning and land use. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 191.
Environmental regulation "does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only that,
however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits." Id.
(quoting Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987)). Furthermore,
federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act is not limitless; exceptions are provided in the
Act itself and states can assume administration of the federal program. ED Brief, supra note 3,
at 27.
188. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
189. Environmental Defense Criticizes Supreme Court Ruling, NEWS RELEASE (Envtl.
Defense, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 9, 2001, at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/pubs/
NewReleases/2001/Jan/_courtruling.html.
190. The states of California, Iowa, Maine, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont,
and Washington submitted a joint brief on behalf of the respondents arguing that states benefit
from the national approach. Cal. Brief, supra note 186, at 12. These states do not believe that
section 404 interferes with traditional state powers over zoning and land use. Id. at 14.
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to protect the functions of its isolated wetlands that would otherwise be
adversely impacted by dredging and filling. Now Florida must commit funds
and enact legislation to fill the SWANCC gap or risk the environmental
consequences. Since Florida law does substantially close the SWANCC gap,
the economic and environmental consequences of the decision will be even
more severe for the majority of states that currently have looser regulations.' 9' Florida's experience demonstrates that the Court's
decision is
92
"isolated" from the actual functioning of the Clean Water Act.1
IV. CONCLUSION
Florida's experience in the aftermath of SWANCC echoes the dissent's
pronouncement that the Court's reasoning "does violence to the scheme
Congress chose to put in place.' 93 Congress intended the Clean Water Act
to "be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation" in order to
protect the nation's water quality and environment.' 94 The SWANCC
decision has created a gap in the protection of isolated wetlands that
Florida's experience intimates many states will be unable to fill, leaving the
water filtration, flood control, and habitat functions served by isolated
wetlands unprotected. The fragmentation in Florida wetlands law exposes
the need for uniform, federal regulation of the nation's waters if the goals of
the Clean Water Act are to be accomplished.
In a well-reasoned dissent, Justice Stevens demonstrates that Congress
intended to afford comprehensive, long-range protection for our nation's
waters. 195 Thoroughly examining the Clean Water Act's mandate, legislative
intent, and the Court's rational in Riverside Bayview, the dissent concludes
that waters need not be actually or potentially navigable to fall within the
scope of the Act. 196 Florida's experience illuminates the practical wisdom of
the dissent's reasoning.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. See discussion supra Part III.B.
See Cal. Brief, supra note 186, at 12.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 191.
Id. at 181 (citing S. Conf. Rep. No 92-1236, p. 144 (1972), reprinted in 1 Leg.

Hist. 327).
195. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer
inthe dissent. Id. at 174.
196. The dissent makes three interrelated arguments: First, the Clean Water Act is
designed to control water pollution, not navigability. Id. at 174-83. Second, isolated
wetlands provide the same functions as adjacent wetlands and thus fall within the scope of the
Riverside Bayview decision. Id. at 183-86. Third, there is a need for national regulation and
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The Clean Water Act's stated purpose is to "restore and maintain
197 the
By
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation'swaters."
definition, the Act extends its reach to all "waters of the United States."'
Since the impact of water pollution does not depend upon whether the waters
affected are navigable, the goals of the Act cannot be achieved if its scope is
based solely on navigability. 199 "Navigable waters" in the statute must mean
those "waters over which federal authority may properly be asserted" in
order to achieve the Act's goals.2 °
By voicing its constitutional concerns and suggesting that the interstate
connection in SWANCC is insufficient, the Court has unnecessarily created
uncertainty in Florida and around the nation over the scope of federal
permitting authority under section 404(a). There is independent, authority
under the Commerce Clause, apart from navigability, to regulate intrastate
isolated waters that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce; the
power to regulate commerce includes the power to protect the natural
resources that generate the commerce. 1 It remains to be seen whether
Congress or the states will be able to formulate an improved plan to protect
the nation's waters.20
DebraAlise Spungin

authority under the Commerce Clause for such regulation independent of navigability.
SWANCC. 121 S.Ct. at 186-88.

197.
198.
199.
200.

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
§ 1362(7).
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 188.
Id.at 182, 189.

201. Id. at 196 (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)

(holding water to be an "article of commerce")). The dissent argues that the Clean Water Act
regulates dredging and filling, almost always an economic activity, and finds the "causal
connection between the filling of wetlands and the decline of commercial activities associated
with migratory birds" is direct enough to render the Migratory Bird Rule within the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Id.
202. In his final words at oral argument,. the Agency's counsel suggested that if the
court decides the case on statutory grounds, it ought to consider whether Congress could come

back with another plan to protect the nation's waters. Petitioner's Rebuttal at Oral Argument
at 23, SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178), 2000 WL 169870.
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